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Abstract 
 
The Australian treasurers: managers and 
reformers in an evolving role 
John Hawkins 
Supervisory panel: John Wanna (chair), Selwyn Cornish, Paul ‘t Hart 
 
If the prime minister is ‘first among equals’, then arguably the treasurer is now ‘second 
among equals’. And the treasurer is increasingly the minister most likely to later become 
prime minister. Yet there is no collective biography of the 39 Australian federal 
treasurers, such as the volume edited by Michelle Grattan on Australian prime ministers 
or that by Roy Jenkins on British chancellors. Nor is there a book analysing the office 
itself. This thesis fills that gap. 
Inspired by Plutarch’s Parallel Lives, chapters Four to Seven compare and contrast four 
pairs of contemporary treasurers with similar backgrounds but divergent careers. As the 
academic literature on political leadership boils down to distinguishing two essential 
types -- managers and reformers -- the pairs contain one of each. Bookending these core 
chapters are introductory chapters, providing context, and analytical chapters, drawing 
lessons from the eight lives studied in depth and the other treasurers. In this way, the 
thesis is a comparative biography but also a work of political history with implications 
for political science.  
The treasurer’s job has changed greatly over time, although some initial responsibilities 
persist. The thesis traces the development, identifying six eras. Initially the treasurer 
presided over a book-keeping department, reflecting the Gladstonian tradition of fiscal 
conservatism. This ended with the Great Depression and the Premiers’ Plan saw a second 
era where the federal government attempted to regain macroeconomic stability. The 
White Paper on Full Employment ushered in a third, Keynesian, era which lasted until the 
mid-1970s oil shocks and subsequent stagflation. A short-lived fourth era of monetarism 
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was followed by the fifth era of economic rationalism. The global financial crisis may 
have seen a shift to a sixth ‘new Keynesian’ era.  
This analysis of eras is brought together with the distinction between managers and 
reformers by adapting Skowronek’s model of ‘political time’ whereby major reformers 
overthrow the old paradigm, fortunate managers then operate it and unfortunate managers 
preside over its collapse.  
The main argument of this thesis is that good treasurers need to be effective and influential 
and many factors produce these qualities. The job is onerous and complex and what 
counts as success may be unclear at the time. Treasurers (like prime ministers) need a 
measure of luck. But three key features stand out as crucial.   
First, an effective treasurer needs immense political skills and the support of his/her prime 
minister. The combinations of Curtin/Chifley and Hawke/Keating, and to a lesser extent 
Bruce/Page, were particularly productive of economic reform. The second crucial 
relationship is with their department, where treasurers need to harness the technical 
expertise of its senior officials who may lack political acumen. Successful treasurers build 
an effective relationship to both develop and accomplish the treasurer’s agenda. The third 
key element is a matter of timing. Some treasurers such as Theodore and Swan are faced 
with downturns in the global economy making their job much more difficult. Some 
treasurers, however, have turned adversity into opportunity and enhanced their 
reputations in crises – Chifley, and perhaps Keating.   
  
 v 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to thank the members of my supervisory panel; John Wanna, Paul ‘t Hart and 
Tim Rowse, who all took turns as panel chair, and Selwyn Cornish who was a panel 
member all the way through. All gave me many helpful comments and guidance and were 
very patient with the delays caused by long working hours, an accident which rendered 
me unable to type or write for some months and family illnesses. Three anonymous 
examiners provided constructive suggestions for improvements to the originally 
submitted version. 
Thanks also to John for providing me with a pleasant office in ANZSOG at ANU. Ram 
Ghimire, with whom I shared the office, was good company at all hours of the day (and 
evening) and all days of the week. I also thank Andrew Podger, Claire Dixon and my 
fellow PhD students for their company and stimulating conversation in the ‘ANZSOG 
corridor’. 
I first started writing about treasurers while working in the Department of the Treasury 
(four treasurers ago!) and I thank my then bosses David Gruen and Steve Kennedy for 
their encouragement.1 
I benefited greatly from many stimulating discussions on Australian economic history 
and policy over lunches with Selwyn Cornish and useful discussions and emails from the 
late Eileen Clendinning on her recollections of working for Ben Chifley, Paul Burton on 
the work of Plutarch, the late Brendan Lyons on his father Joseph Lyons, David Moore 
on Ted Theodore’s involvement with the Mungana scandal, the archivists at King’s 
College Cambridge on Keynes’ correspondence, and the staff at the Chifley Home and 
Education Centre in Bathurst. 
The research was made easier by the assistance provided by staff in a number of libraries 
I used. My main home away from home was the General Reading and Manuscripts rooms 
at the National Library of Australia, but I am also grateful to the Baillieu Library at the 
University of Melbourne, Chifley Library at the Australian National University, the Fryer 
Library at the University of Queensland, the Mitchell Library at the State Library of 
NSW, the National Archives, the Parliamentary Library, the Reserve Bank archives, the 
State Library of Victoria and the Treasury Library. 
I also express my gratitude for the love of my wife Elo Guo-Hawkins and my mother 
Hazel Hawkins.  
 
                                                          
1 Early versions of what is now chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the thesis were published in Treasury’s Economic 
Roundup; Hawkins (2008, 2009, 2010b, 2010c, 2011a, 2011b). 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
Contents 
1. Applying Plutarch’s ‘parallel lives’ approach to biography to Australian   
treasurers..........................................................................................................................1 
2. A review of the literature on treasurers – explaining their performance                    
and success…………………………………………………………………….………16 
3. The job of Australian treasurer………………………………………….…………..33 
4. Andrew Fisher and Joseph Cook: the miners who became treasurers….……..……56 
5. Edward (Ted) Theodore and Joseph Lyons: provincial premiers turned          
depression treasurers………………………….…………………………..…..……….94 
6. Ben Chifley and Arthur Fadden: long-serving treasurers in a period                           
of transition………………………………………………………………....………..136 
7. Paul Keating and John Howard: young treasurers from the                                         
Sydney suburbs…………………………………………………..…………..………179 
8. The Australian treasurers as a class……………………………………….……....238 
9. The Treasury and its relations with treasurers………………….….….…………..250 
10. Analysing the job of Australian treasurer……………..…………………………286 
11. Conclusions on what makes a successful treasurer…………..………...………..302 
 
 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms………………………..………………………306 
Dramatis personae……………………………………………………..…………….307 
Bibliography……………………………………………………..…………………..322 
  
 1 
 
Chapter One: Applying Plutarch’s “parallel lives” 
approach to biography to Australian treasurers 
 
Introduction 
Australia’s treasurers occupy a very important position in Australian politics, arguably 
second only to that of the prime minister. Many prime ministers lost office primarily 
because of a loss of public confidence in their governments’ ability to manage the 
economy (Bruce, Scullin, Whitlam2 and Fraser). In forming public perceptions of 
governments’ economic competence, the role of treasurers has been crucial. 
Yet despite their importance, relatively little has been written about the treasurers and the 
role they play. In Australia there is no collective biography of all the 39 federal treasurers, 
such as the volume edited by Michelle Grattan on Australian prime ministers3 or that by 
Roy Jenkins on British chancellors of the exchequer.4 Until Chris Bowen’s (2015) volume 
on twelve notable treasurers, there was no book even about some of the treasurers. Nor is 
there a book about the office itself, such as that by Patrick Weller (1985) on prime 
ministers in Commonwealth countries or by Richard Holt (2001) on UK chancellors. 
There is also no substantive academic comparison of their performance, such as Paul 
Strangio (2013) has done for prime ministers. The Treasury put out an anecdotal booklet 
to mark its centenary but there is no substantive volume about the Australian Treasury 
such as Bridges (1966) for the United Kingdom Treasury, McKinnon (2003) for the New 
Zealand Treasury, Weller, Scott and Stevens (2011) for the Australian Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet or Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001) for the Australian National 
Audit Office.5 The closest works are arguably Whitwell (1986) on the ‘Treasury line’, 
                                                          
2 Technically Whitlam was majority leader but not prime minister at the 1975 election, having been 
dismissed the previous month by the governor-general. 
3 Grattan (2013). Other collected essays on Australian prime ministers include Whitington (1972) which 
has essays on the main prime ministers up to McMahon (and the then potential prime minister Whitlam); 
Hughes (1976) which goes a little further; and Brown (2002) covering PMs from Menzies to Howard. There 
is even a volume of collective biography of their wives; Langmore (1992). Walter (2007, p 413) has 
described collective biographies as an ‘Australian predilection’. 
4 Jenkins (1998) covered chancellors from 1886 to 1947. Edmund Dell (1996) and Howard Davies (2006) 
relate the story of chancellors whose terms were later than those covered by Jenkins. 
5 The other major institution involved in Australian economic policy, the central bank known as the 
Commonwealth/Reserve Bank, has been the subject of a series of detailed studies. Gollan (1968) covered 
its origins and history up to 1924. Giblin (1951) describes its growth as a central bank from 1924 to 1945. 
Butlin’s (1983) untimely death limited his coverage of the period 1945-1959 but Schedvin (1992) covers 
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Weller (2007b) on the cabinet and Weller and Grattan (1981) and Tiernan and Weller 
(2010) on ministers.  
Globally, much has been written about prime ministers; as biographies, as histories and 
as a sub-genre of books on leadership. Hennessey’s (2000) analysis of the British prime 
ministership is a good example. There has been relatively little written about treasurers 
(or finance ministers as they are generally called overseas) - or other senior ministers for 
that matter. Arguably the main academic scholar that has done comparative studies on the 
topic, Jean Blondel (1985, p vii) argued three decades ago that ‘there are scarcely any 
references to articles on ministers before the 1970s and even since that date…the harvest 
has been meagre’. As discussed more fully in Chapter 2, subsequent work has not added 
much analytical insight, mostly just finding synonyms for ‘managers/administrators’ and 
‘reformers’, subjectively allocating ministers between them and, with some exceptions, 
having little to say about what leads to them choosing between the two roles and what 
determines whether they succeed in these roles.   
This thesis traces the development of the ministerial role of the treasurer, from initially 
an arms-length supervisor of a department of bookkeepers or accountants, to an activist 
manager of the macroeconomy in a Keynesian framework, and then to the provider of a 
stable and sustainable economic background and advocate of microeconomic reform. It 
discusses what leads to a treasurer being regarded as successful. It does so by presenting 
in the core of the thesis, comprising chapters four to seven, a set of comparative 
biographies, organised into four pairs of roughly contemporary treasurers with similar 
backgrounds whose careers can be usefully compared and contrasted.  
It is the contention of this thesis that the eight chosen treasurers encompass four key 
economic and political periods throughout the 20th century; the pre-WWI beginnings, the 
great depression, WWII and the post-war boom, and the era of economic liberalisation in 
the 1980s. The eight chosen encompass, arguably, the most important of Australia’s 
treasurers -- some widely regarded as ‘great’ treasurers and often considered important 
actors in their era in politics. Five of the eight treasurers (chronologically the latter five) 
                                                          
the period 1945-1975 and Cornish (forthcoming) will take the story up to 2000. Cornish (2010) provides 
an overview of the entire history. 
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selected in this thesis were also independently chosen by Bowen (2015) as being among 
the dozen more ‘notable’ treasurers. 
Each pair includes a Labor and non-Labor treasurer, and a successful reformer with either 
a frustrated reformer or one content to be an administrator. Each treasurer is paired with 
another who lived in similar times and had a similar background. This approach of 
comparative collective biography was in part inspired by the classic comparative 
biographical study, Plutarch’s Lives. 
Plutarch’s Lives 
Plutarch was born around 45-50 in Bœotia and studied in Athens under the philosopher 
Ammonius. He travelled to Egypt, Crete and Italy but spent most of his life in the Greek 
world, then part of the Roman Empire at its height. He taught philosophy and served as a 
priest at Delphi. Married, with at least five children, he was a public official, serving as 
archon (leader) of the small town of Chæronea. He was a genial host of intellectual ‘table 
talks’.6 From ancient lists of Plutarch’s works, we know that not all of them now survive.7 
Plutarch lived to around the year 120 CE and the biographies, for which he is best 
remembered, are believed to date from the latter half of his life.8 
His Parallel Lives consisted of 23 paired biographical essays, each giving an account of 
one Greek and one Roman life, followed by a comparison (synkrisis) of them, and 
sometimes preceded by a prologue.9 The prologues tended to highlight similarities 
between the two lives and the synkrises highlighted differences.10 For example, the Greek 
statesman and general Pericles was compared with the Roman Fabius; ‘two lives rich in 
examples of both civil and military excellence’ and two men alike in their virtues 
including their mild temper and demeanour, Plutarch tells us. The Greek orator 
Demosthenes was paired with the Roman orator Cicero, and Alexander the Great with 
                                                          
6 Barrow (1967, pp 18-22), Beck (2014, p 2). Plutarch’s summaries of some of the discussions have been 
preserved. 
7 Sadly, his Lives of the Caesars, written before the Parallel Lives, is mostly lost; Stadter (2010, p 286). 
8 This paragraph draws on Beck (2014), Clough (1864, pp v-xvi) and Russell (1999). 
9 One pairing compares two Greeks with two Romans so that 48 worthies were covered in total, but one 
of the pairings has been lost. The prologues and the synkrises are discussed in detail in Duff (2014) and 
Larmour (2014) respectively. Wardman (1974, p 3) describes the synkrisis as an ‘integral part of Plutarchan 
biography’. Averintser (2002, p 26) argues that while earlier readers found the synkrises the most noble 
component of the lives, to modern taste they are pedantic. 
10 Geiger (1988, p 254), Larmour (2014, p 411), Pelling (1986, p 354), Stadter (1975, p 155) and Tatum 
(2010, pp 3, 9-12). 
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Julius Caesar. The ‘Lives’ varied from around 6,000 words for the more obscure Eumenes 
and Philopoemen to around 20,000 words for Alexander the Great, with the average a 
little over 10,000 words.11 Stadter (2010) argues that six of the pairs, including the late 
republican Roman lives, can be read as a group of twelve to give what he terms ‘parallels 
in three dimensions’. 
Plutarch was already an experienced biographer when he started writing the collection, 
and presumably set out his motivation for the study, and his reasons for adopting the 
pairing approach, in its introduction, now lost.12 It is generally agreed that his motivation 
was to analyse a ‘virtue’ that was common to both the paired lives, to educate and serve 
as an example to the reader.13 But, particularly in the synkrises, Plutarch also drew 
attention to the differences, although he kept the comparison objective and historical and 
generally avoided drawing conclusions on whom was the better man. It is likely that 
Plutarch believed that the comparisons between pairs with important similarities enriched 
the analysis of the individuals.14 He was less interested in stark contrasts between them. 
Pairing a Greek with a Roman in each case may have been intended to preserve the 
reputation of Greek leaders in a time of Roman domination. In only one case does 
Plutarch pair contemporaries.15 
Some scholars have opined that ‘the comparative method is essential to Plutarch’s 
technique’ and used throughout the essays.16 Plutarch himself explained ‘there is no better 
way of learning the similarity and difference…than by putting lives beside lives and deeds 
besides deeds, just as if they were works of art’.17 He adds in the opening paragraph of 
the life of Aemilius Paulus: 
                                                          
11 Stadter (2005, p 56). 
12 Barrow (1967, p 51), Hägg (2012, p 242), Tatum (2010, pp 1-2). 
13 Barrow (1967, pp 53-55), Duff (1999, pp 4-5, 13), Humble (2010, p 238), Podlecki (1987, p 21) and Tatum 
(2010, pp 2-3). Lee (2009, p 23) notes that in his essay on Pericles, Plutarch says ‘actions arising out of 
virtue...immediately put one in a frame of mind such that one simultaneously admires the acts and desires 
to emulate the agents’.  
14 Larmour (1992, p 4156) argues ‘no Life can be anywhere near fully understood without references to 
its partner’.  
15 Philopoeman and Flaminius; Pelling (1986, p 350). 
16 Stadter (1975, pp 155-6). Plutarch stresses the lives are βιοι παραλληλι (parallel lives). It is therefore 
unfortunate that the most accessible modern publications of Plutarch’s work, such as the Penguin Classics 
editions, separate the Greek and Roman lives. Ironically, in one of these split volumes, Duff (2011, p xviii) 
stresses that ‘the comparative element…is central to their meaning…to read one life without its 
partner…is to miss much that was of importance to Plutarch’.  
17 From Plutarch’s essay de mulierum virtutibus, cited by Stadter (1975, p 156). 
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I first set to work writing these lives for the sake of others, but 
their composition has proved so congenial that I now persist in it 
for my own improvement. I am using history as if it were a mirror, 
in the reflection of which I am trying to adorn my own life, so to 
speak, by making its virtues resemble the ones displayed in my 
biographies. For me the experience is very much like actually 
spending time with these figures from the past… 
Plutarch has been described as ‘the last of the Greek classical historians and the first of 
the modern biographers’.18 As Stadter (1996, p 238) argues, by the time Plutarch was 
writing, the Greek encomium and the Roman panegyric were both common literary forms 
but they shared the characteristic of being exclusively laudatory whereas Plutarch aimed 
to depict his subjects truthfully. In a much-cited prologue to the lives of Alexander and 
Caesar, Plutarch proclaimed: 
I am writing lives not history, and the truth is that the most 
brilliant exploits often tell us nothing of the virtues or vices of the 
men who performed them, while on the other hand a chance 
remark or a joke may reveal far more of a man’s character than 
battles where thousands die, huge troop deployments or the sieges 
of cities. When a portrait painter sets out to create a likeness he 
relies above all on the face and the expression of the eyes and 
pays little attention to the other parts of the body; in the same way 
it is my task to dwell upon those details which illuminate the 
workings of the soul… 
                                                          
18 Warner (1958, p xvi) and Ricketson (2004, p 4).  
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Plutarch was not the first biographer, or even the first comparative biographer,19 but he 
was certainly an influential one and arguably ‘the most important Greek biographer’.20  
Duff (1999, p 3) points out that the Lives ‘seem to have been an almost instant success’ 
and influenced Roman writers such as Appianus (who compared Demosthenes and 
Cicero, Alexander and Caeser, and Epaminondas and Scipio) and Amyntianus (who 
compared Dionysius with Domitian, and Philip of Macedon with Augustus).21 They were 
first translated into Latin in the fifteenth century, thence into Italian and Spanish, and into 
French and then English and German in the sixteenth.22 After these translations became 
available, it was held by a contemporary writer that the Lives was ‘more generally read 
than any of all the books which the ancient Greeks or Romans writ’.23 The mode of 
comparative lives also had a pedagogical role and was used for instruction and the 
development of scholarship.  
                                                          
19 Aristotle’s pupil Aristoxenus wrote Lives of Men (with subjects including Pythagoras, Socrates and Plato) 
and Hermippus, whom Plutarch cites, wrote biographies of lawgivers, orators, philosophers and 
physicians. Indeed, Geiger (1985, pp 18-19) suggests most ancient biographies were written as parts of 
series. The Roman writers Terentius Varro and Cornelius Nepos both wrote collections of biographical 
essays which foreshadowed Plutarch in comparing Roman and Greek notables (few of which survive); Duff 
(1999, p 290), Geiger (2014, p 293), Hägg (2012, pp 188-9), Lee (2009, p 22) Mossman (2007, pp 76-77), 
Podlecki (1987, pp 7-8), Scardigli (1995, p 21) and Stem (2012). Duff (1999, pp 243-4), Gossage (1967, 
p 60) and Russell (1973, p 110) discuss the role of comparisons in speeches (panegyric and encomia) 
praising living and dead leaders, the use of paired speeches and the use of comparisons as exercises for 
students. Barrow (1967, p 52) conjectures ‘what appears to be original is to undertake a whole series of 
such comparisons’.  
20 Pimlott (1999, p 35). Pimlott later (p 41) describes biography as ‘a genre that has kept its essential 
structure since Plutarch’. Similarly, Beck (2014, p 1) describes Plutarch as ‘generally considered to be the 
ancient world’s foremost biographer’ and Geiger (1985, p 9) calls the Lives ‘the finest achievement and 
model of the genre’. Hägg (2012, pp 280-1) writes ‘even if the parallel scheme as such had precedents, 
nobody had developed it with such perseverance into anything approaching the Parallel Lives in scale and 
power of attraction’. Walter (2014, p 314) calls him ‘the forerunner of Western biography’ and described 
the Lives as ‘an early disquisition on leadership’. 
21 Pade (2014, p 532). Lamberton (2001, p 68) opines ‘there is probably no single intellectual figure whose 
influence is found more pervasively in the literature of the Roman empire from the second century 
through the fifth’. 
22 Barrow (1967, p 162). 
23 Gilbert Burnet (1682). More recently the same claim is made by Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1926, p 47). 
Lamberton (2001, pp 23, 190) says of the Lives that ‘there can hardly have been a more influential account 
of Greece and Rome, before or since’ and that ‘only Aristotle and Plato, among writers of Greek prose, 
were better represented in the collections of manuscripts in the Italian libraries of the fifteenth century’. 
Gippert (2004, p 307) claims the Lives ‘were most widely celebrated throughout the eighteenth century 
as the ideal biographical model’. 
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Throughout history Plutarch was admired by writers as diverse as Machiavelli, Goethe, 
Rousseau, Shakespeare24, Stanfield25, Samuel Johnson and his biographer James Boswell, 
Vasari, Emerson and Nietzsche.26 Samuel Johnson considered translating the Lives and 
contemplated writing a work called Lives of Illustrious Persons...in Imitation of 
Plutarch.27 Boswell cites Plutarch, whom he calls ‘the prince of ancient biographers’, in 
justifying the inclusion of small incidents from Samuel Johnson’s life that shed light on 
his character.28 Plutarch inspired Shakespeare, the ‘American fathers of revolution’29, and 
‘French rebels and reactionaries’30 as well as other more recent biographers.31  
In Mary Shelley’s (1818) gothic tale, the being animated by Frankenstein taught himself 
about the goodness of humanity by reading Plutarch: 
Plutarch taught me high thoughts; he elevated me above the 
wretched sphere of my own reflections to admire and love the 
heroes of past ages…I felt the greatest ardour for virtue rise 
within me, and abhorrence for vice.32 
Plutarch’s reputation temporarily dimmed during the nineteenth century when there was 
a scholarly fad of trying to attribute Plutarch’s accounts to earlier authors but, as 
Lamberton (2001, pp 193-5) argues, the failure of these endeavours saw his reputation 
restored and he remains to modern tastes ‘the most enjoyable of all the ancient writers on 
the history of Greece and Rome’. A surge of interest in the late 1980s has seen Plutarch 
                                                          
24 Shakespeare used the lives of Coriolanus, Julius Caesar and Mark Antony for the plays that bear their 
names; Duff (1999, p 3). Gossage (1967, p 67) even suggests that Shakespeare satirised Plutarch in 
Henry V, act iv, scene 7, where Fluellen and Gower compare Henry and Alexander the Great.  
25 James Field Stanfield (1813, p 64), whom Lee (2009, p 55) calls the author of the first British book about 
biography, described Plutarch as ‘the great master of the art’ of biography. 
26 Beck (2014, p 1), Russell (1999, p 1201), Stadter (1992, p 1). Lamberton (2001, p 188) argues that 
Plutarch ‘has had a decisive impact on the European tradition’s perception of its Greek and Roman 
antecedents’. 
27 Gippert (2004, p 309). 
28 Boswell (1791, pp 11-12), Gossage (1967, p 70).  
29 Stadter (2011) refers to John Adams and Benjamin Franklin citing Plutarch and cites notes on the Lives 
written by Alexander Hamilton. 
30 Paige (1983, p 184). 
31 Lee (2009, p 32) tells how the publication of North’s translation of the Lives in 1579 energized 
biographical writing in England. This reputation has been sustained. James Stanfield’s 1813 book on 
biography lauds Plutarch as ‘the great master of the art’ while Nicolson (1954) calls him ‘the father of 
biography’. 
32 Shelley (1818, chapter 15). 
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become the classical ‘historian’ attracting the most scholarly attention, ahead of 
Herodotus and Tacitus.33  
Plutarch’s work still resonates as an exemplar both good and bad. Australian biographer, 
the late Geoffrey Bolton referred to ‘Plutarch’s ghost’; writing about past political figures 
as an implicit commentary, or rebuke, of their contemporary successors.34 William 
Coleman referred to what ‘might be called the Plutarchian theory of biography’, that is 
‘the delineation of some valuable individuality…that wins our sympathy or admiration’.35 
Plutarch has recently been cited by ‘t Hart (2014a, p 211) as the exemplar for writing of 
political leaders as heroes in history and his Lives lauded by Walter (2014, p 314) as ‘the 
forerunner of Western biography’. It has been observed in a recent survey of political 
biography that ‘there has been a recurrence of parallel lives, like Plutarch, trying to draw 
a lesson from comparison’.36 Australian cabinet minister Christopher Pyne (2015, p 1) 
has referred to Plutarch’s comment (in his life of Pericles), on how reading of the lives of 
others can lead to emulation of their virtues, in his account of his father’s influence on his 
own career. 
The Plutarchian genre: some other comparative biographies 
Plutarch has been an exemplar for a genre of biography. The long-standing success of his 
format, and its familiarity to many audiences, has led many other biographers to adapt it. 
An early example was Taylor (1846), who produced what he termed a British Plutarch, 
with 38 essays on worthies such as Burke, Cook, Pitt and Watt, but they were arranged 
alphabetically rather than paired. 
More recently there has been a revival of interest in comparative biographies which, 
judging by their titles, were inspired by Plutarch, covering Hitler and Stalin, Jesus and 
Mohammad, and Nehru and Mandela.37 A number of other works do not explicitly refer 
to Plutarch but follow similar lines. Wolfenstein (1967, p 3) gives a comparative 
psychobiography of Lenin, Trotsky and Gandhi analysing the ‘revolutionary personality’. 
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, two gifted and active presidents who 
                                                          
33 Scheidel (1997, pp 273-4). 
34 Bolton (2006, p 2). 
35 Coleman (2007, pp 104-5). 
36 Walter (2014, p 319). 
37 Bullock (1998), Peters (2011) and Maylam (2014). 
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emphasised communication to the public (the former coining the term ‘the bully pulpit’ 
for the presidency), were compared in a joint biography by Cooper (1983). William 
McAdoo, Wilson’s cabinet minister responsible for Treasury, was the subject of a 
comparative biography by Craig (2013), paired with his fellow cabinet member Newton 
Baker. Kowalewski (1981) compared the troubled presidencies of Andrew Johnson and 
Richard Nixon, arguing both of their difficulties can be traced back to similar issues in 
their childhood. Summy (1983) compares the visionary political leaders Jayaprakash 
Narayan of India and Thomas Jefferson of the US. Campbell (2009) looked at eight pairs 
of British political rivals; some from opposing parties such as Gladstone/Disraeli but 
others from the same party such as Thatcher/Heath and Blair/Brown, and observed that 
‘very often they are of contrasting temperaments – one cool and calculating, the other 
temperamental and impulsive; one ascetic, the other self-indulgent; one idealistic, the 
other cynical’.38 Wapshott (2011) compared the lives of rival economists Keynes and 
Hayek. Mary Wollstonecraft and her daughter Mary Shelley were the subject of a parallel 
lives study by Gordon (2015).39 
Closer to the nature of this thesis is the study by Duffy (2004), which provided a 
comparative biography of Mark Latham and Tony Abbott, whose paths first crossed as 
students at Sydney University before both entered federal parliament in 1994. Duffy 
(2004, pp 2-4) claimed both combined ‘leadership’ with ‘larrikinism’, both had ambitious 
parents and a distinguished political mentor and both were keen to project policies not 
always in line with the message of their parties; but they differed in their attitude to 
tradition and authority. 
Manning Clark (1987) used the early careers of Alfred Deakin and Robert Menzies to 
contrast what he termed ‘two Australias’; the ‘old dead tree’ of British tradition associated 
with Menzies and the ‘new tree green’ of the Australian nationalism of Deakin. Bennister 
(2012, p xi) compared John Howard and Tony Blair, prime ministers who, while from 
opposite ends of the world and opposite parts of the political spectrum, both centralised 
power in their office and attempted to establish direct connections with the electorate, and 
served around a decade as prime minister but lost office in 2007, with their popularity 
                                                          
38 Campbell (2009, p 2). 
39 Wollstonecraft died in giving birth to Shelley. Gordon (2015, p xvii) explains how chapters in the book 
‘alternate between the lives of Wollstonecraft and Shelley’ with the goal of ‘allowing readers to hear the 
echo’ and ‘exploring the intersections between their lives’. 
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and political capital eroded. Bob Ellis (1997b) and Paul ‘t Hart (2011b) went in another 
direction, comparing Howard to Richard Nixon, both with conservative upbringings, 
early political success followed by a seemingly terminal setback40 and, after a period in 
the wilderness, ultimate success at age 56, leading a secretive right-wing government, 
followed by a forced retirement. While his book was solely about Paul Keating, O’Brien 
(2015, p 48) observed that Keating and John Howard had what he terms ‘parallel lives’ 
and tried to draw Keating out on the similarities and differences. 
James Walter (1981, p 38) cited Plutarch in arguing that ‘the study of parallel lives, the 
comparative biography of those of similar disposition, role or circumstance, placed side 
by side so that each illuminates the other, is not unfamiliar’ and argued for its extension 
to analysis of groups of intersecting lives. He cited Barber’s (1972) study of US presidents 
as an example of what was then a contemporary analysis of parallel lives. 
The virtues of comparative biographies 
Political scientists have mixed views on the utility of biography to their field. Some, such 
as Patrick Weller, have written acclaimed biographies themselves. They presumably 
would be sympathetic to the view of Harold Lasswell (1930, p 1) that ‘political science 
without biography is a form of taxidermy’, even if they may not go so far as Victorian era 
statesman Benjamin Disraeli who once advised ‘read no history, nothing but 
biography’.41 They might nod when reading Samuel Johnson’s (1750, pp 40-41) view that 
‘no species of writing seems more worthy of cultivation than biography, since none can 
be more delightful or more useful, none can certainly enchain the heart by irresistible 
interest, or more widely diffuse instruction to every diversity of condition’. They might 
empathise with Lytton Strachey (1918, p viii), who while calling biography ‘the most 
delicate and humane of all the branches of the art of writing’, warned ‘it is perhaps as 
difficult to write a good life as to live one’. Jean Blondel (1985, p 5) argued that studies 
of individual ministers and of the general broad pattern of multiple holders of the office 
are complementary, and can help improve the quality of governance. A practising 
Australian politician Chris Bowen (2015, p x) agreed. Echoing Plutarch’s motive of 
self-improvement, this former and aspiring future treasurer argued that researching and 
                                                          
40 Nixon losing the California gubernatorial race proclaimed ‘you won’t have Nixon to kick around 
anymore’ while after losing the opposition leadership Howard said ‘I’d have to be Lazarus with a triple 
by-pass to think of running for the leadership again’.  
41 Cited by UK chancellor Nigel Lawson (1993) and Pimlott (1990, p 214). 
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writing about past treasurers ‘will make me a better treasurer’. He may have been 
following the advice of the medieval intriguer Machiavelli (c1515, chapter 14) who 
advised ‘another thing a ruler must do to exercise his mind is read history, in particular 
accounts of great leaders and their achievements…he must do what some great men have 
done in the past: take as a model a leader who’s been much praised and admired’. 
On the other hand, some political scientists and other academics tend to disdain biography 
as a populist activity; asserting that biographies are less academically rigorous42 and that 
‘real intellectuals do not do political biography’.43 There is even a suspicion that 
‘obsessive shadowing of another man’s life is one of the more bizarre ways to spend one’s 
time’.44 This has led some eminent biographers to lament that their work has been 
dismissed as a ‘retirement pastime…the half dead chasing the dead’ and that many agree 
with WH Auden that biographers are mere ‘gossip writers and voyeurs calling themselves 
scholars’.45 The UK’s Ben Pimlott observed ruefully that ‘while readers take biography 
seriously, nobody else does’.46 A particularly acerbic description was Germaine Greer’s 
barb that biography is ‘an unpardonable crime against selfhood’ by ‘the intellectual 
equivalents of flesh-eating bacterium’.47 
It has been often lamented that biographers tend to fall in love with their subjects48 (and 
autobiographers already are in love!).49 They therefore ‘usually furnish a largely 
favourable portrait’.50 While Lytton Strachey may have moved biography on from the 
                                                          
42 Holmes (2002, p 7) observes that academia ‘has not been very keen to recognise biography’. See Arklay, 
Nethercote and Wanna (2006, p xi) for a discussion of this criticism. The attitude itself has a long history; 
Averintser (2002, p 26) cites the classical Roman writer Nepos as regarding biography as ‘frivolous and 
not dignified enough’. 
43 This common criticism is noted by Bolton (2006, p 1). As Riall (2010, p 376) observes, ‘no one would 
deny that biography sells’, but ‘life writing has a relatively slight reputation among academic historians 
working today, especially political biography’. Marquand (2009) notes that ‘political biography is very 
much an Anglo-American specialty… perhaps reflecting a certain suspicion of high theory endemic in the 
English‐speaking world’. 
44 Penelope Lively, cited by Moggridge (1992, p xvi). 
45 The biographer of Keynes, Robert Skidelsky (1988, p 1). 
46 The biographer of Hugh Dalton and Harold Wilson, Ben Pimlott (1990, p 214). Almost a decade later he 
saw no improvement in the attitude of academics; ‘many historians look witheringly at biographers’; 
Pimlott (1999, p 31). 
47 Cited by Lee (2009, p 96). 
48 Not always as literally as Bob Hawke’s biographer Blanche d’Alpuget (who became his mistress and then 
wife) or General Petraeus’ biographer Paula Broadwell. Some have put the opposite view; Oscar Wilde 
said ‘every great man has his disciples and it is always Judas who writes the biography’; Lee (2009, p 91). 
49 Edel (1981, p 9). 
50 Arklay, Nethercote and Wanna (2006, p xi); Duff (2011, p xxii). 
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hagiographic form it often previously took51, there are still forces acting against the 
biography that is very critical. The subject themselves, obviously, if still alive will have 
a vested interest in their image and may have constructed a ‘life myth to protect 
themselves against certain truths they can’t acknowledge about themselves’.52 Even after 
the subject’s death their family may also have a ‘life myth’, as may their political 
followers and ‘keepers of the flame’ such as prime ministerial libraries and the subject’s 
home town.53 As Virginia Woolf (1939, p 222) put it, ‘the widow and the friends were 
hard taskmasters’. Past biographers may be protective of their interpretations of the life.  
Not only are the calls of the subject, the family and the followers to respect the subject’s 
privacy a consideration but so are the laws of defamation. 
Biographers may act as ‘history’s butlers…solemnly ushering in the facts’.54 Some 
biographers may suffer from a variant of the Stockholm syndrome; after spending years 
engrossed with the writings of their subjects they come to exaggerate their importance. 
Other may deliberately exaggerate to try to generate a wider readership for their book. 
Comparative, or contrasting, biographies may help avoid such biases, as the author is less 
likely to start with a favourable view of both or all subjects and the comparison process 
will serve as a reminder of areas where at least one of the subjects fall short. As has been 
argued of Plutarch’s Lives, ‘the experience of the reader encountering the second life is 
enriched by recalling details, incidents and themes from the first and the first subject is 
(re)interpreted by encountering the second’.55 As Pelling (1986, p 351) observed, ‘even 
when two great men are similar…dwelling on the differences can help us to understand 
important aspects of those individuals more clearly’. 
Comparative collective biography lends itself more to generalisation and inference and 
the development and testing of hypotheses than does the biography of an individual. It is 
therefore less subject to the criticism above. Theakston (1997, p 651) has observed that 
‘comparative biography is unduly neglected as a political science methodology’. 
                                                          
51 Walter (2002, p 321) believes that Strachey’s iconoclasm and Freud’s theory of the subconscious are 
the two major influences on twentieth century biography. 
52 Walter (1992, p 279). 
53 Day (2002), Spalding (2011), Walter (2006, p 29). Lee (2009, p 63) cites Gladstone as describing a 
contemporary biography as so decorous that ‘it is not a life at all …it is a reticence in three volumes’. 
54 Michael Holroyd (1997, p 6), a distinguished biographer playing devil’s advocate. 
55 Larmour (2014, p 410). Similarly, Stadter (1996, p 243) comments ‘setting side by side two similar lives 
allows us to see each more precisely, because it makes us look in one for features we saw in the other’. 
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Comparative biography is an element of the sub-field of ‘comparative politics’ within the 
discipline of political science, for which has been claimed the following virtues: 
By making the researcher aware of unexpected differences, or 
even surprising similarities, between cases, comparison brings a 
sense of perspective to a familiar environment and discourages 
parochial responses to political issues… but perhaps the principal 
function of comparison in political science is that of developing, 
testing and refining theory.56 
A series of comparative biographies of politicians (in this case, treasurers) is of interest 
for what has been called the ‘Great Man’ question: to what extent can we explain the 
course of historical events in terms of the actions and decisions of a few individuals?’57 
A comparative biography can shed more light on this question than can a biography of a 
single subject. 
It is also of value to include sometimes in comparative biographers the less great as well 
as the great. For as Plutarch put it in his prologue to the lives of Demetrius and Antony: 
…young men would appreciate good flute-players better if they 
were given experience of bad ones. In the same way, it seems to 
me that we shall be all the more ready to study and imitate the 
lives of good men if we know something of the wicked and 
infamous. 
                                                          
56 Hopkin (2002, p 249). Hague and Marrop (2007, p 84) comment that the ‘comparative 
approach…[allows us] to formulate and test hypotheses’. 
57 Holt (2001, pp vii-viii). He gives as two examples historian AJP Taylor arguing that the history of modern 
Europe (up to World War II) could be written in terms of just Napoleon, Bismark and Lenin; and Dell (1996) 
blaming the poor post-war performance of the UK economy largely on the mistakes of the chancellors. 
The ‘great man’ thesis is most associated with Thomas Carlyle (1840, p 1), who argued ‘the history of what 
man has accomplished in this world is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here.’ 
An alternative view is put by Leo Tolstoy in War and Peace who likens leaders to the bow waves of boats, 
being in front but being pushed by rather than leading the boat; Grint (2010, p 9). In a similar vein, Alfred 
Deakin commented: 'the mischief is that democracy in Australia, as in the United States, insists on 
attaching an extraordinary importance to the personality of its political leader'; Walter (2010b, p 110). 
Herbert Spencer developed in the 1879s an opposing view to Carlyle, known as cultural or social 
determinism, which argued history was determined by the interplay of social and cultural forces over 
which individuals have little control; Elgie (1995, pp 2-3). Choosing between the Carlyle or Spencer views 
is effectively deciding ‘do leaders make history or does history make leaders?’; Gustafson (2008, p 103). 
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The four paired ‘lives’ in this thesis 
(i) Early pioneers of Australian democracy – Andrew Fisher and Joseph Cook 
Fisher and Cook were both born in the north of the United Kingdom in the 1860s. They 
both had only an elementary school education as they were working as coal miners in 
their teens, although both strove to improve themselves by reading in the evenings and 
both contemplated a religious vocation. Both sought a better life by migrating to Australia 
in 1885 and once here took leading roles in trade unions. Both were elected to state 
parliaments as Labor members before shifting to the federal parliament on their way to 
becoming prime minister and treasurer. 
But around this stage their lives diverged. Fisher stayed true to the Labor cause and 
combined the roles of treasurer and prime minister on three occasions. His was the first 
government with majorities in both houses and he was an active reformer. Cook had 
moved across to the conservative parties while still in the NSW parliament and while also 
serving as both prime minister and later treasurer had few achievements in either role. 
Both ended their careers serving as high commissioner in London, the pomp of which by 
this time suited Cook very well and Fisher not at all. 
(ii) Unorthodoxy versus conventionality in the Great Depression – Edward ‘Ted’ 
Theodore and Joseph Lyons 
Theodore and Lyons both came from humble backgrounds and rose through Labor circles 
to become state premiers before entering federal politics (the only ones making this 
transition since the early days of federation and not followed until John Fahey). Theodore 
held office for only a brief and interrupted period in a government which, stymied by a 
hostile Senate and a stubborn Commonwealth Bank, collapsed around him. Lyons acted 
as treasurer while Theodore had stood down and then became prime minster and treasurer 
after crossing to the non-Labor side of politics. Both had to address the Great Depression, 
Theodore’s daring originality contrasting with the conventionality of Lyons. 
(iii) Reconstructing Australia after World War II – Ben Chifley and Arthur Fadden  
Chifley and Fadden, while on opposite sides politically, both came from humble origins 
and retained the common touch throughout their lives. Both have been credited as 
introducing Keynesian (counter-cyclical) macroeconomic policy into the political 
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mainstream and coped calmly when international circumstances put the Australian 
economy under great pressure. But Chifley was far more interested in pursuing large 
economic reforms while Fadden just wanted to keep the economy ticking over. 
(iv) Dismantling the ‘Australian Settlement’ – John Howard and Paul Keating  
Keating and Howard were both born in suburban Sydney within five years of each other. 
Both their fathers ran small businesses. Brett (2005, p 41) has observed that both were 
steeped in party politics ‘from their youth. Politics channelled their adolescent energy and 
aggression, and they shaped their adult identities around the party polarisations.’ 
As Williams (1997, pp xiii-xiv) observed, ‘despite the chasm between their political 
convictions, Howard and Keating were more alike than either cared to 
acknowledge…Each had played the most influential role in shaping the identity of his 
party during the 1980s…they were both tenacious political fighters’ which enabled both 
to become prime ministers after they had been treasurer.58 Both were keener on reform as 
treasurer than were their prime ministers but Keating was much more successful at 
achieving reforms such as financial deregulation and lower tax rates than Howard. 
Structure of the thesis 
The four pairs of parallel lives are the core of the thesis, comprising Chapters 4 to 7. 
Bookending them are introductory chapters, providing context, and analytical chapters, 
drawing lessons from the eight lives studied in depth and those of other treasurers also 
examined. In this way, the thesis is a comparative biography but also a work of political 
history with implications for political science.  
The non-biographical chapters start with a literature review (Chapter 2). This is followed 
by an introductory discussion of the job of treasurer (Chapter 3). After presenting the 
eight selected parallel lives, the thesis turns to a review of all the treasurers drawing 
lessons from their careers (Chapter 8), and in particular their relationship with the 
Treasury department (Chapter 9), which leads into a more analytical examination of the 
job of treasurer (Chapter 10) and conclusions (Chapter 11). 
                                                          
58 When the ABC’s Four Corners made matching profiles of the two men, they gave them the contrasting 
titles of ‘the big picture man’ and ‘an average Australian bloke’; Brett (2005, pp 29-30). 
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Chapter Two: A review of the literature on 
treasurers – explaining their performance and 
success 
Introduction 
This chapter interrogates the political science literature to see how treasurers can be 
characterised using various typologies in order to understand better how they perform 
their role and what makes for a successful treasurer. It sets the scene for Chapter 10, 
which adapts this literature in the light of the discussion of Australian treasurers in the 
intervening chapters.  
What indicates a successful treasurer and how might they be ranked? 
Treasurers want to be a 'success' in the portfolio and want to be remembered for their 
stewardship and achievements. Views differ about how the success of a treasurer should 
be assessed, and whether ‘good’ economic times were due to their stewardship or to other 
factors largely outside their control. For instance, Holt (2001, p 301) has remarked in the 
UK that ‘there is no sensible way of saying which was the best post-war chancellor. It 
depends on whose values and objectives you use as a benchmark, and on how you assess 
the contribution of the chancellor to the performance of the economy’. 
In the future, it may be possible to compare the performance of treasurers against the 
performance goals set for them by their prime ministers.59 These ‘charter letters’, 
described in Podger (2009, pp 22-23), were first issued to ministers during the Howard 
Government but have so far not been made public. 
One way to gauge the reputed performance of political leaders is to establish some 
comparative ranking drawn up according to some defensible criteria. To date, ranking of 
political leaders has been most comprehensive for the US presidents. The most credibility 
appears to attach to those based on polls of historians, which show a high degree of 
consensus about those which are the greatest (Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and the two 
Roosevelts60) and the poorest performers (Grant, Harding, Nixon) and the rankings are 
                                                          
59 Richard Denniss suggested this criterion in a private conversation. 
60 The carvers of Mount Rushmore, who could not easily revise their opinions, therefore got it pretty right 
in including the four of these presidents who had completed their terms at the time of carving. 
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fairly insensitive to the exact expression used to reflect performance.61 Respondents’ 
ranking of the presidents have been highly correlated with their knowledge of them, 
suggesting that the great presidents attract more attention from historians, but some 
presidents (notably the Civil War general Ulysses S. Grant) may be attracting attention 
for other reasons than their presidential performance and there may be a degree of 
‘presentism’ -- even historians are likely to be more familiar with recent presidents.62  
There have been some ranking exercises for Australian prime ministers by individuals 
such as polymath and former politician Barry Jones (1996) and psephologist Malcolm 
Mackerras (2008), some surveys of academics by newspapers and a more comprehensive 
exercise by Monash University reported by Paul Strangio (2013). There is a fair degree 
of consensus about the best (Deakin, Curtin, Chifley, Menzies in his second run) and the 
poorest (Cook, Scullin, McMahon).63 The studies recognise that there are difficulties in 
comparing leaders from different eras and reducing many facets to a single ranking.  
Gladstone has been hailed the UK’s ‘greatest chancellor of all time’,64 mainly because he 
introduced the modern system of parliamentary oversight of public finances. In Australia, 
there is no definitive champion. Claims have been made for Theodore.65 But while 
undoubtedly very bright and determined it is hard to point to achievements during his 
brief and interrupted tenure. Chris Bowen (2015, pp xv-xvi), himself a former treasurer, 
regarded Keating as the greatest for ‘the scale and scope of his reform program and the 
ability to explain the need for the reforms’, and gave ‘honourable mentions’ to Page, 
Theodore, Fadden, Hayden, Costello and Swan. Turner, the first treasurer, was regarded 
as solid and respected by all parties.66 Chifley has been nominated as the best, and was 
                                                          
61 Simonton (1987, chapter 5). There are very high correlations between rankings on general prestige, 
strength, activeness, and accomplishments. 
62 Simonton (1987, pp 169-170, 176-177). Rhodes and ‘t Hart (2014, pp 13-14) refer to criticisms of ranking 
exercises as being ‘skewed towards recent political figures’. 
63 The rankings predate the tenures of Rudd, Gillard, Abbott and Turnbull. 
64 Lawson (1993, p 279) agreeing sixty years later with Hirst (1931, p 280). Of the post-war chancellors, 
Howe, Lawson and Clarke appear best regarded on the Conservative side and Jenkins and Brown among 
the Labour chancellors. 
65 Chifley called Theodore ‘the best financial brain that this parliament has ever known’; Hansard, 
5 October 1950. By some accounts, Bruce shared this opinion; Calwell (1972a, p 63 and 1972b, p 7). See 
Chapter 5 for more information. Contemporary economists such as Saul Eslake and Ross Garnaut also 
rank Theodore very highly; The Age, 9 May 2005. Leslie Melville, who observed a large number of the 
treasurers, many from close quarters, believed that Theodore was the best.  
66 Barton appointed Turner treasurer in his Protectionist government. Reid, a Free Trade prime minister 
also appointed him treasurer. There were press reports that Watson also wanted him as treasurer in his 
Labor government; Hawkins (2007a, p 122). 
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almost certainly the most loved.67 Fadden has been cited for the good economic 
performance in the latter part of the 1950s.68 Keating’s economic reforms and panache 
often saw him nominated as the best of the post-war treasurers.69 Swan’s handling of the 
global financial crisis, when Australia was virtually the only advanced economy not to 
fall into recession, has led to him receiving plaudits.70 External recognition may be one 
aspect of assessing greatness. Paul Keating (in 1984) and Wayne Swan (in 2011) were 
both awarded Euromoney’s title of ‘world’s best finance minister’.71 
Five treasurers made The Bulletin’s 2006 listing of the 100 most influential Australians 
but only Keating for his work as treasurer.72 When the Australian Financial Review 
conducted an online poll in 2011 asking its readers whom they regarded as the most 
influential business, economic or political leader of the past sixty years, Keating topped 
the poll with 29 per cent of votes, more than twice the runner-up Howard (who was likely 
being cited for his impact as prime minister rather than treasurer).73  
As Oliver (1931, p 31) put it, the success of a treasurer will also be judged politically; 
‘whether he was successful in gaining power, in keeping it and in governing, whether in 
short he was skilful at his particular craft or a bungler’. Much political literature applies 
what Rhodes and ‘t Hart (2014, p 13) call ‘the simplest criterion of all…longevity in 
office’. Errington (2008, p 217) suggested in particular that ‘conservative leaders tend to 
be measured by their electoral success rather than their legislative achievements’. The 
longest-serving treasurers were Costello (4,284 days), Fadden (3,622 days over two 
periods), Keating (3,006), Chifley (2,995) and Holt (2,604). Arguably the most politically 
successful treasurers were those who went on to become prime minister (Bruce, Menzies, 
                                                          
67 For example, Holloway (c1954, p 100) called Chifley our ‘best treasurer’ and MacCallum (2014a, p 118) 
remarked ‘many still regard him as Australia’s best treasurer’.  At Chifley’s funeral, Menzies reportedly 
described him as Australia’s best treasurer; Martin (2015, p 160). 
68 The Age, 9 May 2005, p 4. 
69 Economic journalist Ross Gitttins (2015, p 126), for example, ranks Keating the best treasurer of the 
thirteen with whom he is familiar ‘by a country mile’. Political journalist Laurie Oakes (1988, p 36) 
regarded Keating as ‘the most impressive treasurer this country has seen for a very long time’. McGregor 
(c1990) calls him the ‘best post-war treasurer’ and Chris Richardson ranks Keating as our best treasurer; 
Kelly (2014, p 428). Leigh (2015, p 107) more cautiously calls him ‘possibly Australia’s greatest ever 
treasurer’. 
70 Ross Garnaut credited him with ‘two towering achievements – sustaining economic growth during the 
deepest [global] downturn since the Great Depression and implementation of the world’s best carbon 
price scheme’; Kelly (2012). 
71 Swan was one of the few finance ministers to survive the GFC. 
72 The others were Howard, Menzies, Scullin and Whitlam; Haigh (2006). 
73 Australian Financial Review, 16 August 2011, pp 56-57. 
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Chifley, Holt, McMahon, Howard and Keating74), or at least like Snedden and Hayden 
were subsequently allowed to lead their parties. 
Treasurers and the importance of timing 
Timing is important, especially for a reforming treasurer. It has been observed that: 
What we call luck in politics is actually a gift for timing…while 
politicians are always condemned for opportunism, being a 
skilled opportunist is the essence of the political art…a skilful 
opportunist is someone who persuades the public that he has 
created the opportunity; Ignatieff (2013, p 34). 
When to push which ideas, wage which battles, confront or ignore 
which social problems: considerations of political opportunity, 
timing and momentum are crucial to leadership; ‘t Hart (2014a, 
p 210). 
One aspect of timing relevant to treasurers is that it helps to commence the job in a new 
government, particularly when economic conditions were a factor in the former 
government’s defeat. This allows reforms to be projected as a necessary response to the 
inadequacies of the former government. It also allows credit to be claimed when the 
economy recovers, even if the recovery reflects improved global conditions or the ending 
of a drought rather than domestic policy adroitness. The worst conditions are when the 
global economy deteriorates soon after a new treasurer takes office.  
A difficult political task faces a treasurer who takes over from a treasurer of the same 
party or coalition, particularly if his predecessor has been promoted to the prime 
minister.75 They face challenges whether they act as an innovator or an heir, been seen as 
a traitor (or at least implicitly criticising their predecessor) if they make big changes and 
                                                          
74 Technically Page and Fadden were also treasurers who went on to become prime minister but they only 
served as prime minister for about 20 and 40 days respectively. 
75 As Davies (2006, p 24) observed of UK chancellor Norman Lamont, ‘he inherited a policy from his 
predecessor [John Major] which proved to be unsustainable. Unfortunately that predecessor was now his 
boss’. An earlier chancellor, Roy Jenkins (1998, p 386) remarked ‘it was not much fun being chancellor 
under Gladstone, Lloyd George or even Macmillan’. More generally, Blondel (1991a, p 5) observes ‘a 
finance minister is ‘likely to be subjected to particular pressure’ when the prime minister is a former 
finance minister.  
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a clone if they do not.76 On the other hand, it has been argued there can be an advantage 
in coming into the office after the prime minister has sacked your predecessor; ‘if a prime 
minister sacks a chancellor, he cannot sack a second’.77 To paraphrase Oscar Wilde, to 
lose one treasurer might be regarded as a misfortune; to lose two looks like carelessness.  
Assessing the managerial record of treasurers 
Part of being a great treasurer is good stewardship – having good economic outcomes, or 
at least better outcomes than might have been achieved by an alternative treasurer. As 
treasurer Swan put it, ‘the first and foremost responsibility of a treasurer is to manage the 
economy well and increase the overall level of national wealth.’78 Nigel Lawson (1993, 
p 253), UK chancellor in the 1980s, argued the reputation of a modern chancellor ‘is to a 
substantial extent dependent on much the same factors (with many noughts added) as 
those on which a chancellor in Gladstone’s time [1850s to 1880s] depended. If public 
spending is under control, revenue is coming in well and there is a margin to divide 
between tax reductions and judiciously targeted public spending measures, he will be 
riding high’. 
Assessing the record of treasurers as economic managers is fraught with difficulty. 
Firstly, there is the question of the extent to which economic decisions are truly made by 
the treasurer himself rather than the prime minister or the (inner) cabinet – or in the case 
of inflation reflect the judgements and actions of the independent Reserve Bank. 
Secondly, the global economic circumstances matter greatly. Thirdly, there are questions 
about whether a treasurer’s performance on say unemployment should be measured as 
the average rate over their tenure (which makes it hard for a treasurer such as Lyons who 
inherited very high unemployment to look good) or the change over their tenure (which 
makes it hard for a treasurer such as Holt who inherited very low unemployment and 
inflation rates to look outstanding). Regardless of whether she or he is truly responsible 
for them, politically, a long-serving treasurer will ‘own’ the economic outcomes by the 
end of their tenure and likely be judged by their legacy.  
                                                          
76 Bynander and ‘t Hart (2006). Skowronek (2011, p 13) gives the extreme example of this problem in an 
American context with John Adams feeling so restricted by the legacy of Washington that he keeps the 
great man's cabinet in place. 
77 UK chancellor Kenneth Clarke (2004, p 184). Dell (1996, p 243) makes the same point. 
78 Swan (2005, p x). Similarly, Bowen (2015, p xiv) argues ‘the job of a treasurer is to be a competent 
manager of the economic cycle’.  
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Reforming treasurers 
Some, but not all, treasurers want to be more than just good economic managers of the 
status quo. They want to be reformers and build an economy that is stronger, more 
efficient and perhaps fairer. As Saul Eslake has put it, ‘a good treasurer expands the scope 
for economic policy reform.’79 Bowman and Grattan (1989, p 156) have argued that 
‘self-confidence, clean-cut positions (whether acquired or self-generated) and a strong 
dash of political courage are necessary in those that would promote change’. 
As Gough Whitlam (1957) once lamented, ‘the way of the reformer is hard in Australia’. 
It requires many skills. As Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003) put it, ‘reformist leadership 
requires the embracing of novel policy ideas, the skills to “sell” them to diverse audiences, 
and the wielding of power to see them enacted’. 
Since Keating, educating and advocating ideas to the media is now seen as important, 
although some previous treasurers were reticent to take on this role. Frank Crean (1993, 
chapter 14) did not see himself as a marketer; ‘as far as the press was concerned I never 
refused to see anyone but I did not believe it was right for them or for me that I should 
seek them out’. Now it is regarded that ‘part of the treasurer’s job is to do good economic 
policy but an equally important part of the job is to sell it’.80 
As Machiavelli noted of changes to systems of government: 
The person bringing in the changes will make enemies of 
everyone who was doing well under the old system, while the 
people who stand to gain from the new arrangements will not 
offer wholehearted support…partly because people are naturally 
sceptical: no one really believes in change until they’ve had solid 
experience of it. So as soon as the opponents of the new system 
see a chance they’ll go on the offensive…81  
                                                          
79 Saul Eslake, cited in Kelly (2012). Eslake has also said that the three core requirements for a good 
treasurer are managing the economy effectively, convincing the public that the treasurer is responsible 
for the good results and being the spearhead for reform; cited in Kelly (2012). Similarly, Bowen (2015, 
p xiv) writes that ‘it falls to the treasurer to explain the need for economic reform’. 
80 Economist Saul Eslake, quoted in Ellis (2011). 
81 Machiavelli (c1515, chapter 6, p 23).  
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Views differ about whether it helps or hinders a reformist treasurer to have ambitions for 
the highest office. The UK’s Nigel Lawson (1983, p 253), who did not have that ambition, 
mused that ‘on the one hand my actions did not excite the suspicions among my cabinet 
colleagues’ but on the other hand there was less incentive for them to be supportive as 
‘there was no future in being a Lawsonite’. Marsh, Richards and Smith (2000, p 324) 
suggested it made him more willing to take risks. 
The qualities that make a good treasurer are also those that make for strong performance 
in other portfolios. A recent Australian study asked departmental secretaries about the 
traits of the best ministers they served. Among the responses cited in Tiernan and Weller 
(2010, pp 148-9) were: 
Intellectual openness, honesty, an understanding of the 
boundaries between the department and the office…intellectual 
and personal integrity…judgement in what matters and what 
doesn't…hardworking, respectful of roles…a person with 
principles and high ethical standards…intellectually very able…a 
clear vision of what the government's objectives are…good 
ministers have a framework, trust senior people, good judgement, 
decide quickly… 
But beyond these general observations, the search for objective characteristics that predict 
success for treasurers may not be rewarding. Roy Jenkins (1998, p 10) concluded from 
his study of UK chancellors that ‘they are almost, but not quite, as variegated as a random 
selection of any nineteen reasonably successful men. They all had somewhat more than 
average ability and substantially more than average ambition’. 
Treasurers and crises  
It is sometimes claimed that prime ministers and presidents can only prove their greatness 
by leading their countries in times of crisis, which can be defined as an unusual event 
characterised by significant threats to well-being, a sense of urgency and a high degree of 
uncertainty.82 It can hardly be a coincidence that lists of great leaders of the 20th century 
generally include names such as Curtin, Churchill, Washington and Roosevelt who led 
                                                          
82 't Hart and Tindall (2009, pp 4-6). 
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their countries during major wars. As ‘t Hart and Tindall (2009, pp 4-6) argue, this raises 
the question of whether treasurers can best demonstrate their greatness by coping with 
economic crises such as global depressions.83  
Some studies of leadership, such as Grint (2010, p 19) suggest that people who are good 
at managing crises are better rewarded than those whose good management avoids crises 
arising. As ‘t Hart (2011c, p 203) points out, a successful reformer will ‘not let a good 
crisis go to waste’ but is rather aware that ‘history rewards those who have the capability 
to understand and interpret the crisis of the day to underpin hitherto infeasible attitude 
and policy change’. A reforming treasurer may be more likely to succeed if they can frame 
a policy challenge as a crisis as in these periods the populace has a ‘greater willingness 
to accept unconventional measures’.84 They need to be careful though not to be blamed 
for creating the crisis. 
Ansell, Boin and ‘t Hart (2014, pp 433-3) identified five core tasks in political crisis 
management; sense-making, shaping responses, meaning making, account giving and 
learning. For a treasurer facing a recession these five tasks may translate to explaining 
how the economic problem reflects external influences, devising a policy response such 
as an economic stimulus package, explaining why this is necessary, explaining how the 
policy worked to limit the rise in unemployment and developing better policy responses 
for future recessions.  
Typologies of treasurers  
There are very few analyses specifically referring to types of treasurers or finance 
ministers. There is, however, an extensive literature on prime ministers, a sub-set of the 
large genre of leadership studies. There are also some analyses of cabinet ministers in 
general, albeit not that many.85  
                                                          
83 A study of UK chancellors devotes a chapter to dealing with crises. It starts by asserting that ‘no 
chancellor…has the right to regard himself or herself purely as a victim of circumstances’ and that their 
main task was dealing with crises, adding that it may be that ‘we remember chancellors for the crises that 
befell their periods of office…[and] judge them on the extent to which they were responsible for the crises, 
and the ways in which they dealt with them’; Holt (2001, p 228). John Major (1999, p 135) has ruefully 
reflected that ‘the Treasury enjoys a crisis, having had a good deal of experience with them’, but treasurers 
usually enjoy them less. 
84 Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003, p 238). 
85 Andeweg (2014) observes ‘presidents and dictators attract psychobiographers, but ordinary ministers 
in parliamentary systems do not…We still know very little of why and when some ministers are moulded 
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Arguably the most-cited typology by journalists and politicians themselves is that by UK 
Labour cabinet minister and maverick Tony Benn, who classified politicians into three 
types; straight men such as Jim Callaghan, fixers such as Harold Wilson and maddies 
such as Margaret Thatcher. Barry Jones (2016, pp 138-9) believes this pattern can be 
identified as far back as Homer; with Hector the straight man, Odysseus the fixer and 
Achilles the maddie. Among recent Australian leaders, Howard might exemplify the 
straight man and Hawke and Gillard the fixer,86 while Keating is a self-confessed 
maddie87 and many would place Abbott in that category too. As Deane (2015, p 68) puts 
it, ‘there hasn’t yet been a category created to contain Kevin Rudd’. 
Another informal classification with a particularly Australian flavour comes from Sol 
Encel (1961, pp 175-6) who classifies prime ministers and opposition leaders as larrikins, 
characterised by use of ‘lowbrow’ humour, a liking for the ‘cut and thrust’ of politics and 
a low regard for ideals (eg Reid, Hughes, Fadden, Calwell and Gorton) and prima donnas 
(eg Deakin, Bruce, Curtin, Menzies and Whitlam).88 An updated list would probably see 
Rudd and Turnbull added to the prima donnas, Hawke, Latham and Abbott to the 
larrikins, and Keating perhaps added to both. There would seem to be a third category 
needed for more modest and sober leaders (eg Watson, Cook, Scullin, Chifley, Holt, 
Howard, Crean, Gillard, Shorten).  
Much of the academic literature on political leadership boils down to distinguishing two 
essential types. The first are ‘managers’ whose ambition is to manage competently the 
existing institutions. In the context of treasurers, they would seek to maintain a strong 
rate of economic growth (or improve well-being if more progressively inclined), keep 
unemployment and inflation low and keep the budget in a sustainable position in a 
longer-run sense. The second group are ‘reformers’, who also want to be competent 
managers, but want to go further and transform the existing structures, making the 
economy operate more efficiently (and improve any trade-off between inflation and 
                                                          
by the institutions and others change them’. Rhodes (2006, p 323) asks ‘where are the theories, the 
models and the typologies of executive government in parliamentary systems…?’ 
86 Adams (2008) includes Chifley as a straight man, Menzies as a fixer and Keating as a maddie. In Adams 
(2013) he adds Rudd as a straight man, Gillard and Shorten as fixers, and Evatt and Whitlam as maddies. 
Crabb (2010) classes Beazley and Crean as straight men, Hawke and Gillard as fixers, and Keating, Latham 
and Rudd as maddies. Dobell (2013) classes Rudd as a straight man, Gillard as a fixer and Abbott a mixture 
of fixer and maddie.  
87 Keating phone call to Mark Latham, 12 October 1999, in Latham (2005, p 117). 
88 Encel (1961, pp 175-6). 
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unemployment so that both can be lower) and changing the distribution of incomes and 
opportunities. Some of these studies are listed in Table 2.1. Blondel and ‘t Hart observe 
that it is now commonplace to distinguish leaders and managers, a distinction Blondel 
believes can be traced back to Plutarch.89  
Table 2.1: Sources of contrasting typologies of political leaders 
Managers Reformers   Source 
Lions Foxes Pareto (1916) 
Spectator Lawmaker Barber (1965) 
Minimalists/executive Initiator/creative Headey (1974a) 
Conservatives Reformists Paige (1977) 
Transactional Transformational Burns (1978) 
Straight men/fixers Maddies Tony Benn 
Reactive Anticipatory Richardson, Gustafson & Jordan (1982) 
Office-holders Real leaders Blondel (1987) 
Expressive Mobilising Kavanagh (1990) 
Voyeurs Participants Keating (1990) 
Passive Active Barber (1992) 
Spectators Activists Blondel (1993b) 
Maintainers Initiators Maddox (2000) 
Legitimator/minimalist Initiator/accelerator Marsh, Richards & Smith (2000) 
Agents/managers Commanders Norton (2000) 
Collectivist Interventionist Smith (2000) 
Constraint respecters Challengers Keller (2005) 
Hobbesians Lockeans Jones (2006) 
Transactional Inspirational Nye (2008) 
Managers Mobilisers Miller (2008) 
Conservative Radical Errington (2008) 
Maintenance ministers Policy drivers Tiernan & Weller (2010) 
Managers Leaders ‘t Hart (2014b) 
                                                          
89 Blondel (1987, p 20) comments ‘from Plutarch to the present day, it has apparently been accepted that 
there are “heroes”, “illustrious men”… it has also been assumed there was very little to be said for or 
about the great majority of leaders’.  ‘t Hart (2014b, p 8) argues the literature, probably unfairly, tends to 
regard the leaders as inherently more admirable than the managers. A practitioner, the former chief of 
staff to Greg Combet, Allan Behm (2015, p 68) opined that leadership is about ends whereas management 
is about means, as well as casting leadership as transformational and management as transactional.  
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This reformer/manager split is sometimes cross-classified by whether the leader attempts 
to implement their approach through imposition or by building consensus. This leads to 
what Richardson, Gustafson and Jordan (1982) and Errington (2008) refer to as four 
differing ‘policy styles’. The conservator, generally the most common, maintains the 
status quo by consensus. The regulator is more assertive but also wants to maintain the 
current system. When a strong treasurer drives change, they can be classified as 
transformational. If they achieve change by building support for it through skilled 
advocacy they belong in the concertation category. 
Table 2.2: Policy styles of Australian treasurers 
 Managers Reformers 
Means of exercising 
authority 
  
Imposition Strong regulators Transformational 
Consensus Conservatorship Concertation 
 
 
Richard Holt (2001) provided a typology specific to UK chancellors of the exchequer on 
two dimensions. Firstly, he classified them on whether they were seeking to encourage or 
discourage faster growth in demand. Secondly, he classified them by whether they want 
to make long-term changes to the economy; with Dalton, Maulding, Howe, Lawson and 
Brown regarded as long-sighted. The second criterion is essentially the reformer category 
again. The problem with Holt’s typology is that his first criterion probably applies more 
to the stage of the economic cycle than being an inherent characteristic of treasurers 
themselves. Long-serving treasurers would fall into the expansionary category at some 
stages of their treasurerships and restrictionist category at others. 
Another approach to cross-classifying leaders is James Barber’s (1992) much-cited study 
of US presidents, which classified them on two dimensions; their activity or passivity and 
their positivity or negativity -- their enjoyment of the role. Of the first four presidents, 
Washington was passive-negative regarding establishing stability as his duty; John 
Adams, a dour Puritan, was active-negative; the brilliant Thomas Jefferson was 
active-positive while the irresolute and unsuccessful James Madison was 
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passive-positive. Among later presidents Barber classified Wilson, Hoover, Johnson and 
Nixon as active-negative, having lofty goals but being crushed by their failures to achieve 
them when they stuck rigidly to policies that were failing.90 Coolidge (and to a lesser 
extent Eisenhower) he classed as passive-negative and Taft, Harding and Reagan as 
passive-positive. FDR was the exemplar active-positive president with Truman and 
Kennedy also falling into this category. Their self-esteem allowed them to experiment 
with policies and switch if they did not work and to enjoy their tenure in the job. Of the 
presidents since Barber wrote, Clinton and Obama might be classed active-positive (and 
Trump probably too unless his perception that the job is harder than he expected and his 
lack of achievement moves him into the active-negative category), and Bush Jnr as 
passive-positive. An attempt to quantify the analyses of Barber by Simonton (1987, 
pp 207-209), however, did not find they had any predictive power, or even correlation, 
with measures of presidential success.91 
Barber’s framework was used by Henderson (1992, p 100) to distinguish what motivates 
people to enter politics. He suggests ‘the active-negatives are drawn by a need for power; 
the active-positives by a desire to achieve certain policy goals; the passive negatives by a 
sense of duty; and the passive-positives by a search for affection, gained principally 
through their ability to perform on the political stage’. 
Greenstein (2004, p 3) claimed that Barber’s approach is inapplicable to Westminster 
systems, where there is arguably a ‘tradition of collective leadership’ and ‘the rare 
Winston Churchill, Margaret Thatcher or Tony Blair is far outnumbered by the many 
Stanley Baldwins, Harold Wilsons and John Majors, whose personal impact on 
government action is at best limited’. But this is a tradition that many writers argue has 
been disappearing. For Australia, Brereton and Walter (1978) classify Fraser as 
active-negative and Whitlam as active-positive based on a textual analysis of their replies 
to parliamentary questions without notice. The Barber model is applied to Australian 
treasurers in Chapter 10, especially Table 10.7. 
 
                                                          
90 Wilson’s failure to compromise over the League of Nations, Hoover’s failure to adapt his economic 
policies to the Great Depression, Johnson’s refusal to negotiate over Vietnam and Nixon’s problems with 
Watergate all contributed to the failures of their presidencies; McKay (2014, p 443). 
91 Simonton (1987, pp 207-209). 
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A brief selective survey of the literature on leadership 
A recent survey of literature surveys from the vast area of writing on leadership concluded 
‘there is precious little evidence that there are any qualities that mark out leaders’.92 A 
more optimistic interpretation from Blondel’s (1990, p 284) reading of the literature was 
that ‘at least intelligence, dominance, self-confidence, achievement, drive, sociability and 
energy have appeared positively correlated with leadership in a substantial number of 
studies undertaken by experimental psychologists’. As Blondel (1990, p 284) observed, 
‘psychologists have shown that different types of leadership are appropriate to different 
situations. A more “task oriented” leader will be satisfactory when problems are relatively 
simple, a leader more concerned to establish a “rapport” with the led will be more 
appropriate where the questions to be solved are complex’. Classic examples are 
Churchill and de Gaulle whose leadership was popular during war but were dispensed 
with once peace came.  
Along similar lines, Hermann (2014, p 120) has argued that the preferred leadership style 
varies with circumstances; in turbulent times priority is given to leaders who ‘take charge 
and provide the public with some sense of security’ while in more tranquil periods 
‘leaders who are good at day-to-day politics, at listening and building consensus, become 
more in demand’. Hartley (2014, p 676) observes that of long lists of qualities conjectured 
in individual studies to be associated with effective leadership failed to be replicated in 
other studies and that ‘different leadership contexts and leadership challenges may require 
different behaviours and actions to be effective’. 
Another recent literature survey, by Hermann (2014, pp 120-125), suggested that key 
features of political leaders are their beliefs, leadership style, motivation, reactions to 
stress, background and experience. Treadway, Bentley, Williams and Wallace (2014, 
pp 511-2) concluded that the characteristics that result in effective political leadership are 
perceptiveness, a ‘high internal locus of control’ (ie a belief that the individual can control 
outcomes), affability and extroversion. A study by ‘t Hart (2011a, p 323) concludes 
‘effective public leaders are those who are able to continuously strike a viable balance 
between the requirements of prudence, support and trustworthiness’. 
                                                          
92 Reicher, Haslam and Platow (2014, p 150). Nye (2008, p 22) agrees but regards this as a good thing; if 
scholars had produced a cookie-cutter leadership style, individuals would be forever trying to imitate it’. 
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Blondel (2014, p 712) distinguished three views of political leadership.93 The American 
approach assumes leaders generally act in the interests of the country, as their values lead 
them to perceive this, and can achieve much. The African approach assumes leaders 
generally act in their own interests. The European approach assumes leaders aspire to act 
in the interests of their country but are heavily constrained and cannot achieve much. The 
Australian view is probably closest to the American. As Paul Keating put it, ‘when you 
change the government, you change the country’.94 Australia has been fortunate in its 
treasurers. None have been regarded as primarily motivated by self-enrichment. Only two 
have had to stand down due to financial scandals (Theodore and Lynch) and both returned 
to cabinet and were never convicted by a court.  
A characteristic of leaders, especially in the business world, is that they are ready to take 
risks. This is sometimes incorrectly interpreted as a characteristic of good business 
leaders. But, as Grint (2010, p 53) argues, truly ‘it is only the successful ones that survive’ 
and which therefore attract attention; we know little about the majority who take risks 
and are unlucky while those favoured by the fall of the dice ‘bewitch us with their tales 
of destiny’. Perhaps more accurate is that the characteristic of a good leader is taking 
some well-judged risks. A saying attributed to Mark Twain among others is that ‘good 
judgement comes from experience and experience comes from bad judgement’.95   
Psychobiographical insights 
Harold Lasswell (1930, 1948) pioneered the application of psychology to the analysis of 
politicians. In Australia, the approach has been developed by the ‘Melbourne school’ 
founded by Alan Davies.96 Some of the prominent Australian authors of political 
psychobiographies are Judith Brett, Graham Little and James Walter. 
Lasswell conjectured that the most driven politicians were those who endured doubtful 
self-esteem in childhood, caused by doubts about whether they met the strong 
expectations held for them by their parents.97 This has been challenged by later writers. 
                                                          
93 Blondel (2014, p 712).  
94 Keating in 1996, cited by Brett (2008, p 111), who also points to a similar statement by John Howard in 
2007; ‘there is no such thing as a change of government when everything continues the same’. 
95 Grint (2010, p 67). 
96 Walter (2007, p 148). 
97 He refers to future leaders as having ‘been deprived of the power to which they believed themselves 
entitled’; Lasswell (1948, pp 39-44). 
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Indeed Renshon (2014, p 136) suggested accumulated research shows most political 
leaders do not match Lasswell’s hypothesis and that many seek power to validate high 
estimates of self. For example, leaders such as Whitlam have shown an ‘expansiveness 
and optimism’ that ‘is simply not consonant with a predominantly ego defensive 
personality’.98  
Lasswell classified political actors as agitators, administrators or theorists. Agitators are 
strongly narcissistic ‘with an urge to win an emotional response from the public’.99  
Lasswell (1930, p 78) describes the agitator as ‘enough agitated about public policy to 
communicate his excitement to those about him’.100 He ‘lives in effect, to shout or write 
– to be noticed, to provoke and to leave his mark'.101 But agitators are ‘notoriously 
contentious and undisciplined’, may have been overindulged when growing up and seek 
emotional responses to satisfy underlying emotional drives. By contrast the administrator 
looks to a small group rather than the mass public while the theorist is not focused on an 
audience at all. The theorist, of whom Woodrow Wilson was the archetype, is marked by 
emotional detachment. While the agitator seeks to mobilise the people, the administrator 
works through systems and the theorist seeks to change the world. To the administrator, 
the agitator ‘exaggerates the difference between one desirable social policy and another’. 
While Lasswell regarded politicians such as Hoover as specialised administrators and 
Marx as a specialised theorist, there were those such as Lenin who were composites of 
all three types.  
Lasswell argues that the types of political actor result from underlying character. The 
compulsive character, who ‘relies on rigid, obsessive ways of handling human relations’, 
tend to become an administrator; while the dramatising character, who demands affection, 
tends to become an agitator.  
Predicting the performance of treasurers 
Drawing together the strands of literature and typographies discussed above, a matrix can 
be constructed of type of treasurer and context. It can be postulated that in benign 
economic conditions the current orthodoxy is resilient and there is little demand for 
                                                          
98 Alternative psychological factors have been posited, such as failure to experience ‘optimal frustration’ 
to explain his unusual drive; Walter (1981, pp 33-34). 
99 Davies (1980, p 14), Lasswell (1930, pp 78, 125). 
100 Lasswell (1930, p 78). 
101 Davies (1980, p101), Lasswell (1930, p 79). 
 31 
 
radical change and so managerial treasurers will be assessed favourably and the road will 
be hard for reformers. By contrast when the prevailing economic model appears to be 
failing, and so the current orthodoxy is more vulnerable to challenge, managers may seem 
complacent and reformers more favourably regarded.  
Skowronek presents a typology along these lines for US presidents, summarised in 
Table 2.3. Perhaps inspired by Plutarch, Skowronek (1993) likes to compare 20th century 
presidents with their predecessors facing similar circumstances. 
Table 2.3: Skowronek’s first typology of US presidents 
 Affiliated to orthodoxy Opposed to orthodoxy 
Resilient orthodoxy Articulation 
Munroe, Polk, T 
Roosevelt, L Johnson, G 
Bush snr 
Pre-emption 
Tyler. A Johnson, Taylor, 
Cleveland, Wilson, Nixon, 
Clinton 
Vulnerable orthodoxy Disjunction 
J Adams, JQ Adams, 
Pierce, Buchanan, Hoover, 
Carter 
Reconstruction 
Washington, Jefferson, 
Jackson, Lincoln, 
FD Roosevelt, Reagan 
Source: derived from Skowronek (1993, pp 36-57 and 2011, pp ix, xii, 29, 85-113), ‘t Hart (2011b, p 427). 
The presidents most admired by history tend to fall in Skowronek’s reconstruction cell, 
introducing reforms to address evident problems. By contrast, the disjunctive presidents 
failed to deal with a vulnerable orthodoxy, were seen as complacent or old-fashioned and 
are poorly regarded by history. The articulative presidents took on the easiest task in just 
maintaining a satisfactory status quo and are often regarded by history as bland while the 
pre-emptive presidents were out-of-step and prone to threatened or actual impeachments. 
To their supporters the pre-emptive leaders were ‘conviction politicians’ and to their 
opponents ‘zealots’. Skowronek’s approach has been generalised to political leaders more 
broadly by Laing and McCaffrie (2013) and ‘t Hart (2011b, 2014).  
It is possible to distinguish between those leaders who were content, or perhaps restricted, 
to continuing current policies and those who were reformers, establishing new paradigms 
and using (or aspiring to use) the position to change the economy. The latter are those 
who in Skowronek's second typology, sought to ‘reset political time’. Skowronek’s 
 32 
 
model, summarised in Table 2.4, classifies presidents by eras, identifying those who 
constructed the regime that dominated the era, those who managed the regime and those 
who floundered during the collapse of the regime. As ‘t Hart (2011b, p 421) puts it, rather 
than seeing history as a linear narrative, it views it as ‘cyclical time’, analogous to 
paradigm shifts in science. It could perhaps be seen as a political equivalent of the 
long-term Kondratiev waves some economists see generated by technological 
breakthroughs, demographics and/or long-term asset price speculation and credit 
booms.102 Like the business cycle, Skowronek’s eras are not of any fixed duration.  
Table 2.4: Skowronek’s ‘political time’ model of US presidents 
 Jeffersonian Jacksonian Republican New Deal Conservative 
 1800-1828 1828-1860 1860-1932 1932-1980 1980- 
Constructing Jefferson Jackson Lincoln FD Roosevelt Reagan 
Managing Monroe Polk T Roosevelt L Johnson GH Bush 
Collapsing JQ Adams Pierce Hoover Carter  
Source: based on Skowronek (1993, pp 59-406 and 2011, pp ix, 21). 
Since Skowronek’s books were written, it now looks like the conservative era ended in 
2008 with George H Bush a better fit as the manager and his son caught up in the collapse 
of the era in the global financial crisis. For a while it appeared that Obama may have 
started a new era which Hillary Clinton would have continued but the election of Trump 
has rendered the outlook very uncertain.  
The Skowronek model of political time is applied to Australian treasurers in Chapter 10, 
more specifically in Table 10.9. 
 
  
                                                          
102 See, for example, Solomou (2008). 
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Chapter Three: The job of Australian treasurer 
 
Introduction 
The term ‘treasurer’ comes from the mists of British history. There are references to a 
thesaurarius in the Domesday Book of 1086 and to a ‘Henry the treasurer’ soon after the 
Norman conquest; Chapman (1997, pp 12, 55) and Roseveare (1969, p 20). The latter 
describes the origins of the office as being ‘as mysterious as the migration of eels’. By 
the sixteenth century the Lord Treasurer ranked second only to the Lord Chancellor; 
Chapman (1997, p 13). This post was held from 1572 to 1598 by Lord Burghley, regarded 
as ‘the master mind of Queen Elizabeth’s government’, who appointed a secretary, Henry 
Maynard, effectively the first Treasury department staff member. In time the post of Lord 
Treasurer was replaced by a Treasury Commission, whose first lord became the prime 
minister (the doorplate at no 10 Downing Street reads ‘first lord of the treasury’); Bridges 
(1966, pp 17 19 and 160), Chapman (1997, p 15). The ‘second lord’ is the chancellor of 
the exchequer, the British equivalent of the Australian treasurer., where the office dates 
from Norman times. 
The office of ‘treasurer’ has survived through centuries and is replicated in Australia (and 
many Westminster parliaments). Today the treasurer presents an annual statement of the 
government’s proposed accounts, whose name ‘budget’ also dates back centuries.103 A 
former treasurer, Chris Bowen (2015, p ix), has traced back the use of the title ‘treasurer’ 
in Australia to a recommendation in the Bigge report of 1822 that a ‘colonial treasurer’ 
be appointed in NSW to administer ‘the duty of collection, receipt and account’. 
Paul Keating once said of the treasurer’s post ‘this is a very big and important job. It 
should be done in a noble way’.104 This chapter describes some aspects of the treasurer’s 
job. 
‘Second among equals’? 
A common expression to describe the prime minister is ‘primus inter pares’, that is ‘first 
among equals’, a term coined apparently by Robert Walpole, UK prime minister 
1721-1742.105 If cabinet votes to decide on a policy, while all cabinet ministers in theory 
have an equal vote, the prime minister’s view will often sway the vote of other ministers. 
The prime minister chairs the cabinet and sets the agenda, giving him or her more 
influence. The prime minister also exercises many powers which do not need the 
                                                          
103 Chapman (1997, p 17) and Roseveare (1969, p 114) explain it comes from being applied humorously in 
the 1730s to the bougette, a French term for the wallet from which Walpole as chancellor drew out the 
proposals for the year’s finances. 
104 Cited by Cumming (1991, p 329).  
105 Bennister (2012, p 39). Gladstone’s minister John Morley used the expression in his biography of 
Walpole and it may have been Gladstone who suggested the term; G Edwards (2004, p 12). 
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authorisation of cabinet.106 In Australia, the prime minister has generally been given the 
authority to choose the ministers in non-Labor governments.107 In both Labor and 
non-Labor governments the prime minister allocates ministers to the various portfolios 
(although traditionally the deputy leader is allowed the portfolio of their choice). All this 
is a matter of convention, for neither the cabinet nor the office of prime minister are 
mentioned in the Australian constitution. 
If the prime minister is ‘first among equals’ then the treasurer is generally, as one British 
expert put it, ‘second among equals’.108 In formal terms this is a slight exaggeration. Of 
the 39 men to hold the post in Australia, nine were simultaneously prime minister,109 three 
were simultaneously deputy prime minister,110 seven were ranked second in cabinet 
where there was no formal deputy,111 six were nominally third in cabinet precedence but 
arguably had more influence than the minister ranked second,112 and only fourteen, 
mostly short-term treasurers, had a lower status.113 This is clearly a more impressive 
record than that of any other cabinet office.  
It is generally agreed that ‘Treasury is a post which is by far the most important of any in 
government except that of the prime minister’114 and 'the second most prestigious job' in 
cabinet.115 Alfred Deakin once commented ‘everything that matters finds a place in the 
budget’.116 As long ago as 1915 there were references in the media to 'the important 
Treasury appointment – barely second in importance to that of the prime minister 
himself'.117 Former treasurer Bill Hayden (1996, pp 220-1), who was nearly a prime 
minister himself, wrote in his memoirs that the treasurer’s job ‘was in many ways a more 
significant role than that of prime minister’.118 Tony Abbott has said ‘after the prime 
minister, the treasurer has the broadest brief in the government because there are no issues 
that don’t involve the nation’s finance’.119 As Wallace (2015, p 15) observed, ‘good 
                                                          
106 In recent times in Australia these have been termed ‘captain’s calls’, especially by those critical of them. 
107 Labor prime ministers Watson and Rudd chose their ministers too but were careful to include those 
members who would have polled well in a caucus ballot. 
108 This is the title of Holt’s (2001) book about the UK chancellors of the exchequer, the equivalent to the 
treasurers in Australia. 
109 Watson, Fisher, Scullin, Lyons, Menzies, Fadden, Chifley, Whitlam and Hawke. 
110 Cairns, Keating and Swan. 
111 Forrest, Lyne, Cook, Page, Theodore, Casey and McMahon. 
112 Turner, Watt, Holt, Lynch, Howard and Costello. 
113 Higgs, Poynton, Bruce, Spender, Bury, Snedden, Crean, Hayden, Kerin, Willis, Dawkins, Bowen, Hockey, 
Morrison. 
114 Journalist Mike Steketee (1975, p 11) and UK chancellor of the exchequer Nigel Lawson (1993, p 248). 
115 D'Alpuget (2010, p 26). Similarly, Oakes (2004) says 'Treasury is indisputably the second-most 
important job in government'. Murphy (1980, p 118) says 'next to the office of prime minister, it was the 
most important political appointment in Australia'. Similar views are expressed by economist and 
journalist John Edwards (1996, p 188) and deputy prime minister Doug Anthony, in Oakes and Solomon 
(1974, p 52). Senior cabinet minister Greg Combet wrote that ‘Treasury was the best job in government’; 
Combet and Davis (2014, p 285). 
116 Hansard, 20 August 1912, pp 2348-9. 
117 The Age, 28 October 1915, p 7. 
118 Hayden (1996, pp 220-221).  
119 King (2014, p 258). Similar comments have been made by former treasurer Billy Snedden (1986, 
p 54:17). 
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treasurers are a prerequisite for good government and prime ministers cannot succeed 
without them’.120 
The holder of the equivalent post in comparable economies is also usually seen as the 
second-most important cabinet minister in these countries121 and has an overview of the 
operations of the government.122 Unlike in the UK though, Australian treasurers do not 
have any special privileges over those of other cabinet ministers.123 
In terms of cabinet ranking, of the portfolios existing since Federation the median ranking 
of treasurer has been third; compared to fourth for foreign minister; sixth for 
attorney-general, defence minister and trade minister; and eighth for 
postmaster-general/communications minister. 
                                                          
120 Wallace (2015, p 15). 
121 See, for example, Dell (1996, p 146), Donoughue (1985, p 48), Ganesh (2014, p 295), Holt (2001, p 84) 
and Smith (2000, p 40) for the UK; Farrell (1997, p 48) for Ireland; Henderson (1992, p 111) for New 
Zealand and Müller-Rommel (1997, p 172) for Germany. Blondel (1997, p 10) notes that other than the 
prime minister the finance minister tends to be the only minister given a co-ordinating role. Larsson (1993, 
p 208) reports a survey of European ministers which showed a large majority reporting the finance 
minister as one of the two most important ministers. A survey of experts in Western Europe by Druckman 
and Warwick (2005) found that the treasurer/finance minister role was regarded as the most important 
portfolio (not counting prime minister) in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden, second in Luxembourg and third in Italy. A similar 
exercise by Laver and Hunt (1992) covering advanced economies concluded that the portfolio was 
regarded as the most important (again not counting prime minister) in Australia, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom; the second most important in Finland, Germany, Israel, Luxembourg 
and Malta; and third most important in the United States. 
An extreme case was Gordon Brown, who ‘behaved as if he was a co-equal to the prime minister, 
dominating the Whitehall machine and, through his control of the purse strings, controlling almost every 
aspect of domestic policy’ and there are stories of prime minister Blair begging him to be told what was 
in the budget; Hasan and Macintyre (2011, p 70), Weller (2007a, p 74). One of the few dissenters is former 
shadow chancellor Roy Hattersley (2001), who points to ‘the ease with which failed chancellors are 
dumped’ and argues that ‘for almost half a century British economic policy was dictated more by world 
events than by Downing Street decisions’. 
122 See for example recent chancellor Darling (2011, p 6) for the UK, Larsson (1994, p 177) for Sweden and 
Boston (1992, p 194) for New Zealand. 
123 The UK chancellor of the exchequer has an official residence at Number 11 Downing Street, next door 
to the prime minister (whom they can visit through a connecting door), a country mansion, a robe of 
office, a great seal of office and sleepovers at Windsor Castle. They also engage in a series of rituals when 
bringing down the budget; being photographed holding a briefcase (most chancellors continued to use 
Gladstone’s ancient briefcase) containing the budget papers outside Number 11, usually being filmed at 
repose with his family the previous weekend, feeding ducks in St James Park at lunchtime on budget day, 
having a private audience with the sovereign and being allowed to drink alcohol while delivering the 
speech; all of which chancellor Nigel Lawson (1993, p 274) recalled as both ‘fun’ and serving the useful 
purpose of ensuring ‘for one day in the year the attention of the entire nation should be focused on the 
national economy and the issues involved’. The chancellor also participates in arcane rituals such as the 
‘Trial of the Pyx’, a test of the coins produced by the Royal Mint, where he is accompanied by an official 
called the Queen’s Remembrancer; Lawson (1993, p 278). 
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The demanding nature of the treasurer’s job  
Being treasurer has been called ‘the most demanding of all portfolios’, especially before 
the finance portfolio was hived off.124 A former treasurer, Bill Hayden (1996, p 221), 
recalled that as treasurer he ‘had to master every other submission before the cabinet, 
have a grasp of its detail at least as competently as the portfolio minister…the workload 
was heavy and the tasks demanding’. As treasurer, William McMahon once mused 'life 
was never intended to be pleasant for a treasurer'.125 A former Treasury officer, later to 
become treasurer himself, Leslie Bury, said: ‘in many ways the task of a treasurer is a 
hapless one. He stands at the main pressure point of government where many conflicting 
and irreconcilable forces meet’.126 John Howard argues it is the second hardest job in 
politics, after opposition leader.127  
While being treasurer brings a high profile, treasurers are generally not popular.128 
Gladstone’s chancellor Robert Lowe described his career in the following jingle;  
Twelve millions of taxes I struck off;  
Left behind me six million of gains;  
Of debt forty million I shook off;  
And got well abused for my pains.129  
The sheer demands on time and health are often cited, both in Australia and by overseas 
counterparts. Journalist Laurie Oakes (1998, p 37) has observed that ‘a treasurer is almost 
always associated with bad news’. He has also opined that 'Treasury is by far the most 
                                                          
124 Oakes (1976, p 122). Former chief of staff to treasurer Swan, Jim Chalmers, cited in Anderson and 
Greber (2013, p 17), called it ‘the most difficult job in the government’. 
125 The Sun, 19 August 1977. 
126 Hansard, 21 August 1958, p 648. 
127 Masters (1990b, p 12). Howard is well-placed to judge having been himself prime minister, treasurer, 
other ministers, leader of the opposition, shadow treasurer and other shadow minister and having spent 
over thirty years in parliament; arguably only Hughes, Menzies or Page could claim longer or more varied 
senior experience. 
128 The Australian Election Study has often compared how liked prime ministers are compared to 
treasurers and the treasurer has never been preferred. Hawke was more liked than Keating in 1987 and 
1990, Howard was more liked than Costello in 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2007 and Gillard was more liked than 
Swan in 2010; McAllister and Cameron (2014, pp 41-45). The treasurer was also less popular than the 
opposition leader defeated in 1987, 1990, 1998, 2001, 2004 and 2010.  
129 Cited in Winter (1976, p 297). Lowe had earlier said he expected as chancellor to become ‘emphatically 
disagreeable to everyone all around’; Winter (1976, p 247). Treasurers share this obloquy with their 
department; as McKinnon (2003, p 7) observes ‘treasuries have long enjoyed an almost inbuilt 
unpopularity’. 
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arduous of portfolios.'130 As early as 1908 a former treasurer argued that heading the 
Treasury was more demanding than heading other departments.131 Even someone as 
confident as Paul Keating, who regarded himself as ‘a quick study’, said that ‘this gig’s 
a tough one’.132 As he put it, ‘it’s not the hours or the work, which is hard enough, it’s the 
responsibility. Nations engage people to worry for them’.133 He later remarked ‘you get 
stressed beyond all reason – you get used to it but there’s an enormous weight on you all 
the time…no one does it easily. You adapt, but you adapt at a cost’.134   
A UK chancellor recalled working twice as hard in Treasury as when he was minister for 
defence and that ‘it was very, very tiring indeed…my health got worse and worse…I even 
got a bad attack of shingles because of my exhaustion’.135 When he handed over to his 
successor he said ‘welcome to the bed of nails’.136 One of his predecessors remarked upon 
taking up the position that he ‘soon developed an oppressive sense of awe towards my 
responsibilities’ and worked ‘harder than I have ever done in any job before or since’ in 
what he termed ‘a very wearing and mostly thankless job’.137   
Furthermore, even as a treasurer becomes more familiar with the job, in some ways it 
becomes progressively harder. Wanna (2007, p 30) observed that ‘governments run out 
of steam in undertaking budgetary reforms’ as in their early years ‘they can criticise their 
predecessors and inherited systems, they have their own new agenda and priorities and 
they have enthusiasm’. Costello was one treasurer determined to make a strong start. It 
was said of him in his first year that he was 'a treasurer determined to push things along 
right from the start – before ministers were captured by their departments'.138 But after a 
                                                          
130 Oakes (2004). A similar comment was made by treasurer Crean (1983, p 11:17). 
131 Chris Watson, Hansard, 11 December 1908, p 3165. 
132 A conversation recalled by Bob Ellis (2002, p 391). 
133 Cited by Cumming (1991, p 330). 
134 Cited by Carew (1990, p 28). 
135 Denis Healey (2004, pp 59, 62), UK chancellor of the exchequer 1974-1979. He had earlier listed 
frequent colds, deafness in one ear, arthritis in a shoulder and problems with his teeth as maladies 
consequent upon this job, adding that ‘when I had my routine medical check-up, the doctor and nurse 
together found it impossible to get any blood out of me, confirming all the popular myths about 
chancellors’; Healey (1989, p 384). 
136 Howe (2004, p 76). 
137 Roy Jenkins (1991, pp 218, 226 and 369), UK chancellor of the exchequer. He said that on a typical 
weekday he was at his desk until 8 pm and usually worked five or six hours each Saturday and Sunday. An 
earlier chancellor, Hugh Dalton (1962, p 19), described being chancellor as one of ‘the two most killing 
offices’. A later chancellor, Nigel Lawson, described the job as ‘exceptionally demanding and takes a heavy 
toll of personal and family life’, where the only relaxation during the week was during cabinet meetings; 
Lawson (1993, p 706), Paxman (2002, p 217). 
138 Oakes (1996). 
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few years he was moaning that he only had a few more budgets in him and was 
increasingly seen as bored and lazy. 
But despite this hardship it is a rare minister who turns down the treasury portfolio or 
gives it up voluntarily.139 Some treasurers such as Fadden retired due to age and/or ill 
health. Some such as Bruce quickly stepped up to become prime minister. Probably only 
Cook, keen for the social whirl in London as high commissioner, found another job more 
appealing. (The reasons for treasurers’ departures are summarised in Table 3.2 below.) 
Treasurers need to be skilled politicians more than economists  
There seems no general view that the treasurer should be an economist or accountant. 
'While they all [the ministers] accepted that the Attorney-General should be a competent 
lawyer, most agreed with the principle of the generalist' for other ministries.140 
Economic understanding is likely to be more important for treasurers than for prime 
ministers but judgement and luck are probably still more important. Even Treasury 
officials purportedly believe ‘it is more important for a treasurer to be a good politician 
than a good economist’.141 A UK chancellor of the exchequer argued that treasurers with 
an economic background often ‘try to make generalisations from situations described by 
their teachers when they were students which had actually occurred twenty years earlier. 
So economic theory tended to be based far too much on what happened two generations 
earlier’.142 He quoted with approval a former treasurer of England (and bishop of London 
– God and Mammon then having closer links) who wrote back around 1170 that; ‘non 
enim in ratiociniis sed in multiplicibus iudiciis excellens scaccarii sciential consistit’; 
which translates as ‘the highest skill of the exchequer does not lie in calculations but in 
judgement of all kinds’.143 
                                                          
139 In the UK, Holt (2001, p 84) believes ‘nobody since the second world war has turned down the job’. 
Dalton and Macmillan may arguably have preferred to be foreign secretary. 
140 Weller and Grattan (1981, p 52). 
141 Carew (1988, pp 110-111). 
142 Healey (2004, p 55). Samuel Brittan (1971, p 55), an informed observer of British politics, believed that 
‘considerable harm has resulted in some recent years from politicians in the highest positions who had 
exaggerated ideas of their own economic understanding’. 
143 Denis Healey (1989, p 383 and 2004, p 58) quoting Richard, son of Nigel. In the UK Kenneth Baker said 
of Keith Joseph that his ‘much greater intellect…made him indecisive…he could see both sides of the 
problem’; cited in Marsh, Richards and Smith (2000, p 310). 
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But as economist Joan Robinson (1959, p 17) has said, ‘the purpose of studying 
economics is not to acquire a set of ready-made answers to economic questions, but to 
learn how to avoid being deceived by economists’. A treasurer with some economic 
training is less likely to be bamboozled by economic jargon and better able to probe 
Treasury advice. Bill Hayden, later to be treasurer himself, but at the time an MHR 
studying economics part-time, once referred to the ‘control, pressures, directions and 
intimidations for which the Treasury has become so well renowned’ but hoped a treasurer 
with economic qualifications could resist them.144  
In Australia, the first treasurer with formal economics training was McMahon, followed 
by Bury and Cairns. None have been particularly admired as treasurers.145 The more 
respected Theodore and Chifley, while men of the world with an astute political ‘nose’, 
had no university education and left school early. Both were, however, dedicated 
autodidacts and had read more economics texts than many students who took a course or 
two in economics during their university studies.146 Since Holt, the only treasurer without 
a university degree of any kind was Keating, regarded by many as the most successful. 
Relative to some comparable countries, Australian ministers tend to have less specialised 
knowledge about their portfolios but more political and presentational skills.147 
Views differ about how difficult it is for potential treasurers to get a good grasp of 
economics. The eminent physicist Max Planck, who developed quantum mechanics, once 
told Keynes he had considered going into economics but decided it was too hard while 
the eminent philosopher Bertrand Russell decided against going into economics as it was 
too easy and Keynes himself regarded it as ‘an easy subject at which very few excel’ as 
it requires a combination of mathematician, historian, statesman and philosopher.148 
                                                          
144 Hansard, 23 August 1966, p 321. 
145 As Freudenberg (2009, p 81) observed, ‘there has never been any obvious relationship between the 
success of an Australian treasurer and prior training in economics’. 
146 As Charlton (2015, p 68), reviewing Bowen (2015), observed, ‘knowledge is more important than 
qualifications’. 
147 Headey (1974b, p 78), who compares Australia, Canada, Netherlands, UK and USA. 
148 Keynes (1924a, p 173), Harrod (1950, p 137), Heilbroner (1953, pp 238, 261). 
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Treasurers’ relations with prime ministers   
John Howard, who held both jobs for long periods, observed that ‘prime ministers will 
always leave the dirty work to treasurers’.149 As he explained in Howard (2010, p 537), 
‘it is the role of the treasurer always to argue for expenditure restraint. It is the 
responsibility of the prime minister, at various times, to determine that additional 
expenditure in certain areas is necessary’. Political journalist Annabel Crabb has opined 
that ‘any treasurer who isn't a bit more of a tightwad than the PM is probably in the wrong 
job’.150 Academic Rodney Tiffen (2017, p 76) opines that treasurers typically ‘see 
themselves as custodians of policy purity, while prime ministers are more electorally 
attuned’. Journalist George Megalogenis (2015) remarked ‘we tend to think of prime 
ministers and treasurers as mortal enemies’. The same holds overseas; President Obama 
once remarked that ‘you know how finance ministers are; they’re more conservative’.151 
Edwards (1996, p 168) noted that ‘a successful treasurer needs the support or at worst the 
neutrality of the prime minister’. Bowen (2015, p xii) concludes from his analysis of 
treasurers that ‘successful treasurers work in partnership with a supportive prime 
minister’. Howard (2010, p 537) has written that ‘the dynamic of the cabinet process is 
that the backing of the prime minister is essential to winning the approval of any economic 
change or reform which involves a measure of short- or long-term political pain’. 
Bramston (2014, p 124) records Paul Keating as once remarking ‘you can’t preside over 
such fundamental adjustments without a substantial and deep unity of purpose between 
the prime minister and the treasurer.’ Interviewed by O’Brien (2015, p 178), Keating 
observed that this is not always available; many prime ministers take the view that they 
‘need reforming treasurers like they need a dose of rabies’. Simon Crean observed ‘in the 
end a treasurer is only as strong as the prime minister allows him to be’.152 Weller and 
Cutt (1976, p 78) observe that in cabinet the treasurer is usually the best-briefed 
minister153 but ‘if he is to win consistently he requires the prime minister’s support’. It 
has been suggested ‘the tag team is the better model for a reformist government, with the 
                                                          
149 Cited in Masters (1990b, p 10).  
150 Crabb (2014). She later commented in Crabb (2016, pp 171-2) that ‘tensions between treasurers and 
prime ministers are a common and sometimes even productive feature of government’.  
151 He made the comment to a finance minister who is an exception to the rule; Greece’s then finance 
minister Yanis Varoufakis who complained that Obama’s treasury secretary was less sympathetic to his 
complaints about the austerity programme being forced on the Greek government; Parker (2015, p 49). 
152 Simon Crean, referring to his father’s period as treasurer, cited in Hocking (2012, p 102). 
153 Perhaps along with the finance minister. 
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treasurer as agitator and the prime minister keeping an eye on the politics.’154 Laing and 
McCaffrie (2013, p 85). observed that ‘in terms of setting policy and implementing 
regime change, prime ministers commonly operate in tandem with their treasurers’; with 
Curtin/Chifley, Hawke/Keating and Howard/Costello given as ’prime examples’. 
Bruce/Page was an earlier example of a prime minister and treasurer who had a warm and 
productive relationship. On the other extreme, Hughes and Watt never got on and it is 
unsurprising that Watt did not last long in the role and never achieved what his abilities 
could have allowed with a more supportive leader. Watson, Fisher and, for some of their 
terms, Lyons and Chifley got around the problem of relations with the prime minister by 
taking both roles themselves.155  
In Europe Larsson (1993, p 207) observed that ministers of finance ‘are bound to develop 
a special relationship with prime ministers’. In the UK, Enoch Powell once remarked ‘if 
the prime minister isn’t on the chancellor’s side, nobody’s on his side’.156 Denis Healey 
said 'the most important single thing for a chancellor is to work well with his prime 
minister'.157 But the prime minister is (usually) the boss. Lawson (1993, p 249) recalled 
that when Margaret Thatcher appointed him chancellor she told him to get his hair cut. 
With the treasurer generally regarded as the second most important position, prime 
ministers may be wary of treasurers who could prove to be rivals. Bennister (2012, p 49) 
said of John Howard that he was wary of Costello, being ‘keenly aware of the way Paul 
Keating had used his position as treasurer to launch his ultimately successful defeat of 
sitting prime minister Bob Hawke’. Fear of giving a rival a large stage is also why Tony 
Abbott resisted pressure to replace Joe Hockey as treasurer with the more able Malcolm 
Turnbull. It has been said that the ideal treasurer ‘already has the requisite seniority yet 
                                                          
154 Megalogenis (2006, p 95). Similarly, Laing and McCaffrie (2013, p 85) observe ‘prime ministers have 
tended to be the agenda setters and symbolic leaders of reform, securing support within the electorate, 
whilst their treasurers have had more substantial roles in implementation’.  
155 Keating contemplated this too but Don Russell persuaded him against the idea; O’Brien (2013).  Some 
colleagues warned him that taking on both jobs from 1945 to 1949 drove Chifley to an early death. Hawke 
had laughed at this suggestion when Keating made it in 1988; Hawke (1994, pp 450-1). Yet Keating 
suggested to Mark Latham he be both opposition leader and shadow treasurer; Latham’s dairy 
13 December 2003, in Latham (2003, p 255). Gladstone in the UK had also combined the roles in what 
Jenkins (1998, p 7) terms ‘an exhausting arrangement’. 
156 Cited in Hennessy (1989, p 394). 
157 Cited in Kynaston (1980, p 149). 
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is not a threat to the prime minister’.158 Chifley’s loyal support for Curtin is probably the 
gold standard in this respect.  
Treasurers’ relations with other cabinet ministers  
A difference between cabinets in Westminster systems159 and presidential systems160  is 
that Westminster systems require cabinet ministers to express views across portfolios and, 
being recruited from the ranks of parliamentarians, ministers usually do not have 
extensive experience in the subject of their department when they are first appointed.161  
Westminster ministers are sometimes termed amateurs but are required to be a mix of 
political generalists, technical specialists and managers.162 They are therefore more 
mobile ministers, who hold more than one portfolio during their careers. This also makes 
them more able and willing to discuss matters outside their own portfolios. 
But there are differences in the extent to which ministers typically range outside their own 
departments. The treasurer tends, along with the prime minister obviously, to have a 
broader responsibility in cabinet and their views are given more weight.163 As Weller 
(2007b, p 240) observed, Treasury (and since 1976 Finance) is the only department that 
prepares briefs on almost all cabinet submissions. 
Treasurer Bill Hayden (1996, p 211) reflected that ‘the job has also required one to be 
quite tough, even rough, in rebuffing a good friend in cabinet’.164 This would have 
troubled a sensitive soul like Hayden. Some other treasurers were more brusque; John 
Dawkins commented ‘I don’t go into the cabinet room to make friends’.165  
As a recent political insider put it, treasurers ‘are always caught between the rock of fiscal 
rectitude and the hard place of ministerial ambition’.166 
                                                          
158 Holt (2001, p 90). This implies not always appointing the best person; as Holt puts it, ‘the notion that a 
chancellor has to be papabile is not one that has always appealed to the papal incumbent’. 
159 For example, countries with a British heritage such as Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, India and 
New Zealand, but also others such as Italy, Japan and Sweden. 
160 For example, the United States, Brazil and Mexico. 
161 In countries, similar to Australia only 6 per cent of appointees to finance and trade ministries were 
classified as ‘specialists’ by Blondel (1985, pp 203-205). 
162 Blondel (1991a, pp 7-8). 
163 Tiernan and Weller (2010, p 177). 
164 Hayden (1996, p 211). 
165 Cited in The Age, 29 December 1991. As treasurer, Dawkins became known as bad-tempered as he 
‘savaged’ proposals advanced by spending ministers; Blewett (1999, p 291). 
166 Chief of staff to Greg Combet, Allan Behm (2015, p 38). 
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Treasurers’ relations with other stakeholders 
Holt (2001, p 157) noted one indication of the toughness of the job, and their frequent 
unpopularity with cabinet colleagues, is that beleaguered treasurers and finance ministers 
often enjoy attending conferences with their overseas peers. They may indeed find their 
‘only political friends’ among this ‘finance ministers’ trade union’.167   
As well as his leader, there are other important stakeholders with whom a treasurer needs 
a sound relationship to be effective. For Labor treasurers, the caucus is the main one. The 
role of the party room in non-Labour governments is less clear, although for many Liberal 
treasurers, the attitudes of powerful Country Party leaders were important. When minor 
parties control the Senate, the ability to negotiate effectively with them matters. The 
unions in the case of Labor treasurers and the main business leaders for non-labour 
treasurers are also important. 
Increasingly, with financial deregulation, it has been important for Treasurers to have the 
confidence of financial markets. Contrary to Keating's boast that he 'had them in his 
pocket', often it seems that the markets limit the actions of modern treasurers, likely 
imparting a conservative bias to policy. Ratings agencies have a considerable amount of 
power and influence (utterly unjustified by their performance, in the view of many). Their 
influence on markets has increased the leverage of financial journalists. 
The treasurer’s job as a ‘stepping stone’ or ‘poisoned chalice’  
An inherent attraction in being treasurer is that it is important work that can be very 
satisfying. But another part of the appeal is that it is often seen as a ‘stepping stone’ 
towards the prime ministership.168 It raises public profile and allows the incumbent to 
demonstrate an ability to do a difficult job. Of Australia’s 29 prime ministers, nine had 
previously served as treasurer, whereas only three had been foreign minister, three 
defence minister and three attorney-general.169 Many of the classic leadership challenges 
                                                          
167 Lawson (1993, p 274). A predecessor, Denis Healey (1989, p 419), agrees, commenting that ‘belonging 
as we did to the most depressed and unpopular caste in the political life of all our countries, as 
untouchables we developed a friendly freemasonry which transcended our political differences’. 
168 Weller (2007b, pp 263-4) refers to '…the potential successors who might feel inclined to wrestle the 
position from their leader are often treasurer'. Keating and Costello are obvious recent examples. For a 
time, Hockey was also seen as a potential replacement prime minister.  
169 This is similar to the pattern in post-war Europe where Treasury or its equivalent was the department 
in which a prime minister has been most likely to have served before gaining the top post; Müller and 
Philipp (1991, p 144).   
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to prime ministers have come from their treasurer or equivalent; not just Hawke/Keating 
(or the undeclared Howard/Costello rivalry) in Australia but Adenauer/Erhard in 
Germany, Chretien/Martin in Canada and Blair/Brown in the UK. 
As contemporary chroniclers put it, ‘treasurers naturally see themselves as future 
leaders’.170 Paul Keating once remarked that ‘the only course for me if I was ever going 
to be able to reach the leadership was to do every other single one of the jobs that were 
hard’.171 John Howard comments ‘a prime minister who has been a treasurer has a certain 
understanding of it all’.172 Harold Holt was not particularly interested in being treasurer 
but was keen to take the job lest someone else use it to establish themselves as a rival 
successor to Menzies as prime minister.173 (By contrast, arguably the next most 
prestigious cabinet post, foreign minister, while perhaps ‘third among equals’, has not 
been regarded as a stepping stone and has often been used to park thwarted or overthrown 
leaders).174 
On the other hand, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer Denis Healey famously referred to 
the post as 'the poisoned chalice'.175 A few years later, the same term was used by 
Australian treasurer Paul Keating when he was appointed to the job.176 Kelly (1994, 
p 455) wrote that ‘the Treasury portfolio always damaged its incumbent, sooner or later.’ 
Davies (2006, p 40) observed that in the UK ‘a long spell at the Treasury has typically 
been damaging to the incumbent’s chances of higher office, partly because unpopular 
decisions are an occupational hazard, and partly because of the structural tension between 
the two positions’. A UK chancellor once described as ‘the only Treasury forecast in my 
time that was ever correct’ a prediction upon taking office that he would ‘soon be the 
most unpopular man in Britain’177 and a predecessor blamed being chancellor for his not 
                                                          
170 Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 77). Carney (2009) comments ‘the orthodox view developed 
through the 1980s that this portfolio, second only to the prime minister’s post itself in weight and 
importance, was the path to winning sufficient credits with the public as a politician with serious intent’. 
171 Cited in Carew (1990, p 28). As well as treasurer (1983-1991) Keating also served as deputy prime 
minister and had been NSW president of the Labor Party. 
172 McGregor (1987, p 41). 
173 Howard (2014, pp 267, 285) and Reid (1961b, p 12). 
174 Weller (2014, p 342) gives as examples Casey (seen as a threat to Menzies), Hasluck (defeated 
candidate for PM), and deposed leaders Hayden, Downer and Rudd. 
175 In April 1979; Kynaston (1980, p xi). 
176 In 1983. Carew (1988, p 67), D'Alpuget (2010, p 26). 
177 Norman Lamont (2004, p 147), UK chancellor of the exchequer 1990-1993. Over a century earlier 
outgoing chancellor William Gladstone wrote to his successor that, 'no man wants so much sympathy as 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, no man gets so little' and the successor, Robert Lowe, (whom Maloney 
(2006) called ‘Gladstone’s Gladstone’) agreed that he was certain to be more disliked than other ministers 
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becoming leader.178 Fred Daly (1977, p 215) reported that some believed Gough Whitlam 
appointed Jim Cairns as treasurer as a means of destroying him as a rival leader. 
There is certainly a long history of the treasury and its minister being unpopular. King 
James I once said ‘all treasurers, if they do good service to their masters, must be generally 
hated’.179 Keynes (1918, pp 304-5) regarded Treasury as having an essential role in ‘the 
balancing of one department’s claims against those of other departments’ but this ‘tends 
to make it an unpopular department’. Ben Chifley once reflected that 'treasurers are 
notoriously unpopular. They are loved by nobody, not even their own colleagues. The 
hand of every man is against them. Nobody wants to give them anything, but everybody 
wants to get something from them'.180 Paul Keating once described as a downside of the 
job that it involved ‘being the lightening rod. That means occasionally you get covered 
in carbon’.181 Tiffen (2017, p 76) commented ‘it is unusual for treasurers to have a warm 
and positive public image’. Kelly (2007, p 358) reported that when in 2007 the Liberal 
cabinet was contemplating defenestrating John Howard and making Peter Costello prime 
minister, one factor which stayed their hand was that ‘many ministers had their own war 
stories about dealing with the treasurer’. As the (fictional) Danish prime minister Birgitte 
Nyborg said defending her finance minister, ‘he holds the purse strings; name me one 
popular finance minister’.182 
Holding onto power while treasurer will be easier if the treasurer is able to manipulate 
economic conditions so as to create a pre-election boom. There is certainly anecdotal 
discussion along these lines, with suggestions that governments and treasurers take 
‘tough’ decisions in the budget immediately after an election but increase spending and 
cut taxes in budgets prior to elections. In the academic literature, this phenomenon is 
posited to be itself a possible cause of swings in economic conditions, giving rise to what 
is called the political business cycle. The empirical evidence for its existence, summarised 
in Alt and Rose (2007, p 851), is at best mixed. To succeed requires a government to 
                                                          
as he was closest to 'that most susceptible part of an Englishman's person, the pocket of his trousers'; 
cited in Kynaston (1980, pp 26, 31). 
178 Denis Healey (2004, p 65), asked why he lost the leadership ballot, replied ‘the basic reason was that I 
had to do so many unpopular things when I was chancellor’. 
179 Cited by Roseveare (1969, p 41). 
180 Ben Chifley, quoted by Crisp (1960, p 153).  
181 Carew (1992, p 261). John Howard (2014, p 301) reflected ‘treasurers are never overly popular, as I 
well know’.   
182 Speaking of Bent Serjø in the Danish TV series Borgen, 2010. 
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control the major determinants of economic conditions (despite monetary policy being 
increasingly controlled by independent central banks and a greater role being played by 
international economic conditions); to have good enough forecasts and understanding of 
economic linkages to know how and when to change economic settings; and the voters 
(or the commentators who inform them) not being forward-looking enough to see the 
longer-term consequences of easier macroeconomic policies. But even if these 
considerations are too strict for manipulation of economic conditions in this way to work, 
governments may still think tax cuts and targeted increases in spending win votes from 
those favoured by them.  
As a test of the extent to which the treasurership reduces the public popularity of its 
holder, Table 3.1 lists the swings to/from treasurers in their seat since they took up the 
position, and compares this with the national average to or from their party. (Many 
treasurers are excluded due to the short period they held the post, or because they were 
also prime minister at the time. Turner and Forrest were unopposed in their seats in 1901 
and 1903.)  
The most spectacular swing against a treasurer was that against Theodore after the great 
depression hit (exacerbated by the splits in the Labor Party). Since the second world war 
almost all treasurers have seen their vote drop after taking up the post. They have usually, 
but not always, polled worse than the national swing to or from their parties would imply, 
suggesting that being treasurer in itself reduces their popularity.  
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Table 3.1: Cumulative change in share of primary vote of treasurer since election 
prior to his becoming treasurer (compared to that of his party183 nationally) 
(First election as treasurer) First election as treasurer  Second Third 
Watt (1919) -9 (+2) 
 
  
Bruce (1922) +8 (-4)   
Page (1925) +5 (+1) +10 (-1) na184(-3) 
Theodore (1931) -58 (-22)   
Casey (1937) -2 (0)   
Menzies (1940) +12 (-6)   
Chifley (1943) +20 (+10)   
Fadden (2nd stint) (1951) 0 (0) -8 (-3) -15 (-3)  
Holt (1961) -6 (-4) -2 (-1)  
McMahon (1966) +3 (+4) -7 (-3)  
Snedden (1972) -5 (-2)   
Crean (1974) -1 (0)   
Hayden185 (1975) -7 (-6)   
Lynch186 (1977) -7 (-6)   
Howard187 (1980) -2 (-2) -6 (-4)  
Keating (1984) -1 (-2) -10 (-4) -8 (-10) 
Willis (2nd stint) (1996) -6 (-6)   
Costello (1998) -2 (-8) -3 (-4) -1 (-1) 
Swan188(2010) -11 (-5) -12 (-10)  
Morrison (2016) -1 (-3)   
Main sources: derived from Parliamentary Handbook, 5th, 11th, 12th, 16th, 18th, 26th to 33rd editions; Jaensch 
and Hughes (1987, p 394). 
 
 
                                                          
183 For the purposes of this table, the Liberal and National parties, and their predecessors, are treated as 
a single party. 
184 Page was unopposed in 1929. 
185 Strictly speaking Hayden was no longer treasurer by the time of the December 1975 election but had 
only been dismissed, with the rest of the Whitlam government, the month before. 
186 Strictly speaking Lynch was no longer treasurer by the time of the December 1977 election but had 
only stepped down the month before. 
187 Howard’s month as treasurer before the 1977 election is disregarded. 
188 Disregarding that Swan stepped down as treasurer three months before the 2013 election. 
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Tenure of treasurers  
The Westminster system reduces the security of ministers, especially in Australia where 
an election must be held within three years; not only must ministers retain the confidence 
of the prime minister and/or their parliamentary party colleagues but the government must 
stay in office. They are highly unlikely to emulate the tenures of ministers untroubled by 
elections such as Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko who served from 1957 to 1985 
or Saudi foreign minister Saud Al Faisal who was in place from 1975 to 2015.   
The tenure of some Australian treasurers has been very short: one day in the special case 
of Hawke appointing himself an interim treasurer, two weeks by Whitlam in the 
‘duumvirate’, and around three months for Watson, Poynton and Bowen. At the other 
extreme, Costello served for over a decade and Fadden, Chifley and Keating all served 
for over eight years. These four longest serving treasurers between them accounted for 
about a third of the time served by all treasurers while the eleven shortest serving only 
accounted for 4 per cent between them. This marked skewing in the length of service is 
such that while the mean tenure has been three years, the median has been two. There 
have been 39 treasurers but only 29 prime ministers. 
Table 3.2 shows the reasons why Australian treasurers left the office. The most common 
reason was the government in which they served losing office.189 The second most 
common cause was being demoted by their prime minister. The demotions have reflected 
a mix of poor performance, scandals and political manoeuvring.190 It is more common for 
treasurers to leave voluntarily than for prime ministers,191 but it is still a small proportion 
of the exits. As Enoch Powell famously observed, (almost) ‘all political lives…end in 
failure’.192 Like prime ministers, treasurers suffer from an ‘illusion of irreplaceability’ 
                                                          
189 In western Europe, the most common reason for the departures of ministers, accounting for 
approaching half of all departures, was also their party no longer being in government; Blondel (1991b, 
p 159). Holt (2001, p 257) observes that in the UK ‘most chancellors’ careers have ended painfully’ 
although few have been openly sacked. 
190 In deciding whether to dismiss a treasurer, a lot will depend on the nature of the prime minister. 
Dowding and McLeay (2011, p 159) have classified prime ministers as butchers, dominators, operators 
and consensus seekers. Butchers are more likely to demote a treasurer whereas the other categories are 
more likely to try to improve their performance. 
191 Cross and Blais (2011, p 135) observe that in Westminster systems ‘leaders rarely leave voluntarily’. In 
Australia, only Barton, Menzies (the second time), and perhaps Fisher, have left the prime ministership at 
a time of their choosing. The most common reasons for prime ministers losing office have been electoral 
defeat and overthrow by parliamentary colleagues; Strangio (2011, p 210). 
192 The full quotation is ‘all political lives, unless they are cut off in midstream at a happy juncture, end in 
failure, because that is the nature of politics and of human affairs’; Powell (1977, p 151). 
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and fear an ‘empty life’ away from power and may be discouraged from stepping down 
by advisers, courtiers and spouses who would also lose status; Bynander and ‘t Hart 
(2006). While death has claimed three prime ministers in office, with the pressures of 
office arguably a contributing cause in all cases, no treasurers have died in office. While 
two sitting prime ministers (Bruce and Howard) have lost their seats in parliament, 
Theodore is the only treasurer to suffer this embarrassment. 
Table 3.2: Reasons for treasurers leaving office 
Government lost office 19 Turner I, Watson, Lyne, Fisher I, Forrest II, 
Fisher II, Forrest III, Higgs, Poynton, Page, 
Theodore II, Fadden I, Chifley, Snedden, 
Hayden, Howard, Willis II, Costello, Bowen 
Demoted193 10 Casey, Spender, McMahon, Bury, Crean, 
Cairns, Lynch, Kerin, Willis I, Hockey 
Rose to prime minister194 2 Bruce, Holt 
End of temporary period as 
treasurer 
3 Scullin, Whitlam, Hawke 
Resigned (but stayed in 
parliament) 
8 Forrest I, Forrest IV, Watt, Theodore I,  
Lyons, Menzies, Keating, Swan 
Retired (and left parliament)195 5 Turner II, Fisher III, Cook, Fadden, Dawkins 
Lost parliamentary seat (1)196  
Died in office 0  
Still in office 1 Morrison 
 
An international comparison of post-war tenures by Herman (1975, p 61) showed that the 
Australian treasurers were among the longest lasting. This period, however, is atypical 
                                                          
193 While it is conceivable that a move to another cabinet post may not be regarded as a ‘demotion’, in 
most if not all the cases here the treasurer was displeased about the move. 
194 Fadden (in his first stint) and Chifley also rose to become prime minister but stayed treasurer. 
195 Fadden was 64 when he left the treasurer’s job, almost retirement age, whereas Dawkins was only 46. 
Fisher and Cook took up the post of High Commissioner in London at the ages of 53 and 60. 
196 Theodore lost his seat but the Government had been defeated as well. 
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for Australia as it is dominated by the long treasurerships of Fadden and Holt during 
Menzies’ record reign from 1949 to 1966. In western Europe Larsson (1993, p 219) shows 
that the average tenure of finance ministers between 1945 and 1984 varied between 
5-6 years in Sweden and Germany to less than three years in the UK, Belgium, Finland 
and Italy. These averages are longer than the typical Australian tenures. 
For ministers as a whole, across the world from 1945 to the early 1980s, it has been 
estimated that the average tenure is only two to four years, raising doubts about whether 
it should even be referred to as a career.197 At best, as Blondel (1985, p 13) put it, ‘the 
ministerial career is viewed as a gamble, where the stakes are high, but failure is fairly 
routine.’ In the UK ‘the old adage about chancellors is that the only way to get out with 
your reputation intact is to get out early’.198 Popularity is likely to decline as any 
‘honeymoon effect’ wears off, it becomes less plausible to blame problems on a 
predecessor and decisions cumulatively offend various groups of voters.199 A British 
study by Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2012, p 247) showed that ministers are more 
likely to survive in their posts if they are educated, female, young and highly ranked.  
It has been observed that on average European finance ministers tend to stay in office 
longer than do their cabinet colleagues.200 But Gunnar Sträng is likely to remain an 
outlier, having served for 21 years (1955-1976) as finance minister in Sweden.   
Horiuchi, Laing and ‘t Hart (2015) have shown that long-serving party leaders can be a 
‘hard act to follow’ and their successors tend to serve shorter than average terms in the 
post. A classic example would be when the founder of the Liberal Party, Sir Robert 
Menzies, stepped down after a sixteen-year reign as prime minister, the party then 
churned through four leaders (Holt, Gorton, McMahon, Snedden) in seven years and 
when their second longest-serving leader John Howard was defeated they had three 
leaders in two years (Nelson, Turnbull, Abbott), with none ever gaining the stature of 
Menzies and Howard. There is a mixed pattern among treasurers in this respect. The 
                                                          
197 The mean tenure is 3½ years but the median only 2½ years; Blondel (1985, p 82). The mean tenure 
tends to shortest in Latin American countries and longest in communist countries and around 4 years in 
those countries most comparable to Australia; Blondel (1985, p 91). 
198 Holt (2001, p 256). Thomas Jefferson once remarked that ‘no man will ever bring out of the presidency 
the reputation which carries him into it’; cited by Simonton (1987, p 76). 
199 A statistical study of US presidential popularity suggested it decayed over time like a radioactive 
element (but may kick up as the next election neared, giving a parabolic shape); Stimson (1976). 
200 Blondel (1991a), Larsson (1993, pp 218-9). The risk of being sacked is 20 per cent less for holders of the 
top two portfolios; Huber and Martinez-Gallardo (2008, p 176). 
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dominant Keating was followed by a succession of short-lived treasurers over the next 
five years (Kerin, Willis, Dawkins and Willis again). Holt’s lengthy period as treasurer 
was followed by relatively short stints from McMahon, Bury and Snedden. On the other 
hand, Fadden’s lengthy tenure was followed by a smooth handover to the long-serving 
Holt. Chifley and Costello’s long terms were ended by changes of government but the 
incoming treasurers served for nine and six years respectively. 
The reasons for Australian treasurers leaving office are contrasted with those in three 
comparable countries in Table 3.3. One feature of the table is that there has been a higher 
turnover of Australian treasurers than of their counterparts in Canada, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom. As with treasurers, the government losing office is the most 
common cause of UK chancellors and Canadian and New Zealand finance ministers 
ceasing to hold the post, with reshuffles the next most common cause. Fewer chancellors 
and NZ finance ministers retired than treasurers. Dismissals are rare in all countries, 
although some ‘resignations’ or ‘retirements’ may have occurred under the threat of 
dismissal. Australia was uniquely fortunate in having no treasurers dying in office.  
The tenures for treasurers and the reasons for their departures are compared in Table 3.4 
with the other key portfolios that have been part of every ministry since federation.201 The 
mean tenure for treasurers of 2½ years202 is comparable to the 2-3-year average tenure in 
the other ministries. Those holding the higher status ministries of treasury and foreign 
affairs are less likely to be moved in reshuffles, but more likely to retire, than those with 
the junior portfolios of trade and communications. Two treasurers (Bruce and Holt203) 
were promoted directly from treasurer to prime minister; more than for any other 
ministers. Theodore is the only treasurer to have lost his seat (at the same time as the 
government fell) but this has been more common in other senior portfolios. Defence 
ministers are most likely to be dismissed leading Hugh White (2006) to call the portfolio 
the ‘graveyard of political ambitions’. 
                                                          
201 Barton’s cabinet also had a minister for home affairs but it was not clear which portfolios should be 
regarded as the successors. In addition, the vice-president of the Executive Council and a minister without 
portfolio were included in Barton’s cabinet but these are not comparable to the portfolios in the table. 
202 In this calculation, the mean treats, for example, Forrest’s four periods as treasurer as four rather than 
one observation. 
203 Chifley succeeded Curtin as prime minister almost immediately after Curtin’s death but remained 
treasurer. 
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Table 3.3: Reasons treasurers & equivalents left office: number of cases 1901-2016 
 Australia Canada New 
Zealand 
United 
Kingdom 
 Treasurer Minister of 
Finance 
Minister of 
Finance204 
Chancellor of 
the Exchequer 
Government lost office 19 14 12 15 
Lost parliamentary seat 0 0 1 0 
Reshuffled 9 7 7 6 
Dismissed from ministry 1 0 1 2 
Rose to prime minister 2 0 2 7 
End of temporary period  3 0205 1 0 
Resigned  8 7 4 7 
Retired  5 5 1 1 
Died in office 0 1 3 2 
Still in office 1 1 1 1 
Total 48 35 33 41 
Mean tenure (years) 2.4 3.3 3.5 2.8 
Main sources: derived from Table 3.2, McKinnon (2003, pp 428-431), Canada Ministry of Finance website 
(http://www.fin.gc.ca/comment/minfin-eng.asp), Jenkins (1998).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
204 Colonial treasurer to 1907, and treasurer from 1996 to 1999 when the finance minister was the junior 
minister. 
205 Two brief periods of acting ministers are excluded from this table.  
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Table 3.4: Reasons ministers left office: number of cases 1901-2016 
 Treasurer Foreign 
affairs206 
Defence  Attorney 
general 
Trade  Post/ 
comm’s207  
Gov’t lost office 19 19 17 18 18 17 
Lost seat (1)208 2 4 0 1 3 
Reshuffled 9 7 13 9 21 19 
Dismissed  1 2 5 3 3 3 
Rose to PM 2 1 0 1 0 1 
Temporary  3 0 1 1 1 0 
Resigned  8 2 5 4 9 11 
Retired  5 6 8 6 2 0 
Died in office 0 2 3 0 2 0 
Still in office 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total 48 42 57 43 58 56 
Mean tenure  2.4yrs 2.7yrs 2.0yrs 2.7yrs 2.0yrs 2.1yrs 
Median tenure 1.3yrs 1.7yrs 1.4yrs 2.3yrs 1.2yrs 1.3yrs 
 
Many regard the average tenure of under three years as inadequate. One view is that ‘a 
minimum of three years in a portfolio is required for someone to be able to exert influence 
over the department’.209 Another is that a minimum of three years is necessary to carry 
                                                          
206 Minister for External Affairs from 1901 to 1916 and from 1921 to 1970, Minister for Foreign Affairs 
(and Trade) since 1970. There was no formal minister from 1916 to 1921 but effectively the role was held 
by prime minister Billy Hughes who is taken to be the minister for the purposes of this table. 
207 Postmaster-General from 1901 to 1975, Minister for Post and Communications from 1975 to 1980, 
Minster for Communication(s) 1980 to 1987, Minister for Transport and Communications from 1987 to 
1996, Minister for Communications (Information Economy) and the Arts from 1996 to 2007, Minister for 
Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy from 2007 to 2013, and Minister for 
Communications from 2013. 
208 Theodore lost his seat but the Government had been defeated as well. 
209 Blondel (1993a, p 327).  Kellner and Crowther-Hunt (1980, p 211) in the UK suggest that given the ‘long 
time-scale required both for the formulation and implementation of most policies’ it is ‘extremely difficult 
for the average chancellor in his 2½ years to counter the Treasury view in any coherent rational way’. 
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out a major new policy.210 The UK minister Anthony Crosland opined ‘I reckon it takes 
you six months to get your head above water, a year to get the general drift of most of the 
field, and two years really to master the whole of the department’.211 The ministers 
consulted by Weller and Grattan (1981) said that as it takes months to get on top of a 
department, ministers should stay in the one job for a minimum of three years. Most 
thought, however, that after five or six years it was time to move, as most decisions would 
require changing earlier decisions.212 
Post-treasurer careers  
Other than the five cases of retirement, outgoing Australian treasurers remained in the 
parliament. In nine cases the outgoing treasurer had a second (or in Fisher’s case third 
and Forrest’s fourth) turn as treasurer.213 As noted above, eight subsequently became 
prime minister. Two left to become High Commissioner in London. Two later served as 
governors-general. A number engaged in some form of business career (if only serving 
on boards) after leaving parliament but arguably only Watson (who headed the National 
Roads and Motorists Association) and Theodore achieved any prominence in these 
roles.214 It is notable that former treasurers seem to have less glittering corporate careers 
than they expected, Keating and Costello being two recent examples.215 As has been said 
of Australian former prime ministers, some former treasurers ‘wander around aimlessly, 
seeking out a meaningful role…criticising their successors’.216 They may suffer from 
what Gareth Evans termed ‘relevance deprivation syndrome’.217 It has been said that 
‘there is nothing so ex- as an ex-politician’.218  
                                                          
210 Rose (1971, p 406). 
211 Cited in Headey (1974a, p 99). A similar view is put by Paxman (2002, p 208) who opines ‘unless they 
are familiar with the subject from a conscientious period as opposition spokesman, ministers will spend 
much of their first year learning the job, dependent upon the permanent officials. In the second year they 
may begin to make a mark. Often it is only by the third year – at which point they may well be on the way 
out – that they are fully in command’. 
212 Weller and Grattan (1981, p 56). 
213 Bowen, or less likely Swan, may yet add to this list as they remain in parliament. 
214 Walter Massy-Greene, who had been an assistant treasurer, went on to become ‘an outstanding 
company director of his era’; Lloyd (1986). See also Appendix 2 and Kemp (1964). 
215 Perhaps this is because, as Nigel Lawson (1993, p 271) remarked in his first address to the House of 
Commons as chancellor, few ‘have left office with their reputation enhanced’. 
216 Robert Ray, cited in Strangio (2011, p 209). 
217 In a speech to the National Press Club on 18 February 2010, Gareth Evans lamented that this term and 
‘streaker’s defence’ were the expressions for which he was most remembered. 
218 Ignatieff (2013, p 166). An almost identical statement was made by Paxman (2002, p 262). 
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By comparison, in western Europe, ‘most ministers in most countries are thus in 
parliament after leaving office; but the duration of their stay in parliament is usually rather 
short’, around three to four years.219 Blondel (199b, p 167) reports that former academics 
and lawyers are the most likely European ex-ministers to return to their former 
professions. 
 
  
                                                          
219 The United Kingdom is an outlier as a significant number of ministers have been appointed to the House 
of Lords for life; Blondel (1991b, p 164). 
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Chapter Four: Andrew Fisher and Joseph Cook: 
the miners who became treasurers 
 
Prologue 
In 1885 a young miner from Scotland named Andrew Fisher stood on the deck of the 
passenger ship New Guinea contemplating the new life awaiting him in the Australian 
colony of Queensland. He was unaware that boarding a similar ship later that year would 
be a man who as Joseph Cook would go on to hold many of the same posts he would; 
Labor220 MLA, government minister, treasurer, prime minister and finally High 
Commissioner. 
The two men had very similar backgrounds. Indeed, to borrow some words from Plutarch, 
in their origins they ‘resemble each other so closely that it seems that god originally 
fashioned them out of the same mould’.221 They were both born into mining families in 
small mining villages in the United Kingdom; Fisher in Crosshouse in Scotland and Cook 
in Silverdale in central England. Both had fairly rudimentary formal education but were 
self-disciplined and keen on self-improvement, studying most evenings. Both were 
working in the mines in their teens and during winters Sunday had a literal meaning as 
the only day they might see the sun. Both were men of faith, and could have become 
ministers of religion rather than parliamentary ministers in different circumstances. Both 
came to believe their prospects would be better in Australia and as young men moved 
there. Once in their new country they both became involved in trade unionism, joined the 
Labor Party and were elected to colonial legislatures.  
The federation of Australia in 1901 saw both switch to the new federal parliament but by 
now only Fisher was still representing Labor. The two men’s careers now changed from 
parallel paths to greatly diverging ones. Andy Fisher stayed with his long-held principles 
and working class sympathies while Joseph Cook gradually affected middle or upper class 
mannerisms and advocated conservative policies. The two men would become political 
rivals, most notably leading the two sides of politics in the 1913 and 1914 elections, 
                                                          
220 Prior to around 1912, the party variously used the spellings ‘Labor’ and ‘Labour’ before settling on the 
latter; Faulkner and Macintyre (2001, p xi), McMullin (1991, p ix). 
221 Plutarch (c100, p 198), Prologue to the Lives of Demosthenes and Cicero. 
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winning one apiece. They had very different policy approaches as treasurers; Fisher being 
an activist treasurer while at his political peak and simultaneously prime minister while 
Cook was a reluctant treasurer in the twilight of his political career.222 They also had very 
different styles when both ended their careers returning to Britain as Australian High 
Commissioner. This chapter looks at how this divergence occurred. 
Table 4.1: The parallel lives of Joseph Cook and Andrew Fisher 
 Joseph Cook Andrew Fisher 
Born December 1860 August 1862 
Migrated to Australia Dec 1885 – Feb 1886 June-August 1885 
Elected to state parliament June 1891 May 1893 
State minister July 1894 – Sep 1899 December 1899 
Elected to federal parliament March 1901 March 1901 
Appointed federal minister June 1909 April 1904 
Treasurer July 1920-Nov 1921 Nov 1908 - June 1909; 
April 1910 – June 1913; 
Sept 1914 – Oct 1915 
Prime minister June 1913 – Sept 1914 Nov 1908 - June 1909; 
April 1910 – June 1913; 
Sept 1914 – Oct 1915 
Resigned from parliament November 1921 October 1915 
High Commissioner in 
London 
Nov 1921 – May 1927 Oct 1915 – April 1921 
Died July 1947 Oct 1928 
 
 
                                                          
222 Cook was one of only two prime ministers to serve as treasurer after holding the higher office, the 
other being Arthur Fadden. SM Bruce served as assistant treasurer after being prime minister.  
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Both men have been rather forgotten. They were overshadowed by more colourful 
contemporaries Deakin and Hughes. Not helping matters were that Cook burnt most of 
his papers while Fisher’s languished in London for many years. Neither wrote memoirs. 
Around the centenary of his first becoming treasurer there was a sudden spate of Fisher 
biographies.223 Cook, and particularly his period as treasurer, remains neglected.224 
This chapter looks at the reasons why these two men’s views diverged so far after starting 
off so close.  
Family and childhood 
Andrew Fisher was born on 29 August 1862 at Crosshouse in Ayrshire, Scotland. Family 
lore cited by Day (2008b, p 12) said they were descendants of Scottish rebel William 
Wallace. Andy’s father, Robert Fisher, a coalminer and beekeeper, helped establish a 
co-operative society which set up a library which the young Andy used to supplement his 
primary school education. His mother, Jean Garven, was a blacksmith’s daughter.  
A boyhood friend recalled young Andy as known for his ‘good conduct, honourable 
dealings and kindliness of nature’.225  As a young man, his brother recalled him as being 
‘interested in the educational and general welfare of the village of Crosshouse’.226   
When he was three, Andy was knocked unconscious by a kick to the head by a runaway 
cow. This was to affect him the rest of his life for it left him with limited hearing in one 
ear, making him appear aloof at noisy social gatherings.227  
Joseph Cooke was born in the Staffordshire mining village of Silverdale on 7 December 
1860, the second child of William and Margaret Cooke. Growing up in poverty, he also 
had only primary level education. 
                                                          
223 Day (2008b), Humphreys (2008) and Bastian (2009). Perhaps surprisingly, Bowen (2015) does not 
include Fisher among the dozen treasurers he profiles. Fisher appears as a minor supporting character in 
plays about Deakin by Kylie Tennant (1952) and O’Malley by Boddy and Ellis (1974). 
224 Cook’s service as treasurer is accorded just one sentence, and without any achievement mentioned, in 
essays about him by Denning (c1952b), Fitzhardinge (1959), Hughes (1976), Rickard (2000) and Wildman 
and Hague (2016) and not mentioned at all by Fricke (1990) and Gorman (2013). 
225 Hugh Murdoch, letter to Arthur Jose 12/11/33 in Jose papers, University of Melbourne archives 65/12. 
226 Letter from David Fisher, July 1934, Jose papers, University of Melbourne archives. Douglas (1998) 
describes life in Crosshouse at this period. 
227 Bastian (2009, p 8), Day (2008b, pp 7, 45), Anderson (2001, p 190). His daughter suggests the impaired 
hearing may have contributed to his having a speech impediment as a child; P Fisher (1962, 1976). 
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From the age of thirteen, or perhaps earlier, Andy was working in the coal mines.228  
Robert Fisher’s work had left him with ‘black lung’ and the family needed the income. 
Being born slightly before Fisher, Cooke started working in a mine even younger, at the 
age of nine. A new Education Act saw him back in the classroom not long after, but at 
twelve he was back in the mine after his father died in a mining accident.229  
Religious beliefs 
Fisher was firmly in the ‘Christian socialist’ tradition. He grew up a Presbyterian and was 
a regular church-goer all his life, using biblical references in his everyday speech.230 His 
family were members of the Free Church of Scotland, known as the ‘wee free’; whose 
adherents were ‘known for thrift and temperance in private life’.231 The church was 
non-hierarchical and ‘instilled in him a sense of equality, self-governance and collective 
decision-making’.232 Marginson (1970, p 187) claimed his ‘views on the nature of man 
largely reflected his Presbyterian upbringing’. According to Bastian (2009, p 13), Fisher 
believed ‘men were tempted by wealth and power to behave badly towards others’. In 
1891 he contemplated taking up an offer by a local reverend to pay for him to attend the 
University of Melbourne with an eye on joining the ministry but decided against it.233   
In his early days at least, Cooke was even more deeply religious than Fisher and he had 
attracted good congregations to hear him preach at age 16.234 He went further towards 
joining the ministry, passing some exams to do so, but was prevented from taking up a 
position by the need to support his family after the death of his brother and father. His 
religious beliefs led him to different conclusions than did those of Fisher. Cooke was 
initially a member of the ‘primitive Methodism’ also known as ‘ranters’ or ‘Clowsites’, 
                                                          
228 A report when he was first elected says that he started work at ten, but stopped after legislation fixed 
the minimum working age as twelve; Gympie Times, 6 May 1893, p 5. A letter from his brother David in 
July 1934 recalled him starting work ‘about 11 years of age’ and that he worked underground until he 
emigrated; Jose papers, University of Melbourne archives. But in an account corrected by Fisher himself 
it is said he started working in the mine at 13; Fisher (1910). Day (2008b, p 18) suggests some of the 
confusion may have arisen by Fisher saying he had been ‘down the mine’ at an earlier age, but referring 
to taking his father lunch rather than working there. 
229 Cook told the NSW parliament of having ‘a vivid recollection of being dragged out of bed by my mother 
every morning at 4 o’clock to go to work’; NSW Parliamentary Hansard, 12 September 1894, p 386. 
230 Williams (2013, p 55). 
231 Steven (2001, p 65), Williams (2013, p 56). 
232 Bastian (2009, p 13). 
233 In a letter to Arthur Jose, dated 12 November 1933, Hugh Murdoch, a contemporary in Crosshouse, 
recalls receiving a letter from Fisher in which he expressed an interest in being a church minister; Jose 
papers, University of Melbourne archives. 
234 An anonymous report in the Cumberland Argus and Fruitgrowers’ Advocate, 8 February 1913. 
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who had split from the mainstream Methodists whom they regarded as too concerned with 
money and status and they mainly comprised working class devotees who liked to 
worship in the open air and placed great emphasis on self-improvement.235 Their views 
overlapped less with trade unionism than did Fisher’s Presbyterians; they only wanted the 
government to remove the impediments to self-advancement. Over time Cook shifted to 
mainstream Methodism and then to a more conservative minority view within it, 
becoming a ‘puritanical renegade’236 with a ‘determinedly old testament view of the 
world’.237 He opposed Sunday opening of Taronga Zoo lest it distracted people from 
church.238 
Both men had a reputation for dourness. Cook was known for having ‘no time for 
frivolity’239 and was uninterested in sport, dancing or music.240 Fisher was introduced to 
British readers by an Australian correspondent as ‘he jokes with difficulty and very 
drily’.241 He has also been recalled as having ‘no sense of humour at all’242 but took some 
interest in sport and played cricket.243  
A contemporary newspaper wrote of Fisher that ‘a more modest and unassuming man 
never associated with politicians’; Anon (1908, p 1). Fisher was a much warmer man but 
even Cook could lighten up somewhat in private. Cook had a cheery smile for friends and 
‘a tranquillity of soul’.244 Fisher was renowned as ‘a man of irreproachable honesty’.245  
                                                          
235 Williams (2013, p 64). 
236 Williams (2013, pp 67-69). 
237 Williams (2013, p 24). 
238 Murdoch (1966, p 6). 
239 Buchanan (1940, p 4). Murdoch (1968, pp 10-11) describes his ‘deficient sense of humour’ and how ‘he 
did not laugh readily’. Souter (1998, p 109) refers to Cook as ‘humourless’. Alfred Deakin (1906, p 177) 
believed Cook’s ‘want of humour’ prevented him being more popular than his party chief Reid. Wildman 
and Hogue (2016, p 37) describe Cook as ‘the most humourless of Australia’s prime ministers’. 
240 Abjorensen (2015, p 202) refers to Cook as a ‘dour wowser…devoid of any positive attributes’. Peter 
Cook (1994, p 2), however, claims his grandfather was ‘never a wowser’. 
241 Manchester Guardian, 25 January 1917, p 6. 
242 His private secretary Malcolm Shepherd (1958, part 2, p 73). Scott (1936, p 43), for example, describes 
him as having ‘the minimum of humour’. A contemporary journalist, ‘Amicus Curie’ (1912, p 7) also refers 
to his ‘lack of the sense of humour’. 
243 He captained a parliamentary team against one led by the governor-general. His modest scores of 5 
and 11 were at least better than Hughes’ effort of 2 and 1. Only Malcolm Shepherd scored more than 11 
in the second innings. The Argus, 8 December 1908, p 6. 
244 Clark (1987, p 109). Bebbington (1988, pp 91-92) says Cook, while often dour in public, displayed a 
sense of humour with his family. Anonymous (1909a, p 564) also called him ‘very genial’ outside 
parliament, while Anonymous (1905, p 216) wrote he had ‘a smile for a friend, a sneer for the world’. See 
also Murdoch (1998, p 110). Denning (c1952b, p 1) describes him as a ‘kindly and pleasant man’. 
245 Amicus Curie (1912). 
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Emigration 
The Ayrshire newspapers Fisher read in the local library ran stories of how immigrants 
from the area had made good in Queensland, notably Thomas McIlwraith, who rose to 
become a wealthy grazier and premier of Queensland.246 McIlwraith visited Ayrshire in 
1884 promoting Queensland as a destination and Fisher was convinced it offered ‘greater 
freedom and opportunities’ and ‘a better chance’,247 especially once he had been 
blacklisted for his union activities. 
Andy and his younger brother James migrated to Australia. They arrived in Queensland 
in 1885 and found work at the Burrum coal fields. Andrew soon became a manager. He 
moved to the Gympie goldfields but when he went on strike was dismissed. He obtained 
an engine driver’s certificate and gained another position. 
Cooke meanwhile had married Mary Turner, a teacher from a nearby village. After 
Cooke’s mother remarried, the couple decided to emigrate to Lithgow in New South 
Wales, following in the footsteps of Mary’s brother. Cook found a job in the Vale of 
Clwydd colliery in March 1886 and Mary and their son joined him in early 1887. It was 
at this time that Cook dropped the ‘e’ from his name.248 They went on to have nine 
children during their 62 years of marriage and Dame Mary, as she became, spent a lot of 
time working for the Red Cross. 
Unionism and self-improvement 
Both Andy Fisher and his father were ardent unionists and blacklisted for their activism. 
Fisher became involved with trade unionism early, meeting the pioneering UK labour 
leader Keir Hardie at evening school and discussing economics and history with him.249 
Hardie, who went on to found the Independent Labor Party and become one of the first 
British Labour MPs, was a Christian socialist and the national secretary of the Miners’ 
                                                          
246 Murphy (c1983). 
247 Fisher (1910), Dougan (1998), Steven (2001, p 67). 
248 Murdoch (1996, p 24). 
249 Cockburn (1956, p 66). 
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Union. In the early 1880s Fisher visited Hardie on a regular basis250 and they kept in 
touch, catching up again in Australia and Britain as fellow parliamentarians.251  
By 1879, though only seventeen, Fisher was secretary of the Crosshouse branch of the 
Ayrshire Miners’ Union, which was wiped out by a ten-week strike in 1881. Fisher 
continued his active involvement with trade unionism once he settled in Australia. He 
joined the Amalgamated Miners’ Association and by 1890 was secretary and in 1891 
president of its Gympie branch. In 1891 he became secretary of the Gympie Joint Labor 
Committee and then president of the Gympie branch of the newly formed Workers' 
Political Organisation, later known as the Labor Party. He represented Gympie at a 
Labor-in-Politics conference in Brisbane in August 1892. Similarly, once settled in 
Australia, Cook became secretary of the local Miners’ Association.  
Fisher was not driven by ego. As Douglas (1988, p 3) observed, ‘the overriding reason 
why Fisher wanted to reach the top of the political ladder was because experience had 
shown that only from such a vantage point would he have any hope of putting the 
principles he advocated into practice’. 
Both were keen on self-improvement. Fisher taught himself shorthand and accounting 
and read widely on social sciences and economics.252 One of his youthful friends recalled 
him ploughing through the works of Thomas Carlyle and Ralph Waldo Emerson as a 
young man.253 In his personal finances Fisher was a ‘keen and careful investor’.254   
Cook studied shorthand and book-keeping during lunch-breaks and after his shift, hoping 
to become an accountant or journalist. He also read more widely but not with any apparent 
                                                          
250 Bastian (2009, p 23). 
251 Hardie saw Fisher again in 1907 in Australia while on a convalescent cruise. Hardie wrote to Fisher later 
on economic conditions in the UK where Hardie’s colleagues were ‘doing all we can to get the government 
and local authorities to tackle the question of unemployment’. He also requested a resolution of the 
Australian parliament favouring the enfranchisement of women which he hoped could be influential in 
the British parliament; 4 November 1908, Fisher Papers, MS 2919/1/41. In 1911 when Hardie 
accompanied Fisher on his homecoming to Ayrshire, and presided over a Miners Union dinner in his 
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people’; Kilmarnock Standard, 20 May 1911, p 5. They also had breakfast together at 11 Downing St at 
the invitation of Lloyd George; Pearce (1951, p 79). Fisher was a little cautious about associating with 
Hardie too much to avoid damaging Australia’s relations with the UK government and being labelled too 
radical by the Australian press; Cockburn (1956, p 237), Fyfe (1935, p 118).   
252 Bastian (2009, p 10). The Kilmarnock Standard, 24 June 1911, refers to him as an ‘omnivorous reader’. 
253 Hugh Murdoch to Jose; Jose papers, University of Melbourne archives. 
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my financial proposals is that they do not have the Scotch head’. 
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special interest in economics.255 Like Fisher, he esteemed Emerson and another favourite 
author was Whitman.256 By 1890 he was a part time auditor with the local council. 
Cook put considerable effort into improving his public speaking. While from the 
humblest of origins, by the latter stages of his parliamentary career, ‘in manner and 
language, he comported himself as though born to a public school and Oxford’.257  
Initially a poor speaker he trained himself to become an assertive debater: it was said ‘he 
would crush and exterminate’258 and ‘he does not know when to stop fighting’259. This 
was complemented by a thorough grasp of parliamentary standing orders.260 
Fisher also developed his public speaking but not to the same extent. He was a competent 
orator but with no great flair.261 His public speeches sometimes suffered from 
procrastination in their preparation.262 This meant that his grasp of the topic was 
                                                          
255 P Edwards (2004a, p 115) described Cook as ‘devoted to self-improvement’. Anonymous (1913c, p 128) 
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(1968, p 17), however, suggests that being self-taught he did not develop critical skills. He was engaging 
in hyperbole, though, when he later described Cook as a man who ‘never had an original thought in his 
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256 Cook, recalling his early life, in Bright (1896). 
257 Smith (1933, p 49). 
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having ‘a resilience unparalled in Australian political history’. A bizarre simile for his parliamentary 
speaking style came from Billy Hughes who said he was like ‘an ichthyosaurus attempting the gavotte’; 
cited by Souter (1998, p 121). Fitchett (1919, p 8) called him ‘perhaps the most formidable debater in the 
federal parliament’. Two anonymous writers in 1913 called him a ‘clear, interesting, forceful’ speaker and 
‘one of the most capable debaters in state or federal politics’. Norman Makin (1982, p 64) recalls Cook 
had ‘a voice of satin smoothness’ and was very capable in debate. Campbell-Jones (1935, p 148) says ‘his 
delivery always suggested the pulpit’, a sentiment echoed by Amicus Curie (1912, p 7). 
259 Amicus Curie (1912, p 7). Another journalist called him ‘a bitter tongued debater’ who had learned the 
parliamentary game in a hard school; Anon (1914, p 92). 
260 Shepherd (1958, part 2, p 109) comments ‘what he did not know about parliamentary procedure was 
not worth knowing’. 
261 As Greenwood (1955, p 222) observes, like Curtin and Chifley, Fisher had ‘an ability to express simply 
the convictions of the ordinary working man’. Anonymous (1913a, p 70) states ‘his style is good Doric, 
straight and to the point’. Anon (1908, p 1) wrote ‘he has neither imagination nor eloquence’ but was 
‘clear, intelligent and precise’. Makin (1961, p 30) says ‘while having no great gifts as an orator, he could 
speak clearly and vigorously’, and Buchanan (1940) and Fitzhardinge (1964, p 120) have similar views. 
Ithurial (1909, p 6) wrote ‘he never soars, he never scintillates’ while Anon (1910, p 572) described his 
‘poverty of qualifications’ in oratory. Amicus Curie (1912, p 7) claimed ‘verbatim reporting of Mr Fisher 
would be unintelligible’. But critics such as Biggs (1924, p 3), Eggleston (1953, p 11) and Ellis (1962a) go 
too far in calling him ‘inarticulate’. Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2015, p 170) characterise him as ‘a 
mediocre rhetorician at best’ known for ‘pedestrian speaking’.  
262 His secretary Malcolm Shepherd (1958) describes his exasperation with this. 
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sometimes not fully appreciated.263 Scott (1936, pp 38-39) argues Cook was a better 
orator than Andrew Fisher, ‘more fluent… more resourceful with an ampler 
vocabulary…more polish, more finesse’ (although Fisher had ‘more force, more 
fervour’), perhaps due to his experience in sermonising. 
Cook saw self-improvement as involving adopting more formal styles of dress and a more 
aloof manner. Sir Norman Cowper (1951, p 36) opined that an observer of ‘Cook’s voice, 
appearance and manner’ would never’ have dreamed that here was a man who started life 
as a working miner and was one of the first small band of Labor politicians’. Cook had a 
growing sense of self-importance. When he read that a journalist described him 
(accurately) as having ‘a pointed beard, a bald head, the mannerisms of a methodist 
minister and a habit of washing his hands with invisible soap’, he threw the offending 
magazine the length of his balcony.264 
Both were known for their diligence. A contemporary writer said of Fisher that he had 
‘no eccentricities except the love of hard work’.265 In one month Fisher visited 36 towns, 
received 60 deputations, addressed 51 meetings and covered over 3,500 miles by train, 
coach and buggy, horseback and railway tricycle.266  
Both men were very involved with the community in their new homeland. Fisher was 
active in the Independent Order of Oddfellows and the Gympie Industrial Co-operative 
Society, as well as serving as superintendent of the Presbyterian Church Sunday School. 
As well as the church, Cook was involved with many local charities. 
Colonial parliaments 
Fisher was the successful Labor candidate for Gympie at the 1893 Queensland Legislative 
Assembly elections (surprising even himself by the margin with which he topped the poll) 
and became vice-chairman of the parliamentary party. 
In his 1893 election address he advocated a progressive land tax, ‘the establishment of a 
state department of labour to which men can apply for work at a minimum wage as a 
                                                          
263 Rankin (1928), for example, wrote in his obituary that ‘if Fisher ever studied political economy deeply 
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264 Anon (1918, p 244). 
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right’, and a ‘state bank so that those engaged in agriculture and productive operations 
generally may have use of the public funds at half the rate of interest charged by private 
banks for the same money’.  He was critical of the government's budget, saying the state 
was 'living beyond its means' and advocating cuts in military spending. He argued for a 
halt to immigration, at least for as long as unemployment was high, and suggested it was 
being encouraged by those who wanted to see land prices bid up.267 
This first parliamentary term was influential on his thinking.268 The collapse of the 
Queensland National Bank led to him refining his ideas about a state bank. Polden (1977, 
p 66) tells of Fisher’s interest in the Queensland note issue. His experience of the great 
strikes led him to favour the establishment of arbitration tribunals.   
Fisher lost his seat at the 1896 poll and worked as an engine driver and municipal council 
auditor while awaiting the next election. One reason for the loss was the strong campaign 
against him by the conservative press and while out of parliament Fisher helped journalist 
Henry Boote found the Gympie Truth, concentrating on its financial management.269 He 
was a delegate to the June 1898 Queensland Labor convention which adopted a platform 
including establishment of a government bank. 
He returned to the Queensland parliament in 1899. He served under Anderson Dawson 
as minister for railways and public works in the world’s first labour government but, as 
it only lasted a week, obtained no real experience.270 He twice unsuccessfully introduced 
bills to establish a scheme for workers’ compensation. He became the party's main 
speaker on budgetary and financial matters.271 
                                                          
267 Gympie Times, 15 April 1893, p 2 and 25 April 1893, p 3. 
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Cook, meantime had become president of the first Labor Electoral League in Lithgow in 
May 1891.272 The next month, with some luck, he won Labor preselection and then the 
Lithgow-based seat of Hartley in the New South Wales parliament.273 He advocated the 
eight-hour day, free trade (abandoning earlier beliefs in protectionism), better education, 
female suffrage and land reform. In the latter, he was so influenced by Henry George’s 
advocacy of a single tax on land that he became the local secretary of the Land 
Nationalisation League. 
With a group of like-thinking fellow members, Cook founded a Labour Party in the New 
South Wales parliament and by October 1893 was leading it. In January 1894, he chaired 
the first Intercolonial Parliamentary Labour Party conference, which Fisher attended.274 
This was probably the only occasion the two men met before Federation. 
The paths start to diverge 
Fisher never wavered from his Labor beliefs. Cook, however, claimed he could not accept 
being bound by a pledge to support all caucus decisions. He left Labor and in 1894 
defeated an official Labor candidate for his seat of Hartley. The Free Trade premier, 
George Reid, offered Cook the portfolio of Postmaster General and he accepted, serving 
for four years of great activity.275 He then briefly served as Minister for Mines and 
Agriculture, where he appointed William Farrer to experiment with wheat strains to great 
success, before Reid’s government fell in 1899. He chaired an inter-colonial conference 
which led to telephone calls across the Pacific. When he first accepted Reid’s offer of a 
ministry, Cook retained some Labor sympathies and rationalised that being in cabinet 
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Labor, Cook prophetically warned of parliamentarians that ‘the moment they get into a state of comfort, 
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meant he was able to do more for the working classes.276 But he soon moved into the 
middle class, both geographically and emotionally.277 
Federal parliament 
Fisher campaigned enthusiastically for Federation, and easily won the federal seat of 
Wide Bay, which encompassed his state seat of Gympie.278 Cook was much less 
enthusiastic about the federal sphere. When Reid announced his move to the federal 
parliament, Cook saw himself as a future NSW premier. Reid’s Free Trade Party, 
however, prevailed on Cook to contest the seat of Parramatta (which then extended west 
to Lithgow) at the federal election, with Reid promising him a ministry if the party formed 
government. Cook was elected unopposed and lined up behind Reid in opposition to the 
Barton-Deakin Protectionist government. 
Both Fisher and Cook showed early signs of ambition. Fisher stood unsuccessfully for 
the leadership in 1901.279 In August 1905 he was elected to the new post of deputy leader, 
beating Billy Hughes by a single vote.280  
Cook was less successful, missing out on the deputy leadership when it became vacant in 
1903 and he was not offered a ministry in Reid’s only cabinet in 1904. This was likely 
due to suspicions of residual radicalism and led him to adopt more conservative 
stances.281  
In the first decade of Australia’s parliament, the free traders were almost always in 
opposition so Cook’s career lagged behind that of Fisher. In 1902 Fisher represented the 
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Australian Labor Party at the coronation of Edward VII, which doubled as a 
honeymoon.282 He was appointed to the Labor caucus’ economics committee in 1903. In 
1904, he served as minister for trade and customs (ranking fifth in the cabinet) in the 
Watson government. While longer lasting than Dawson’s, it also lacked a majority and 
was out of office after four months. 
Fisher was also more active in championing positive reforms. In 1903 he called for the 
creation of a federal statistical department to produce uniform statistics.283 He supported 
state-owned enterprises as ‘sound, beneficial and necessary’ and able to face 
competition.284 In March 1908 Fisher successfully moved in the House that old age 
pensions be introduced, one of his lasting legacies. Fisher was elected as a Queensland 
delegate to the Labor Party’s triennial conferences in 1905, 1908, 1912 and 1915, and the 
delegates unanimously chose him as president in 1908. At this conference, Fisher argued 
for better social statistics, particularly on the distribution of wealth, more representation 
of women and for a history of the Australian labour movement to be prepared.285   
Fisher also continued his self-education on economic matters, gathering with some 
colleagues on Sundays to read and discuss theoretical economics. Henry Higgins was 
surprised to see this, noting that on the occasion he observed them they were discussing 
Böhm-Bawerk’s writings on interest, quite a technical piece.286 
Fisher’s performance was rewarded. When Watson resigned in October 1907, Fisher beat 
Hughes and Spence for the ALP leadership.287   
Cook was also climbing the political ladder. In 1905 he became the deputy leader of the 
Free Trade party, which by then was marketing itself as the ‘anti-socialist’ party. With 
Reid often attending to his legal practice in Sydney, Cook was frequently leading the 
party in the House. Cook was a hard-working and shrewd parliamentarian, with a 
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reputation for dry speeches but witty interjections. In 1909 he succeeded Reid as party 
leader unopposed. 
Political beliefs 
Fisher’s core political beliefs were largely unchanged throughout his adult life. As he 
wrote to Keir Hardie ‘a man can escape from a country, but he can never escape from 
himself. I imagine my beliefs will stand the Australian climate’.288 He combined a utopian 
Christian socialism with a belief in practical measures. A much-quoted statement of 
Fisher was that ‘no Labour Party worthy of the name can deny that its objective is 
socialism, but no socialist with any parliamentary experience can hope to get anything 
for many years to come other than practical legislation of a socialist nature’.289 At the 
1908 conference he declared ‘we are all socialists now’ and ‘indeed the only qualification 
you hear from anybody is probably that he is not an extreme socialist’.290 Fisher wanted 
‘to improve social conditions as far as is humanly possible under the existing constitution’ 
and described as ‘my kind of socialism’ giving ‘the typical labourer…the fullest 
opportunity to rise in life’.291 He distinguished between the ‘speculating’ and ‘labouring’ 
classes and sought the greatest opportunity for the latter. But he was no revolutionary.292 
A study of the Queensland labour movement in the late 19th century by Rayner (1947, 
p 27) concluded Marxism had a negligible influence and this was true of Fisher. Indeed, 
we have no less than Lenin’s word that he was no communist. Lenin (1913, p 243) 
described Fisher’s Labor Party as ‘a liberal-bourgeois party … the leaders of the 
Australian Labor Party are trade union officials, an element which is everywhere most 
moderate and capitalist-serving, but which in Australia is altogether peaceful and purely 
liberal’. The article is discussed in Kuhn (1989). Fisher has been classed as in the 
centre-right of the Labor Party by Stockley (1976, p 238). While Fisher would sometimes 
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employ the Labor rhetoric of caricaturing big business as the ‘fat man’293, he had no 
objection in principle to workers also being shareholders.294 
Cook by contrast was changing his political beliefs quite markedly as he rose from the 
working class to the middle class and above. The trade union movement which had 
provided his ladder up was now dismissed as ‘an organisation for developing class feeling 
and disseminating hatred in the community’.295 Cook started referring to ‘the workers’ in 
the third person: he was no longer one of them.296 He now attacked Labor for ‘preaching 
the doctrine that men will necessarily become better if you improve their environment’.297 
Trusts and monopolies were now regarded as part of the ‘natural law’ rather than a 
problem to be addressed.298 
Fisher’s first term as treasurer and prime minister 
In the parliament elected in 1906 Deakin’s party with between 16 and 20 members 
governed with the support of, but not in a formal coalition with, the Labor Party’s 26 
members.299 The Labor Party succeeded in having legislation passed but some members 
were unhappy about not being in office. Fisher characteristically urged caution on his 
colleagues but in late 1908 caucus voted to end its support for Deakin. In November 1908 
Fisher became prime minister in a minority government (supported by the Deakinites). 
While some writers had high hopes, the realists recalled Watson’s experiences leading a 
minority government. Fisher had, in Day’s (2008, p 153) words, ‘swapped power without 
office for office without power’.  
Fisher followed Watson’s practice of also serving as treasurer. He attached importance to 
‘keeping the books’, perhaps a legacy of his father’s work as treasurer of the 
co-operative.300 Fisher had specialised in finance in parliament. Being ‘modestly well off 
                                                          
293 For example, Hansard, 7 September 1908, p 133. The ‘fat man’ image was taken from political cartoons 
in the Worker and the Bulletin. 
294 Day (2007). 
295 Hansard, 4 August 1910, p 1208. 
296 Murdoch (1996, p 68). 
297 Hansard, 19 June 1906, p 369. 
298 Hansard, 19 June 1906, pp 363, 369. 
299 Deakin was accused by Forrest and others of being dominated by the Labor leaders; for example, 
Forrest refers to reliance on Labor support as ‘humiliating’ in a letter to Deakin, 27 July 1907, justifying his 
resignation; Forrest Papers, NLA. But Deakin replied to Forrest on 5 August 1908 that ‘Fisher has been 
quite as courteous as Watson so far – never threatened, never dictatorial’. 
300 Murdoch (1998, p 17). He later wrote that Fisher took the treasury portfolio ‘so that the final word of 
honest decision and distribution would be his alone’; Murdoch (2013, p 26). 
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in his private life he had acquired an understanding of banking and finance through the 
management of his own investments’.301 Fisher was concerned to avoid being the first 
federal treasurer to post a deficit.302 In March 1909 Fisher attended a premiers’ conference 
in Hobart, but declined to discuss a financial settlement, believing it was for a future 
government to decide. 
During his first term as prime minister Fisher made an important policy speech in Gympie 
outlining Labor’s programme of proposed reforms and how they would be financed. He 
did not, however, spend enough time preparing it and it was regarded as too long and 
detailed, rather dull and poorly delivered.303 Given his lack of a majority, it was 
essentially a platform for the next election. Among other policies he foreshadowed a land 
tax to fund old age pensions, nationalisation of the iron industry and a federal currency.304   
In 1909 Fisher’s government was defeated on the floor of the House by a ‘fusion’ of most 
of Deakin’s followers with those of Forrest and the free traders now led by Cook. 
Although the free trade group was the largest of the three fusing parties, Cook made no 
serious attempt to wrest the leadership for himself and served as Deakin’s defence 
minister and effectively his deputy.305 
Deakin derided the objecting Labor members as ‘like a lot of unruly urchins dragged 
screaming from a tart shop’.306 Given how long Labor had supported Deakin in 
government, the Labor members regarded Deakin’s attitude as churlishly ungrateful and 
it created much ill-will, ending Deakin’s friendship with Fisher. Fisher posed on the 
hustings the question ‘What can you do with a man like that?’ and the electorate’s answer 
was to remove him from office.307 Cook was once again in opposition. 
Fisher’s second term as treasurer and prime minister 
Fisher won the April 1910 election convincingly on a platform that included land tax, a 
Commonwealth Bank and a note issue, old age pensions and arbitration but the character 
                                                          
301 Murphy (undated, p 16). 
302 Humphreys (2008, p 24). 
303 Day (2008, pp 170-2). 
304 The speech was published as Fisher (1909). 
305 Murdoch (1996, p 79). 
306 Cited by Day (2008, pp 172, 177), McMullin (1991, p 67) and Smith (1933, p 108). 
307 Lloyd (2000, p 80). 
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of Fisher was also important.308 This was the first federal election to change the 
government and Fisher’s was the first Australian government to have clear control over 
both Houses. It was also the world’s first majority Labor national government. 
Unsurprisingly, Fisher was re-elected ALP leader unopposed. It was a very active 
government, passing 113 acts in its term. As well as the implemented measures, well 
ahead of his time Fisher also advocated a decimal currency system.309  
Fisher introduced Australian government banknotes, derided by his critics as ‘Fisher’s 
flimsies’, backed 25 per cent by gold and effectively gave them a monopoly by 
introducing a 10 per cent tax on private banknotes.  The issue of notes under the control 
of the government and not fully backed by gold was decried in some circles.  
Fisher introduced a tax on unimproved land levied at a penny per pound for properties 
valued over £5,000 and progressively increased to a rate of 6d per pound with an 
additional penny for absentee owners.  He commented that ‘the land tax, while making a 
substantial contribution to revenue, has operated beneficially in inducing some owners to 
subdivide their large estates, providing homes for more settlers and adding to the 
productiveness of the land’.310 He claimed the creation of a large number of small 
landowners was ‘my kind of socialism’.311 A land tax had been advocated by the followers 
of Henry George in Australia, who included a significant element in the Labour 
movement. Fisher was familiar with George’s work and may have heard him speak.312 A 
progressive land tax had been successfully introduced in New Zealand in 1891 and in 
1906 the New Zealand prime minister discussed it with Watson.313 The Treasury secretary 
was reportedly not keen on the idea.314  
                                                          
308 Fisher (1909). This was the first election with two clear alternative prime ministers in Fisher and Deakin. 
Labor made Fisher’s character a major issue and Dyrenfurth (2008, p 19) argues Fisher’s image was a 
major factor in their victory. Stockley (1976, p 253) regards the electorate’s cynicism towards the ‘fusion’ 
as another factor. 
309 He also advocated the metric system; Hansard 4 August 1910, p 1135. 
310 Fisher’s budget speech, Hansard, 1 August 1912, p 1582. 
311 In an interview in Stephens (1910). 
312 Henry George had addressed a public meeting in Kilmarnock, very near Fisher’s home, in 1884 and 
toured the Australian colonies for three months in 1890; Bastian (2009, pp 24-25). Sawer (2012, p 72) 
comments that advocacy of land tax by Henry George and John Stuart Mill had been influential in 
Australian progressive political circles. 
313 Dilley (2013). A progressive land tax had also been advocated by Thomas Paine (1792), a likely influence 
on Fisher’s thinking.  
314 Punch, 16 September 1909, p 428. 
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Fisher introduced anti-trust legislation in 1910, in the spirit of the US Sherman Act. In a 
foreshadowing of a current political debate, the Australian Industries Preservation Act 
meant that the prosecution in a monopoly case only needed to have the effect of restraining 
trade rather than proving the intention and shifted the burden to the defence of proving 
that any restraint of trade was in the public interest.315 Labor wanted to strengthen the 
ability of the legislature to control ‘the financial monsters who…seem to multiply 
exceedingly in our commercial deep’.316 This was a focus of both the 1913 election 
campaign317 and the referenda campaigns of 1911 and 1913. 
Fisher opened his first budget speech, for 1910-11, by noting that the previous financial 
year was the first not subject to the Braddon clause, which had required three-quarters of 
federal revenue to be passed to the states. Fisher introduced a 25 shillings per capita 
payment to the states. In discussing spending, most attention was paid to military 
expenditure and pensions. In the speech for 1911-12 he was able to point to strong growth 
in revenues from a growing economy. The speech for 1912-13 again paid a lot of attention 
to military expenditure. 
Fisher conducted two referendum campaigns aimed at giving the federal government 
greater economic powers. The first set in April 1911 included two propositions. The first 
was four amendments to section 51 of the Constitution to extend commonwealth authority 
to all rather than just interstate trade and commerce; expand the corporations power; give 
the parliament power to control wages and conditions of employment; and add a new 
power to control combinations and monopolies. The second proposal would have 
empowered the commonwealth to nationalise monopolies. Both proposals were 
decisively rejected in all states other than WA, in part due to insufficient campaigning 
(Fisher was in the UK for much of the time) and division in Labor ranks. Prominent Labor 
identities such as Holman in NSW opposed giving more power to the federal 
                                                          
315 Sawer (1956, p 94). 
316 Hughes, as acting prime minister, also making the point that intent is ‘practically incapable of proof’ 
and in cases of predatory pricing the initial effect on the public is beneficial; Hansard, 11 November 1910, 
pp 6038-9. 
317 Fisher (1913). 
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government.318 Fisher divided the proposals into six separate referenda when 
resubmitting them in May 1913 but they were all narrowly defeated.319 
In May 1911 Fisher again visited London for the Imperial Conference and the coronation 
of George V. He received a hero’s welcome when he returned to his birthplace and 
accompanied Keir Hardie on a visit to the south Wales coalfields where he spoke in 
support of miners fighting for better conditions.320   
Fisher, King O’Malley and the Commonwealth Bank 
Arguably the economic act of Fisher’s administration with the greatest repercussions, 
albeit not to be fully realised for many years, was the founding of the Commonwealth 
Bank of Australia. There are conflicting accounts of how this came about, and particularly 
the role played by the legendary King O’Malley in its founding.  
While a ‘national bank’ had appeared on the Labor platform in New South Wales as far 
back as 1891,321 and South Australia had established a state bank in 1895, in the first 
decade after Federation it was O’Malley who was its main advocate322 and pushed for it 
to be much more than just a government-owned trading bank. O’Malley elaborated on his 
plans in a parliamentary paper published 15 April 1908.323 At the Labor Conference in 
                                                          
318 Stockley (1976, p 314). 
319 Sawer (1956, pp 99-100). There were majorities in support of all six referenda in three states and 
overall votes in favour of over 49 per cent; they therefore came closer to passing than most referenda; 
Humphreys (2008, pp 61-62, 72-73). They were subsequently reintroduced into parliament in 1915 but 
after Fisher retired, his successor Hughes cancelled plans to resubmit them to the people. 
320 Kilmarnock Standard, 8 July 1911; Kirk (2011, pp 293-4). 
321 Notably this means it predates the 1893 bank crashes. Holt (2001, p 9) claims the novel Caesar’s Column 
by Ignatius Donnelly (1891) was one influence. 
322 Fisher acknowledged ‘the credit to which … [O’Malley] is entitled for constantly keeping this question 
before the public’; Hansard, 28 November 1911, p 3263. O’Malley had been arguing for banking legislation 
at least as far back as O’Malley (1893). 
323 O’Malley (1908). Beazley (1967a, Chapter VIII, p 3 and 1967b, p 22) suggests it may have been written 
by Giblin, as it is not in O’Malley’s usual flamboyant style. But while Tasmanian political circles were small 
enough that O’Malley almost certainly knew Giblin, 1908 was before Giblin had developed expertise in 
economics and before he joined the Labor Party. It is also notable that while, in his account of the early 
history of the Commonwealth Bank, Giblin (1951, p 2) refers to O’Malley’s advocacy he does not mention 
the paper. O’Malley himself said that he ‘had to play the fool to keep the people listening’ (Australasian, 
22 May 1937, p 5) but was also capable of more serious work. As one journalist put it, ‘behind an 
extravagant public manner, Mr O’Malley carries as sound a knowledge of finance as any member of his 
party’; The Age 30 April 1910, p 19. Praise also came from an unlikely source; Sir Robert Gibson, the Bank’s 
chairman during the Depression and no friend of Labor politicians, told the financial editor of The Argus 
of his respect for O’Malley’s financial ability; Cook (1958, p 143). Fisher’s secretary, Malcolm Shepherd 
(1958, p 176), opines that O’Malley ‘despite his political pantomimics, was a well-read, well-informed, 
and in some ways, highly cultured man … and there was never any question as to his honesty’.  
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July 1908 O’Malley moved that the Commonwealth Bank be ‘one of issue, deposit, 
exchange and reserve’ with Holman and Watson supporting him.324 Fisher did not 
participate in the debate on it. On 30 September 1909 O’Malley spoke for five hours in 
parliament on his banking proposals. O'Malley discussed monetary and banking issues 
with Professor Irvine of the University of Sydney.325 
The controversy surrounds whether O’Malley and some colleagues, the so-called 
‘Torpedo Brigade’ had to force Fisher to implement the policy at a caucus meeting in 
October 1911. O’Malley has given a few accounts of the proceedings, embellishing them 
as he got older.326 Beazley (1963, 1967b, 1967c) dismisses O’Malley’s account as a total 
fabrication invented in response to O’Malley’s chagrin at his role being understated in 
publications about the Bank produced in the 1920s. Beazley also cites inconsistencies 
between O’Malley’s version of events and the caucus minutes.327 The minutes, however, 
usually record decisions taken (motions moved/amended and so forth) and provide little 
indication of the debate that led to them.328   
                                                          
324 O’Malley papers, National Library of Australia, MS460/3849. Official Report of 4th Commonwealth 
Political Labour Conference, p 21. O’Malley was ahead of its time in wanting his bank to have central 
banking functions; clause IV.xvii says ‘the bank shall be a bank of reserve for the deposit of reserves of the 
banking companies operating in the Commonwealth’. He argued ‘every writer on political economy from 
Aristotle to Adam Smith, from Ricardo to Colhoun concedes that a change in the money volume alters the 
price of every ounce and yard of goods’. He argued ‘private banking corporations are more apt to 
encourage the panics than to allay them’, noting the reductions in credit in the 1890s. His bank could 
adopt a counter-cyclical policy; the ‘way to prevent a speculative disaster or shrinkage of credit from 
developing into widespread distress called panic is to expand the money volume by easy loans or 
otherwise’. He described leaving the control of money with the private banks as ‘lambs in the keeping of 
wolves’. The Swiss National Bank is mentioned as a model of what O’Malley had in mind. 
325 McFarlane (1966, p 12). 
326 O’Malley (1923, 1930, 1931, 1939); Australasian, 22 May 1937, p 5; the account he supplied to a 
sympathetic biographer Dorothy Catts (1957, pp 171-173); and his letter to Commonwealth Bank 
governor Hugh Armitage, 24 September 1947; O’Malley papers, NLA MS 460/6216. 
327 The caucus minutes refer on 30 August 1911 to Fisher outlining the government’s programme which 
included a ‘national bank’. The 5 October caucus meeting, chaired by McGregor in Fisher’s apparent 
absence, referred the Banking Bill to the Treasury and Pensions Committee of which O’Malley was a 
member and their report was presented by Spence to caucus on 19 October, whereupon a special meeting 
was convened for 25 October, at which Riley and Archibald moved ‘that the government introduce the 
Banking Bill’. The motion is carried and first reading took place on 1 November. Discussions on 28 and 29 
November approve of a single governor running the Bank; Weller (1975a, pp 280, 287, 290 and 294). The 
Beazley interpretation is supported by then Labor senator George Pearce in Pearce (1951, p 104) and 
Heydon (1965, p 23) and adopted by some later writers such as Day (2008, p 250), Murphy (1981) and 
Weller (1975a, p 290). 
328 For example, as noted above, they have no mention of Fisher contesting the leadership in 1901. 
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Furthermore, O’Malley is not the only member of the 1911 caucus to describe Fisher, and 
particularly Hughes, as needing to be pushed.329 Dr Maloney, who shared ‘a certain 
flamboyance’330 with O’Malley, claimed to have been chair of the Torpedo Brigade and 
asserted that Fisher had promised the private banks that he would not introduce a 
Commonwealth Bank.331 Maloney recalled ‘Labor members who voted for the original 
Commonwealth Bank Bill, after having forced Mr Fisher, against his will, to introduce 
it’.332 James Catts claims Fisher had no intention of proceeding with the Commonwealth 
Bank until ‘a number of us took steps in the party room’ and nominates O’Malley as the 
leader.333 According to King (1986), John McDougall supports O’Malley’s account. 
David O’Keefe and Alfred Ozanne wrote letters to O’Malley in 1937 and 1941 
reminiscing about the antics of the ‘Torpedo brigade’ and O’Malley’s role in forcing 
Fisher’s hand.334 Fisher’s successor as treasurer, William Higgs, urged that O’Malley’s 
influence should be recognised by an inscription at the Bank’s head office.335 A future 
Commonwealth Bank governor believed the Bank had been established ‘mainly at the 
instance of King O’Malley’.336 So did some of the non-Labor members of parliament.337 
                                                          
329 Other writers broadly supporting the O’Malley story include Cockerill (1943, pp 115-6), Copland (1958, 
p 214), Crean (undated), Ellis (1962a), Green (1963, p 91), Jauncey (1933, p 58 and 1949, p 171), Lang 
(1962, p 18), Luers (1987, p 81), McConnell (1946, p 8), Noye (1981,1985) and Sawer (1956, p 96). Anon 
(1910, p 572) described Fisher as the ‘natural leader of the conservatives in caucus’.  
330 In a letter to the author of a history of the bank on 25 January 1933, Maloney claims that Fisher told 
caucus that it ‘not being the opportune time’, progress on the bank would be delayed, but after a ‘ding 
dong go’, the ministers agreed to introduce it without a vote; NLA MS 460/5306; see also Biddington 
(2010, p 296). 
331 Biddington (2010, p 339). 
332 Hansard, 22 April 1931, p 1190. He had earlier described O'Malley as the man 'to whose efforts, more 
than to those of any other, the creation of the Bank is due'; Hansard, 4 November 1920, p 6200 and 
12 June 1924, p 1228. He later remarked ‘had there been no King O’Malley there would not have been a 
Commonwealth Bank in Australia today’; Hansard 2 November 1934. 
333 Catts claims his recollections were confirmed by Higgs, Maloney, Page and Matthews; Hansard 
19 December 1918, pp 9843-4, 13 June 1924, p 1264. 
334 O’Malley papers, NLA 460/5604, 5915; extracts are published in Hoyle (1981, pp 129-131). 
335 Gollan (1968, p 99). In apparent contrast, Fisher’s daughter claims Higgs told her he rejected O’Malley’s 
account. 
336 Hugh Armitage added ‘it was only by continuous pressure and a good deal of underground wire pulling 
that he was eventually able to get it passed into legislation’; Armitage reminiscences, 1949. Armitage 
repeated his view in a speech to a Christmas party for retired Bank officers in 1958; RBA archives RBA 
SA-65-84. 
337 Grosvenor Francis proclaimed ‘the members of the Labour party claim credit for the establishment of 
that bank, but we all know that Mr. King O'Malley forced it upon them whether they liked it or not and 
that they accepted with fears and forebodings’; Hansard. 12 October 1927, p 457. A similar account is 
given by Edmund Maher (undated). Another prominent conservative, Sir Norman Cowper (1951, p 38) 
calls O’Malley ‘undoubtedly the man to whom the establishment of the central bank was principally due’. 
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There is other evidence that Hughes at least was reluctant to see the bank established.338 
O’Malley challenged Hughes to show where he had made a speech advocating a national 
bank prior to October 1911, offering a £100 donation to a charity of Hughes’ choice, but 
Hughes did not respond.339 In a letter from Hughes to Fisher in September 1911 about 
forthcoming legislation, a bill for a Commonwealth Bank is conspicuously absent.340 The 
decision in 1910 to allocate the role of issuing bank notes to Treasury could be interpreted 
as indicating the government was not committed to any rapid establishment of a 
Commonwealth Bank.341  
Fisher’s daughter later recalled her father taking seriously concerns raised by the private 
banks about the viability of the Bank.342 In his lengthy ‘Gympie speech’ in 1909 setting 
out Labor’s programme, and in a post-election interview343 in April 1910, he made no 
mention of a central bank. Fisher made no move to introduce a Commonwealth Bank 
during his first stint as treasurer. By one account, ‘he was just plain scared of it’, but it 
may have just been that lacking a majority he saw no point in introducing legislation.344 
Ironically, its very advocacy by O'Malley, whom Fisher disliked, may have made Fisher 
more hesitant about the bank.345 
Furthermore, O’Malley himself provided a private account much closer in time to the 
events. In a friendly letter to ‘brother Fisher’ in May 1919, urging him to return to 
Australia and take up the Labor leadership, O’Malley refers to Fisher having been 
‘chagrined when in 1911 I took the Bank to caucus and you will admit that it took some 
courage to go against the opinion of the whole government’.346 
                                                          
338 In a letter to Hugh Mahon, 15 March 1909, Hughes writes ‘about the Commonwealth Bank we must 
be dumb; if not we shall frighten all the timid souls’; Mahon papers, NLA MS 937/128. Day (2008, pp 177, 
250) describes Hughes as being ‘nervous at times about the reaction of the business community’ and 
having forced Fisher ‘to omit mention of the Commonwealth Bank from his Gympie speech’. O’Malley 
(1931, p 7) called Hughes, Pearce and two others, but not Fisher, his main opponents. 
339 Australasian, 5 June 1937, p 9. 
340 Hughes to Fisher, 11 September 1911; Fisher papers, NLA MS 2919, box 2, series 3, item 79. 
341 Jauncey (1933, p 57), Bastian (2009, p 224). Fisher said he was ‘not averse’ to the Bank issuing notes 
once it had become established; Hansard, 15 November 1911, p 2886. 
342 P Fisher (1976). See also Bastian (2009, p 223) and Catts (1957, p 171). Fisher told parliament he had 
met with some private bankers to discuss proposed banking legislation and while no record was made of 
the discussion he had no objection to the banks giving their version of what was discussed; Hansard, 
14 July 1910, p 401. 
343 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 April 1910, p 7. 
344 O’Malley’s biographer Catts (1957 p 125). Fisher once said ‘I make no pretension to banking 
knowledge’; Hansard, 30 May 1911, p 3454. 
345 Bastian (2009, p 223), Butlin (1961, pp 349-351), Hoyle (1981, p 125). 
346 O’Malley to Fisher, 5 May 1919, NLA MS 460/5073. 
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Reluctantly or not, Fisher had Treasury prepare the bill to establish the Bank but it lacked 
many of the features that O’Malley wanted.347 In particular it was proposed to be just 
another commercial bank rather than a central bank as well. Fisher referred to the Bank 
as ‘a business concern pure and simple’ and blandly remarked that ‘in a country like our 
own, which is growing in wealth and population, there is ample room for the 
establishment of another bank. A new bank has not been established in Australia for a 
long time’.348 Alfred Deakin described the bill as merely an ‘instalment’ of the O’Malley 
plan while his colleague Irvine called it ‘O’Malley pasteurized’.349 Fisher did, however, 
go on to conjecture that ‘it will ultimately become the bank of banks rather than a mere 
money-lending institution.350  
Denison Miller, then a senior officer of the Bank of New South Wales, was chosen to be 
the Commonwealth Bank’s inaugural governor.351 There appears no truth to rumours that 
Fisher was interested in becoming governor of the Bank himself.352 Fisher praised 
Miller’s caution; ‘he acted with discretion in seeking to build up a national bank that 
                                                          
347 The drafting instructions for the bill merely stated ‘a bill is required for the establishment of a 
Commonwealth Bank’; Garran (1958, p 153). 
348 Hansard, 15 November 1911, pp 2646, 2650. 
349 Hansard, 22 November 1911, p 3036. 
350 Hansard, 15 November 1911, p 2661. 
351 According to Campbell-Jones (1935, pp 265-6), Fisher chose him after the first interview and without 
wanting to interview the remaining applicants short-listed for him by Treasury Secretary Allen. Harper and 
Schedvin (1988, p 207), however, describe the appointment process as ‘lengthy and difficult’, which 
matches a contemporary press report by Anon (1912) claiming the search took six months with many 
private bankers approached being unwilling to take the job. In an alternative account, O’Malley asked 
John Russell French, general manager of the Bank of New South Wales, to name ‘the best banker in the 
world’ and when French nominated Miller, O’Malley arranged for the cabinet to interview him; this 
account is given by O'Malley's biographer and friend Dorothy Catts (1957, p 174) but is also supported in 
recollections by a future governor, Hugh Armitage, 1949, RBA archives RBA SA-65-84. An exchange of 
letters between Fisher and the English, Scottish and Australian Bank’s Charles Wren reveals Wren 
recommended Miller after declining the job himself; (20 May 1912, NLA Fisher papers, MS 2919 and Wren 
papers MS 6758). Initially the plan had been for a board to govern the bank but the final bill had a sole 
governor in charge; Butlin (1983, p 162). Hugh Armitage believed some government members wanted 
Treasury secretary Allen to be appointed but O’Malley persuaded them it was better to have someone 
with banking experience, and after two senior bankers approached said they were not attracted to a 
‘semi-socialist undertaking’, Miller was the next choice and that Miller had ‘great creative powers’ and 
being a ‘good organiser with a pleasant and friendly personality’; Armitage reminiscences in 1949, RBA 
archives SA-65-84. 
352 Souter (1988, p 142) refers to incorrect reports along these lines. Labor MP Finlayson reports hearing 
the rumour, and supporting the idea, in a letter to Fisher on 23 March 1912; Fisher papers, 2919/5/14. 
Fisher ridiculed the suggestion, writing on the letter ‘and the 1st of April is still five days off’. 
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ultimately should be the bank of banks’.353 Fisher promised Miller that he would be 'free 
from political control or interference in any way whatever' and held to this.354 
Cook’s government as an interregnum 
By the 1913 election Joseph Cook had taken over from the retiring Deakin as leader of 
the Fusion, now styled the Liberal Party, beating John Forrest by one vote. In the 1911 
Budget debate, Cook had advocated a comprehensive scheme of national insurance and 
this formed part of the Liberal Party's platform in 1913.355 Cook (1912b, p 16) advocated 
the establishment of a public accounts committee. 
At the 1913 election, Labor lost government by a single seat due to a swing against it in 
rural areas, and Cook became prime minister. But Labor retained control of the Senate. 
By now Fisher was the father of six young children and showing some signs of strain, but 
he defeated challenges to his leadership from Higgs (who represented the more radical 
wing of the Labor Party) and Hughes.356  
Frustrated by the block the Senate placed on his legislation, Cook elected not to play safe 
and serve out his term but instead set up the conditions for the first double dissolution in 
Australian history by passing legislation opposing union preference and restricting 
maternity allowances which he knew the Labor majority in the Senate would reject. Cook 
set out his credo as ‘liberalism stands in the first place for encouragement of individual 
effort. Then it stands for equality of opportunity all round’.357 While Cook had stated in 
August 1913 that his government planned to take the Commonwealth Bank out of savings 
bank business, the required legislation had not passed the House before it was dissolved.  
Fisher’s policy speech in July 1914 was largely a restatement of that of 1913. When 
World War I broke out, Fisher famously promised to support the United Kingdom ‘to the 
                                                          
353 1914 policy speech, reported in Sydney Morning Herald 7 July 1914, p 7. Fisher says approvingly of 
Miller’s passivity that ‘the governor did not attempt to outbid the other financial institutions in order to 
attract business’. Another indication of Miller’s caution was that Hughes once said to Fisher ‘if the 
Commonwealth Bank continues to treat its overdraft customers in the way it has treated me, it won’t go 
broke in a thousand bloody years’; Armitage reminiscences in 1949, RBA archives SA-65-84. 
354 Cited by Harper and Schedvin (1998, p 210). 
355 He had also advocated social insurance schemes in 1908 and 1910; Greenwood (1955, pp 203, 230). 
356 It is not mentioned in contemporary press reports but the caucus minutes show the vote as Fisher 42, 
Higgs 18 and Hughes 1; Weller (1975a, p 322). It is tempting to assume Hughes’ single vote was his own 
but a biographer says this was not the case; Booker (1980, p 171). 
357 Buchanan (1940, p 21). 
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last man and the last shilling’, essentially the same policy as Cook, neutralising the war 
as an election issue.358 Fisher led Labor to a clear majority in both houses. 
Fisher’s final term as treasurer and prime minister 
Fisher had to concentrate on mobilising for war rather than the social or economic reforms 
which characterised his previous term and better suited his personality. In the earliest days 
of the war Fisher was concerned about the impact war would have on the international 
economy and unemployment in Australia. This, he wrote, ‘could be far more serious than 
the direct consequences of war itself’ and suggested that the Commonwealth Bank would 
be needed to support credit so ‘the wheels of industry keep moving’.359 
The war disorganised parliamentary financial procedures; Fisher presented a budget on 
3 December 1914 but there was no budget in 1915. War expenditure drove the budget 
into a deficit of unprecedented magnitude. This was despite Fisher trying to raise revenue 
by increasing the rate of land tax and imposing probate on deceased estates. These 
measures, however, did not raise as much as might have been expected.360 In July 1915 
Fisher told caucus the government intended to impose the first income tax.361 It raised 
nearly £4 million in 1915-16. 
Fisher had a deep-seated abhorrence of debt, perhaps reflecting his working class 
upbringing and his experience of political corruption involving borrowing in Queensland 
politics. In 1903 he had opposed a proposal by Turner to establish a permanent federal 
debt. He cited ‘a very old saying that parliamentary gods very seldom know what revenue 
                                                          
358 Fisher’s letter to the editor, Sydney Morning Herald, 10 August 1914, p 11. Fisher was not quite the 
uncritical Empire loyalist this comment might suggest. He had opposed sending Australian troops to the 
Boer War, when the United Kingdom was not under threat. Fisher rejected a proposal by Hughes that the 
election be cancelled in favour of an electoral truce; Beaumont (2013, p 17), Holman (1935, pp 109-110). 
Fisher was ‘repelled by the brutality and carnage of war’; Meaney (2010, p 45). He ‘regarded war as a 
scourge…[and] believed that international arbitration was a preferable way to resolve conflicts’; 
Beaumont (2013, p 44). The ‘last shilling’ expression had earlier been used, in reference to the Boer war, 
by Cook in the NSW Parliament (Hansard, 18 October 1899, p 1458). 
359 The Argus, 24 August 1914, p 13. 
360 Sawer (1956, p 145) comments ‘land tax revenues were disappointing, partly because of drought years, 
partly because the tax began to have some effect in breaking up large estates so as to bring holdings below 
the taxable level, and partly because of administrative and legal difficulties in assessing tax on the outback 
leaseholds’. 
361 Weller (1975a, p 416). This was despite a proposal for an income tax being defeated at Labor’s Adelaide 
conference. The first British income tax had also been introduced to pay for a war, by Pitt in 1798 to pay 
for the Napoleonic war with France; Darling (2011, pp 186-7). 
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there is in economy’ in arguing for funding expenditure from revenue not borrowing.362 
In 1910 he had argued that borrowing was justifiable for ‘a great national work such as 
the transcontinental railway’ but ‘the creation of a regular borrowing policy…every time 
that wealth objects to provide its share of revenue…such a policy is nationally dangerous 
as well as socially unjust’ and described borrowing as ‘a costly and perhaps a dangerous 
policy if it can be avoided…by living within our income from taxation…we want to tax 
accumulated wealth’.363 Yet his government passed the Loan Act in 1912, authorising the 
raising of money for constructing post offices and Australia House in London. He 
defended this by arguing both purposes would generate revenue as there were to be 
tenants as well as government offices in Australia House.  
During the early war years, he passed legislation enabling the federal government to raise 
war loans and borrowed from the British government and the Australian banks, lamenting 
having to abandon his ‘cherished hope of financing our war forces…from revenue’.364 
The resignation of Fisher  
Fisher’s health deteriorated as he was attacked by both conscriptionists and Labor 
radicals. He delegated piloting of the Income Tax Bill through parliament to Hughes. He 
also seemed to be losing confidence in his own abilities, reportedly telling the 
Governor-General ‘that he had no knowledge of finance, although he had ideas’.365 A 
holiday in New Zealand, disguised as inter-government negotiations, was insufficient for 
him to regain his health.366 In October 1915 he resigned the prime ministership to become 
High Commissioner in London, taking over from another former prime minister, George 
Reid.367 While Fisher later attributed his decision primarily to his health, writing ‘the bare 
fact is I was more run down in health when I left the Commonwealth than my friends 
                                                          
362 Hansard, 12 September 1905, p 211. 
363 Stephens (1910). 
364 Hansard, 3 December 1914, p 1341. 
365 Letter from Munro-Ferguson to the Colonial Secretary cited in Attard (1989, p 148) and Murdoch (1998, 
p 69). 
366 Murphy (1981). 
367 In May 1915 there were rumours about Fisher becoming high commissioner but the governor-general 
believed that while Fisher regarded Reid as old and lazy, he had ‘no aspiration to the fill the latter’s place’; 
Munro-Ferguson to Harcourt, 13 May 1915, NLA MS 696/691. His predecessor as Labor leader, Chris 
Watson, wrote to Fisher on 11 May 1915 and argued ‘if you feel knocked out in health then it would be 
well enough to take it’; Fisher papers, MS 2919/1/107. 
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knew’368, the account by his former colleague George Pearce of Fisher’s last departure 
from the House where he shook his fist in its direction and said ‘they can all go to ____, 
George’ suggests political pressures also played an important role.369 He was also 
                                                          
368 Letter to his former colleague, and successor as treasurer, William Higgs, 6 September 1919, Fisher 
papers, NLA MS 2919/1/507. He had earlier commented that ‘parliamentary life is much less healthy and 
much more exhausting…the nervous strain is continual’; Fisher (1910). When returning to office in 1914 
Fisher said he would only work ordinary office hours and take Sundays off, but by 1915 Fisher ‘had been 
under great strain and his health had suffered’; Smith (1933, pp 148, 162). He suffered frequent illnesses 
including a few days of temporary deafness and complained to the governor-general of ‘intolerable 
strain’; Day (2008, p 328). The governor-general was soon describing Fisher as in a ‘high state of nervous 
tension aggravated by a chill which he was unable to throw off’; Meaney (2010, p 46). Keith Murdoch 
said in 1918 that Fisher suffered a ‘sort of nervous tiredness, rather serious and necessitating rest’; 
Attard (1991, p 143). Garran (1958, p 221) observed that Fisher ‘from physical and mental overwork was 
feeling the strain of his responsibilities’. Day (2010) suggests the mine work in his youth had damaged 
his lungs. Cooney (2015, p 4) refers to Fisher as having a ‘collapse’ at the time of his resignation. Even in 
1910 it was remarked that ‘while Mr Fisher is a comparatively young man, being now 48 years of age, 
he looks older. The strain of leadership has not failed to leave its mark, as his rapidly whitening hair 
shows’; The Age 30 April 1910. Baxter Cook, a journalist, felt that Fisher ‘always seemed to me to be in 
a state of apprehension’; Cook (1958, p 113).  Buchanan (1940) and Attard (2010, p 50) suggest his health 
problems included a loss of mental acuity. Hughes apparently believed there were signs of Alzheimer’s 
disease as early as 1915, although this may be self-serving. Hughes’ supporter Hume-Cook 
(1936, pp 15-6, 20) says of Fisher at the time ‘though seemingly in full possession of his physical powers, 
there was not the same virility about his mental powers… in some subconscious way he was cognisant 
of the mental trouble that was approaching’ and so ‘to avoid being drowned in the waters of oblivion by 
giving up his post – he grasped the high commissionership and so saved himself from the fate he 
dreaded’. Fisher’s daughter, however, says the memory loss only started in the 1920s; P. Fisher (1976). 
The sudden deaths of his friends and cabinet colleagues Egerton Batchelor (at the age of 46), and Charlie 
Frazer (aged just 33), may have influenced him. The example of Alfred Deakin may have also played on 
his mind and suggested leaving the stresses of parliament could best serve his physical and mental 
health. 
369 Anderson (2001, p 203), Attard (1995, pp 119-20), Hirst (1999, p 57), Malkin (1979, p 15), Marginson 
(1967, p 83) and Meaney (2010, p 46) suggest Fisher, a long-term opponent of conscription, foresaw the 
growing support for conscription within the Labor Party which could lead to a split. In this he was right 
but he was wrong to think that in his absence the party would fall in behind Hughes. Sykes (2006, p 11) 
believes ‘Fisher could see that the Great War had made conflict with some of his parliamentary friends 
and supporters inevitable’. His cabinet colleague George Pearce (1951, p 127) states ‘increasing 
differences in the party was the general cause of Mr Fisher’s retirement’. Weller (2007b, p 34) and Encel 
(1974, p 45) suggest Fisher was wearying of a 'constant battle with caucus' and Dyrenfurth (2011, 
pp 183-4) refers to criticism within Labor ranks about the conduct of the war. Dyrenfurth (2012, p 32) 
described Fisher as ‘under pressure from both his party’s Left and Right’.  Attard (1989) suggests Fisher 
was frustrated by disputes with the state governments. Day (2008, p 342 and 2010, p 67) suggests Fisher 
may have feared the political consequences once the extent of the Gallipoli debacle became known. 
Edward Holloway (c1954, p 28), then president of the Melbourne Trades Hall Council and the Victorian 
branch of the Labor Party, says Fisher resigned as he was ‘irritated beyond patience by some of his 
colleagues in the cabinet and party, led by WM Hughes who was hankering for power’. Other accounts, 
such as M Ellis (1962a), Fitzgerald (2014, p 79), Humphreys (2008, p 1), Jeffreys (1977), Makin (1961), 
MacCallum (2009, p 4) and Pearce (1951) and the Boddy and B Ellis (1974) political farce, also place more 
blame on Hughes for bringing Fisher down. Makin (1961, pp 34-35 and 1982, pp 57-58) describes Hughes 
challenging Fisher’s authority by bringing forward legislation which Fisher had promised would be 
deferred. Fisher offered Hughes the post of High Commissioner in London to get rid of him, and when 
Hughes refused took it himself. Similarly, Senator Ferricks refers to Fisher having been ‘jockeyed out’ by 
Hughes; Hansard, 9 February 1917, p 10387. But as Lloyd (2000, p 83) and MacCallum (2014a, p 42) argue, 
this seems inconsistent with Fisher seeing off all Hughes’ earlier challenges for leadership positions. 
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uncomfortable as a war leader, sending soldiers to their death rather than implementing 
social reforms.370 Of course the political pressures were probably themselves 
exacerbating his health problems. There was also a financial incentive as the London post 
was well-paid and more secure than a political career and Fisher had a large family and 
had bought a large house.371 Or perhaps he was just homesick or thought he could do 
more for the Australian war effort in Britain. Most likely it was a combination of all these 
factors. 
Cook, meanwhile, had been playing the role of leader of the loyal opposition. When 
Fisher retired, his successor Billy Hughes split the Labor government by his advocacy of 
conscription and led a band of rebels to form the National Labor Party. Well short of a 
majority, Hughes opened discussions with the Liberals, and they agreed to form a ‘win 
the war’ coalition which successfully contested an election. The two parties then merged 
to form the Nationalists. As in 1909, Cook appeared not to covet the leadership, despite 
the Liberals being the larger component of the new party, and Cook served loyally as 
Hughes’ unofficial deputy prime minister for the next five years. He initially also took 
the relatively junior post of navy minister but by one assessment was the ‘real leader’ on 
the floor of parliament, ‘exercising a directing force over proceedings’.372 Cook 
accompanied Hughes to the UK for a war conference in June 1918 and the two remained 
there for the peace conference, signing the Treaty of Versailles and not returning to 
Australia until August 1919.373 On their return Hughes took all the credit and did not 
support Cook when it was proposed that Watt replace him as deputy leader.374 
 
                                                          
Abjorensen (2015, p 69), an academic who has studies prime ministerial exits, comments ‘to what extent 
Fisher left office of his own volition remains an issue of contention’. 
370 Kevin Rudd’s interpretation of his reading about Fisher is that ‘he became very sick’ as he ‘internalised 
so much’ of the horrors of the war; cited in Williams (2013, pp 58-59).  
371 Smith (1933, p 162) suggests the ‘comfortable emoluments’ of the high commissionership was a factor. 
372 Daily Telegraph, 24 September 1917, p 4. 
373 There are various conjectures about the reason Hughes took Cook with him. One possibility is that 
Hughes was too suspicious of Cook to leave him in Australia as acting prime minister. Another is that his 
colleagues preferred Watt as acting prime minister. Another is that the ex-Liberals wanted Cook to go to 
keep an eye on Hughes. Hughes delegated very little to Cook during their time in the UK, but Cook took 
solace from a knighthood and the chance to return as ‘the local boy made good’ to his birthplace. He was 
involved in redrawing the borders of Czechoslovakia. He enjoyed his time in the UK so much he set his 
sights on becoming High Commissioner; Anderson (1972, p 268), Beaumont (2013, p 438), Murdoch (1996, 
p 131). 
374 Murdoch (1968, p 378). Despite Cabinet support, Watt declined the post due to ill health. 
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Cook as treasurer 
In March 1920 Cook became acting treasurer, when Watt left for a trip to London. Cook 
then reluctantly became treasurer following Watt’s resignation, when SM Bruce declined 
the position.375 While Cook had earlier seen the treasurer as an important position, saying 
in Cook (1912a, p 1) that ‘in the glass of the budget we behold the face of the nation’, he 
was now impatient to become High Commissioner in London and his promotion to 
treasurer was as unwanted as it was unexpected. 
Cook served in a challenging period. This was the height of the post-war boom, and the 
government was concerned about inflation. At the same time, unemployment remained 
high. Global interest rates were high due to war debts and a shortage of ships impeded 
trade.  
Cook thought it was ‘the main financial duty of a government to keep its commitments 
as low as possible and to balance the budget’.376 He was focused on reducing inflation377 
and, as often during his career, was more comfortable opposing proposals than 
propounding them. Cook noted about the discussion of an excess profits tax that it had 
been first applied in Sweden but ‘spread like Spanish influenza to other countries’ and 
believed it ‘encourages wasteful expenditure, puts premium on overcapitalisation, puts 
penalty on brains, energy, enterprise, discourages new ventures and confirms old ventures 
in their monopolies’ and was ‘in many instances passed on as a consumption tax’.378 He 
decried the maternity payment as a ‘bangle bonus’ and a ‘waste of money’, arguing ‘much 
of it is going into the pockets of women who do not need it’.379  
In his first budget (16 September 1920) Cook aimed to reduce borrowing and set the 
country up for repaying war debt quickly, but was only willing to raise taxes modestly 
from fear of discouraging investment. This forced him to be very parsimonious with 
spending, and ruled out any expansion in public works to ease unemployment. The only 
                                                          
375 Both Robert Best and Arthur Rogers were also viewed as possible treasurers; Daily Telegraph, 27 July 
1920. 
376 Murdoch (1996, p 132). Hughes (1998, p 133) muses that Cook’s early poverty may have been the 
source of his penny-pinching attitudes. 
377 Cornish and Coleman (2014, pp 5-6). 
378 Entry in Cook’s notebook 1919-1920, p 31, NAA M3580, 10. 
379 Hansard, 20 October 1921, p 12074. 
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large expenditure initiative was on ships to alleviate export problems. Labor and the 
Country Party criticised him for not making further cuts in spending.380   
His second budget (29 September 1921) continued this deflationary policy, although by 
now the Australian and global economies were slowing, Australia was suffering from 
drought and inflation had fallen. Cook lamented the ‘huge interest bills’ the government 
faced after the war and in his dour way was critical of the ‘luxurious living in which many 
people have been able to indulge as a result of profit made during the war’.381 His 
‘stand-pat budget’ was closely debated, and almost defeated in parliament, but the critics 
proposed no clear alternative. 382 
The Federal Economies Commission, chaired by businessman Robert Gibson, delivered 
its report on 4 April 1921.383 It was critical of the cost of Australia House in London and 
poor oversight of expenditure in the Navy department and called for the centralising of 
accounting functions.384 It also called for more purchases of calculating machines, a 
recommendation which has been described as ‘more easily understood given the 
knowledge that one of the three commissioners was a senior executive of an adding 
machine company’.385 But overall it seems to have had little impact. 
While acting treasurer, Cook had assured the parliament that ‘a Royal Commission to 
consider the whole incidence of Commonwealth taxation’ would be appointed ‘at an early 
date’.386 Following its recommendations, Cook set up a Board of Appeal for taxation and 
introduced income averaging for primary producers, as well as some more modest 
changes. 
Cook as acting treasurer had replied to a parliamentary question that ‘the Government 
intends, as early as practicable, to institute a searching investigation into the question of 
the insurance of the workers against unemployment and sickness, with a view to the 
                                                          
380 Sawer (1956, p 205). 
381 Hansard, 29 September 1921, p 11587. 
382 Sawer (1956, p 205). 
383 The Royal Commission upon the Expenditure of the Commonwealth of Australia with a View to 
Effecting Economies, to give it its full name, had been appointed in 1918 when Cook’s predecessor Watt 
was treasurer. Gibson was to go on to chair the Commonwealth Bank and his clashes with Theodore are 
discussed in the following chapter. The other members were businessman George Turton and the chief 
accountant from the Postmaster-General’s department, Gilbert Haldane; Weight (2014). 
384 Weight (2014).  
385 Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001, p 49). 
386 Hansard, 22 April 1920, p 1441. 
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establishment of a system fair to both employers and employees’.387 No action, however, 
was taken while Cook was treasurer. 
Cook had been unenthusiastic about the establishment of the Commonwealth Bank; while 
campaigning in 1914 he described it as ‘a wicked and costly and unnecessary proceeding 
… however it was there and they must make the best of it’. But he made an important 
reform to it while treasurer. Cook transferred to a department within the Bank 
responsibility for banknote issue, a measure he had advocated as far back as 1914.388 
While its governor saw the move as ‘the first and most important step in the enlargement’ 
of the Commonwealth Bank into ‘a national bank in every sense of the word’389 and 
Cornish (2010, p 3) regarded it as ‘an important development in the history of Australian 
monetary policy’, Cook himself described it as ‘a modest little proposal’ and ‘merely a 
machinery measure’.390 It was not discussed in the Nationalist party room meetings.391 
Cook argued that the ‘very essence of the note issue depends on its elasticity, because it 
must rise and fall with the volume of…business’ and he argued that the Bank was more 
in touch with both money markets and the general public than was Treasury.392 But as he 
did not want the note issue under the sole control of the Bank’s governor, he constituted 
a board (‘outside all intruding political influences’393 as he put it) of four including the 
governor, a representative from Treasury and two businessmen. While housed in the 
Commonwealth Bank, the Note Issue Department was 'kept distinct' from the rest of the 
Bank's operations. It could be argued Cook was ahead of his time in this concern for 
'central bank independence'.394  But in the bill he abandoned the idea of requiring banks 
to keep a set proportion on notes in their reserves after ‘receiving satisfactory assurances’ 
from the banks and instead suggested this could be revisited as part of a broader banking 
bill in due course.395 
                                                          
387 Hansard, 31 March 1920, p 1009. 
388 Hansard, 13 November 1914, p 671. 
389 Sir Denison Miller, cited by Harper and Schedvin (1998, p 220). Miller had advocated it to treasurers 
and prime ministers Fisher, Hughes, Forrest and Watt but been rebuffed; Cornish and Coleman (2014, 
p 6). 
390 Hansard, 4 November 1920, p 6174. The operations of the Note Issue Department are described in 
Coleman (1999, 2001), Cornish and Coleman (2014, pp 6-19) and Polden (1977). 
391 Their minutes for the relevant period are contained in the Pearce papers, NLA MS213, series 12. 
392 Hansard, 4 November 1920, p 6175. 
393 Hansard, 4 November 1920, p 6182. 
394 Coleman (2001) points out that this independence only lasted four years, giving it as an example of the 
impossibility of real central bank independence. 
395 Hansard, 4 November 1920, p 6177. 
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In June 1921 the board was stating its policy as being ‘to decrease the [note] circulation 
by all legitimate means’ as a means of depressing the price level and coaxing the exchange 
rate back to its previous parity under the gold standard.396 It was a crude form of 
monetarism but one board member regarded it as based on ‘elementary truths’ and 
endorsed by experts at the Brussels international financial conference.397 By June 1922 
the board was able to say they had succeeded in reducing the amount of currency in 
circulation. The private sector members of the board were pushing to reduce it further but 
the banks were resisting.398 The conflict was eventually resolved when Page as treasurer 
handed responsibility for the note issue to the Commonwealth Bank in 1924. 
While his admirers regarded him as fulfilling the treasurer’s role with ‘his usual 
aplomb’,399 with the exception of the note issue measures, Cook was an unimaginative 
treasurer who contributed little to post-war reconstruction, to reducing unemployment, to 
improving economic efficiency or to reducing inequality. Admittedly, Hughes would 
probably not have encouraged him.400  Nor was he a very confident or enthusiastic 
treasurer, saying ‘the position of the Commonwealth Treasurer is more difficult today 
than it has ever been … I do not pretend to be an expert’, adding ‘I am a bit tired of being 
“shot at” both inside the House and outside by everyone who thinks he can teach me how 
to do the job’.401 He complained that ‘every frog in every marsh is calling out for 
economy’ while he was also pushed for extra spending on specific worthy projects.402 
From April to September 1921 Cook was also acting prime minister, while Hughes 
attended an imperial conference, bringing a greater harmony to party and cabinet.403 Cook 
was able to do this despite Hughes taking all the prime minister’s senior staff with him.404 
                                                          
396 Armitage to Collins, 17 June 1921, cited in Cornish (1988a, p 5). 
397 Collins, the Treasury secretary and board member of the Notes Issue Department represented 
Australia at the Brussels Conference in 1920; Cornish (1988a, p 6). 
398 Cornish (1988a, pp 9-10). 
399 Ellis (1962b, p 22). 
400 There is a story that Cook once spent an hour explaining an idea to Hughes only to be told ‘It’s no 
bloody good, Joe. You might as well piss up against the pyramids and imagine you’re irrigating the Nile 
Valley’; Murdoch (1996, p 135). 
401 Hansard, 30 September 1920, p 5211. He had earlier interjected to agree when a Labor member 
described him as ‘not a financial genius’ and lacking the ‘ability to carry the heavy responsibilities of 
getting Australia out of its financial difficulties’; Hansard, 25 March 1920, p 881. He later described himself 
as being ‘at my wit’s end…to find money to keep public works going’; Hansard, 26 October 1921, p 12198. 
402 Hansard, 7 October 1920, p 5434. 
403 Upon Hughes’ return the Nationalist party room unanimously praised Cook’s performance as acting 
leader; their minutes for 28 September 1921 are in the Pearce papers, NLA MS 213, series 12. 
404 Murdoch (1968, p 393). 
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After Hughes had settled back into the prime minister’s role, Cook was happy to hand the 
treasurer’s job on to Bruce in December 1921.405 
High Commissioners and retirees 
Both Fisher and Cook moved straight from active politics to be High Commissioner in 
London. But Cook was better suited to the position and enjoyed it much more. 
Fisher served his five-year term diligently, but his dislike of protocol and his informality 
meant that it was not a role for which he was well suited.406 And needing to defer to 
Hughes when he visited the United Kingdom must surely have grated. Cook, by contrast, 
revelled in the social prestige the position granted him.407 
By the latter stages of their postings both men’s health and mental acuity were 
deteriorating.408 They played little role in public life once they finished their time as High 
Commissioner. Cook was 67 by the time he returned from London and uninterested in 
resuming a political career. The only public role he took on was serving as chairman of a 
royal commission into South Australia’s share of federal funding in 1930. The former 
postmaster-general also participated in the first telephone call between London and 
Sydney in 1930. He enjoyed a long and pleasant retirement in Sydney before his death on 
30 July 1947.  
Fisher, aged 59, was mentioned as a possible candidate for the electorate of West Sydney 
following the sudden death of TJ Ryan. He apparently indicated to Labor members he 
would accept being drafted but did not want to run in a contested preselection and another 
                                                          
405 Hughes graciously (if inaccurately) said it was ‘a very great wrench to part’ from Cook and he would 
‘miss him very much’ when announcing the appointment to the Nationalist party room on 10 November 
1921; Pearce papers, NLA MS 213, series 12. 
406 As Campbell-Jones (1935, p 263) put it, he ‘hated display or posing or any form of public vanity’. He 
rejected a knighthood and was tardy in replying to letters offering him the privy counsellorship and 
preferred to attend an engagement in Kilmarnock than attend the King’s Council to be sworn in; Fisher 
papers, National Library of Australia MS 2919/1/60. Shepherd (1958, p 133) tells of the struggle to get 
him to wear court dress at George V’s coronation. He ripped off the ‘effeminate’ lace collar. He declined 
an honourary degree from Oxford and the Légion d’honneur; Meaney (2010, p 47).  
407 Attard (2010, p 59) describes him as ‘self-assured, socially at ease and a competent public speaker’ and 
cites the UK secretary of state for the colonies as finding him ‘a charming man’. On the other hand, Hughes 
complained of his weak administration and Latham complained of his ‘mediocrity, self-satisfaction, 
idleness and discourtesy’; Attard (2010, p 59). 
408 George Pearce described Fisher as ‘capable of little concentrated effort’ towards the end of his tenure; 
Heydon (1965). Towards the end of his term Cook was reported as ‘aging rapidly’ and suffering from ‘loss 
of memory’ and ‘irritability’; Attard (1991, p 175). 
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candidate was selected instead.409 He returned to London410 and unsuccessfully sought 
Labour preselection for the Scottish seat of Kilmarnock in the House of Commons.411 He 
then lived in London, sinking into dementia, until his death on 22 October 1928. 
Commemorating Fisher and Cook 
Fisher has a suburb in Canberra commemorating him. There is also a suburb of Cook but 
this commemorates both Sir Joseph Cook and Captain James Cook. There is a federal 
electorate named after Fisher but the electorate of Cook refers to James Cook. The 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet is located in the Andrew Fisher Building in 
Canberra. 
Synkrisis 
These two treasurers and prime ministers started their careers in such similar ways. If, as 
a contemporary governor-general put it, the odds were ‘a million to one against a coal 
miner becoming prime minister’412, then the odds against both of them doing so were a 
trillion to one against. At his funeral Cook was described as the ‘Australian Lincoln’413, 
an analogy that would hold equally for Fisher. 
But why were they so different by the time they served as treasurer? As evidenced by the 
time the two young teetotallers put into studying in the evenings when their peers would 
be resting or carousing, both believed strongly in self-improvement. But for Fisher 
self-improvement meant acquiring knowledge and using it to lift the whole working class 
up. For Cook it meant social climbing for himself and his family and leaving the working 
class behind.  
                                                          
409 Sydney Morning Herald 8 August 1921, p 9; 10 August, p 11 and 11 August, p 7. William Higgs had 
earlier heard rumours of Fisher’s return and wrote to him on 8 July 1919 that ‘if you come back in time to 
contest the Wide Bay, you could win the same and probably carry our party to victory again’; Fisher 
Papers, MS 2919/1/501. Attard (1995, p 127, however, suggests he would no longer have fitted 
comfortably into a Labor Party that had shifted to the left and been abandoned by many of his friends. 
Scott (1936, p 304) believed Fisher’s health would have ruled out a political comeback and by 1921 Makin 
(1982, p 57) noted Fisher ‘showed some distress of mind’. 
410 Attard (1991, p 165) describes this as ‘bowing to family pressure’. 
411 He may have been inspired by an earlier prime minister and high commissioner, George Reid, who had 
taken a seat in the Commons. His daughter and an obituary writer believe he lost out on getting 
preselection due to excessively pro-royalty sentiments; Rankin (1928) and P Fisher (1976); but Day (2008, 
p 408) suggests that the preselectors realised his mental powers were failing. 
412 Sir Munro Ferguson, cited by Dyrenfurth (2008, p 19) and Murdoch (1998, p xiv). 
413 Reverend Deane, reported in the Sydney Morning Herald, 2 August 1947. 
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As noted above, Fisher’s Free Presbyterian religion reinforced his belief in collective 
democratic action, while Cook moved himself to the more individualist end of the 
spectrum of Methodist belief. Both men exhibited pride in various ways but for Cook it 
was pride in his individual accolades while Fisher was more concerned that a Labor leader 
be accorded the same respect as a conservative leader. Fisher was content to represent the 
caucus, the party and the broader labour movement and implement the policies 
determined in party fora.414 In this he differed from his predecessor Watson and successor 
Hughes. It was also a stark difference between him and Cook, who rejected the notion of 
caucus solidarity. Even this may have been a cover, for he later showed no problem with 
the principle of cabinet solidarity, which should have raised similar issues if he truly 
believed he had to be free to follow his own conscience,415 and he was a compliant deputy 
to men as different as Reid, Deakin and Hughes. 
Fisher, contrary to the poor press he initially attracted until the recent biographies by 
Bastian and Day,416 was an intellectual. Henry Boote, who knew him well, recalled his 
ability to discourse on philosophy, metaphysics and literary classics.417 A contemporary 
writer called him a man ‘who is not afraid of ideas’.418 An Australian correspondent 
introducing him to British readers wrote ‘of the intellectual depth…there is no doubt’.419 
                                                          
414 A contemporary journalist emphasised this point. Anon (1908, p 1) stated with some exaggeration that 
Fisher ‘had long since shredded any shred of individuality’ and reproduced party policy like a gramophone. 
415 Murdoch (1979, p 8) cites Cook as explaining; ‘every individual who enters a cabinet must surrender 
something of his private opinions in order to reach a point of agreement and concerted action’. 
416 For a long while Fisher was overshadowed in histories by his prime ministerial predecessor Deakin and 
successor Hughes who both shone more brightly as orators and characters and were the subject of two 
volume biographies while Fisher suffered from his two aspiring biographers (Denis Murphy and Clem 
Lloyd) dying before their works were completed. Day (2007) points out Fisher spent the last thirteen years 
of his life in London and his papers were not repatriated until the 1960s. As Humphreys (2005, p 2) 
comments, ‘invariably he is presented as handsome in appearance and manner, with his neat moustache 
and fetching Ayrshire burr, but as a man of modest abilities, pragmatic and even plodding’. Bernays (1919, 
pp 139-40), Broinowski (1949), Clark (1981, p 284), Cockerill (1943), Encel (1974, p 169) Fitzhardinge 
(1964, p 120), Greenwood (1955, p 216), Jose (1937, p 308), La Nauze (1965), Lyons (1965, p 79), Serle 
(1949), Sladen (1916, p 22) and Tennant (1952, p 102), and more recently Hirst (2013, p 33), are examples 
of this tendency to damn Fisher with faint praise. Good examples of the more recent recognition of 
Fisher’s achievements are Murdoch (1998), Lloyd (2000), Anderson (2001), Scates (2001), P Edwards 
(2004b), Galligan and Abdiel (2007), Day (2008), Humphreys (2008) and Bastian (2009). 
417 Boote (1928, p 7). Jose (1937, p 307) reports that by 1880 Fisher was ‘exceptionally well-read in the 
literature of reform’. Cockburn (1956, p 60) refers to Fisher studying history and geography’. A 
contemporary writer called him a man ‘who is not afraid of ideas’; Review of Reviews, July 1911, p 26. A 
British newspaper said of him ‘of his intellectual depth…there is no doubt’; Manchester Guardian, 
25 January 1916, p 6. In Fisher (1910) he crossed out a reference to himself as ‘not a great reader’. 
418 Review of Reviews, July 1911, p 26 
419 Manchester Guardian, 25 January 1916, p 7. 
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While in some quarters he was regarded as stubborn and fixed in his views,420 Fisher 
himself declared ‘if our opponents can show by argument that we are wrong we should 
retrace our footsteps and admit our error’.421 Other writers have argued Fisher was 
‘willing to listen to views which did not coincide with his own’422 and as treasurer ‘sought 
out expert and educated bankers and economists’.423 A sign of his intelligence and 
competitiveness is that ‘he played both chess and draughts with considerable skill’.424 He 
also had an interest in art.425  
Fisher had the support of his wife Margaret in pushing forward social reform. Unusually 
for a prime minister’s wife of this time, she was actively involved in public affairs, joining 
a radical suffragettes’ march critical of the British government while in London. By 
contrast, Cook’s wife Mary, while having sufficient social conscience to be heavily 
involved with the Red Cross, took a more traditional role.  
Fisher therefore developed a clear idea of economic reforms he wanted introduced and so 
aspired to be a reformer if he got the chance. Cook seemed to have narrower interests, 
focused on religion, and few strongly held goals he wished to achieve. In marked contrast 
to Fisher’s steadfast consistency, Cook was notorious for the range of issues on which he 
had changed his mind. It was said of him that: 
‘Mr Cook’s view upon any subject is important, but unfortunately it is almost 
certain to be ephemeral, so we must make the most of it while it lasts … [he] 
has no political roots. He will transplant readily, and grow in any soil.’426 
                                                          
420 An influential view was Shepherd’s (1958, p 20) claim that Fisher ‘was not a reader and did not want 
to read anything that differed from his point of view’. Apparently based solely on this comment, Souter 
(1998, p 98) claims Fisher ‘rarely read a book, for fear he might have to revise his point of view’. By Latham 
(2001) this had become an assertion that ‘Fisher once said he avoided reading books because they might 
make him change his point of view’.  
421 Official Report of 4th Commonwealth Political Labour Conference, 7 July 1908, p 14.  
422 Scott (1936, p 44). Another contemporary journalist, while making a number of criticisms, conceded 
Fisher was ‘open-minded’; Anon (1908, p 1). 
423 Murdoch (2013, pp 33-34). 
424 Smith (1933, p 48). Day (2008, p 184) reports his winning a parliamentary competition. Bastian (2009, 
p 164) and Biggs (1924, p 3) also refer to his chess prowess. 
425 Anonymous (1913a, p 70). Whitlam (2002, p 132) recalls that as prime minister Fisher said that once 
the necessary public service buildings had been constructed in Canberra, next would be a public library 
and art gallery. Shepherd (1958, p 275 and part 2, p 77), his private secretary, recalls his support for 
Australian art and literature. Fisher was good friends with artists John and Hugh Paterson; Day (2008, 
pp 182-3). He established the Historical Memorials Committee which commissioned portraits. 
426 Thomas Ewing, Sydney Morning Herald, 16 February 1906, p 5. Among the many diverse issues on 
which he changed his mind were tariffs, trade unions, old age pensions, smoking, republicanism, female 
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Spending most of his career in opposition, it was said of Cook that ‘the habit of a decade 
of criticism never left him and … he had not developed that constructive side which is so 
essential for both ministerial and cabinet life’427 and he possessed ‘few skills in 
negotiation.’428     
Fisher was the more likeable man429 and therefore good at building support for his 
proposals and was an adept political manager.430 Cook was more dour and aloof. He also 
‘had great difficulty in appreciating other points of view, and seldom made any real 
attempt to do so’.431    
It will be argued later in this thesis that an important characteristic of the more successful 
reforming treasurers (eg Page, Chifley, Keating, the early Costello) was that they had the 
strong support of their prime minister. Fisher was ideally placed in this respect as he was 
both prime minister and treasurer. Cook by contrast was treasurer to the autocratic Hughes 
who held him in fairly low esteem.432  
It is also easier to be a reforming treasurer if you take up the post after a change in 
government. Fisher did this for all three of his terms and in the case of his second, and 
                                                          
suffrage, postal charges, upper houses of parliament, land nationalisation, anti-trust legislation, 
federation, land taxation, arbitration courts to settle industrial disputes, a national bank, deficit 
budgeting, income taxation, federalism, primitive versus ‘new connexion’ or mainstream Methodism, 
conscription, states’ rights and possibly teetotalism. He also justified some of the change by cabinet 
solidarity. As Cook destroyed most of his personal papers there is little record of his private views to assess 
how they differed from those expressed publicly. 
427 Shepherd (1958, part 2, p 109) argues ‘his years spent in opposition and consequently devoted mainly 
to destructive criticism of government proposals tended to make him ‘anti’ in most things’. His extended 
period in opposition meant ‘his hostility became more than a role, his bitterness more than a cloak’; 
Punch, 10 June 1909, p 792. 
428 P Edwards (2004a, p 115). 
429 An otherwise unsympathetic account in the Australian Magazine, 1 October 1910, p 802, called Fisher 
‘a pleasant man whom everybody likes’. Another mostly critical account by contemporary journalist 
referred to Fisher as ‘sincere, kindly, faithful, open-hearted’; Anon (1908, p 1). Scott (1936, p 44) 
comments ‘a more friendly man there was not in the politics of Australia in his time’. Edward Holloway 
(c1954, p 100) described him as the ‘most lovable prime minister’. AG Stephens observed ‘people call him 
Andy after five minutes’ acquaintance’; Fisher (1910). 
430 Fisher held together a fractious Labor Party, which split just over a year after he left. He held the seat 
of Wide Bay from 1901 until his retirement in 1915 but Labor did not win it again until 1961. Labor 
historian Clem Lloyd has commented ‘no-one has led the party better. Probably only Curtin has led it as 
well’; cited in MacCallum (2014a, p 44). Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2015, p 169) referred to Fisher’s 
‘emotional intelligence’, an attribute in which he far outshone Hughes. Mackerras (2008) rates Fisher as 
one of Australia's four greatest prime ministers. 
431 Murdoch (1996, p 19). 
432 Hughes reputedly regarded Cook as ‘the biggest damn fool in creation’; Beaumont (2013, p 268) and 
J Hume Cook (1936, p 79). He also described him as ‘not an efficient administrator [and he] knows nothing 
about business’; Attard (1991, pp 172, 174). 
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most significant, term it happened after an electoral landslide to which his own standing 
had been an important element. Cook by contrast was following on from Watt in the same 
government under the continuing leadership of Hughes. Arguing for dramatic reform 
could therefore be taken as criticism of his colleagues and so he was more likely to accept 
the status quo. 
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Chapter Five: Edward (Ted) Theodore and Joseph 
Lyons: provincial premiers turned depression 
treasurers 
 
Prologue 
The newly re-elected Tasmanian premier and treasurer Joseph Lyons sat at his desk in 
1925, writing a note of appreciation to the former Queensland premier and treasurer ‘Red 
Ted’ Theodore for coming to Tasmania to campaign for him.433 In his short letter Lyons 
thanked Theodore for his ‘signal services’ which he hoped to one day reciprocate.434 
Theodore had stood down from the Queensland parliament to move to federal politics, 
where there was something of a leadership vacuum on the Labor side.435 Theodore 
believed Lyons would one day also make a strong contribution to national government. 
Indeed, when the federal party successfully talked Lyons into making the move, Theodore 
apparently personally guaranteed Lyons' salary should he be defeated at the election.436 
 
                                                          
433 Theodore addressed public meetings in Devonport, Burnie, Launceston and Hobart. In Devonport, 
Theodore said Lyons ‘had accomplished wonders in straightening up the financial position and saving the 
state from the verge of insolvency’; (Burnie) Advocate, 23 May 1925, p 6. He said he was ‘impressed with 
Mr Lyons’s earnestness, his sincerity, his tenacity and his courage’; Mercury, 22 May 1925, p 7. 
434 The letter, dated 30 June 1925, is in the Theodore papers, NLA MS 7222, folder 2. Lyons may not have 
met Theodore in person until they were elected to the federal parliament in 1929. Theodore had not been 
to Tasmania before 1925 and there is no reference to the men sharing a platform while he was there. 
Lyons had only made a handful of trips to the mainland. Lyons had been selected as a delegate to Labor’s 
national conference in 1919, which Theodore attended, but Lyons could not attend for financial reasons; 
Hart (1967, p 23). Lyons was not a delegate to any other Labor national conference and Theodore was not 
a delegate when it met in Hobart in 1912. Theodore attended the 1916 premiers’ conference as acting 
premier and the 1918 conference as Queensland treasurer but Lyons did not attend either. Lyons 
attended the 1915, 1926 and 1927 conferences (none of which was in Brisbane) but Theodore did not. 
Neither attended the premiers’ conferences of 1917 and 1920. Theodore attended the 1919 treasurers’ 
conference but Lyons was then in opposition.  
435 The talented TJ Ryan, Theodore’s predecessor as Queensland premier, had moved to federal politics 
and become deputy leader but died suddenly in 1921, aged just 45. The ALP leader, Frank Tudor, died in 
1922. His successor Matthew Charlton had been hospitalised with a serious illness during the 1922 
campaign. Former senior Labor figures such as Hughes, Pearce and Watson had defected to the 
conservatives over the conscription issue, while Fisher was living in declining health in London. 
436 Hector McFie, a Tasmanian MLC, claims this in a letter to Philip Hart 3 June 1964, Hart papers, National 
Library of Australia, MS 9410, folder 1. Theodore believed Lyons was ‘a man whose word was worth 
listening to, who was sincere, who knew his subject and who commanded respect’; Denholm (1922, p 59). 
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Table 5.1: The parallel lives of Joseph Lyons and Edward Theodore 
 Joseph Lyons Edward Theodore 
Born Sept 1879 Dec 1884 
Elected to state parliament April 1909 Oct 1909 
Becomes deputy Labor leader January 1914 Sept 1912 
Appointed state minister April 1914 June 1915 
State treasurer April 1914 – Nov 1916; 
Oct 1923 – Jun 1928 
June 1915 – Feb 1925 
State deputy premier April 1914 – Nov 1916 June 1915 – Oct 1919 
State premier Oct 1923 – Jun 1928 Oct 1919 – Feb 1925 
Elected to federal parliament Oct 1929 Jan 1927 
Appointed federal minister Oct 1929 Oct 1929 
Acting treasurer Aug 1930 – Jan 1931 n.a. 
Treasurer Jan 1932 – Oct 1935 Oct 1929 – July 1930; 
Jan 1931 – Jan 1932 
Prime minister Jan 1932 – April 1939 n.a. 
Defeated at election n.a. Jan 1932 
Died April 1939 Feb 1950 
 
When writing his letter to Theodore, Lyons may have reflected on what his son Brendan 
Lyons (2008, p 101) would later call their ‘remarkable similar political backgrounds’. 
Both men had risen from humble origins through dint of hard work and application. Both 
were involved in union activities and joined the Labor Party. Both were elected to state 
parliament in 1909. Both quickly rose to become state treasurer and then premier. At this 
time, Lyons’ biographer Henderson (2011, p 171) observed they shared similarly 
pragmatic views about economics. 
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But Lyons at that time would never have dreamed then that he would one day leave the 
Labor Party and bring down the Scullin Labor government in which he would serve with 
Theodore, ending Theodore’s political career. 
When the Scullin government was elected in 1929, Theodore and Lyons were its only 
members with any government experience and both were given senior cabinet positions. 
Theodore was treasurer and, when he had to stand aside and Scullin was overseas, Lyons 
was acting treasurer.  
But as the Scullin government wrestled with the Great Depression their views on how to 
deal with the economic collapse differed markedly. In time Lyons left the Labor Party 
and led the federal opposition. The December 1931 election saw Lyons become prime 
minister and treasurer and Theodore lose his seat. Lyons was treasurer as Australia 
gradually emerged from the recession. While Theodore never stood for parliament again, 
Lyons nonetheless contemplated appointing him to a government post.  
This chapter looks at the reasons why these two men’s views diverged so far after starting 
off so close.  
Family and childhood 
Joseph Lyons was born in Stanley, Tasmania on 15 September 1879, of Irish ancestry, 
and grew to be a staunch Catholic. He retained some Irish sentimentality.437 He attended 
the local convent school, and was a keen student and debater. Indeed, one relative referred 
to him as ‘fairly droolin' with the schoolin'’.438 He was a good runner, footballer and 
cricketer at school.439 After his father gambled away the family’s savings on the 1887 
Melbourne Cup, Lyons had to find work. He had a number of part-time jobs, including 
as a printer’s devil as a nine year old (the same job as former treasurers Chris Watson and 
William Higgs).   
                                                          
437 In a parlour game in 1905 Lyons was asked his favourite colour and replied ‘the colour of the shamrock’; 
illustration in Henderson (2011, p 37). 
438 According to Enid Lyons (1965, p 53). Bradish (1927, p 15) claims ‘as a boy he was tireless in every 
opportunity to enhance his debating powers’. Manning Clark (1987, p 263), however, compares his 
intellectual thirst unfavourably with contemporaries such as Scullin and Curtin, claiming Lyons ‘was never 
a voracious reader or a man with a lively curiosity’. 
439 ‘Lithe as a deer’ recalled Pithouse (c1940). 
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Edward Theodore was of more distinguished ancestry but grew up in similarly modest 
circumstances. He was born on 29 December 1884 at Port Adelaide. His father, a 
Romanian immigrant, originally called Vasile Teodorescu but later Basil Theodore, was 
a son of a senior Greek orthodox bishop and a nephew of the inventor of the first 
submarine440 but was himself only a labourer, tug boat operator and later part-time farmer. 
He had an interest in organised labour and was approached about standing for parliament 
but declined.441 Theodore's mother, born Annie Tanner, was an English immigrant. Ted 
attended local schools and did some labouring jobs before heading for the Western 
Australian goldfields at the age of fifteen. 
Unionism and self-improvement 
After two aunts offered to pay his school fees Lyons was able to qualify to become a 
teacher and in 1907 was sent to Hobart to attend Teacher Training College. He was then 
sent all over the state, generally to small village schools, before gaining a post in 
Launceston in 1908. One of his postings was to the Carmichael Lyne estate, where he met 
the owner’s brother, William Lyne (the former NSW premier who went on to serve as 
federal treasurer), fuelling his interest in politics. By 1906, Henderson (2011, p 37) 
reports, he was listing ‘studying politics’ as his favourite occupation. Dissatisfied with 
the way teachers were treated, in 1906 Lyons joined the Tasmanian Workers’ Political 
League. 
Theodore was much more peripatetic. He moved to the Abrolhos Islands and then to 
Broken Hill. By 1906 he had moved to Chillagoe, in the hinterlands of Cairns, where he 
toiled as a mine labourer and prospector. He literally bore the scars of his work there as a 
mining accident left his back permanently marked.442 He became known as ‘Red Ted’, 
for his politics rather than his appearance. In 1909 he married Esther Mahoney. Along 
with his close friend Bill McCormack, Theodore was a founder of the Amalgamated 
Workers’ Association of North Queensland, and Theodore was its first secretary. It was 
said that ‘Theodore provided the brains and McCormack the brawn’.443 When it merged 
                                                          
440 Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1946, p 7. 
441 Joyce (1959, p 1). 
442 Fitzgerald (1994a, p 365). 
443 Kett Kennedy, cited in Moore (2015, pp 27, 97). Kennedy (1977, p 15) describes the ‘forcible’ way in 
which Theodore and McCormack went about recruiting for the union. 
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with the much larger Australian Workers’ Union in 1913, Theodore served as the state 
president from 1913 to 1916. 
While they had limited formal schooling, both Lyons and Theodore were interested in 
learning and read a good deal, although Theodore had greater intellectual depth. A 
contemporary journalist recalled Lyons as ‘intelligent and well-read’.444 Miners with 
whom Theodore worked recalled his 'incessant reading'.445 Simpson (1931) reports that 
Theodore built up a substantial library of books on economics after moving to a larger 
house in 1916. 
Religious and political beliefs 
Lyons was a staunch Catholic all his life. According to Manning Clark (1987, p 263), he 
‘turned to God in all the crises of his life’. His first biographer, Hart (1967, p 8), however, 
considered ‘his Catholicism does not appear to have greatly influenced his views on 
particular political issues…he probably knew little of the Church’s detailed social 
teachings.’ Williams (2013, p 93) similarly observed that ‘he was uninvolved – and, it 
would appear, largely uninterested – in the debates of the 1930s conducted within 
Australian Catholic-intellectual circles’. He did, however, dress his crucial criticism of 
Theodore’s economic policy of expansionary credit in religious terms; ‘only the Creator 
could make something out of nothing’.446 Lyons was known as ‘honest Joe’, reflecting a 
virtue very important to him.447 
Lyons was involved with a discussion group of Fabian hue formed by the economist (and 
for a time fellow MP) LF Giblin, whom he had first met in 1907.448 While not professing 
to be an economist himself, Lyons was advised by economists of the stature of Giblin and 
Douglas Copland. Throughout his career, Lyons would reach out for diverse sources of 
                                                          
444 Buchanan (1940, p 3). Denning (1937, p 30) recalled him as ‘abreast of the latest developments in 
financial thought’. Johnston (1987b, pp 60-61) gives a similar view. He was also ‘widely versed in socialist 
literature’; Bolton (1963, p 293). Murphy (1975, p 175) refers to him as having ‘a zeal for reading socialist 
and economic tracts’. 
445 Joyce (1959, p 1). Fitzgerald (1994b, p 39) remarks that even while an itinerant miner, 'wherever he 
went he joined a library and read whatever he could' and once in parliament, 'he devoted his spare time 
to studying finance'.  
446 Cited by Manning Clark (1987, p 371). Along similar lines, Lyons claimed Theodore’s Fiduciary Notes 
Bill attempted ‘what is possible only to the Creator – the performance of a miracle’; Hansard, 13 March 
1931, p 237. 
447 As early as 1905 he described ‘honesty’ as his favourite virtue; Henderson (2011, p 37). 
448 Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006, p 14); Henderson (2011, pp 47-48). 
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advice. His wife wrote of how he 'conferred with pastoralists, industrialists, trade 
unionists, farmers and businessmen'.449  
While in 1909 he referred to himself as a 'socialist', at times addressed colleagues as 
'comrade', and in 1921 declared 'the capitalist system had failed'450, he never revealed any 
deep knowledge of or strong support for Marxism.451 He opposed the Labor Party's 
adoption of the socialist objective in 1921 and became interested in finding a 'third way' 
between capitalism and communism.452 Towards the end of his life he confessed ‘I am 
still a Labor man at heart’.453  
Despite Theodore’s father’s family being pillars of the Greek Orthodox church, Edward 
was also raised a Catholic (his father having adopted his mother’s faith) but, while for a 
time he was a regular attender at mass, religion never appears to have played a big part in 
his life.454 By his latter years he was apparently an atheist.455 Fitzgerald (1994b, p 410) 
reports that a priest came to him on his deathbed but it is not clear whether Theodore 
genuinely welcomed him or just wished to appease some family members. 
Theodore had the stronger and more curious mind of the two men. He was widely read in 
socialist literature456 and in Theodore (1926, p 3) referred to capitalism as a ‘passing phase 
of human history’ which was chiefly responsible for inequality. He added, however, that 
Labor’s planned transition to a more socialist model would be gradual and peaceful. 
Theodore was never a Marxist revolutionary. Indeed, he was a significant investor and 
                                                          
449 Cited in Henderson (2008, p 207). When he appointed an advisory council in 1925 to investigate ways 
of ameliorating the state's financial position, its members included former conservative premier and 
treasurer Sir Elliot Lewis and leading businessmen Sir Alfred Ashbolt as well as Giblin 
450 He continued '…it has to go. Hitherto the Labor Party has attempted to correct the evils of a rotten 
system. Now, they must seek to remove the rotten system…'; Hobart World, 14 March 1921, p 4. 
451 Hart (1967, p 7), his son Brendan Lyons (2008, p 65). 
452 Bird (2008, p 15 and 2009, p 41). Enid Lyons (1965, p 145) describes how by the late 1920s 'his early 
dreams of socialism were tempered now by awareness of the danger to individual freedom that lay within 
it'. Melville (c1974, p 63) recalled Lyons as ‘never really very much imbued with Labor traditions’. As early 
as the mid-1920s there had been signs of Lyons moving away from the Labor movement; Denholm (1977). 
For example, an editorial in the Mercury, 23 July 1926, p 6 commented ‘in practice there is really no 
substantial difference between one party and the other in Tasmania. It is, more or less, a matter of chance 
that Mr Lyons has political connections with the Labour Party’. 
453 Denning (c1948b, p 23) and Lyons’ daughter Sheila, cited in Crawford (1989, p 24). 
454 Fitzgerald (1994b, pp 74-75), Young (1971, pp 6-7). Greenwood (1966, pp 2-3) pointed out that 
Theodore was sent to a government rather than catholic school.  
455 A letter from John Wren to Theodore on 4 October 1949 refers to a conversation between them where 
Theodore expressed disbelief in an afterlife; Griffin (2004, p 33). 
456 Bolton (1963, p 293) and Murphy (1975, p 175). 
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saw nothing wrong with this. As John Howard (2014, p 28) put it, he ‘mixed easily with 
entrepreneurs; he was something of one himself, though prone to corner cutting.’ 
Rather than overthrowing capitalism Theodore sought to reform and govern it to make it 
consistent with the interests of the workers. Kim Beazley Snr (1966, 1972) called 
Theodore ‘Australia’s first significant Keynesian’;457 probably true of parliamentarians 
but there were Keynesian economists in Australia at the time such as Giblin and Copland.  
Into state parliaments 
In 1909 Lyons resigned as a teacher and successfully stood for the state seat of Wilmot.458 
This was a largely rural seat, although it included Launceston. Lyons supported the Labor 
programme, which included radical measures such as breaking up large estates. Although 
untrained in finance, he took an early interest in financial matters, serving on the Standing 
Committee on Public Accounts. In 1912 he became president of the Tasmanian branch of 
the Labor Party, and topped the poll in Wilmot. He was soon the deputy leader of the 
parliamentary Labor party. 
Also in 1909, aged only 24, Theodore won the Queensland Legislative Assembly mining 
seat of Woothakata (from 1912 Chillagoe), on some accounts having won a toss of a coin 
to decide whether he or McCormack should be the candidate.459 Working hard to improve 
his rhetoric and studying finance in the parliamentary library, he was rewarded with a 
rapid rise. When T J Ryan became leader in September 1912, Theodore became his 
deputy. Theodore spoke out on economic issues, calling for a debt sinking fund and 
advocating succession duties, increased income tax, a tax on dividends and a land tax.460    
                                                          
457 In a more accurate refinement, Beazley (1971, p 4) referred to him as the ‘first Keynesian in Australian 
public life’, an accolade repeated by Souter (1998, p 265). A cynic might say he would identify with Keynes’ 
comment to Lytton Strachey that his ambition was ‘to manage a railway or organize a trust, or at least 
swindle the investing public’; cited in Walsh (2007, p 49). (Keynes’ biographer Harrod (1950, p 111) 
discreetly omits the latter part of this quotation.) 
458 The Tasmanian lower house was elected under proportional representation using the same electorate 
borders as the federal electorates. As second on the Labour ticket, Lyons had a good chance of being 
elected, although it was still a gamble to quit his job.  
459 Childe (1923, p 114), McMullin (1991, p 81) and Moore (2017, p 60) report this story –as does Hardy’s 
(1950, pp 324-5) fictionalised account -- but Sykes (1988, p 226) does not believe it. An anonymous 
journalist (1945, p 7) reports old-timers recalling Theodore as a reluctant candidate who saw himself as 
too young and inexperienced. 
460 Queensland Parliament Hansard, 9 September 1913, p 1239. 
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State treasurers 
The election of a Labor government in Tasmania in April 1914 saw Lyons become 
treasurer, as well as deputy premier and minister for education and railways. The 
government, however, had only a precarious hold on the lower house and faced an 
obstructive upper house. Lyons represented Tasmania at the Premiers' Conference in 
Sydney in 1915, which doubled as a honeymoon with Enid. As education minister, ahead 
of his time, he attempted to introduce equal pay for women.461 He established a royal 
commission into public debt, serving as a commissioner himself along with Giblin and 
three others.462  
The Tasmanian economy suffered from educating children who then left for the mainland 
to find work. By January 1915, the unemployment rate in the state was over 13 per cent. 
With little manufacturing industry of its own, the rural exporters in Tasmania suffered 
from the federal tariffs. 
After a bitter conscription referendum campaign and a split in the Labor Party, the 
government was defeated and Lyons became leader of the opposition in November 1916 
and was seen as Labor’s ‘bright new hope’.463 He stood unsuccessfully for the northern 
Tasmanian federal seat of Darwin in 1919. A car accident in 1926 put his life at risk, and 
left him lame for years in one leg. 
Meanwhile in Queensland TJ Ryan had led Labor into power in 1915 and Theodore 
became treasurer464, deputy premier and secretary for public works. The new 
administration aimed to be a reformist government in the mould of the concurrent federal 
government led by fellow Queenslander Andrew Fisher. In May 1916 Theodore took to 
the national stage as acting premier at the premiers’ conference. 
Theodore’s approach to the state budget was described as ‘orthodox’.465 Indeed Fitzgerald 
(1994b, p 62) suggests that Theodore and Ryan ‘swept into power largely because they 
embodied petit-bourgeois ideals of good book-keeping’. But this did not prevent them 
                                                          
461 Enid Lyons (1972a, p 3). 
462 Frank Green (1969, p 10), who served as secretary to the commission. 
463 Davis (1983, p 10). 
464 This appointment surprised some, who regarded William Lennon, a former banker who had served as 
Labor’s acting leader, as the best qualified candidate for the position; Greenwood (1966, pp 114-5). 
465 Cain (1990), Clark (1975, p 28). 
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implementing many reformist measures. The new government sought to promote 
competition by establishing government-owned enterprises ranging from ‘cattle stations 
and butchers, timber and sugar mills, banking and insurance services, even a hotel’.466  It 
also had ambitions to break up land monopolies and reform industrial legislation, 
although these faced considerable opposition in the upper house. Ryan and Theodore ran 
the Queensland campaign against the conscription referenda, with Theodore arguing it 
would set a dangerous precedent for 'industrial conscription'.467 When one of Theodore's 
pamphlets was censored, he had it incorporated in Hansard and published, to the ire of 
Prime Minister Hughes. 
With a drought sapping revenues and a desire to expand the rail network, Theodore 
introduced new taxes on companies in his first state budget on 13 October 1915. To one 
writer, ‘it encapsulated Theodore’s belief that governments had obligations to intervene 
in the economy in times of adversity’.468 This belief presaged Theodore’s future approach 
to the national budget.  
His second budget, on 1 November 1916, continued in a like vein. In August 1919 
Theodore introduced the Unemployed Workers Bill, providing for establishment of an 
Unemployment Council to study the issue and devise policies to combat it. The central 
thrust was to time public works projects for periods of slack demand. It also allowed for 
a levy on companies to fund unemployment insurance. While like much of the 
government’s legislation it was blocked by an upper house of members appointed for life, 
it was an important assertion of a new principle. Theodore declared ‘every citizen of the 
state has a right to get work’.469  It foreshadowed the attitudes he would adopt as federal 
treasurer a decade later. 
State premiers 
In October 1923 Lyons became premier and treasurer and held both posts until 1928. 
Initially he led a minority Labor government, but in June 1925 Lyons achieved a majority. 
He was a cautious premier and state treasurer, who brought the budget from deficit to 
                                                          
466 Cain (1990). 
467 Murphy (1978b, pp 311-312). 
468 Kennedy, the biographer of Theodore’s close colleague William McCormack, cited in Fitzgerald (1994b, 
p 70). 
469 Queensland parliament Hansard, 2 September 1919, p 502. 
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surplus through application of financial orthodoxy. His bipartisan style and the priority 
he accorded to improving the state's public finances, attracted criticism from Labor 
hardliners, but the conservative Legislative Council rejected Lyons' more progressive 
legislation. Lyons had started studying law but dropped his studies when appointed 
premier.  
In October 1919, when Ryan resigned to enter federal politics, Theodore became premier 
at the age of 34. He remained treasurer as well as taking on the role of chief secretary. 
(From March 1920 to February 1922 he transferred the treasurer’s job to deputy premier 
John Fihelly.) In 1920 Theodore was to have represented the ALP at an international 
labour conference in Geneva but was unable to attend.470 In 1922 Queensland became the 
only state to pass legislation to abolish its upper house, which enabled Theodore to pass 
legislation providing for unemployment benefits, broader workers' compensation, 
organisation of rural marketing and funding of relief work by local governments.471 In 
May 1923 he increased his government’s majority from one to fourteen.472 
In October 1921 Brisbane hosted the Labor Party national conference. Scullin supported 
a motion establishing the objective of the party as ‘the socialisation of industry, 
production, distribution and exchange’. Theodore unsuccessfully moved an amendment 
limiting nationalisation to ‘those agencies … which are used under capitalism to despoil 
the community’, but later succeeded in having conference adopt the ‘Blackburn 
interpretation’ that the policy’s extent was only ‘for the purpose of preventing 
exploitation’.473 Theodore explained the need to control the instruments of credit and 
supported the nationalisation of banks. In Theodore (1922, p 3) he expressed sympathy 
for farmers, 'the most indispensable worker in the community' and expressed concern 
about the 'rural exodus' to the cities. Greenwood (1966, p 86) characterises Theodore as 
premier as ‘no ideologue but a practical, political realist’. 
                                                          
470 ALP federal executive minutes, 14 October 1920, in Weller and Lloyd (eds) (1978, p 50). 
471 Higgins (1954, pp 26-28). 
472 The Round Table, December 1923, p 162, described the government as the ‘single remaining Labour 
government in the British Empire’. 
473 Theodore also viewed Scullin's idea of a Supreme Economic Council controlling the nationalised 
industries as impractical, indeed as 'extreme' and 'Bolshevik'; Fitzgerald (1994b, pp 147-9); Colegrove 
(1967, p 7) and Ross (1934, p 59). Theodore had also been an active delegate to the 1919 and 1924 
conferences. 
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When UK investors were critical of his radicalism,474 Theodore became the first 
Australian premier to raise funds in the New York money market. These funds, however, 
proved more expensive and Theodore later compromised some policies to secure further 
funds from London.  
Writing for international audiences, Theodore said 'the essential character of the Labour 
policy necessitates a gradual, and not a violent, progress towards reform' as 'change by 
force can only be maintained by force'. He claimed that the Ryan and Theodore 
governments had resulted in 'less ruthless exploitation and profiteering, less poverty and 
misery among the workers, and a fairer distribution of prosperity and happiness among 
men and women in Queensland than in any other country in the civilised world'.475  
At Labor's national conference in 1924 Theodore successfully moved to have put in the 
platform a call for the ‘Commonwealth Bank to be developed on the lines of a central 
reserve bank, while retaining its ordinary and savings bank functions’, notwithstanding 
the ongoing commitment to bank nationalisation.476 Theodore (1925a, pp 2, 9 and 16) 
regarded Page's 1924 central banking legislation as 'an emasculation of the central bank', 
putting it under the control of private banks and ‘pandering to the plutocrats’.  
While the governments in which Lyons served and led were noted for their caution, 
Hughes (1972, p 365) called the Ryan-Theodore Government 'one of the golden periods 
of Labor Party history, on a par with the Chifley-Curtin period for innovation in policy 
and probably more effective in terms of long run achievement'. A sign of Theodore’s 
ability was that the other side of politics tried to recruit him.477 
 
                                                          
474 The UK investors were warned off by a delegation of Queensland conservatives including a former 
premier; Schedvin (1971). 
475 Theodore (1923, pp 198-9) and Theodore (1925b, p 434). The 'gradual approach' of Labor was 
emphasised for a domestic audience in Theodore (1924). For contemporary press references to, and a 
left-wing critique of, Theodore's moderate reformism, see JHC (1924).  
476 Official Report of the Proceedings of the 1924 ALP Commonwealth Conference, 3 November 1924, p 65; 
Murphy (1978a, p 336), Robinson (1986, p 138). 
477 There had been a move to get him to lead a 'centre party'; Higgins (1954, p 61). In 1922 large sums of 
money were offered to Theodore to lead the conservatives in the Queensland parliament; Larcombe 
(1934, p 79). Earle Page made strenuous efforts in 1923 and 1924 to get Theodore to switch sides; Young 
(1971, p 43), Clark (1974, p 28). The Round Table, December 1923 observed that ‘political opponents 
continually make overtures to him to become the leader of their party’ (p 166). 
 105 
 
Into federal parliament 
While both Lyons and Theodore had long considered moving to federal politics, 
Theodore was the first to get there, but his path was far from untrammelled. After winning 
Labor preselection for the federal seat of Herbert, Theodore resigned as premier in 
February 1925 and MLA in September, but to all-round surprise narrowly failed to win 
the federal seat.478 Too impatient to wait three years for the next federal election, 
Theodore was willing to move to somewhere affording him a chance to enter parliament 
sooner. He relocated to New South Wales, where he won the seat of Dalley at a 
by-election in January 1927, having been endorsed by the state executive without the 
usual local preselection ballot. There were strong suggestions that the former member, 
William Mahony, had been paid £5,000 to resign but a royal commission found no 
evidence that Theodore had made such a payment.479 The move to NSW, however, 
brought him into conflict with the Lang machine.480  
Theodore’s speeches as a backbencher were mainly on economic matters. Young (1971, 
p 74) observed that Theodore’s arrival was especially welcome because at the time while 
treasurer Page was vulnerable on financial issues there was no Labor members with the 
technical ability to put him under pressure. Theodore attacked Page for supporting cuts 
in wages and reductions in tariffs. By February 1928 Theodore was a federal frontbencher 
and had compiled a detailed compendium of statistics and arguments for Labor 
candidates.481 He went within one vote of being elected deputy leader in April 1928, and 
by February 1929 was the unanimous choice for the position, serving as acting leader for 
two months while Scullin was ill.482 After Labor defeated the Bruce government in 
                                                          
478 Politicians as diverse as Lyons, Hughes and Forde and almost all the press regarded Theodore as 
virtually a certainty; Fitzgerald (1994b, p 182).  
479 A common view was that controversial businessman John Wren may have made the payment; 
Fitzgerald (1994b, pp 206-210), Griffin (2004, pp 258-260) and Young (1971, pp 80-86) and the lightly 
fictionalised account in Hardy (1950, chapter 10).  
480 While Lang referred to policy differences, much of Lang’s opposition to Theodore appears a personal 
rivalry; Young (1963). The seat of Herbert was held by Labor from 1928 to 1958, so Theodore’s impatience 
may have cost him a long federal political career and perhaps his chance of the prime ministership. 
Alternatively he could have contested the Queensland seat of Kennedy, traditionally Labor and only won 
by the Nationalists in 1925 due to the death of the sitting Labor member after nominations had closed, 
which was held by Labor from 1929 to 1966.  
481 Theodore (1928). 
482 When Charlton stepped down in 1928 Theodore made it clear he would not stand against Scullin for 
the leadership; Denning (1937, p 26). But there was press speculation that Theodore rather than Scullin 
might still be chosen by the Labor Party as their prime minister; Sydney Morning Herald, 15 October 1929, 
p 11. Charlton may have stepped down earlier than he otherwise planned in order to prevent Theodore 
assembling the numbers to become leader; Kennedy (1988, p 290). 
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October 1929, Theodore, who had been campaign director, became treasurer and 
effectively deputy prime minister. He reportedly relaxed after the election win by reading 
a book on economics at a picnic.483 
Lyons considered standing for the federal equivalent of his state seat of Wilmot in the 
1925 election but decided against it after being re-elected as premier.484 After Labor 
narrowly lost the 1928 state election, he rejected suggestions he stand at the 1928 federal 
election.485 At Scullin’s request, Lyons successfully contested the federal seat of Wilmot 
at the snap poll of 1929. He was immediately brought into cabinet as postmaster-general.  
Lyons was reportedly disappointed not to be made treasurer,486 given his experience, but 
Scullin preferred Theodore, who was also a former premier and state treasurer but had 
longer experience in the federal parliament. 
The early days of the Scullin Government  
Theodore as a new treasurer was described by Cain (1990) as:  
carefully attired, aloof, grave and measured in manner, the new 
treasurer stood out in a parliament where his air of brooding 
strength and confident grasp of the world at large intimidated 
colleagues and foes alike… Theodore was a solitary man. In the 
comfortable library of his Kirribilli home were gathered works 
ranging from economics and history to philosophy and literature. 
Proud and relentlessly self-improving, already prospering from 
investments and multiplying his contacts in the business world, 
he had moved far in style and circumstances from the working 
man he once was. 
                                                          
483 According to reminiscences by his former campaign manager reported in Fitzgerald (1994b, p 228) and 
Laughren (1994). 
484 He mentioned considering standing in a letter to Theodore dated 6 December 1924; Theodore Papers, 
NLA MS 7222, folder 2. It seemed a less attractive option after he won the state election as it would have 
meant giving up the premiership for an uncertain chance of election as 1925 was a poor year for Labor. 
485 He cited ‘personal reasons’ rather than political to a Labor Party conference; Mercury, 3 December 
1928, p 6. The seat was retained by the conservative Llewellyn Atkinson, who had held it since 1906 under 
various party labels. As Henderson (2011, p 184) points out, whereas when he stood in 1919 the federal 
parliament was still meeting in Melbourne, by 1928 it had moved to Canberra, travel to which took much 
longer, and he now had eight rather than three children. 
486 White (1987, p 109), citing former Labor speaker Norman Makin; MacCallum (2014a, p 76). 
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Theodore stood out as a treasurer who probed and questioned Treasury rather than 
passively accepting what they gave him. As his senior officials generally had an 
accounting background, Theodore knew more economics than they did. 
Theodore assumed the responsibilities of treasurer in October 1929 at a time when many 
observers, especially overseas, had serious concerns about the state of the Australian 
economy.487 Australia was particularly vulnerable given the importance of wool and 
wheat exports, whose prices had collapsed, and the reliance on overseas capital. The UK 
bankers and investors had become concerned about the accumulation of Australian debt 
during the 1920s, and the increase in tariffs and end of assisted immigration from the UK 
made things worse. The London market had effectively closed to Australian government 
borrowers after January 1929.488  
Theodore was already critical of the pro-cyclicality of conventional approaches to fiscal 
policy, noting that capital works spending 'tends to grow in times of prosperity and to 
diminish in times of depression'.489 But initially Theodore followed financial orthodoxy. 
A week after becoming treasurer, Theodore reportedly promised that he would balance 
the budget by the next June.490 But within days of taking office Wall St had crashed and 
Brigden prepared a note forecasting a 10 per cent drop in national income in 1930.491  
Theodore revised Page’s budget, raising income taxes on high incomes and 
foreshadowing cuts in government expenditure. He argued the Bruce-Page government 
'had greatly understated the expenditure requirements and over-estimated the probable 
revenue'492 and revised the budget estimate for 1929-30 from Page’s estimate of a surplus 
                                                          
487 The Economist described it as having 'a dangerous element of insecurity palpable to the eye of the 
most casual observer'; 19 October 1929, p 706. Green (1969, p 81) remarked 'the Commonwealth treasury 
was empty. No ministry had ever assumed control of the government in less auspicious circumstances'. 
488 While treasurer, Theodore asked leading business figure WS Robinson to sound out secretly the Bank 
of England’s attitude towards Australia; Robinson (1967). 
489 Hansard, 21 November 1929, p 114. Scullin elaborated on this argument in a speech, commenting that 
'the general tendency of treasurers is to curtail their expenditure on public works whenever there is a 
period of industrial depression. This has the effect of aggravating the whole position. If the problem of 
unemployment were tackled on scientific lines the public works policy of the Commonwealth as a whole 
would be formulated so that during times of general industrial depression there would be an impetus to 
work of this character with a corresponding curtailment of it during times of general industrial prosperity’; 
The Argus, 4 November 1929, p 7. 
490 Anstey (c1936). 
491 Brigden (1929). This was one of the earliest macroeconomic forecasts. His analysis included some 
multiplier effect and discussed how the income loss would be distributed. Brigden made public his views 
in Sydney Morning Herald, 7 December 1929. 
492 Hansard, 21 November 1929, p 111. He added this meant that as treasurer he ‘inherited an empty 
Treasury’; Hansard, 21 November 1929, p 119.  
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of £0.4 million to a deficit of £1.2 million. He ended on an optimistic note, however, 
declaring; 'if we are blessed with good seasons, our troubles will soon disappear, and we 
shall commence a new era of progress and prosperity'.493 The deepening economic crisis, 
however, meant that revenue estimates were continually revised down.  
At this stage, Theodore was still supporting economic orthodoxy. When a backbencher 
moved at a caucus meeting in May 1930 ‘that the Government arrange to have £20 million 
available through the Commonwealth Bank for the purpose of supplying the wants of the 
states and commonwealth for public works’, Theodore in the chair opposed it as ‘not 
practicable’.494 
While Theodore was caught up in the coming economic maelstrom, Lyons took little part 
in the economic debates. Lyons recalled that on joining cabinet he was ‘confining my 
activities to the administration…of my department'.495 
The economic and other strains appeared to be taking more of a toll on Scullin than on 
his treasurer, and by early 1930 there were rumours Scullin might step down in favour of 
Theodore.496 Scullin announced that Theodore would be acting prime minister while he 
went to Europe to attend the Imperial Conference.497 
Theodore’s attempts to establish a central bank 
As early as December 1929 Theodore had outlined to cabinet a proposal for a 
reconstruction of the Commonwealth Bank.498 In January 1930 the cabinet agreed to 
appoint a committee of four economists including academic Douglas Copland and 
Commonwealth Statistician Charles Wickens to report on 'present restricted credit and 
the cause thereof'. 
                                                          
493 Hansard, 21 November 1929, p 119. Theodore realised he may need to take controversial measures. 
He doubted the Senate would be obstructionist, but warned of a double dissolution if it were; Sydney 
Morning Herald, 16 October 1929, p 16. 
494 Caucus minutes, 14 May 1930, reprinted in Weller (1975b, pp 371-2), Anstey (c1936), Fitzgerald 
(1994b, p 239). 
495 Hansard, 13 March 1931, p 230. 
496 Cook (1971, p 191). 
497 While there were important duties there, Denning (1937, p 180) suggests Scullin was ‘cracking under 
the strain’ and partly went for a respite. 
498 Cabinet minutes for 16 December 1929 in Crisp papers, NLA MS 5243/20/156. Theodore agreed with 
those who argued 'the Commonwealth Bank as a central bank had definitely failed to arrive'; The 
Economist, 26 October 1929, p 756. 
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Armitage at the Commonwealth Bank worked with Theodore on his Central Reserve 
Bank Bill of April 1930.499 The opposition-controlled Senate failed to pass it after they 
referred it to a select committee, which did not report until December.500 The bill would 
have separated central banking functions from the Commonwealth Bank into a separate 
Central Reserve Bank, to be managed by a board appointed by the governor-general 
consisting of a governor, two deputy governors, the treasury secretary and five other 
directors, retiring in rotation ‘who are or who have been actively engaged in agriculture, 
commerce, finance, industry or labour’.501 (The remainder of the Commonwealth Bank 
would then be able to compete freely with the private banks for ordinary banking 
business, an aspect that did not appeal to the private banks.502) The Central Reserve Bank 
would have control of the note issue, and banks would be required to hold reserves with 
it and supply it with information on their operations. The Bank would be empowered to 
buy and sell exchange and securities and make advances and so act as a ‘lender of 
last-resort’. These provisions are very similar to the arrangements ultimately established 
                                                          
499 Cornish (1993b, p 11), Hill (1993), Schedvin (1970, pp 86, 173) and Giblin (1951, p 109). Armitage 
recalled James Collins drawing up the bill; Armitage reminiscences in 1949, RBA archives SA-65-84.  
Schedvin (1970, p 86) suggests that a bill drafted for Page in 1928 may have formed the basis for 
Theodore's bill. A letter to Armitage on 8 February 1930 refers to the Attorney-General's Department 
working on a Reserve Bank Bill and a Commonwealth Bank Bill; RBA S-d-13. Armitage writes to 
Heathershaw on 15 April 1930 informing him of progress in drafting the bill, and noting that Theodore 
'has been through this memorandum and made his annotations'; RBA S-d-13. Armitage recalled he had 
received the permission of Gibson to advise Theodore; Armitage reminiscences in 1949, RBA archives 
SA-65-84. 
500 An influential voice pushing the opposition to do this was the head of the largest private bank, Alfred 
Davidson; Schedvin (1988, p 342). See Hawkins (2010d) for a further discussion of the select committee. 
Sir Ernest Harvey recommended it be deferred, claiming it was regarded in London as 'fundamentally 
unsound in principle' on the grounds of its potential for 'excessive political influence and control'; Harvey 
to Gibson, 7 April 1930, RBA S-e-3. 
501 Young (1971, pp 110-1). 
502 Theodore had earlier expressed reservations about turning the Commonwealth Bank into a purely 
central bank if this meant it could no longer compete with the private banks; The Economist, 26 October 
1929, p 757. But he came to realise that ‘the Commonwealth Bank cannot function properly as a central 
reserve bank while it is in active competition with the private banks‘; Hansard, 1 May 1930, p 1335. 
Furthermore, keeping the retail operations also meant that the Commonwealth Bank held similar, illiquid, 
assets as the private banks and so was not well placed to support the private banks in a crisis; Cornish 
(2007a, pp 7-8 and 2010, pp 5-6) and Harvey (1927). The private bankers generally were supportive of a 
central bank in principle, but this seems to be partly motivated by the idea of converting the 
Commonwealth Bank from an active competitor to a neutral umpire – they conspicuously refer to the 
Commonwealth Bank becoming a central bank and dropping its trading operations rather than a new 
central bank being established in addition. These fears may have been amplified when the 
Commonwealth Bank Bill of May 1930 seemed to set it up for more vigorous competition; Holder (1970, 
p 653). Theodore did not have a high opinion of the heads of the private bank, commenting in a speech 
at the Cremorne Theatre on 14 March 1931 that just because they ‘had some clerical experience in 
keeping ledgers’ did not mean they had any expertise in economic policy; the speech is in the Latham 
papers, NLA MS 1009/46/379. 
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in 1960 and in large measure still applying today.503 Much informed opinion found the 
bill unobjectionable.504 
The powerful chair of the Commonwealth Bank, Sir Robert Gibson, however, wrote to 
Theodore expressing the Board's opposition and calling for a delay.505 As well as his 
generally conservative stance, Gibson was likely opposed to a reduction in his own power 
as he would not have been appointed as chair of both the Central Reserve Bank and the 
Commonwealth Bank.506 The scope for the Labor Government to appoint the head of the 
new central bank was a concern to conservatives generally, who saw in Gibson a doughty 
defender of 'sound finance'. 
Lyons replaces Theodore as ‘treasurer’ 
In July 1930 Theodore stood down from cabinet after the conservative Queensland 
government established a royal commission into accusations that the Mungana mine, in 
which it was alleged that Theodore had at least an informal interest, was sold to the 
Queensland government at an inflated price while he was premier.507 While the 
commission found against Theodore, no criminal charges were laid.508 At a subsequent 
delayed civil case in August 1931, a jury509 acquitted Theodore, finding that neither of 
the key points – that the mine was sold at an inflated price510 and that Theodore had a 
                                                          
503 A short history of central banking in Australia is provided by Cornish (2010).  
504 For example, The Economist (5 April 1930, pp 767-8) described it as ‘an attempt to put an end to a 
long-standing anomalous situation … there is no obvious weakness in these proposals’. 
505 Gibson to Theodore, 6 February 1930, RBA S-d-13. 
506 Gibson had made the chairmanship of the Commonwealth Bank almost his full-time job; Armitage 
reminiscences, 1949, RBA archives, RBA SA-65-84 
507 Anstey (c1936) claims that Theodore told him Scullin had requested he stand down but the cabinet 
minutes of 7 July 1930 state that Theodore rang Scullin requesting to resign and Scullin accepted this; NAA 
A3264. Contrasting perspectives on the Mungana affair are given by Connolly (1954), Johnston (1987b), 
Kennedy (1978), Moore (2015), Sykes (1988) and Young (1971). Theodore had said he could not appear 
before the commission until after the budget but the commission would not delay proceedings for a 
month to allow this and Theodore sent no written evidence.  
508 The royal commission referred to cheques sent from McCormack to Theodore for about half of the 
revenue McCormack received from Mungana and regarded this as evidence of corrupt behaviour by 
Theodore; Kennedy (1978, pp 65-66), Smiths Weekly, 19 July 1930.  
509 The jury’s composition did not suggest it would have a pro-Labor bias. It comprised an accountant, a 
garage proprietor, a storekeeper and an insurance agent; Moore (2017). 
510 There is always scope for a range of views on the true value of a mine. Moore (2015, p 22) characterises 
it as ‘spectacularly uneconomic’. In the Theodore papers in the National Library (MS 7222, folder 3) are 
documents sent to Theodore in 1937 which indicate that a British investor was willing to pay more for the 
mine than the price for which it was sold to the government. A contemporary note by Theodore says he 
saw little point in reopening the issue now he was done with politics. Maher (1983, p 1) reports an 
estimated value of $18 million in 1983. Geologist Ian Plimer claimed the area had ‘the richest mineral 
deposits in the world’; Moore (2017), who strongly rejects Plimer’s claims. 
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conflict of interest511 – were proven. Sawer (1963, p 7) regarded the jury’s decision as a 
‘complete vindication’. But there was not ‘acquittal in the public mind’.512 
Theodore spent much of his time on the backbench developing his thoughts on economic 
policy, notably through discussions with Professors Irvine, Copland and Giblin.513 Bridge 
(2011, p 121) reported that Theodore also had discussions with former Labor leader Billy 
Hughes who agreed with much of his new thinking. Theodore moved from a relatively 
orthodox to a more radical line, which could be described as proto-Keynesian. This was 
six years before the publication of Keynes' General Theory, but Theodore had read and 
been influenced by other books by Keynes such as The Economic Consequences of Mr 
Churchill (1925), the Treatise on Money (1930c) and articles such as Keynes (1930a).514 
It is not known whether Theodore had read other works by Keynes advocating public 
works to reduce unemployment, such as Keynes (1924b), Can Lloyd George Do It?515 
                                                          
511 McCormack sent a series of cheques to Theodore, which neither ever satisfactorily explained, but this 
was not proof that Theodore held a stake in Mungana; it may have just been that the Mungana payments 
allowed McCormack to repay a loan from Theodore for some unrelated purpose. Theodore told a public 
meeting in Brisbane on 3 October 1930 that he had ‘many business transactions’ with McCormack; Daily 
Standard, 4 October 1930, pp 1, 10. Moore (2017) says this was the only time Theodore addressed the 
substance of the allegations. A writ was issued on the day Theodore was to address this public meeting 
and rebut the charges, which Theodore believed was designed to inhibit him from speaking; Brisbane 
Courier, 4 October 1930, p 13.  
512 Whitlam (1971, p xiii). Theodore could perhaps have done more to prove his innocence, such as suing 
for defamation Smith’s Weekly, who published photographs of cheques from McCormack to Theodore 
along with excerpts from the Royal Commission report in their 19 July 1930 issue; Kennedy (1978, p 123). 
Theodore’s supporters pointed to the political involvement in the proceedings; the barrister assisting the 
royal commission being the state chair of the Nationalist Party and he and the attorney-general 
representing the crown at the civil case, with the latter, Macgroaty boasting that the case ‘smashed the 
Labor Party’ and so ‘I was worth what I was paid’; Labor Call, 1 June 1932, p 7, Moore (2015, p 323).  A 
communist sympathiser, possibly Frank Hardy, writing as Franklin (1950, p 7) described the civil case as a 
deliberate ‘white wash’ in exchange for Theodore’s support for the Premiers’ Plan, but offers no support 
for this implausible suggestion. 
513 McFarlane (1966); Hart (1967, p 72); Kennedy (1988, p 294); Millmow (2010b, p 81). Copland and Giblin 
were admired by Keynes according to Menzies’ diary entry, 12 March 1941, reproduced in Martin and 
Hardy (1993, p 153). Armitage at the Commonwealth Bank supported Theodore’s view; Armitage 
reminiscences in 1949, RBA archives SA-65-84. Cain (1987b) suggests NSW MP and lecturer in economics 
Clarry Martin, once a student of Irvine, may have helped Theodore with his speeches, but the biography 
of Martin by White (1986) has no suggestion of this. Millmow (2007b, p 177) notes that Martin spoke in 
support of Theodore’s approach but makes no reference to his helping develop it. Martin is not referred 
to in the Theodore biography by Fitzgerald (1994b).  
514 Other than discussion of Keynes’ views on World War I reparations, there were only six parliamentary 
references to Keynes before Theodore in 1931. The term ‘Keynesian’ was not used in a parliamentary 
speech until Dr Evatt and Frank Crean in 1953. 
515 Co-written with Hubert Henderson, the editor of The Nation and Athenæum. Cornish (1981b, chapter 
2, p 10) points to an unsigned article in The Nation and Athenæum, 30 July 1927, probably by Keynes, 
calling for increased public works spending. 
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(1929) or the Lloyd George Liberal Party’s ‘yellow book’516, that presaged the ideas of 
the General Theory in a simpler and shorter form.517 It is quite likely he did, especially 
as many of the articles were published in The Nation and Athenæum which Theodore was 
known to read.  
It has been argued that Theodore in early 1931 was more consistently ‘Keynesian’ than 
was Keynes himself.518 Keynes had had relatively little to say about public works 
spending as a means out of recession between 1924 and 1929.519 Indeed at times he 
appears to have been sceptical about their efficacy. In an unpublished draft Keynes 
(1924c, p 23) Keynes wrote ‘the expenditure, on the production of fixed capital, of public 
money which has been raised by borrowing, can do nothing in itself to improve matters; 
and it may do actual harm if it diverts existing working capital away from the production 
of goods in a liquid form’. In Keynes (1932) he supported the Premiers’ Plan which 
sought to balance the Australian budget through spending cuts, an approach very different 
to what would come to be termed ‘Keynesian’.520 
While Theodore was becoming Keynesian, Lyons was certainly not. He regarded Keynes 
as one of the most distinguished economists in the world, but this respect did not 
overcome Lyons’ fiscal orthodoxy. Lyons' family experience had led him to avoid 
personal debt, and by analogy he wanted to avoid national debt.521 Lyons preferred to 
stick to the orthodox ‘Treasury view’522 which held that public works spending would be 
                                                          
516 The report by the Liberal Industrial Inquiry (1928, p 476), to which Keynes contributed, argued for ‘a 
large programme of national development’ for ‘dealing with unemployment’. 
517 Keynes called his book the ‘general theory’ as he saw classical economics as only dealing with the 
specific and uncommon case of full employment. Keynes modelled his language on Einstein’s distinction 
between his own ‘general theory of relativity’ and the specific Newtonian case; Skidelsky (2003, p 960). 
518 Economist Saul Eslake, for example, refers to Theodore ‘anticipating the Keynesian Revolution before 
it happened’; The Age, 9 May 2005. Similarly, Calwell (1963a, p 83) wrote that Theodore ‘wanted to apply 
Keynesian economics at a time when Keynes himself was barely known’. 
519 Booth (1989, p 8). There are many articles that have been written distinguishing between Keynes and 
‘Keynesians’. Keynes himself quipped after a meeting with Keynesian economists in 1944 that ‘I was the 
only non-Keynesian there’; Clarke (2009, p 168). 
520 The month before writing it Keynes had dined with the leading Australian conservative politician John 
Latham, who may have influenced him; Millmow (2010b, p 134). Later that year, however, Keynes put his 
name to a letter drafted by Pigou arguing that ‘in present conditions’ individuals or governments cutting 
back spending ‘will be injuring others as well as themselves’; Macgregor et al (1932, pp 138-139). 
521 Personal conversation with Brendan Lyons, 2008. 
522 The ‘Australian Treasury view’ was essentially the same as the ‘British Treasury view’ which probably 
influenced it. The British view was well expressed by chancellor of the exchequer Stanley Baldwin who 
asserted in 1922 that ‘money taken for government purposes is money taken away from trade, and 
borrowing will thus tend to depress trade and increase unemployment’ and reiterated in the 1929 budget 
speech by Winston Churchill, who later referred to it as an ‘unanswerable argument’ and an ‘economic 
law’; Cornish (1981b, Chapter 3, pp 13-16). 
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ineffective as it would just crowd out private spending. Keynes rebutted this argument in 
articles such as Keynes (1929);523 in his evidence before the Macmillan Committee524 in 
1930; and eventually in a much more developed form in the General Theory.525 
A key part of the argument for public works being an affordable means of stimulating an 
economy in recession (and hence rejecting the Treasury view) is the ‘multiplier’ effect 
whereby as those initially found work spend their new income it creates jobs for others 
who in turn spend their new income and so on. This creation of multiple jobs both 
generates more tax revenue for the government and reduces its expenditure on 
unemployment benefits, providing an important offset to the cost of the initial public 
works. Keynes first referred to the ‘multiplier’ publicly in 1933, citing Kahn’s paper of 
1931, although he had been thinking along similar lines earlier.526 He elaborated on it in 
Chapter 10 of the General Theory.527  
The idea of the multiplier, however, had been discussed in Australia earlier than this. A 
speech by Brigden in September 1929 referred to Australia suffering an income loss of 
£30 million leading to an ‘indirect loss’ of a further £30 million.528 In more formal 
writing, Giblin (1930) had a similar analysis but while a copy of his paper was in the 
library of King’s College (where Keynes worked in Cambridge), Keynes had apparently 
not read it.529 Giblin's early work on the multiplier may have inspired Theodore, whose 
March 1931 paper to caucus said 'every one hundred additional men employed upon 
                                                          
523 While the article is unsigned it is consistent with the beliefs and style of Keynes who was chairman of 
the board of the magazine in which it appeared. For the evidence on Keynes’ authorship, see Clarke (1988, 
p 59). 
524 Keynes (1930b, p 129-131). 
525 The General Theory was ‘written to give theoretical support to the expansionist economic proposals 
already being put forward in the 1930s’; Millmow (2010b, p 17).  In it Keynes argued that the economic 
system ‘seems capable of remaining in a chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a considerable 
period’; Keynes (1936). Meade (1937) was the first to present the ideas from the General Theory as a set 
of equations. This Nobel prize-winning economist later summarised Keynes’ critique of the Treasury view 
as ‘an intellectual revolution’ which ‘was to shift economists from thinking normally in terms of…a dog 
called savings wagged his tail labelled investment to…a dog called investment wagged his tail called 
savings’; Meade (1975, p 82). 
526 Keynes (1929, p 710), Keynes (1933a, b), Kahn (1931), Keynes (1938), Keynes and Henderson (1929, 
pp 105-106). 
527 Keynes (1936, pp 113-131). 
528 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1929, p 10. 
529 The key passages are Giblin (1930, pp 10-11). See the discussion in Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006, 
pp 85-90, 93-94 and 104-106). Markwell (1985, p 35) claimed that Giblin had expressed a similar idea in 
the late 1920s. Melville (c1974, p 20) refers to doing multiplier calculations in 1930. 
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productive work would necessitate the employment of two hundred additional men in the 
factories, shops and transport services'.530  
When Theodore stood aside, Scullin took on the treasurer’s position himself, hoping that 
Theodore would soon be able to be reappointed, with Lyons as assistant treasurer. In 
August 1930 Scullin left for the Imperial Conference in London. With Theodore stood 
down, it was now Scullin’s long-standing friend Jim Fenton who was left as acting prime 
minister and Lyons as acting treasurer from 25 August 1930 to 10 January 1931. Lyons 
apparently resented being passed over for Fenton, who ranked behind him in the cabinet 
and lacked Lyons’ leadership experience as a former premier.531 
As well as leaving for Europe, Scullin made two other decisions which proved 
controversial within the Labor Party. When the Bank of England suggested a mission to 
Australia to examine public finances, Scullin approved but it is unclear whether caucus 
had even been informed.532 Scullin also renewed Gibson’s term on the Commonwealth 
Bank board, virtually ensuring he would remain chairman. Anstey claimed Scullin had 
consulted Theodore first, although Theodore denied any involvement.533  
                                                          
530 Caucus Minutes, 2 March 1931, in Weller (1975b, p 416). This sentence also appears in a public 
presentation of his plan; Theodore (1931, p 240) and a similar idea was expressed in a speech at the 
Cremorne Theatre on 14 March 1931; Latham papers, NLA MS 1009/46/379. 
531 Makin (1982, p 71) refers to this as ‘possibly his greatest disappointment’ and reports that Scullin 
believed this may have been a factor in Lyons’ subsequent defection, a view shared by contemporary 
journalist Joe Alexander (1971). It is not clear why Fenton was chosen; perhaps on seniority as he had 
been in the federal parliament since 1910 whereas Lyons joined only the previous year, perhaps as a 
Victorian he had more supporters in the caucus, or perhaps Scullin thought that Lyons, as a former state 
treasurer, was more needed to act in the treasurer’s role. Robertson (1974, p 268) seems to incline 
towards the latter consideration as he notes that Scullin was not expecting parliament to sit in his absence. 
(Robertson also notes that Brennan and Daly also ranked ahead of Fenton but Brennan was also going 
overseas and Daly was an inexperienced senator.) Hart (1967, p 64) argues that Fenton’s appointment 
‘reflected only his party seniority and his friendship with Scullin’. There is no sign in the caucus minutes 
of an acting deputy leader, who would have had the strongest claim to be acting prime minister. In January 
1931 Scullin referred to Theodore being ‘reinstated’ as deputy but ‘to put the matter in order’ a vote was 
taken for the post; Caucus Minutes, 26 January 1931, in Weller (1975, p 411). 
532 Fitzgerald (1994b, p 241). Cook (1971, p 231) and Souter (1988, p 264) believe caucus had not been 
told. Lyons claimed that Scullin and Theodore suggested the invitation to cabinet; Hansard, 8 May 1931, 
p 1714. See Millmow (2004), Attard (1992) and Hawkins (2010a) for further discussion. 
533 At the time of the reappointment Theodore was out of cabinet, absent from parliament and 
preoccupied with Mungana and Lyons was acting treasurer. Scullin says he consulted cabinet and 
Theodore and they unanimously supported the reappointment; Hansard, 29 April 1931, p 1369. Warwick 
Smith (1969, p 40) claims Scullin consulted Theodore. Forde (1971, p 1:2/32) recalled cabinet ‘thought it 
wise to reappoint him’. Anstey (c1936, p 378), who was at the meeting, disputed Scullin’s claim and 
Beasley, who had been absent, complained of not being consulted; Hansard 29 April 1931, p 1369 and 5 
May 1931, pp 1609-12. Cabinet minutes for 4 August 1930 support Scullin’s claim that cabinet (at a 
meeting which included Scullin, Anstey and Lyons but not Theodore or Beasley) agreed; NAA A3264. The 
matter was questioned at a cabinet meeting on 6 September (with Beasley present) but it was affirmed 
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The battle of the plans begins  
While 'the tragedy of the great depression moved him profoundly', Lyons believed the 
'prime duty of government was to restore confidence by sound administration and 
financial stability'.534 In this Lyons was far more conservative than many of his Labor 
colleagues. As Hart (1967, p 72; 1970, p 40) wrote, 'Theodore was Lyons' intellectual 
superior and as such able to comprehend new theories that alarmed Lyons' more orthodox 
and cautious mind'. 
Despite being advised by Giblin that a deflationary policy would be 'a fatal mistake',535  
cabinet agreed on 20 August 1930 that ‘the budget shall be balanced this year and that the 
                                                          
that the reappointment was decided on the recommendation of Scullin. Denning’s (1937, p 75) view is 
that Scullin had consulted Lyons, Fenton and Brennan but not Anstey and Beasley but ‘there was always 
a certain amount of mystery about it’. 
A report in the Sydney Morning Herald, 6 January 1931, p 9, claims that caucus had directed that no 
reappointment was to be made before they were consulted. Henderson (2011, p 218) claims that at least 
some caucus members believed they had been assured that Gibson would not be reappointed.  AW Martin 
(1999a, p 91) claims that Scullin ‘secured caucus agreement…by arguing that Gibson’s experienced 
counsel was needed’ and that the Bank chair was elected by the board and ‘all members shared Gibson’s 
views on finance and politics’. The caucus minutes suggest that the matter was not discussed before the 
reappointment but on 19 February 1931 a motion was moved disapproving of it. It was reported that 
Scullin denied allegations that he had previously promised that Gibson would not be reappointed and that 
cabinet had supported the decision; Sydney Morning Herald, 20 February 1931, p 11. An amendment 
saying ‘that we accept the explanation of the prime minister’ was carried unanimously; Weller (1975b, 
pp 414-5). Holloway (c1954, p 134) recalled the reappointment being a ‘shock to caucus’ and attributed 
the decision to Scullin. There was a press report that Scullin had floated with Gibson the idea that as a 
condition of reappointment he hand an undated resignation letter to the prime minister but Gibson had 
scornfully rejected the idea; that Scullin had then told Gibson he would not be reappointed but that Scullin 
then backed down when Gibson threatened to disclose publicly the details of the discussions; Argus, 
2 January 1934, p 7. 
Green (1959, p 31) suggests Theodore opposed the reappointment. Questioned at a public meeting, 
Theodore said 'no doubt Mr Scullin had good reason for not changing the chairman at that time. I do not 
know the reason'; Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1931, p 17 and Australian Worker, 21 January 1931, 
p 8. In a speech at the Cremorne Theatre on 14 March 1931 Theodore sidestepped the issue of his own 
involvement and said the reappointment occurred ‘because the prime minister did not want to make a 
change of that kind while certain negotiations were going on and while at that time he was assured by Sir 
Robert Gibson of the heartiest support and co-operation in carrying through a progressive financial policy’ 
and also argued that ‘he was only one of six conservative directors’ ; the speech is in the Latham papers, 
NLA MS 1009/46/379. Cook (1931, p 211) suggested Theodore reluctantly agreed with Scullin's wish. Clark 
(1975a, p 30 and 1981, p 187) uses Theodore's alleged support as casting doubt on Theodore's political 
and economic nous. Millmow (2006) argues that Theodore played no part in the reappointment.  
The reappointment has generally been viewed 'with bewildered amazement at its apparent absurdity', 
although Colegrove (1967, p 69) argues that this is unfair as it was only after his reappointment that 
Gibson became troublesome. Martin (1999, p 91) and Millmow (2010b, p 42) argue the reappointment 
was motivated by the need to assure the financial and business communities, with Melville (1974, p 29) 
arguing Scullin had little choice if he wanted to maintain the confidence of the London financial markets. 
534 Menzies (1967, pp 121-2). 
535 Giblin to Lyons, 4 September 1930, in Lyons Papers, NLA MS 4851, folder 14. As Giblin put it, 'To be 
scared of a policy involving a definite moderate measure of inflation is as sensible as to avoid a glass of 
beer for fear of delirium tremens.' In a similar vein, Keynes and Henderson (1929, p 118) had suggested 
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position shall be watched carefully and that the steps will be taken, at the earliest moment, 
necessary to adjust the position by in the first place reduction in expenditure’.536  
Lyons moved in caucus to make the government’s policy ‘free exchange rates, 
stabilisation of internal prices by monetary control, reduction of interest rates and 
provision of credits for industry, and that every effort shall be made by the government 
to induce the Commonwealth Bank to carry out such policy.’537 An amendment seconded 
by Theodore sought to direct the Commonwealth Bank to create sufficient credit to 
finance the government and provide for £20 million for works programmes, and was 
carried 26-14.538 (This proposal, moved by Theodore’s friend and fellow MHR George 
Gibbons, is sometimes termed the ‘Gibbons plan’ – see Table 5.1 for a comparison of the 
plans). Some suggested Theodore was preparing the ground for a challenge to Scullin.539  
A few days later, however, Fenton read to caucus a letter from Scullin apparently 
supporting Lyons’ position.540 Initially, this was not sufficient to sway caucus, with 
Curtin and Anstey moving that the government should continue to push the 
Commonwealth Bank. Fenton and Lyons said that ‘in view of the vote that they would 
consider their position’.541 Reconsidering, to avoid a party split, caucus agreed to defer 
the matter until Scullin returned.542  
Caucus also wanted to defer for a year the redemption of bonds. Lyons opposed this 
‘repudiation’ but lost the initial caucus vote. He won a subsequent vote following the 
arrival of a supportive telegram from Scullin. 
Lyons brought down a supplementary budget on 5 November 1930 with some modest 
revenue and expenditure adjustments to reduce the widening deficit. He explained 'the 
people of Australia have accustomed themselves to a condition of prosperity due in part 
to high prices for our staple exports and to the heavy borrowings abroad. Now…a lack of 
                                                          
that ‘to bring up the bogey of inflation as an objection to capital expenditure at the present time is like 
warning a patient who is wasting away from emaciation of the dangers of excessive corpulence’.  Giblin 
drew on his pioneering work on the multiplier when advising Lyons; Cain (1983). 
536 NAA A3264. Scullin and Lyons were present at this meeting but not Theodore. A subsequent meeting 
on 5 September, chaired by Fenton while Scullin was overseas, (including Lyons, Anstey and Beasley) and 
attended by Gibson, unanimously agreed to carry out the plan for a balanced budget. 
537 Caucus Minutes, 28 October 1930; Weller (1975b, p 391). See also Souter (1998, p 270). 
538 Caucus Minutes, 30 October 1930; Weller (1975b, p 395). 
539 Cain (1990). 
540 Caucus Minutes, 6 November 1930; Weller (1975b, p 396). 
541 Caucus Minutes, 6 November 1930. Press reports suggest that the meeting was bitter, but that 
Theodore voted against the Curtin-Anstey move; Weller (1975b, p 397). 
542 Love (1990, p 416). 
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confidence has developed. The community generally is at present in a state of inertia and 
awaiting a lead…the first need in present circumstances is that the Government should 
take steps for the balancing of the budget'.543 
Sir Otto Niemeyer544, the Bank of England adviser despatched to Australia, described 
Fenton and Lyons (using a somewhat mixed metaphor) as ‘entirely at sea … like a couple 
of rabbits popping their heads out of the hole’.545 Lyons asked Niemeyer not to attend one 
meeting as Lyons was 'afraid of criticism from his own people that he was acting under 
direction'.546 
In December 1930, Curtin and Chifley successfully moved to have the Labor Party 
appoint a committee to formulate a clear monetary policy. The committee was to include 
Curtin himself, the radical Anstey, Theodore and conservatives Fenton and Lyons, and 
with the power to co-opt other members as necessary.547   
The parting of the ways  
The Country Party’s Earle Page had made strenuous efforts in 1923 and 1924 to get 
Theodore to switch sides to the conservatives,548 but to no avail. Lyons, it turned out, was 
more easily persuaded.  
While acting as treasurer, Lyons’ profile was raised by his campaigning for subscriptions 
to a government conversion loan, which he argued was a patriotic act. He declared 12 
December 1930 to be ‘All for Australia Day’, with many businesses promising to invest 
profits from the day in the loan and Lyons appealing to households to do their Christmas 
shopping that day.549 The loan ended up oversubscribed. Allan Martin (1999a, p 93) saw 
this as a ‘turning point in his career’. 
                                                          
543 Hansard, 5 November 1930, p 61. 
544 Niemeyer had a distinguished career, finishing first in the 1906 civil service entrance exam ahead of 
Keynes (and thereby forcing Keynes to join the Indian office rather than Treasury), but had been 
associated with Churchill’s disastrous move to return the pound to its pre-war parity with gold in 1925. 
Henderson (2011, p 221) describes him as adopting ‘a high-handed and insouciant tone in his dealings 
while in Australia’. 
545 Niemeyer (1930, p 268). 
546 Niemeyer (1930, p 302). 
547 Caucus Minutes, 10 December 1930; Weller (1975b, p 407). 
548 Young (1971, p 43). There had been a similar move while Theodore was Queensland premier, trying to 
get him to lead a 'centre party'; Higgins (1954, p 61). 
549 Henderson (2011, p 240). 
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Lyons may have hoped to become treasurer when Scullin returned from London in 
January 1931.550 Instead Scullin persuaded caucus to reinstate Theodore. Lyons felt this 
was inappropriate as Theodore had not yet been cleared of the Mungana allegations.551  
Lyons tried to trigger a spill of all positions at caucus but failed and voted against 
Theodore’s reinstatement at the caucus meeting. There are reports that he ‘made a bitter 
personal attack on Theodore’.552 Rather than applauding Lyons’ efforts as acting 
treasurer, the Tasmanian Labor Party Conference censured him. Denning (1937, p 37) 
believed this further disenchanted a ‘harassed and hunted’ Lyons from Labor.  
Lyons (along with Fenton) resigned from the cabinet over the reinstatement of Theodore 
and then in March 1931 left the Labor Party itself after voting against Theodore’s 
proposal for a fiduciary notes issue.553 Among Lyons’ close friends and economic 
                                                          
550 Whitington (1972, p 69) and Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2016, p 173) suggested Lyons had wanted 
the position, and this was a large part of the reason for his resignation from Labor. Jenkins (2008, p 13) 
suggests he was 'fully expecting to be appointed treasurer'. Henderson (2011, p 241) cites Enid Lyons as 
recalling Lyons met with Keith Murdoch and they thought that Scullin would make Lyons treasurer. 
Henderson (2013, p 163) believed he ‘had every right to expect he would be given the Treasury portfolio', 
as did Fricke (1990, p 104) and Souter (1998, p 274). Lyons said he suggested Scullin keep the post himself 
(Hansard 13 March 1931, p 236; Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1931, p 11), but when Scullin 
demurred, Lyons thought he had a better claim than Theodore; Lloyd (1984, pp 81-2). A less charitable 
interpretation is that Lyons saw his road to the Lodge blocked by Theodore in a Labor government;  
Hughes (1976, p 82). 
On the other hand, Lyons claimed 'I did not desire to be treasurer. I know my limitations'; Hansard, 
13 March 1931, p 236. Lyons told the press ‘when Mr Scullin returned I pressed on him the desirability of 
his taking the [treasury] portfolio…[as] finance is so important in government’ but he replied the duties 
were ‘too onerous’; Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1931, p 11. This is consistent with Scullin’s claim 
that Lyons asked to be relieved of the job; Sydney Morning Herald, 16 January 1931, p 11. Enid Lyons 
(1965, p 168) recalled Lyons replying to Keith Murdoch when he predicted Lyons would soon be treasurer 
that he doubted he would wish to be. Lyons’ son Brendan recalls his mother saying that Lyons had not 
wanted the post, which is also reported by Enid's biographer, Henderson (2008, p 151) and ALP historian 
McMullin (1991, p 169). Lyons told a dinner of his Tasmanian supporters that he was willing to stand down 
for someone better; (Burnie) Advocate, 9 January 1931, p 2. Scullin’s biographer Robertson (1974, p 302) 
claims ‘Lyons was quite anxious to relinquish Treasury burdens’. Henderson (2011, p 246) refers to him 
handing them back to Scullin ‘with great relief’. Scullin said Lyons was 'relieved of the Treasuryship at his 
own request'; (Burnie) Advocate, 23 January 1931, p 7. At the time, Lyons said 'it will be a distinct relief 
to be out of office, as the strain has been constant and severe'; Sydney Morning Herald, 30 January 1931, 
p 11. Lyons ‘intimated he was not prepared to take on the treasurership permanently’; Allan Martin 
(1999a, p 96). Lyons' claim is however weakened by the fact that he subsequently chose to keep these 
burdens in addition to the prime ministership not many months later even though the return of Bruce to 
parliament gave him an obviously qualified candidate for the treasurer’s post.  
The biography by White (1987) regards the evidence as ambiguous. 
551 Hansard, 13 March 1931, p 229. Lyons told parliament he had not judged the treasurer but hoped he 
would have remained outside cabinet until he was cleared. Lyons had himself stood aside a minister over 
a financial scandal in his Tasmanian administration in 1927; Henderson (2012, p 6). 
552 Morgan (1966, p 131). 
553 He argued that Theodore’s policy was contrary to those taken by the party to the previous election. 
Lyons rejected calls to resign his seat, unless either Scullin or Theodore would contest it at the subsequent 
by-election; Hansard 13 March 1931, p 234. There have been suggestions that he had decided to leave 
Labor even before Theodore’s reappointment; Sykes (1988, p 244). But Lyons described as a ‘contemptible 
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advisors was Staniforth Ricketson, a stock broker whom he had known since his 
Tasmanian days. Ricketson was a member of the group of Melbourne identities who 
became involved in persuading Lyons to leave the Labor party.554 Lyons and some fellow 
Labor defectors joined with the Nationalists to form the United Australia Party.555 
Theodore said Lyons had succumbed to ‘adulation and flattery’.556 
Lyons has long been on more friendly terms with the conservative side of politics than 
was usual for Labor members. After Labor’s narrow loss in the 1928 Tasmanian election, 
the Nationalist leader McPhee praised Lyons’ statesmanship and offered to serve under 
him if he left the Labor Party. Lyons found the Federal Parliamentary Labor Party 
uncongenial and had little affinity with the machine politics practised in Sydney and 
Melbourne.557 When opposition leader John Latham had called for a unity government to 
fight the depression in December 1930, Lyons had reputedly been sympathetic to the idea 
but caucus rejected it.558 
 
 
                                                          
lie’ the suggestion that he had discussed with Latham leaving the Labor Party while Scullin was overseas; 
Hansard, 13 March 1931, p 234. Many of his former Labor colleagues referred to him as a ‘rat’. Holloway 
(c1954, p 43) believed the ‘offer of a short cut to even greater fame won him over’. 
554 Balderstone (1983, p 258); Hart (1967, p 52 and Hart (1979, pp 115-7), Henderson (2011, p 241). Other 
members of 'the Group' (sometimes called the 'Temple Court Group' or the ‘Savage Club group') were 
Kingsley Henderson, a businessman and architect who became a close friend of Lyons in the 1930s, then 
Victorian MP Robert Menzies, businessman (and former adviser to Treasury and treasurers) Sir John 
Higgins, businessman Charles Norris and retired journalist Ambrose Pratt; Murray and White (1988, 
p 318); Hart (1967, pp 87-9). The Group had originally formed to support a December 1930 loan 
conversion campaign; Hart (1970, p 44). Tsokhas (1988, p 27) adds media baron Sir Keith Murdoch to its 
members. Pratt referred to the group as being Lyons' 'special bodyguard'; Henderson (2011, p 275). 
555 Bird (2009, p 48) suggests Lyons may have regretted leaving Labor after it adopted the conservative 
'Premiers’ Plan' in July 1931 but by then there was no way back. An obituary cites a confidant suggesting 
'I do not think he was ever an entirely happy man afterward'; (Melbourne) Herald, 8 April 1939, p 4. This 
is also the view of his former colleague Edward Holloway (c1954, p 43). Lyons' friend Frank Green (1959) 
regards Lyons as effectively being 'driven out' of the ALP. The UAP's slogan for the 1931 election was 'Tune 
in with Britain', an odd choice for a leader with an Irish Catholic heritage. Lyons’ speech is reported in The 
Age 5 December 1931 and Luscombe (1967, p 172).  
556 Speech at the Cremorne Theatre on 14 March 1931; Latham papers, NLA MS 1009/46/379. 
557 Hart and Lloyd (1986); Henderson (2004, p. 931), White (1987, p 109). Enid Lyons (1972b) observed 
that Tasmanian politics lacked the ‘ruthlessness’ evident on the mainland. Bradish (1927, p 15) 
exaggerates for comic effect when he writes ‘instead of bickerings, calls-to-order, hurtling inkwells, and 
all the futilia of disturbance in other parliaments, we have gentle whisperings, handholds and prefect bliss’ 
but it gives some idea of the difference. White (1987, p 108) estimates that before 1989 Lyons had 
probably only ‘been to the mainland about half a dozen times’. 
558 Henderson (2008, p 152). 
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The battle of the plans continues 
Theodore warned at the February 1931 Premiers’ Conference that Australia ‘was getting 
close to the final smash’ with a loss of £125 million in income.559 His reflationist plan560 
drew on a paper by statistician Wickens to argue that the Commonwealth Bank should 
adopt an expansionary policy until the price level was stabilised.561 Giblin also provided 
Theodore with what may have been the first official estimates and forecasts of Australian 
national income.562  
The Theodore plan was a ‘middle way’ between the deflationist plan and the Lang plan 
of repudiation563 (Table 5.2). Theodore spoke eloquently of the need to counteract 'the 
complete breakdown of the monetary system'. Theodore aimed to get wholesale prices 
back to their average 1925-1929 level through the expansion of credit.564 He quoted 
international economists such as Keynes565, Cassel and Hobson566 in his speech. He also 
drew on discussions with local economists Giblin (whom Theodore appointed acting 
statistician), Copland, Dyason and Irvine, although none would probably have supported 
the plan in total.567  
                                                          
559 Conference of Commonwealth and State Ministers Proceedings, 7 February 1931, p 28. 
560 He presented his plan to caucus where it was approved 32-12, and a summary is included in the 
minutes; Caucus Minutes, 2 March 1931, in Weller (1975b, pp 416-8), reproduced in Shann and Copland 
(1931a, pp 1-8), and publicly as Theodore (1931).  
561 Castles (1997a). While Wickens’ October 1930 paper was confidential, when some of it was leaked 
Wickens publicly confirmed his belief in anti-deflationary measures; Sydney Morning Herald, 
20 November 1930, p 9. Wickens was criticised in parliament by Gullett for this ‘exceedingly 
regrettable…lapse’ from ‘public service traditions’; Hansard, 27 November 1930, p 803. The acting prime 
minister soon after released the full note, which cited Keynes’ Tract on Monetary Reform to argue for an 
easing of monetary policy when prices were falling as ‘it is doubtful which of the two – inflation or 
deflation – is the worse evil’; Sydney Morning Herald, 27 November 1930, p 12. Tragically Wickens, a 
self-educated economist who played a role in establishing the Economic Society of Australia which he 
chaired in 1928, was felled by either a stroke or epilepsy on 2 February 1931 and while he lived another 
eight years he was essentially an invalid and played no further role in public affairs. Coleman, Cornish and 
Hagger (2006, p 120) described Wickens as ‘the solitary official in the Commonwealth Government who 
could claim an expertise on economic issues’. 
562 They were £663m in 1928-29, £550m in 1929-30 and £470m in 1930-31; Giblin  
563 The Lang plan was derided by Calwell (1971b, p 10) as ‘gibberish’ based on a speech by Anstey that 
mixed social credit theory and orthodox finance. 
564 Theodore (1931, p 240) and his Cremorne Theatre speech of 14 March 1931 (available in the Latham 
papers, NLA MS 1009/46/379) in which he quotes from Keynes (1925) but incorrectly dates it to 1929. His 
thoughts were influenced by a note by Copland, Dyason and Giblin (1930). 
565 Theodore referred to Keynes’ well-known works The Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill and the 
Treatise on Money as well as a recent magazine article, Keynes (1930a). 
566 Hobson (1930, p 138), to which Theodore referred, includes a reference to the ‘failure of effective 
demand’, which would later be regarded as a Keynesian concept. 
567 Melville (c1974, p 42). McFarlane (1966) and Millmow (2007b) provide biographical essays on Irvine.  
Manning Clark (1987, p 362) suggested Irvine ‘converted Theodore to the case for bank credit’. The 
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Table 5.2: Battle of the Plans  
 Niemeyer 
plan 
(Melbourne 
agreement) 
Stabilisation 
(Economists') 
plan 
Lyons 
(Sheehan) 
plan 
Gibbons 
(Theodore) 
plan 
Theodore plan Lang      
plan 
Premiers' plan 
 August 
1930 
Sept 1930 Oct 1930 Oct 1930 Feb/March 1931 Feb 1931 June 1931 
Government 
spending 
cut cut cut but 
expand 
public 
works 
increase 
public works 
expand unemployment 
relief; some other cuts 
 cut by 20%                           
(12½% for pensions)  
Taxation  raise on 
property 
income 
raise on 
property 
income 
   raise income and                  
sales taxes 
Interest rates  lower lower lower lower lower lower 
Exchange rate unchanged devalue 20% free devalue  devalue goods 
standard 
devaluation 
Public sector 
wages 
cut cut by 10% cut by 2½ 
to 15 per 
cent 
cut high 
salaries only 
cut (stable in real terms)  cut by 20% 
Private wages cut cut by 10%     cut by 20% 
Government 
debt 
    special tax on interest defer 
interest 
Voluntary                     
conversion but                       
with tax penalty 
Bank credit  expand expand expand expand  expand  
Major sources for Table 5.2:  
Niemeyer plan: Schedvin (1970, pp 182-3);   
Stabilisation plan: Schedvin (1970, p 222); Copland, Dyason and Giblin (1930); Copland, Giblin and Wood (1930, pp 179-86); 
Copland, The Argus, 27 October 1930, p 9. 
Lyons plan: Cornish (1988b), Schedvin (1970, p 190); Sydney Morning Herald, 3 October 1930, p 11. 
Gibbons plan: Schedvin (1970, p 192); Weller (1975b, p 391). 
Theodore plan: Theodore (1931), Weller (1975b, pp 416-8). 
Lang plan: Schedvin (1970, p 228);  
Premiers' plan: Schedvin (1970, p 249); Shann and Copland (1931a). 
                                                          
influence of Irvine is discussed in David Clark (1981, p 187) and Groenewegen and McFarlane (1990, 
pp 126-127 and 162-164), with the former going so far as to claim that Theodore was just parroting Irvine’s 
views without understanding them. Given Theodore’s ability to respond to questions and interjections on 
his plans, and the regard in which his economic knowledge was held by the likes of Melville, this seems 
unlikely. His plan also drew on Copland, Dyason and Giblin (1930). 
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Theodore regarded attempting to balance the budget with what would today be called 
‘austerity’ policies would be self-defeating as it would just further contract the economy. 
He called for an easing of monetary policy, arguing ‘if we could thus stimulate industry 
in Australia so that the 250,000 men now unemployed would be set to work, their 
production would enormously increase the real wealth of the community. Unless we do 
that I do not see how we can balance the budget’. He argued he did not aim for inflation 
for its own sake; ‘we should not set out to increase price levels as a first step but monetary 
policy might be reflected in price levels’.568 Theodore later claimed that had he not been 
forced to resign he might have been able to persuade the commercial banks to adopt a 
more expansionary lending policy.569 
Theodore felt conservative economists and bankers were excessively wedded to 
maintaining parity between the Australian pound and sterling, which he dubbed a 
'conservative fetish'.570 Theodore wanted the Commonwealth Bank to buy government 
bonds to drive the yield down to 5 per cent, bond holders to pay a special interest tax and 
the exchange rate to depreciate.  
Theodore played a prominent role in negotiations for merger of the Government Savings 
Bank of NSW and the Commonwealth Bank's savings bank arm.571 
Cabinet approved Theodore's Fiduciary Notes Bill in March 1931, after an amendment 
by Scullin. It envisaged an issue of £18m, with £1m a month being used to support 
employment and £6m for farmers.572 Whitlam regarded Theodore’s speech in parliament 
of 17 March 1931 supporting his bill as demonstrating 'a dazzling command of basic 
economic ideas but it shows his humanity and his recognition that economics is only 
about people.’573 In April 1931 the Senate rejected the bill. Theodore was reported as 
suggesting it would be reintroduced and if rejected again form the basis for a double 
                                                          
568 Theodore speech reported in Sydney Morning Herald, 9 February 1931, p 9. Melville (c1974, p 44) 
described the Theodore plan as having ‘made quite good economic sense’. 
569 Interview in August 1934, reported in Maclaurin (1937, p 44). 
570 Sydney Morning Herald, 17 January 1931, p 17. 
571 This was 'regarded as a triumph for Mr Theodore'; Round Table, no 86, March 1932, p 410. 
572 Arthur Calwell (1972a, p 68) claimed it was Gibson who suggested a fiduciary notes issue, a claim 
repeated in the biography by his daughter Mary Calwell (1998, p 51), but this seems totally implausible. 
Millmow's (2010, p 82) suggestion that Calwell was confusing Gibson with Giblin seems more likely. 
Another possibility is Calwell was confusing Gibson with Gibbons, Theodore’s parliamentary supporter. 
573 Whitlam (1971, p x). The speech is in Hansard, 17 March 1931, pp 300-19. A long-serving clerk of the 
parliament regarded it as 'the finest speech I ever heard in this place'; cited by Katter (2012, p 17). 
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dissolution, but given the weak position of the government, this was likely a bluff.574 The 
bill was very controversial. One radio announcer rhetorically asked ‘why are the bells of 
St Paul’s cathedral like Mr Theodore?’ and replied Spoonerishly ‘they peal from the 
steeple’.575 
Theodore quoted from Keynes’ A Treatise on Money in his speech. Theodore had the first 
copy of this in Australia as his friend WS Robinson had arranged for a copy to be sent to 
Theodore as soon as it was published in 1930.576 Theodore prophesised that the book ‘will 
stand for fifty years’.577 This was an uncannily accurate prediction about Keynes’ impact 
(although it was the later General Theory rather than the Treatise that had the major 
influence); 1980 was about when Keynesianism was (temporarily) eclipsed by 
monetarism. 
The Keynes of the General Theory would, however, have cautioned Theodore of the need 
to bring business leaders on board for his plan to be effective. As Keynes (1936, p 162) 
lamented ‘economic prosperity is excessively dependant on a political and social 
atmosphere which is congenial to the average business man’ and policymakers need to be 
wary of ‘upsetting the delicate balance of spontaneous optimism’. 
An alternative to the Theodore Plan was the Premiers' Plan, developed by Copland, 
Giblin, Melville and Shann. It was hailed by many overseas commentators as a good 
example of governments listening to economists.578 Melville (1971) rejects Schedvin's 
characterisation of the Premiers' Plan as passively following the market, arguing that the 
authorities could have kept deficit budgets and used controls to fix the exchange rate and 
not cut wages.579 
An econometric exercise by Valentine (1988) concludes that the Premiers' Plan had little 
net impact on the economy as the interest rate cuts were expansionary but the government 
                                                          
574 Giblin (1951) and Cook (1971, pp 375-8). In a speech at the Cremorne Theatre on 14 March 1931 
Theodore said a double dissolution ‘must take place’; the speech is in the Latham papers, NLA MS 
1009/46/379. Sawer (1963, p 21) doubts that there was any intent to use the bill as a double dissolution 
trigger. 
575 Hugh Brain ‘reminiscences’, 1976, University of Melbourne archives 77/97, folder 3. 
576 Fitzgerald (1994b, p 278) and Laughren (1994). This probably put Theodore ahead of Australia's 
professional economists: Cain (1987a, p 5) says the book '…did not begin to register in Australian academic 
discussion until the second half of 1931'. Most reviews of it did not appear until 1933. See Markwell (2000) 
for a discussion of Keynes' influence on Australian economists. 
577 Hansard, 17 March 1931, p 318. 
578 Millmow (2010b). 
579 In Melville (c1974, p 34) he characterised the plan as ‘talk deflation and inflate like hell’. 
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expenditure cuts were contractionary. It also suggests the Theodore plan would have done 
most to expand real GDP, but in keeping wages higher, it would have produced higher 
rates of unemployment. In Valentine's model, a combination of lower interest rates, 
increased government spending, cuts in wages and a devaluation would have been the 
best response – what he terms the 'hindsight plan'. Butlin and Boyce (1988) also believe 
a faster and larger devaluation would have been beneficial. 
In February 1931, the Arbitration Court reduced the basic wage by 10 per cent. This 
move, supported by most economists, was intended to be a cut in real wages, but 
consumer prices soon dropped by a similar amount. The exchange rate was also devalued 
in 1930 and 1931. 
Sir Robert Gibson wrote in February 1931 that the Commonwealth Bank would cooperate 
with the government only if wages, pensions and social benefits were reduced, and in 
April told Theodore that the Commonwealth Bank would provide no further assistance to 
the government, leaving it no choice but to resign, default or agree to the deflationary 
Premiers’ Plan.580 Theodore reluctantly agreed to the Premiers’ Plan. In a letter to Curtin 
in 1932, Theodore explained: 
in the hope of getting a respite for the government I agreed to the 
economy policy of the Premiers Conference conditionally upon 
the public debt interest and mortgage interest being included in 
the cuts. I never had any belief that that policy would restore 
employment unless it was accompanied by credit expansion on a 
large scale…the banks gave us assurances they would cooperate 
with the government in the increase of money but they let us down 
villainously in this respect…I stated…a crisis precipitated then 
would be fatal to our electoral hopes but an acceptance of the 
premier’s [sic] plan would ensure us our supply and give us 
twelve months breathing space. I held the opinion…within twelve 
                                                          
580 Gibson's letter and Theodore's reply are reproduced in Shann and Copland (1931a, pp 44-56). 
According to Armitage, Gibson later realised his mistake and told Armitage ‘it was wonderful how right 
Mr Theodore had been all the way through the depression’ although at the time he and the board had 
been unable to see it; Armitage reminiscences in 1949, RBA archives SA-65-84. At the time of his 
appointment, Gibson had ‘not a great deal of knowledge of central banking’, according to Armitage. 
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months the whole world would probably go inflation and thus kill 
the Opposition crusade581   
Young (1971, p 139) and Clark (1975a, p 32) suggested that ‘Theodore probably could 
have proceeded to the party leadership and the job of prime minister by vigorously 
opposing’ the Plan. It took Scullin and Theodore hours to convince a majority in caucus 
and they only won over Labor's national executive by 7 votes to 5, but in the end the 
Premiers' Plan was adopted in June 1931.  
Millmow’s (2004b, p 142) judgement is that while the Plan was deflationary it was a 
‘more equitable and imaginative blueprint than Niemeyer’s’.  
The July 1931 budget continued the implementation of the Premiers' Plan. It increased 
sales tax, and cut public service salaries, maternity allowances and pensions. A big drop 
was expected in direct tax collections. Theodore's speech was unenthusiastic but he rallied 
somewhat near the end, calling the budget 'a policy of internal financial rehabilitation 
which, though drastic in its incidence, is at any rate equitable in its effects on the various 
sections of the community'.582   
The end of the Scullin government and Theodore’s political career 
After Lyons, Fenton and their supporters left the Labor Party and formed the United 
Australia Party, a group of Lang supporters now held the balance of power and they 
continued to attack Theodore. In November 1931, they accused Theodore of corruption 
in the distribution of unemployment relief. When Scullin refused to initiate an inquiry, 
the rebels joined with Lyons’ United Australia Party to bring down the Scullin 
government. At the subsequent election, Labor was reduced to fourteen seats, with 
Theodore among the seven ministers to lose their seats.583   
 
                                                          
581 14 October 1932, Theodore papers, NLA MS 7222, folder 2. Cornish (1988b, 1992) suggests that 
Treasury Assistant Secretary Sheehan was persuasive. 
582 Hansard, 10 July 1931, p 3746. 
583 Opposed by a Langite Labor candidate, Theodore’s share of the vote dropped from 78 per cent in 1929 
to 20 per cent. While it was not the decisive issue, Lang's supporters taunted Theodore with a parody of 
a popular song of the time, singing 'Yes, we have no Munganas' at Theodore's campaign rallies; Round 
Table, no 86, March 1932, p 416. As Head (1978, p 14) points out, there were 13 federal and state elections 
between 1929 and 1933 and in 12 of them the incumbent government was defeated. 
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The Lyons government with Lyons as treasurer 
Lyons led his new party, essentially a collection of ministerialists, to a decisive victory at 
the December 1931 election and clear wins in 1934 and 1937, in no small measure due to 
his personal popularity and ability to adopt radio, film and air travel for campaigning. It 
was suggested the ‘group’ who persuaded him to leave Labor, and big business funders 
of the UAP in general, exerted considerable influence over him, although this suggestion 
is repudiated by some writers.584 
Lyons purportedly offered Chifley the treasurership if he also left Labor585 but Chifley 
declined. Lyons took the post himself. He saw nothing unusual in this as he had been both 
premier and treasurer in Tasmania.586 He appointed Bruce, a former prime minister and 
treasurer, as assistant treasurer from January to June 1932. One interpretation for this was 
that as the election had 'centred on finance and honesty…Lyons determined to take 
personal responsibility for its implementation'587 and 'give the public the impression that 
"Honest Joe" was safeguarding their savings'.588  Lyons took the title himself as Bruce 
was 'having to live down his reputation for reckless expansion'.589 Bruce himself said he 
had to 'hold Lyons' hand'590 and 'more or less from the background steered him'.591  
When Bruce left for London, much of the routine administrative Treasury work was done 
by Walter Massy-Greene, an assistant minister, and then from September 1933 by 
Richard Casey.592 It has been claimed that Lyons 'leaned very heavily on his assistant 
                                                          
584 Former Clerk of the House, and a friend of Lyons since his teenage years, Frank Green claims that as 
prime minister Lyons reported cabinet decisions to them and sometimes their influence had such 
decisions reversed (an example being the national insurance scheme); letter to Lyons' biographer Philip 
Hart, 10 February 1964, Hart papers, National Library of Australia MS 9410, folder 1 and Green (1969, 
pp 114-5). Those close to Lyons referred to Henderson as Lyons’ ‘guide, philosopher and friend’ and he 
was a pall-bearer at Lyons’ funeral; Hart (1979, pp 121-2). Malcolm Fraser (1987, p 322) referred to the 
ongoing influence they exerted over the UAP in the 1930s; ‘those who paid the bills attempted and often 
succeeded in determining candidates and policy’. On the other hand, Hart (1967, p 187) concludes ‘all the 
available evidence, therefore, supports Lyons’ claim that he never received dictation from any 
extra-parliamentary organisation’. 
585 E Lyons (1972a, p 97); B Lyons (2008, p 135). This is somewhat surprising given Chifley’s support for 
Theodore. 
586 Personal conversation with Brendan Lyons, 2008. Lyons also briefly served as Minister for Commerce. 
587 B Lyons (2008, p 163). Bruce ranked third in cabinet seniority. 
588 Hart (1967, p 245). 
589 This was the view of Giblin cited by Millmow (2010b, p 119). 
590 Cain (2005, p 267), Edwards (1965, p 208). 
591 Cited by Hazlehurst (1979, p 155), purportedly said to Bruce’s biographer Cecil Edwards. See also 
Millmow (2010b, p 122). 
592 Hart (1967, p 245). From October 1933 to October 1934, Senator Harry Lawson also contributed as 
Assistant Minister (Treasury). 
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treasurer [Walter Massy-Greene, who] … had a great natural gift for finance’.593 The 
1935 budget was presented to the House by Casey as assistant treasurer. Lyons appointed 
Casey as Treasurer594 in October 1935, making Lyons the first prime minister since 1910 
not to hold a portfolio.  
Lyons was a lonely man as prime minister, cut off from his former Labor colleagues and 
lacking a strong affinity with many of his former opponents now his UAP colleagues. 
Country Party leader Earle Page's more friendly attitude, and role as both policy and 
medical adviser, gave him considerable influence over Lyons.595   
Treasury was still dominated by accountants and the Commonwealth Bank played an 
important role in economic policymaking. Lyons said of its chair, 'no man played a greater 
part than Sir Robert Gibson in the rehabilitation of the Commonwealth’.596 Lyons 
appointed Giblin to the Commonwealth Bank board in 1935. 
In January 1932, a Premiers’ Conference led to the establishment of a committee headed 
by Adelaide businessman Wallace Bruce, and driven by the economists Giblin, Melville, 
Mills and Shann, to examine policies to fight unemployment.597 It recommended 
devaluation, cuts in real wages, reductions in tariffs, smaller budget deficits and a limited 
expansion of state spending on relief projects, but rejected proposals for significant 
increases in public works. Millmow (2010b, p 129) regarded it as in some ways 'a reprise 
of the Premiers' Plan'. In June, the premiers agreed to cut deficits by cutting pensions. 
Asked to comment, Keynes said that he 'sympathised intensely with the general method 
of approach' but put more emphasis on public works than wage cuts or devaluation.598 
Lyons and Bruce initially welcomed the report but then cooled at the idea of trying to 
                                                          
593 Kemp (1964, p 97). Hart (1967, p 245) agrees. 
594 Henderson (2011, p 352) suggests a possible motive was to bolster Casey’s chances of being Lyons’ 
successor rather than Menzies.  
595 As a Labor renegade, a catholic and not having served in the war, Lyons did not have a lot in common 
with most of the other UAP members. Page was 'shrewd enough to be both respectful and matey towards 
Lyons', as well as being a medical adviser; journalist George Baker, letter to P Hart, Hart Papers, National 
Library of Australia, MS 9410, folder 1. Support for this view also comes from Page's private secretary 
Ulrich Ellis, letter to Hart, MS 9410, folder 2 and Hasluck (1952, p 110). 
596 Cited by Millmow (2010b). After Gibson’s death Lyons referred to him as a ‘financial genius’ and a 
‘personal friend’; Argus, 2 January 1934, p 7. By contrast, Leslie Melville (c1974, p 21), better placed to 
make an assessment, opined that Gibson ‘had little knowledge of central banking’. 
597 The other member was George Stanley Colman (a Melbourne businessman). Copland was also 
appointed but was overseas for much of the investigation. Their report estimates that real per capita 
income had fallen by around a quarter from 1926-27 to 1930-31. 
598 Keynes (1932, p 94). On the latter point, Keynes advised '…expand bank credit and stimulate capital 
expenditure as much as courage and prudence will allow.' His comments are discussed by Clark (1976). 
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force Gibson to devalue. Melville regarded the decision to reject the recommendation to 
devalue as having slowed the recovery.599 In responding to the report Lyons (1932) 
announced the formation of federal and state Employment Councils 'to ensure that the 
fullest and most immediate investigation of ways whereby unemployment can be relieved 
should take place’. 
Australia was one of the first countries to emerge from the depression and Roosevelt 
asked Lyons how it was done.600 On the other hand, the Lyons government was criticised 
by Maclaurin (1937, p 242) as excessively passive; 'the Administration from 1932 to 1936 
followed a policy primarily of waiting for something to turn up, and seemingly was afraid 
to do anything constructive lest it retard the slow recovery'. The Lyons government had 
one run of good luck; the rural sector had a run of good harvests. 
Lyons’ first budget speech in September 1932 referred to national income falling from 
£650 million to £450 million.601 He placed the budget in the context of the Premiers' Plan 
and said it represented the 'path of financial rectitude'.602 He referred to a survey of 
company profits which suggested tax revenue would fall. The budget restricted maternity 
allowances, cut public servants' wages and reduced pensions. 
The Imperial Conference of 1932 led to the ‘Ottawa agreement’ calling for tariff cuts. 
Fenton, then trade minister, resigned in protest. Bruce also resigned around this time and 
moved to London. Lyons offered the assistant treasurer job to the Country Party but they 
rejected his accompanying conditions. Lyons refused to drop tariffs below those 
prevailing in the Scullin government. 
In April 1932, Western Australia voted to secede. Partly in response, but also reflecting 
his experience as a treasurer of a small 'claimant' state, Lyons hastened his plans to 
establish the Commonwealth Grants Commission.603 Lyons appointed Giblin to the 
commission. 
                                                          
599 Melville (1971) and his interview by Cornish (1993b). 
600 Personal conversation with Brendan Lyons, 2008. 
601 Hansard, 1 September 1932, p 86. 
602 Hansard, 1 September 1932, p 86. 
603 B Lyons (2008, p 167). 
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In his second budget speech, Lyons lamented 'the condition of the world is one of 
uncertainty, doubt and confusion'.604 He emphasised the importance of rolling over 
maturing debt in London, for which Bruce was now responsible as resident minister. A 
degree of domestic recovery allowed some tax cuts and the partial restoration of public 
servant salaries. He called the budget the 'reward which the Australian people have earned 
by the sacrifices they have made'. 605    
Further tax cuts were given in the 1934 budget in response to the 'remarkable 
improvement in the Australian economic situation'.606 In his policy speech for the 1934 
election Lyons claimed to have presided over ‘one of the most spectacular economic 
recoveries the world has known’.607 Australia’s recovery was faster than the average in 
comparable countries (see Table 10.4 below), which Eichengreen (1988) attributed to its 
larger devaluation. 
After losing seats in the 1934 election, Lyons needed to form a coalition with the Country 
Party, whose leader Earle Page became minister for commerce and deputy prime minister, 
and his influence on Lyons increased. But unlike the coalition with Bruce, Page either did 
not demand or could not persuade Lyons to give him the treasurer's job. 
In the 1934 election campaign, in part due to rural pressure, Lyons agreed to establish a 
Royal Commission on Banking. He appointed as one member of it Ben Chifley as ‘both 
his knowledge of finance and the analytical habit of his mind fitted him admirably for 
such a task’.608 It reported in 1937 (and is discussed in the following chapter). 
While Lyons was sometimes criticised for leading an inactive government,609 he had his 
hands full managing a fractious group of egos, united by little more than a general 
antipathy to socialism and a ministerialist liking for government posts. 
                                                          
604 Hansard, 4 October 1933, p 3201. 
605 Hansard, 4 October 1933, p 3223. 
606 Hansard, 24 July 1934, p 594. 
607 Sydney Morning Herald, 14 August 1934, p 11. 
608 E Lyons (1972a, pp 97-98). 
609 As an editorial put it, 'Few governments have derived so much self-satisfaction from doing so little'; 
The Age 30 July 1945, cited by Hart (1967, p 236). 
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As far back as his first budget speech in 1932, Lyons had foreshadowed a 'contributory 
system of old age pension'.610 In 1935 a cabinet subcommittee was appointed to 
investigate it. The contributory scheme was seen as avoiding the looming budgetary 
problem of paying for the age pension, although this was obscured in public 
presentations.611 At the 1937 election, Lyons promised to introduce a national insurance 
scheme, combining elements of health insurance and superannuation. The legislation 
passed through parliament in 1938, but employers opposed it, concerns were expressed 
about administrative difficulties and defence came to be seen as a greater priority. Reid 
(1980a, p 359) recalled Lyons emerged from the cabinet room in tears when the final 
decision was taken to abandon it. Menzies resigned as deputy leader and attorney general, 
supposedly in protest at the scheme’s abandonment.612   
Lyons established a committee of Giblin, Melville and Wilson in December 1938, 
initially in the Defence Department, which with the addition of Brigden, Copland and 
Coombs became known as the 'F&E'.613  
                                                          
610 Hansard, 1 September 1932, p 104. Page had long advocated something similar. The Bruce-Page 
Government had set up a commission of MPs to investigate which did not issue a final report until 1927. 
Legislation was introduced in 1928 but as the economy turned down it was abandoned in August 1929. 
611 Watts (1980). Watts (1980) and Richards (1975) point out that the Labor Party also supported social 
insurance but wanted it funded from a combination of a capital gains tax, wealth tax, payroll tax and 
higher company tax. 
612 Many contemporaries viewed Menzies’ action as motivated more by impatient ambition to secure the 
prime ministership for himself; Hart (1967, p 308), Wentworth (1987, p 12:7). This view is supported by 
noting that, despite his purported fervour, in his sixteen years as prime minister Menzies never tried to 
introduce such a scheme himself. Menzies' biographer reports an earlier attempt by Menzies to 
overthrow Lyons, in 1935, which was foiled when Casey would have nothing to do with it; Martin (1999b, 
p 43). 
613 The Financial and Economic Committee, to give it its full name, is described in Maddock and Penny 
(1983) and Whitwell (1985 and 1986, pp 65-79). 
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The portents of a second world war, and the domestic political pressure from Menzies’ 
disloyalty,614 caused Lyons immense stress.615 In early 1939 he again approached Bruce 
to return to office. Bruce said he would only do so if it was immediately as prime minister. 
Lyons apparently initially accepted this demand, but then (possibly due to influence by 
Casey, who saw himself as another possible successor) changed his mind. Nothing came 
of the idea. 
While he stayed reluctantly in office,616 Lyons' health continued to deteriorate, and he 
died of a heart attack on Good Friday, 7 April 1939, at the age of sixty, a few days short 
of eclipsing Hughes' then record of longest-serving prime minister. It was said 'few men 
who have held high office have been as sincerely and widely mourned'.617 
Theodore after parliament  
Theodore resisted subsequent entreaties from Curtin, Chifley and others to re-enter 
politics.618 He initially stayed active in public affairs. In 1932 he led a committee which 
                                                          
614 In particular, Menzies made a speech in November 1938 about how democracies needed inspiring 
leadership, widely regarded as disparaging Lyons, and distressing to him; Weller (2007b, p 70), White 
(2000, p 187) and Perkins (1968, pp 66-7, 73). His press secretary, Irvine Douglas (1972) opined that 
Menzies’ disloyalty ‘helped to bring on his breakdown and his heart attack’. Page, a medical doctor, 
believed that anxiety caused by Menzies’ disloyalty caused Lyons’ fatal illness; Denning (c1948b, p 15). 
Chamberlain (1972, p 1:2/45) shared this view. So, according to Wentworth (1987, p 12:7) did Enid Lyons. 
There may have been other plotters. According to Enid Lyons, Charles Hawker had been on his way to 
challenge Lyons when he was killed in a plane crash in October 1938; Hart and Lloyd (1986), Henderson 
(2013, p 165). Richard Casey, Archdale Parkhill, NSW premier Bertram Stevens and former prime minister 
Bruce were all discussed as possible replacements; Henderson (2013, pp 164-5). Ellis (1963, p 236) and 
Hart (1967, p 305) suggested there were elements within the party that thought Lyons should step down 
once he passed Hughes' landmark as longest serving prime minister in April 1939. In 1937 Lyons had raised 
with some of his business backers the idea of retiring in favour of Menzies but was told ‘our people are 
unanimously of the opinion that Menzies is not ready for the job’; Hart (1979, p 133).  
615 Lyons had long had a 'strong emotional repugnance to violence and war' and a lifelong opposition to 
conscription; Hart (1967, p 13) and E Lyons (1965, p 53). The prospect of being a war leader therefore 
greatly disturbed him; White (1987, pp 176-7).  
616 Green (1969, p 116) believes he was awaiting details of an appointment by the British Government 
until he resigned and cites Lyons as saying ‘I should never have left Tasmania; I had good mates there, and 
was happy, but this situation is killing me’. Whitington (1954, p 69) believed Lyons was hoping to hand 
over the leadership to Casey and then become Australian ambassador to the US. 
617 Buchanan (1940, p 24). Similarly, Stevens (1939, p 5) mourned the loss of 'one of the best-loved figures 
ever known to our public life'. Hasluck (1952, p 109) comments 'the tributes paid to Lyons after his death 
bear testimony to his uprightness, his understanding, patience, forbearance and tolerance'. 
618 For example, Chifley wrote to him on 30 July 1945 regretting that he had not returned to politics as 
‘your abilities would be invaluable these days’; Theodore papers, NLA MS 7222, folder 2. Even Lyons raised 
the possibility of him returning to serve in a ‘composite cabinet’; Fitzgerald (1994b, p 384). Theodore 
wrote to Curtin on 19 January 1932 ‘my statement, after the elections, that I supposed I should have to 
employ my energies in some field other than the political field for the immediate future has been 
construed by the press as a renunciation of politics for all time. I did not intend it that way, but I confess 
that politics have lost their glamour…I do resent insults and intolerance and base ingratitude from the 
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pointed out that a handful of banks possessed 90 per cent of business in 'a virtual money 
trust'.619 Theodore's committee argued for nationalisation of private banks with 
compensation, and a Commonwealth Bank with a majority of the board appointed by an 
incoming government but with some officials remaining to provide continuity. 
But gradually he turned his attention from public policy to business. He joined with Frank 
Packer to take over the struggling AWU paper, The World. Forming a company called 
Consolidated Press, they later launched the Australian Women’s Weekly, and revitalised 
the Daily Telegraph. In the mid-1930s Theodore was living in Fiji running a gold mining 
company.620   
It has been suggested that Lyons put aside earlier differences and asked Theodore to 
return to Australia in March 1939 to co-ordinate defence preparations or an economic 
policy co-ordinating body, but Theodore was unenthusiastic and Lyons was dead before 
there could be further discussion.621 Menzies considered appointing Theodore to head the 
Loan Council.622 Curtin brought Theodore back to government as director of the Allied 
Works Council, skilfully organising resources for war-related projects from 1942 to 1944. 
He also informally advised the government of Fiji.623 
His business interests made Theodore a wealthy man. By 1945 he was reputed to be a 
millionaire624 and historian Geoffrey Bolton (1963, p 316) called him ‘the closest that 
Australia had come to producing the Great Gatsby’. After a major heart attack in 1948, 
                                                          
workers whom I have served…I do not feel compelled to abase myself before them’; reprinted in Black 
(2001, pp 159-161). In a similar vein, he wrote to Curtin on 14 October 1932 that ‘my faith in the 
intelligence of the workers is sadly shaken’; Theodore papers, NLA MS 7222, folder 2. 
619 Theodore et al (1932, p 9). In a later individual paper, Theodore (1933, p 179) argued that 'the power 
vested in the controllers of monetary policy transcends in many respects the power vested in government 
and in parliaments' and the private banks do not wield this power in the public interest. 
620 Ironically, given that when treasurer he had said 'gold has a fictitious value because a majority of the 
stupid people in the world have chosen to make it currency'; Anon (1945, p 7). 
621 Calwell (1972a, p 69); Kennedy (1978, p 115), Anon (1945, p 7). The F&E lobbied Lyons in 1939 for 
Theodore to co-ordinate economic policy on the Committee's advice; Maddock and Penny (1983, p 30). 
622 Anon (1945, p 7). On 4 September 1940, Evatt claimed 'When Mr Theodore was willing to assist in 
Australia's financial organisation and Mr Spender has suggested his name to the conference of State 
Premiers, Mr Menzies allowed Mr Theodore to be rebuffed, humiliated and almost insulted. It would seem 
probable that Mr Menzies did not want the assistance of a man of brains'; Hazlehurst (1979, p 192). A 
contrary account by Cain (1990) has Theodore's appointment blocked by the Country Party, leading an 
exasperated Menzies to say 'give up this deplorable habit of throwing stones at great men'. 
623 Anon (1945, p 7). 
624 Anon (1945, p 7). 
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Theodore resigned the chairmanship of Consolidated Press. He died of heart disease on 9 
February 1950, survived by his estranged wife and four children.  
Commemorating Lyons and Theodore 
Both Lyons and Theodore have suburbs in Canberra commemorating them. The town of 
Castle Creek in Queensland was renamed Theodore in 1926. The electorate of Wilmot 
was renamed Lyons in 1984 and a number of conservative MPs formed a discussion group 
called the Lyons forum. Another legacy is that Theodore reportedly coined the name 
‘surfers’ paradise’ for what was then an undeveloped beach.625  
Synkrisis 
Despite some similarities in their backgrounds, Lyons and Theodore differed in their 
characters. Lyons was a gentle and kindly man and very sensitive.626 Theodore by contrast 
was brasher and self-confident. Theodore was described as 'tall, robust and commanding' 
with a 'cold, driving ruthlessness'627 (although he was also capable of charm628). He was 
a hard man but ‘neither a boor nor a bore’.629 An indication of his combative but cultured 
nature was that one of his few recreations was chess.630 Whereas Lyons was empathetic, 
Denning (1937, p 31) recalled that Theodore’s ‘most striking weakness was an 
inexplicable incapacity to appreciate the psychology of the men among whom he 
worked’. As Anstey (c1936) put it, he shared with Bruce the 'same confidence in their 
superiority to the worms around them'.631 Combined with a deeper intellect and wider 
reading, this gave him confidence to absorb new ideas and reject the orthodoxy. Theodore 
                                                          
625 Courier-Mail, 10 February 1950, p 3. 
626 His wife Enid (1965, p 53) recalls ‘he had sympathy for every living creature. He was the very gentlest 
of men’. Time magazine (8 July 1935) introduced him to an international audience as the ‘tame Tasmanian’ 
who was 'honest, naïve, likeable'. An early acquaintance recalls him as ‘a sensitive lad’; Pithouse (c1940, 
pp 227, 230). His press secretary, Irvine Douglas (1972), recalls him as ‘very sensitive indeed’. He could 
suffer from ‘moments of black depression’; Mercury, 10 April 1939, p 9. 
627 Cook (1971, p 8). Denning (1937, pp 26, 30) remarked that compared to Scullin, Theodore was ‘more 
ruthless, more determined, more constructive, more tenacious, more instinctively a fighter’. Makin (1982, 
p 71) also recalls his ‘ruthless nature’. Whitington (1954, p 28) refers to him as ‘ruthless and determined’. 
628 A contemporary journalist wrote 'his name stands for success, efficiency, ruthlessness, political 
dynamite. Only a handful of people are aware of the charming personality behind this forbidding façade'; 
Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1945, p 7. Denning (1937, p 30) recalled him having ‘when he cared 
to reveal it, a charm of manner, a kindness and a considerateness’. Arthur Calwell said it was ‘a rare and 
exquisite privilege’ to have known Theodore; according to his daughter Mary Calwell (2012, p 146) citing 
unpublished papers. 
629 Nairn (1986, pp 183-4). 
630 Buckridge (1994, p 150) refers to him as a ‘chess enthusiast’. 
631 Anstey (c1936). 
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could become an early Keynesian where Lyons would hesitate. Instead Lyons drifted to 
more conservative economic stances over the course of his career. 
Theodore was much more confident in his grasp of economics, an area in which he had 
read widely. While Lyons had studied political economy at teachers’ college,632 had read 
a range of political economy texts633 and had many discussions with Giblin and other 
Australian economists, he was very modest about his grasp of the subject, describing his 
knowledge of economics as having been 'much over-rated'.634 His son recalls him saying 
he ‘knew nothing’ of it.635 He repeatedly said 'I know little about finance'.636 Theodore 
by contrast was regarded as having 'a firmer theoretical grasp of the situation than his 
senior Treasury officials'.637 
As well as rejecting Theodore’s new expansionist policies, the other factor that drove 
Lyons from Labor was his view that Theodore had failed to clear himself of the Mungana 
allegations. Financial proprieties and integrity in public administration were more 
important to Lyons whereas Theodore had more of a ‘whatever it takes’ mentality. 
Theodore’s pre-federal politics had been in the rougher environment of Queensland and 
he then had to contend with the Lang machine in New South Wales whereas Lyons had 
only experienced the more genteel Tasmanian politics. 
Lyons also thought Theodore did not deserve to be returned to cabinet for what Lyons 
regarded as his disloyalty to Scullin in supporting changed policies while Scullin was 
                                                          
632 Pithouse (1940, p 229). 
633 Enid Lyons (1972a, p iii) records that Lyons ‘had read extensively. In sociology and political economy, 
his imagination was captured and his thoughts stimulated by John Stuart Mill, Ruskin, Bellamy and Henry 
George, among others’. 
634 Cited by Hart (1967, p 82). Henderson (2011, p 7) regards this as merely an example of his 'endearing' 
characteristic of 'learned humility'. 
635 Personal conversation with Brendan Lyons, 2008. Lyons was similarly modest in parliament; Hansard, 
12 March 1931, p 238. Leslie Melville (c1974, p 63) recalled Lyons ‘didn’t have any real grasp of financial 
matters’. 
636 Notable examples include his speech leaving the Labor Party (Hansard, 13 March 1931, p 238) and at 
an earlier testimonial dinner (Burnie Advocate, 9 January 1931, p 2). 
637 Schedvin (1970, p 119). Souter (1998, p 265) reports he ‘was said to have a firmer grasp of the economic 
situation than anyone at Treasury’. Denning (1937, p 30) recalled him as ‘abreast of the latest 
developments in financial thought’. Johnston (1987b, pp 60-61) gives a similar view. The conservative 
premier Bertram Stevens described him as ‘the coolest, best and most experienced financial brain in the 
southern hemisphere’; cited in Sydney Morning Herald, 5 September 1945, p 7. Cook (1971, p 261) says 
'there is no doubt that he had an acute intelligence, was well read in the literature of economics and had 
an excellent understanding of the problems of government finance'. Leslie Melville (c1974) admired 
Theodore as a politician, administrator and intellectual and regarded him as being ‘as honest a politician 
as anybody I ever met’. 
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away in Europe.638 Lyons was somehow able to convince himself that he himself was not 
being disloyal when he brought down Scullin’s government, or at least that he was 
maintaining loyalty to his electors instead. As he once put it in response to an interjector 
at a rally, it was better to ‘rat’ on your party than on your principles. 
While econocrats may admire Theodore more than Lyons, in political terms Lyons has 
the far better track record federally. During his time as treasurer the economy gradually 
emerged from the great depression, and probably quicker than did most comparable 
economies. He led his new party to three election victories and was still popular at the 
time of his death in office. By contrast Theodore’s federal political career was one of 
great promise unfulfilled.639 Based on his ability, Ben Chifley, and purportedly also 
SM Bruce, regarded Theodore as Australia’s greatest treasurer, a view shared by many 
others.640 But his achievements were few.  
 
  
                                                          
638 Enid Lyons (1965, pp 169- 170).  
639 As another Labor treasurer, Chris Bowen (2015, p 85), put it, ‘no treasurership has been marked by as 
much lost potential and missed opportunity’. 
640 Calwell (1971a), Whitlam (1971a, p viii) and Lemmon (1987, p 6:30) report that Chifley regarded 
Theodore as ‘our greatest treasurer’. By some accounts, Bruce shared this opinion; Calwell (1972a, p 63), 
Chifley in Hansard, 5 October 1950. Economic historian and depression chronicler Boris Schedvin (1970, 
p 119) regarded Theodore as probably ‘the most able holder of the Treasury portfolio in Commonwealth 
history … [given] his outstanding intellect, his imagination and grasp of the wider issues’. Treasury officials 
reportedly rated Bruce and Theodore as the best treasurers of their age, according to Edwards (1965, 
p 59) and Page (1983). Theodore had become ‘something of a cult figure in the Treasury’ according to 
Fitzgerald (2013, p 10). Recalling treasurers over his long life, Melville said Theodore stands out for his 
knowledge of economics; Cornish (1992). A senior Treasury official asked at the end of World War II 
whether Chifley was the best treasurer said 'well we had Theodore’; Crisp (1960, p 165). More recently, 
Ross Garnaut and Saul Eslake both rank him among the best treasurers for his vision; The Age, 9 May 
2005. Politicians as diverse as Paul Keating, Malcolm Fraser and Bob Katter agree in their admiration of 
Theodore; Katter (2012, p 17). See Hawkins (2010c, p 92) for further examples. A rare counterargument 
is provided by Tony Smith MHR who argued Theodore ’was the worst Treasurer this Commonwealth has 
ever seen’ claiming his Fiduciary Notes Bill represented a move to ‘cast fiscal sobriety adrift in order to 
neutralise that political threat’ (from Lang); Hansard 16 February 2012, pp 1712-4.    
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Chapter Six: Ben Chifley and Arthur Fadden: 
long-serving treasurers in a period of transition 
 
Prologue 
Labor’s Ben Chifley and the Country Party’s Arthur Fadden between them held the 
treasurership from 1940 to 1958, almost a fifth of the 20th century. They held the office 
in a period where the transition from accounting to Keynesian macroeconomic 
management, to which Theodore had pointed the way, was realised. By the end of 
Fadden’s second stint as treasurer fiscal policy had been directed at an inflationary boom 
and a fully-fledged central bank was being established. Both became unchallenged 
leaders of their parties but more tellingly they were also personally popular with their 
political opponents and personally respected in their performance as treasurer even by 
those who disagreed with their policies.  
Both men were well regarded as treasurers. Indeed, both have hailed as among our 
greatest ever, with Chifley hailed as a reformer and Fadden as a manager.641 This is 
despite Chifley handing over an inflation rate approaching 10 per cent in 1949 and 
inflation peaking under Fadden at an all-time high of over 20 per cent in 1952. They both 
also served as prime minister and opposition leader.  
Chifley was recalled as 'a prodigious worker'.642 Evatt said 'I do not suppose there has 
been a man in public life who has worked harder'.643 Reid (1961a, p 13 and 1980a, p 366) 
described Fadden too as 'a hard working treasurer'. 
                                                          
641 Gough Whitlam (1991, p 30) called Chifley ‘if not the world’s greatest treasurer, at least Australia’s 
greatest’. Golding (1996, p 126) remarks 'there are many who would argue that Chifley was in fact one of 
Australia's very great treasurers'. One of his colleagues, Holloway (c1954, p 100), calls Chifley our ‘best 
treasurer’ and MacCallum (2014a, p 118) remarks ‘many still regard him as Australia’s best treasurer’. The 
argument for Fadden being ranked highly is that, as Professor Ross Garnaut commented, 'if the role of the 
treasurer is primarily one of maintaining economic stability, then the people who have presided over long 
periods of stable growth have to get high marks'; The Age, 9 May 2005, p 4. Whitington (1964, p 151) 
judged him as 'by far the best treasurer Menzies could have had' but not of the calibre of Chifley or 
Theodore. Hasluck (1985, p 189) reports that Wilson and Randall thought Fadden was the best treasurer 
they had had (which would put him ahead of Holt, McMahon, Bury and Snedden). 
642 A public servant cited by Day (2001, p 389). He was described as living in ‘almost hermit-like seclusion’ 
as treasurer; Denning (c1952a, p 10). There is an example of an 83-hour working week in Sunday 
Telegraph, 8 April 1945. 
643 Hansard, 20 June 1951, p 68. 
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Table 6.1: The parallel lives of Ben Chifley and Arthur Fadden 
 Ben Chifley Arthur Fadden 
Born Sept 1885 April 1894 
Elected to local government 1933 1930 
Elected to state parliament n.a. 1932 
First elected to federal parliament Nov 1928 Dec 1936 
First appointment as minister March 1931 April 1940 
Treasurer Oct 1941 – Dec 1949 Oct 1940 – Oct 1941; 
Dec 1949 – Dec 1958 
Opposition leader Feb 1950 – June 1951 Oct 1941 – Sept 1943 
Prime minister July 1945 – Dec 1949 Aug 1941 – Oct 1941 
Died June 1951 April 1973 
 
Both men were noted for their familiarity with economics and finance, although to 
differing degrees. Fadden was described by Coombs (1981, p 154) as ‘interested in 
economic and financial issues’. Country Party historian and friend of Fadden, Ulrich Ellis 
(2007, p 253) said that Fadden ‘in his leisure hours devoured government reports and 
financial papers’. While the majority view is that Fadden was ‘no intellectual’, Arklay 
(2014, p 1) believed he ‘possessed an inquiring mind’. It has been suggested Fadden had 
a ‘deeper intellect and sensitivity than he was willing to disclose to the public’.644 
It was said of Chifley that ‘his interests were economic and financial. They were almost 
exclusively economic and financial.’645 Indeed, Chifley’s wife recalled that it was a 
frequent topic of conversation when they were courting.646  Nugget Coombs, who worked 
                                                          
644 Sir John Carrick, cited by Arklay (2010, p 28). 
645 Holt (1969, p 51). Palmer (1940, p 208) called him ‘preoccupied’ with finance. Senior public servant 
Breen (1974, p 228) characterised him as 'a thinker well above the average in finance'. Ryan (2004, 
pp 84-85) refers to Chifley's extensive reading, especially of Keynes. Green (1959, p 39) recalled him 
reading widely, particularly on history and world affairs. At the time of his death he still kept in his study 
a copy of Shann and Copland’s (1931b) compendium of key economic documents related to the 
Depression.  
646 Crisp (1960, p 8). In Ellis and McLachlan's (2005, p 21) play about Chifley, he says of his wife 'what I 
liked about her…was how you could talk to her about economics'. 
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closely with Chifley, refers to his ‘considerable mental aptitude for financial and 
economic matters’ but added that this was ‘developed by good solid hard work’.647 Even 
his opponent Menzies agreed that Chifley ‘mastered the techniques of public finance’.648 
More recent writers also refer to Chifley's ‘quite remarkable grasp of finance’.649 Chifley 
was not blinded by economics, however, once observing that ‘economic research is not 
an exact science…academic theorists bring into their findings their own pet ideas’.650 
Despite their policy differences, Fadden and Chifley got on well with ‘a shared 
knowledge and understanding of finance and their temperamental compatibility’.651 
Chifley and Fadden were also popular with the public. Neither were pompous nor formal, 
and they were known as ‘Chif’ and ‘Artie’. As Arklay (2014, p 213) remarked, ‘like Ben 
Chifley, Arthur Fadden seemed to understand the average Australian’. One side of 
Fadden’s sociability was that he could be a prodigious drinker but Arklay’s (2014, 
pp 183-4) judgement is that, at least until near the end of his career, it very rarely affected 
his performance as treasurer. 
Neither man was regarded as a silver-tongued orator but both were effective 
communicators. Fadden could be quite nervous when presenting his budgets652 but had a 
reputation as a good raconteur with a fund of anecdotes on which he could draw and some 
good quips. Chifley’s voice became increasingly raspy over the years as addressing many 
outdoor public meetings in poor weather took its toll.653 
                                                          
647 Melbourne Herald, 11 August 1976; Coombs (1970, p 46). 
648 Menzies (undated). On the ABC TV programme Mr Prime Minister (broadcast 25 May 1966), Menzies 
recalled that Chifley 'had the most acute mind – he got on top of Treasury and economic problems in the 
most remarkable way'. 
649 Golding (1996, p 126). Reid (1951b, p 20) wrote ‘in his way he was a financial genius’. Day (2001, p 235) 
described Chifley as 'deeply interested in economic matters'. Edwards (2005, p 81) believes, however, 
that Curtin was more widely read in economics than was Chifley. 
650 Hansard, 11 March 1929, p 988. 
651 Enid Lyons (1972a, p 98). 
652 Heather Henderson, daughter of Menzies, cited in Acklay (2014, pp 64, 174). A parliamentary colleague, 
Jo Gullett (1992, p 247), recalled ‘his choice of words was not good, he tended to repetition and his voice, 
while clear and strong, was monotonous’. Cox (1968, p 2) recalled ‘Fadden never became a really 
impressive orator at the table of the House’ but ‘he shone on a public platform’. 
653 Nugget Coombs (1986, p 51) commented he ‘could command the attention of the House by clarity and 
mastery of his subject and when the occasion called for it by a homespun humour’. Parliamentary 
contemporary Gordon Brown (1953, p 212) regarded him as ‘the calmest speaker it has been my lot to 
contact…[with] no frills or flourishes’. Clark (1983, p 34) called Chifley ‘a good stump performer and 
parliamentary debater’. 
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Both were very popular with their staff. One of Chifley’s staff recalled him as ‘lovely…a 
true gentleman’.654 A future treasurer who worked in Treasury said of Fadden ‘no one 
could have a more kindly and considerate chief’. 655 Murray Tyrrell (1974, p 7; 1975, 
p 19), a public servant who worked for both men, described Chifley as someone who 
‘looked after his staff’ and Fadden as an ‘extremely good man to work with, a very honest 
and upright boss’. 
One time colleague and later opponent, and fellow treasurer, Joe Lyons described Chifley 
‘as one of the finest fellows I have ever met’, while Lyons’ wife Enid remembered 
Chifley’s ‘rugged good looks, immense personal dignity and his friendly but always 
slightly reserved bearing’.656 Indeed one biographer referred to the challenge that ‘it is 
almost impossible to find anybody with a bad word to say’ about him.657   
Similarly, it has been said of Fadden ‘there would not be one member in parliament…who 
disliked him’.658 Parliamentary contemporaries recalled Fadden as 'energetic, outgoing, 
shrewd and immensely likeable' and ‘sharp-witted with a fund of jokes’.659  As the British 
High Commissioner put it, ‘you couldn’t meet a better man in a bar’.660 He had an 
enormous zest for living.661  
While on opposite sides of parliament, in some ways the views of Chifley and Fadden 
were not that different. With his background, it has been said ‘Fadden should have joined 
                                                          
654 Eileen Clendinning, personal discussion 24 May 2015. She referred to him as also concerned about the 
wellbeing of his staff. Nugget Coombs (1981, p 90), appreciated Chifley's 'gentleness, his simple faith in 
mankind and his warm gift for friendship'. Similarly, Rogers (1971) recalled Chifley was noted for being 
‘more than kind to his staff’. Historian and senior Liberal politician Paul Hasluck (1997, p 39) also observed 
that all his public servants liked him. 
655 Leslie Bury, Hansard, 21 August 1958, p 648. 
656 Enid Lyons (1972a, p 97). Future treasurer and prime minister Harold Holt described Chifley as ‘one of 
the more loveable men ever to have inhabited Parliament House’; cited in Thompson (1964, p 74). Hasluck 
(1986, p 17) recalls Menzies choosing Chifley as his first pick when asked to select an all-time best cabinet. 
657 Thompson (1964, p 55). There are a few critics who argued Chifley wore a working class ‘mask’ and 
played down his learning and affluence; Scalmer (1996, p 46) gives some examples. 
658 Parliamentary contemporary John Cramer (1989, p 30). Political opponent Fred Daly (1977, p 116), for 
example, recalled Fadden as ‘a very lovable character’. He had been called the ‘most popular man in 
parliament’; Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 1973. Menzies’ private secretary Hazel Craig (in Fitzgerald 
(2014, p 189)) and Davey (2011, p 47) describe him as a 'hail fellow, well met' character. Enid Lyons (1972a, 
p 98) recalled 'everyone whole heartedly liked Artie'. 
659 Beale (1977, p 50). Daly (1977, pp 25, 29, 32) includes some examples of Fadden’s wit. 
660 Cross to Cranborne, 20 January 1942, cited by Macintyre (2015, p 79). 
661 Gough Whitlam, Hansard, 1 May 1973, p 1467; E Holt (1969, p 69). 
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the Labor Party’662 and he wrote himself that he could have become a union official663 
and that in his twenties his sympathies were more on the Labor side.664 
Family, childhood and young adulthood 
Ben Chifley was born in Bathurst on 22 September 1885, the son of a blacksmith and a 
convent employee. While Ben had two brothers in addition to his parents, the greatest 
influence on him growing up was likely to have been his Irish grandfather for he was 
largely raised on his grandfather's farm in the hamlet of Limekilns 18 kilometres away. 
Ben lived there from the age of five to fourteen; as he laconically put it, ‘I went for a 
holiday and I came back nine years later’.665 While there he received only rudimentary 
schooling 2-3 days a week. There are two ways this period in his life may have influenced 
Chifley as a treasurer. Firstly, it instilled in him a love of reading and, secondly, observing 
the effect on his grandfather and their neighbours of the bank collapses of the 1890s meant 
banking reform was always a preoccupation for Chifley.666 Over half a century later, 
Chifley recalled ‘I can remember the depression of the 'nineties, and the farmers near 
where I lived who were desolated and grief-stricken at the closing of the banks’.667 
Arthur Fadden also grew up far from the major cities. He was born in Ingham, in tropical 
north Queensland, on 13 April 1894. He was the eldest of ten children. Both his father 
and maternal grandparents had been Irish immigrants. His father was a policeman in a 
small rural village and young Artie’s bedroom was next door to a cell. He grew up in the 
cane fields and, as Ellis (1963, p 306) put it, 'gambolled with the Tom Sawyers and 
Huckleberry Finns on the banks of the Pioneer River'. He mixed with children from 
different ethnic groups at school, developing social skills which served him well in later 
life.668 As a young man, he excelled at cricket, rugby, running and boxing. He also 
performed in amateur theatre. Being treasurer of a vaudeville troupe was his first 
experience of balancing the books. 
                                                          
662 MacCallum (2014a, p 97). Denning (c1948a, p 5) says Fadden had many friends in the Labor Party but 
was not attracted to its policies. 
663 Fadden (1969, p 7) suggests this could have occurred if he not been rejected when he applied for a 
clerical job with the railways. 
664 Canberra Times, 24 April 1973, p 2. 
665 Crisp (1960, p 3). 
666 Reid (1951b, p 20). 
667 Hansard, 11 November 1947, p 1927. 
668 Arklay (2014, p 2), Fadden (1969, p 3). 
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When Chifley returned to Bathurst, he started work at a general store but soon moved to 
the railway workshop and over a decade quickly rose to driving locomotives. For 
recreation, he played cricket and rugby, being good enough at the latter to represent NSW 
Country. A little discussed episode in his life is that in the 1920s Chifley made his first 
overseas trip, to south Asia, working his passage on a steamship to observe conditions 
there.669 
Fadden also left school young and at 15 was working as an office boy at a sugar mill. He 
then became an assistant to the town clerk for Mackay Town Council. When he 
discovered defalcations in the books kept by the town clerk (missed by five auditors), the 
clerk was dismissed and Fadden appointed in his place. Fadden attempted to enlist in the 
army in 1915 but was rejected on health grounds.670 Fadden subsequently became a public 
accountant in Townsville in 1918. When a cyclone hit Mackay in January 1918 Fadden 
narrowly escaped drowning and worked tirelessly with the relief effort. 
Chifley married Elizabeth McKenzie, the daughter of another locomotive driver, and they 
shared the same Bathurst cottage provided by her parents for the rest of their lives. 
Elizabeth suffered from scoliosis (a bent spine) and remained in poor health most of her 
married life. She miscarried in 1915 and the Chifleys never had children. Fadden married 
Ilma Thornber, a milliner, in 1916. Her father, grandfather and brother-in-law had all been 
mayors of Mackay, so the marriage brought him closer to political circles. They had four 
children.  
Self-improvement 
Chifley rued his lack of formal education, once commenting to his nephew ‘I’d rather 
have had Mr Menzies’ education than a million pounds’.671 Since childhood he was an 
avid reader, and Plutarch’s Lives was one of his favourites.672 Once he returned to 
Bathurst he attended evening classes four times a week for fifteen years and continued to 
read voraciously. He taught at the Railway Institute on Sunday mornings. 
                                                          
669 Bolton (2006, p 4). 
670 Despite his sporting prowess, Fadden was also rejected on physical grounds for a clerical position with 
the railways; Fadden (1969, p 7). 
671 Crisp (1960, p 6), Martin (2015, p 85). 
672 Crisp (1960, p 6), Courtney (1951, p 4), Day (2001, p 43), Martin (2015, p 63). School friends recalled 
Chifley ‘sitting in the school playground, waiting his turn to bat, with his head stuck in a book’; Thompson 
(1964, p 58). 
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Fadden was less obsessive but also studied in the evenings, gaining accountancy 
qualifications by correspondence. He was also an avid reader of the local papers so had a 
good grasp of local affairs.  
Religious and political beliefs 
Chifley was from a catholic family, whose family motto, recalled Martin (2015, p 41), 
was ‘keep the faith’. He did indeed retain his beliefs all his life.  But when he married 
Elizabeth, who was a presbyterian, he placed himself outside the mainstream of his church 
and the couple married in a presbyterian church in Sydney to avoid embarrassment to 
their families in Bathurst.673 Chifley still attended catholic services, sitting at the back of 
the hall, and read the Bible from cover to cover at least eleven times.674 Archie Cameron 
thought Chifley ‘loved God’ but ‘hated the priests’.675 The religious dispute extended 
beyond the grave: Ben and Elizabeth Chifley are buried in different sections of the 
Bathurst cemetery.676 
Fadden was a presbyterian and a freemason, but religion seems not to have played a large 
part in his life. As the Country Party’s historian Ulrich Ellis (2007, p 249) put it, ‘Artie’s 
religion was mateship’.677  
A pivotal movement for Chifley was the 1917 railway strike which saw Chifley demoted 
for a time due to his involvement and spend one or two nights in a police cell, the injustice 
of which only fuelled his belief in the cause of the labour movement.678 Chifley became 
a ‘true believer’ in the Labor cause.679 Bob Hawke (1985, p 1) claims Chifley described 
the Labor Party as his ‘real religion’. While an idealist, remembered for coining the term 
'light on the hill' to capture Labor's aspirations for a better world, he was pragmatic 
enough to have also coined the expression 'hip pocket nerve' to denote what motivates 
                                                          
673 A papal decree of 1908 denied the sacraments to those marrying outside the church; Day (2001, 
pp 92-93). As Chifley explained to a friend; ‘one of us has to take the knock. It’d better be me’; Crisp (1960, 
p 9). 
674 Martin (2015, p 84), Williams (2013, pp 114-5).  
675 Hasluck (1997, p 29). 
676 Wright (1988). 
677 Ellis (2007, p 249). 
678 Martin (2015, p 166). Chifley later declared ‘I should not be a member of this parliament today if some 
tolerance had been extended to the men who took part in the strike of 1917’; Crisp (1960, p 11). 
679 The expression ‘true believer’ was popularised by Bob Ellis’ eponymous television series about the 
Curtin-Chifley era. In discussion with the author, Ellis conceded the term was not used in Labor circles at 
the time. 
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many voters.680 He had both a 'deep-rooted passion to improve the lives of his fellow 
Australians' and 'a practical appreciation of the political compromises and ruses that were 
sometimes necessary for success'.681 Chifley supported a mixed economy. As he put it, 
'nationalisation of hamburger stands or ice cream shops or permanent wave 
establishments is not our business'.682 
Into local and state government 
Fadden spoke at a public meeting in support of a friend running as a Nationalist against 
Theodore in 1925, but declined an offer from the Country and Progressive National Party 
to run himself at the 1929 state elections. His first serious foray into politics was his 
election to the Townsville City Council in 1930, leading a team of independents known 
as the ‘servicable six’.  
Chifley was elected to Abercrombie Shire Council in 1933 and stayed on it until 1947 
(even while prime minister and treasurer), serving as shire president for a few years. 
Fadden narrowly won the Queensland Legislative Assembly seat of Kennedy for the 
Country and Progressive National Party in 1932 and in 1934 was appointed to lead for 
the opposition in financial debates. He was a strong supporter of the conservative 
‘Premiers’ Plan’ for dealing with the Depression. He advocated curing unemployment by 
settling people in northern Queensland. After a politically motivated redistribution aimed 
at unseating him, he unsuccessfully contested the sugar belt seat of Mirani in 1935.683  He 
then returned to his accountancy practice in Brisbane. 
Into federal parliament 
Chifley was elected for the then Bathurst-centred seat of Macquarie, at his second attempt, 
in 1928, and sat next to fellow newcomer and future prime minister John Curtin, to whom 
he became very close. In one of his first parliamentary speeches Chifley (like Curtin) 
opposed Bruce's plan for a Bureau of Economic Research as duplicating work done by 
                                                          
680 Day (2007, p 94). Chifley was probably unaware that UK chancellor Robert Lowe had much earlier 
referred to ‘that most susceptible part of an Englishman’s person, the pocket of his trousers’; The Times, 
22 December 1868, p 4, cited in Maloney (2006, p 407). 
681 Day (2001, p 530). Chifley once described his aim as to create a ‘heaven on earth’; Crisp (1960, p 383). 
682 Speech in September 1948, reprinted in Chifley (1952, p 35). 
683 It was suggested several hundred roadworkers were moved into the electorate to ensure his defeat; 
Canberra Times, 24 April 1973, p 2, Fadden (1969, p 37). 
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other organisations and questioned whether economists with 'academic ideas gathered in 
the rarefied atmosphere of some university' offered better advice than 'someone with a 
wider and more practical experience'.684 Chifley served on the busy Joint Committee of 
Public Accounts and in the course of its inquiries seemed to have formed a more 
favourable view of economists.685 
Fadden’s chance to move to the federal parliament occurred with a by-election in late 
1936 for the federal seat of Darling Downs, following the death of Sir Littleton Groom. 
Groom had sat for United Australia Party but Fadden chose to sit with the Country Party. 
He held the seat until 1949 when he moved to the neighbouring Gold Coast seat of 
McPherson which he kept until his retirement.  
Chifley in the Scullin government  
Chifley became minister for defence in Scullin's government in March 1931 and assisted 
Theodore on some economic matters, such as being delegated responsibility for 
implementing some spending cuts required under the Premiers Plan.686 Some accounts 
suggest Chifley had some misgivings about Theodore’s approach, but others say he was 
a 'strong supporter of the Theodore plan'.687 On a personal level he got on well with 
Theodore. They had long conversations walking the gardens of Parliament House and 
they fished together.  
The Scullin government fell, however, within a year of Chifley's appointment when 
Lyons defected and rebels backing NSW premier Jack Lang turned on it too. Particularly 
hurtful for Chifley was that in the internecine conflicts within the Labor movement, he 
was expelled from the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive Enginemen which he 
                                                          
684 Hansard, 19 March 1929, p 1470.  
685 Crisp (1960, p 52). One of its reports recommending establishing a body like the Commonwealth Grants 
Commission. 
686 Bennett (1973, p 8), Bowen (2015, p 115), Carroll (1978, p 111), Crisp (1960, p 62), Crisp and Bridge 
(2004, p 417), Day (2001, p 258) and McKinlay (1988, p 118) all call him 'minister assisting the treasurer', 
Marr (1980, p 52) refers to him as ‘assistant treasurer’ and Watts (1987, p 69) refers to him as ‘assistant 
minister’ but he does not seem to have been officially recognised as such (he is not listed in the 
Parliamentary Handbooks or Hansard with any such post, for example). 
687 Waterson (1993), Robinson (1986, pp 129-30). Day (2001, p 254) says Chifley was concerned about 
how London bondholders would view Theodore's policies. Crisp (1960, p 51) believes Chifley was not 
moving towards expansionary policies at the same pace as was Theodore. In parliament Chifley strongly 
supported Theodore's Fiduciary Notes Bill; Hansard, 25 March 1931, pp 602-6. By the time he was 
treasurer himself, Chifley regarded Theodore's policies as right; Reid (1980b, p 40). 
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had helped form. In the ensuing election, Chifley lost his seat and was out of parliament 
for nearly a decade. 
Fadden builds his parliamentary career while Chifley is in the wilderness  
Lyons purportedly offered Chifley the treasurership in his United Australia Party 
government if he also left Labor but Chifley declined.688 Chifley’s biographer says 'he 
rebuffed it immediately' but according to Lyons’ wife, Chifley ‘had been briefly tempted 
to go with Joe ... but the mystique of Labor tradition held him back: only through the 
party could social reform be achieved, he felt, and it was better to ride out the present 
storm in the hope of a better future’.689 
While out of parliament Chifley fought the Lang forces, being elected as NSW president 
of the federal version of the Labor Party in 1934. Chifley's involvement with many 
community organisations in Bathurst was not enough for him to win back Macquarie 
when he contested it again in 1934. In 1935 he stood unsuccessfully against Lang in the 
state seat of Auburn. By one account he made a trip to Indonesia.690 Crisp (1960, p 86) 
described how he continued his study of finance and economics and continued to meet 
with Theodore. 
The Menzies government appointed Chifley to the Capital Issues Advisory Board soon 
after the outbreak of the war, a sign that he was viewed as a moderate Labor voice.691 
Chifley was also briefly Director of Labour at the Department of Munitions, before 
resigning and winning back the seat of Macquarie at the 1940 election. Chifley was 
immediately restored to the frontbench and in 1941 served on the Board of Inquiry into 
Hire Purchase and Cash Order Systems. 
Fadden, meanwhile, had quickly established a reputation as a speaker on financial 
subjects.692 His first parliamentary speech ended by outlining his vision of a ‘varied and 
                                                          
688 Crisp (1960, p 65), E Lyons (1972a, p 97); B Lyons (2008, p 135). Lyons was now leading the United 
Australia Party. Given the UAP candidate won Macquarie at the 1931 election and held it until Chifley won 
it back in 1940, taking up Lyons' offer would almost certainly have allowed Chifley to stay in parliament 
throughout the 1930s. He may well have succeeded an ailing Lyons as prime minister in the 1930s; Ellis 
and McLachlan (2005, p 41). 
689 Crisp (1960, p 65), E Lyons (1972a, p 97). 
690 Ryan (2004, p 87). Crisp (1960) and Day (2001), the major Chifley biographies, make no mention of this. 
691 Butlin (1955, pp 202-3). 
692 Denning (c1948a, p 4). 
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balanced economy’.693 Early on he was mentored by Country Party leader Earle Page.694 
In 1939 Fadden tried to dissuade Page from attacking Menzies in the House. Failing in 
this, Fadden and three colleagues withdrew from the Country Party until after Page stood 
down and was replaced by Archie Cameron. Fadden was critical of what he termed the 
Government’s ‘half-baked scheme known as national insurance’695 and supported a tax 
on gold as the increase in its price ‘may be described as a windfall’.696  
When Menzies needed to appoint Country Party ministers in April 1940, Fadden became, 
to his ‘utter surprise’697, minister assisting the treasurer. In this role, he claimed (without 
giving any details) that the government was funding the war ‘by the most scientific means 
at its disposal, to find one-half from indirect tax and one-half from direct tax'.698  
Fadden had been booked on the plane which crashed in August 1940 killing three 
ministers, but fortunately had taken the train instead. He was appointed minister for air 
and civil aviation in addition to assistant treasurer. 
Chifley and the Royal Commission on Banking 
In 1935 Lyons and Casey appointed Chifley to the Royal Commission on the Monetary 
and Banking Systems. As Enid Lyons observed, ‘both his knowledge of finance and the 
analytical habit of his mind fitted him admirably for such a task’.699 Chifley later 
suggested he had been chosen as the government thought he ‘would take the most 
moderate Labor view’.700 Over nine months the commission took evidence in every 
capital. A biographer comments that Chifley 'added to his knowledge of economics and 
finance by his searching interrogations of the leading economists who came before the 
                                                          
693 Hansard, 17 June 1936, p 40. 
694 Fadden recalled ‘Earle Page had been like a father to me from the time I entered the House’ and was 
‘always the soul of kindness and understanding’; Fadden (1969, p 81). 
695 Hansard, 23 November 1938, p 1931. 
696 Hansard, 19 September 1939, p 708. 
697 Fadden (1969, 42). 
698 Hansard, 9 May 1940, p 662. 
699 E Lyons (1972a, pp 97-80). Anstey had lobbied for the position but Curtin pushed Chifley and it is likely 
that Chifley's case was helped by the good opinions held of him by Lyons and Scullin; Crisp (1960, p 167), 
Day (2001, p 321), Love (1990, p 441), Sutherlin (1980, p 39), Whitlam (1991, p 13). Much later, Richard 
Casey uncharacteristically and uncharitably recalled 'I brought him off the street, not for the reason that 
he had any prior knowledge of banking, because I think at that stage the right honourable gentleman did 
not know a bank from a public convenience'; Hansard, 20 April 1950, p 1707.  
700 Carroll (1978, p 114). 
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commission, as well as by the many months of discussion, both formal and informal, with 
his fellow commission members’.701 
Chifley questioned the Commonwealth Bank about their reluctance to compete with the 
private banks,702 in part due to a perceived incompatibility with the Bank’s role as a 
central bank,703 and their lack of control over the exchange rate.704  He asked the private 
banks about funds they placed with the Bank and referred to the compulsory deposits 
banks were required to place with the central banks in New Zealand, America and South 
Africa.705 He referred to evidence from Professor Gregory to the Canadian banking 
inquiry about the need for such required reserves to supplement open market operations 
and similar suggestions by the Macmillan Committee.706 He also asked about controls on 
interest rates and about open market operations.707 Chifley asked whether the treasurer 
rather than the treasury secretary should be on the board given confidentiality would 
inhibit the secretary reporting back to the treasurer.708 Chifley was concerned that bank 
mergers were reducing competition and that this was further impeded by gentlemen’s 
agreements between the banks.709 He repeatedly questioned the banks about their ability 
to check booms or recessions or to affect the demand for imports.710 He was also 
concerned about the lack of finance, particularly longer-term finance, for small 
business.711 
                                                          
701 Day (2001, p 322). An economist and future treasurer, Leslie Bury, who attended the hearings thought 
that Chifley asked 'astute' and 'penetrating' questions; Bury (1975, p 3). Howard (2014, p 102) suggests 
Chifley established ‘contacts with professional economists as well as Treasury boffins’. 
702 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 13, 53-54 and 68-69. He also put this question to the 
private banks, eg p 464. 
703 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 17, 54. 
704 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, p 28. 
705 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 161, 313, 351 and 482-3. He also questioned economists 
about this eg Melville, Transcript of Evidence, p 1153. 
706 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 67, 276 and 481-2. 
707 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 1174, 1175 and 1279. 
708 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 57, 1395. 
709 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 183-4, 208, 222-3, 257, 315 and 363. At times these 
exchanges became testy with one banker accusing Chifley of attempting to ‘put words in my mouth’; p 97. 
710 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 101, 134 and 257. 
711 Royal Commission, Transcript of Evidence, pp 50, 258, 400 and 1112. 
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The economist with the commission recalled that Chifley was 'vitally important in the 
drafting process' and 'the Royal Commission's major impact was the education of Ben 
Chifley'.712 
The commission concluded that 'no action by the monetary and banking system of 
Australia could have avoided some depression, although the system together with the 
governments, and, indeed, the community as a whole, must share some responsibility for 
the extent of the depression… the proper policy for the Commonwealth Bank, as the 
depression developed, was one of expansion'.713 The commission also thought the 
government should explore establishing a market for treasury bills and should introduce 
decimal currency. They recommended some, relatively mild, strengthening of the central 
banking powers of the Commonwealth Bank, such as requiring trading banks to place a 
deposit representing a proportion of their liabilities with the Bank. But in his dissenting 
comments, Chifley argued the report did not go far enough and that desirable economic 
outcomes were incompatible with privately-owned, profit-oriented banks.714 It may be 
that Chifley felt obliged to put forward nationalisation as Labor policy, even if his 
personal preference was for central bank control over private banks.715  
Fadden’s first stint as treasurer (and briefly prime minister) 
Following the September 1940 election there was a challenge to Cameron’s leadership of 
the Country Party. After Cameron withdrew from the contest the vote was tied between 
former leader Earle Page and future leader John McEwen. To break the deadlock Fadden 
was appointed acting leader, and therefore unofficial deputy prime minister. He was 
                                                          
712 Jock Phillips, interviewed by Sutherlin (1980, pp 48 and 278). Kuhn (1988, p 62) describes how ‘in accord 
with Labor’s policy’ Chifley advocated nationalisation, but referred to it as ‘ultimate’ nationalisation rather 
than immediate. 
713 Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems (1936, pp 209-10).  
714 Royal Commission on Monetary and Banking Systems (1936, pp 262-8). Chifley commented 'in times 
of unhealthy boom conditions the trading banks are unable individually to check these conditions, and 
collectively they have never attempted to do so…during a depression or feared slump, the banks, in their 
own interest, and to protect their depositors, on whose confidence the banks' prestige and solvency 
depend, adopt a policy of contraction which intensifies the evil.' Butlin (1937, p 50) opines that 'Mr Chifley 
made out, even in his three pages, a better case for nationalisation than the Majority did for private 
ownership'. Sir Leslie Melville, however, recalled that Chifley's minority report 'did not leave much 
impression'; Cornish (1993b, p 444). 
715 Jock Phillips, interviewed by Sutherlin (1980, p 123). Millmow (2010b, p 222) comments ‘Chifley wrote 
the addendum only to give mandatory voice to Labor Party policy’. Clark (1975b, p 32) refers to Chifley as 
‘a very reluctant nationaliser’. The Commonwealth Bank’s governor Armitage recalled in 1949 that Chifley 
had been opposed to bank nationalisation when first treasurer; Armitage reminiscences, RBA archives 
RBA SA-65-84. See the discussion of bank nationalisation later in this chapter. 
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confirmed as party leader in March 1941. While Menzies was visiting London, Fadden 
was acting prime minister from January to May 1941. Martin and Hardy (1993, p 139) 
referred to rumours that Fadden would have been ‘happy to see Menzies go’ but there 
was no active plotting against him. 
Fadden was promoted to treasurer,716 and in November 1940 brought down his first 
budget, increasing a range of taxes (including a ‘greatly increased yield from the middle 
incomes’717) and borrowing heavily to pay for vastly increased military spending. 
Concerned about rising inflationary pressures, Fadden rejected reliance on further 
expansion of credit. He regarded inflation as the least equitable means of raising revenue 
from the public.718 Fadden failed in an attempt to convince the states that they should 
yield income taxes to the federal government. Price controls had been introduced 
‘preventing profiteering and safeguarding the interests of the Australian consumers’.719  
A payroll tax was introduced to help fund child endowment. Banking regulations were 
introduced by agreement between the government and reluctant banks.720 
Former Commonwealth Bank governor 'Nugget' Coombs (1981, p 10) recalled ‘Fadden’s 
first budget was phrased in more traditional financial terms and its Keynesian structure 
was less apparent’. 
Fadden and Treasury Secretary Stuart (‘Misery Mac’) McFarlane were not 
temperamentally compatible.721 An Economic and Industrial Committee of Cabinet was 
established in June 1941, chaired by Fadden and with Professor Copland as Economic 
Consultant, but it only operated for a few months.722 More influential was the ‘F&E 
Committee’ of leading economists.723 Acting on advice from F&E Fadden tried 
                                                          
716 Spender (1972, pp 73-74) believed Fadden demanded it as his right as effective deputy prime minister, 
although Menzies tried to present it as his own decision to make the best use of Fadden’s accounting 
background; Bowen (2015, p 162). 
717 Hansard, 21 November 1940, p 87. 
718 Hansard, 21 November 1940, p 85; Hasluck (1952, p 282). 
719 Hansard, 21 November 1940, p 80. 
720 Butlin (1983, pp 98-99). 
721 In addition to his dourness, ‘McFarlane’s style of presentation sometimes showed a carelessness of 
detail which offended Fadden’s accountancy standards’ leading Fadden to complain of some tables 
‘bloody thing doesn’t add up!’; Coombs (1981, pp 6, 11). 
722 The Committee is described in Crisp (1978, p 377), Hasluck (1952, pp 429-430) and Weller (2007a, 
pp 74-75). 
723 Maddock and Penny (1983) and Whitwell (1985) describe this committee, with the latter emphasising 
the profound impact the Depression had on its members and their embrace of Keynesianism.  
 150 
 
unsuccessfully in February and June 1941 to persuade the states to transfer income tax 
powers to the federal government.724  
Fadden persuaded the banks to agree to place ‘special deposits’ with the Commonwealth 
Bank and follow its policy on advances as a means of constraining credit expansion.725 
He had earlier expressed the desirability of the Commonwealth Bank being able to operate 
more as a central bank using ‘open market operations’.726 
Menzies resigned as prime minister in August 1941 and a joint party room meeting chose 
Fadden as his replacement despite his being from the smaller party in the coalition. But 
his government was short-lived; as he put it he only 'reigned for forty days and forty 
nights’ (like the Great Flood).  
Fadden remained treasurer as well as being prime minister.727 He regarded the 1941-42 
budget as one of the two best he presented. He viewed war with Japan as inevitable, so 
was concerned with new measures to raise revenue. Fadden aspired to introduce a scheme 
of ‘compulsory loans’728 from singles earning over £100 a year, reaching 90 per cent on 
very high incomes to accrue interest at 2 per cent and be repaid after the war.729 A 'high 
profits' tax was proposed for companies earning over 8 per cent on capital. Payroll tax 
was introduced to help fund child endowment. The budget included forecasts of national 
income, and said about 15 per cent of this would be needed for war purposes.730   
The parliament, however, voted against the budget. Labor leader John Curtin denounced 
the budget as ‘contrary to true equality and sacrifice’ and two independents withdrew 
their support from the coalition government. Curtin replaced Fadden as prime minister.  
                                                          
724 Maddock and Penny (1983, p 38). 
725 Hansard, 25 September 1941, p 576; Cornish (2010, pp 32-33). 
726 Hansard, 23 November 1938, p 1933. 
727 He said he would wait until after the budget to rearrange the cabinet portfolios; Courier-Mail, 
30 August 1941, p 1. It is not known whether if he continued in government he would have relinquished 
the treasury portfolio. 
728 This was an idea of Keynes (1939a, pp 47-51, 1939b, pp 59-62) also known as ‘compulsory saving’, 
'deferred pay','post-war credits' or 'national contribution', suggested by the F&E Committee; Coleman, 
Cornish and Hagger (2006, pp 190-192), Davey (2011, p 63), Maddock and Penny (1983, p 39) and 
Markwell (1985, p 50). It had been strongly advocated by one of the independents on whom Fadden relied 
to hold government but Fadden was particularly proud of the idea; Fadden (1973, pp 8-9). 
729 Hansard, 25 September 1941, p 574. Similarly, there would be compulsory loans out of company 
income. 
730 Hansard, 25 September 1941, p 570. 
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Chifley as Curtin’s treasurer 
While Chifley’s appointment as treasurer was seen with hindsight by journalist Warren 
Denning as ‘practically automatic’, many commentators at the time were surprised, 
expecting the job to go to deputy leader Forde.731 Chifley ranked behind only Curtin and 
deputy leader Forde in cabinet precedence. He brought down on 29 October 1941 a 
revised Commonwealth budget, dropping the ‘compulsory loans’ and focusing the 
income tax increases on high income earners. Soon after, the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbour in December 1941 and the bombing of Darwin in February 1942 brought the war 
much closer to Australia and greatly increased public support for a 'total war economy'. 
War expenditure almost doubled between 1940-41 and 1941-42, and the 1942-43 budget 
expanded it further, necessitating further increases in personal income, company and sales 
taxes. 
Curtin established a Production Executive, a cabinet committee similar to Menzies' 
Economic Cabinet, to which he appointed Chifley.732 Chifley introduced the tradition of 
the ‘budget lockup’ for journalists. 
The government very quickly adopted responsibility for income taxation. In February 
1942, an advisory committee733 was established to examine whether the federal 
government should take over as the sole imposer of income tax. Following its report in 
March, the government moved to take over the powers in May. The High Court rejected 
a challenge by four states in July 1942. The income tax system was also placed on a 
'pay-as-you-earn' basis.  
In his 1943 budget speech Chifley said 'a well-balanced system of taxation is the most 
efficient and equitable method of meeting the cost of the war. It makes a direct reduction 
                                                          
731 With Scullin too ill, Chifley was the best qualified for the job in terms of experience (and was 
recommended by Scullin, of whom Chifley was a protégé according to Vines (1964, p 17)) but Forde 
aspired to it and as deputy leader was expected to be given it; Crisp (1960, pp 140-142), Whitington (1972, 
pp 110-1), McMullin (1991, pp 212). Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2015) comment that Curtin ‘picked 
Chifley above a range of “big beasts” in the party’. Watts (1987, p 69) claims Chifley ‘did not figure in any 
of the journalists’ lists of likely ministers before the caucus elections’. The Sydney Morning Herald, 
6 October 1941, p 5, for example, expected either Curtin to be treasurer himself or it to go to Forde. 
732 The Production Executive, chaired by Dedman, is described in Crisp (1978, p 377) and Hasluck (1952, 
pp 430-3). 
733 It included Scullin, Professor Mills (with whom Chifley had served on the Banking Commission) and UAP 
MP Eric Spooner (who after later losing his seat stood unsuccessfully against Chifley in Macquarie in 1946). 
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of the volume of civilian spending.'734 He foreshadowed that taxes would need to be 
maintained: 'after the war, to save ourselves from inflated costs and prices, and to 
distribute equitably the additional wealth which full employment brings, we must expect 
fairly heavy tax rates...higher than before the war.'735  By 1944, however, he was warning 
'taxation is so high that it is impracticable to obtain any further contribution from this 
source'.736  
While Menzies and Fadden had been focused on their own short-term political survival, 
the Curtin government was more forward looking. While Curtin himself concentrated on 
the war effort, a cabinet subcommittee, comprising Chifley, Evatt, Holloway and Ward, 
was established in August 1942 to consider post-war reconstruction. As well as treasurer, 
from December 1942 to February 1945 Chifley was minister for post-war reconstruction, 
a new department headed by Coombs and including a number of talented progressives.737 
Banking and monetary policy 
Curtin was keen to avoid the problems faced by the previous Labor government and so 
supported Chifley in taking control of the Commonwealth Bank.738 By early 1942, much 
of the recommendations of the 1937 report of the Royal Commission on Banking had 
been implemented under wartime National Security Regulations, such as requiring the 
private banks to lodge funds in special accounts with the Commonwealth Bank and 
comply with its policy on advances. The Commonwealth Bank was also empowered to 
set maximum interest rates on bank deposits and advances, a measure favoured by 
Australia’s leading economists, although there was concern about disintermediation if 
banking controls were pushed too far.739   
                                                          
734 Hansard, 29 September 1943, p 157. Chifley was drawing on advice from Australia's leading economists 
on the 'F&E committee'; Maddock and Penny (1983, p 32). 
735 Chifley (1943, p 2). 
736 Hansard, 7 September 1944, p 574. 
737 It is discussed further in Chapter 9. 
738 Curtin had curbed some of his radical views by the time he was prime minister. Reminded of a speech 
he gave years before when he advocated nationalisation, Curtin replies 'yes, I remember that speech and 
I also remember that that year I lost my seat’; Beazley (c2000, p 17). 
739 A meeting involving Melville, Giblin, Copland, Coombs, Clark, Walker, Isles, Hytten, Butlin, and Wilson 
agreed that ‘bank interest rates and, as far as possible, mortgage rates would have to be controlled so as 
to avoid too much pressure on the bond market with its threat to the budget and to the confidence of 
investors in government securities’ but that ‘an attempt to control bank advances, for example, might 
merely result in investment going past the banks’, Notes of a meeting of economists, 8-9 November 1943, 
RBA S-43-1. 
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A mortgage bank was established in 1942 as a department within the Commonwealth 
Bank. While its operations were restricted at the time, Chifley saw it as 'a powerful 
instrument in post war reconstruction'.740 An Industrial Finance Department was 
established later for long-term lending. 
In March 1945 Chifley introduced legislation to continue the wartime controls on the 
private banks, consolidate the Commonwealth Bank's role as a central bank and replace 
its board with a single governor and an advisory board of officials. The Banking Act 1945 
and the Commonwealth Bank Act 1945 have been described as 'substantially the work of 
JB Chifley'741, though this probably understates the role of Nugget Coombs in reassuring 
Chifley that these changes made bank nationalisation unnecessary. As Chifley explained, 
the legislation was 'based on the conviction that the Government must accept 
responsibility for the economic condition of the nation...the Government has decided to 
assume the powers which are necessary over banking policy to assist it in maintaining 
national economic health and prosperity.’742  
This required the Commonwealth Bank to act as a central bank and 'to control the issue 
of bank credit by all the banks in such a manner as to avoid expansion of credit in times 
of boom and contraction of credit in times of depression.'743 
The Act introduced the three goals of the Bank which are still in place as the goals of the 
Reserve Bank today and remain inscribed in gold letters on the Bank's headquarters: 
• The stability of the currency of Australia 
• The maintenance of full employment 
• The economic prosperity and welfare of the people. 
 
                                                          
740 Hansard, 25 September 1942, p 973. 
741 Polden (1977, p 2). Jock Phillips is less sure; '…although Chifley was a very strong force behind the 
legislation, much of it would have happened anyway'; Sutherlin (1980, pp 278-9). 
742 Hansard, 9 March 1945, p 547. This was the first time that the Commonwealth Bank had been explicitly 
referred to as a central bank in legislation; Butlin (1983, p 103). A move to nationalise the banks was 
rejected by caucus on 20 February 1945; Weller (1975b, p 350). Chifley did not support the proposal, 
perhaps reflecting his personal view or possibly, as Calwell and Dedman believed, deferring to Curtin who 
had promised no nationalisation during the course of the war; Dedman (1972, p 3), Stephens (1974, p 85). 
743 Hansard, 9 March 1948, p 548. 
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Welfare measures 
There was a long history of calls in Australian politics for some form of social insurance, 
with Labor generally wanting it funded from general revenue and liberals calling for a 
scheme based on compulsory contributions into individual accounts. 
Despite the pressure of war, Chifley increased old age and invalid pensions and 
introduced widows' pensions, additional maternity allowances, funeral benefits, 
unemployment and sickness benefits. He foreshadowed further measures once the war 
was over.744 This was sometimes portrayed as a trade-off for extending income tax onto 
lower income earners.745 This was implemented through a National Welfare Fund into 
which was paid the lower of £30 million or one-quarter of personal income tax 
collections. This had the additional advantage of being an economic stabiliser.746  Chifley 
(1945) rejected viewing welfare as a form of insurance, believing it was more equitable 
for it to be paid out of progressive taxation. The view of leading economists at the time 
was that ‘high taxes have not deterred incentive in the past’.747   
Another major reform was the government’s agreement to introduce a 40-hour week in 
exchange for the ACTU’s support for the war effort by not disrupting the economy. As 
prime minister, Chifley introduced the National Welfare Act 1945 to place the Welfare 
Fund on a permanent basis and finance it from payroll tax and a specified component of 
personal income tax. He also introduced the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. 
The rise of Keynesianism and the 1945 White Paper 
The government was concerned that 'employment and aggregate incomes are constantly 
increasing whilst the goods and services available for civilian spending are continually 
                                                          
744 Hansard, 11 February 1943, pp 548-550. In Chifley (1945, pp 1-2) he introduced what was to become 
a familiar metaphor, comparing social security to a trapeze artist’s safety net, providing ‘a national 
minimum of cash income which is available to all in their emergencies and below which none must be 
allowed to fall’. 
745 Butlin and Schedvin (1977, p 337) called it ‘the sugar coating on the pill’. See also De Maria (1991, 
p 282). 
746 Chifley (1943, p 10 and 1945, p 12). 
747 There was in the context of a discussion of a 70 per cent top marginal tax rate; Notes of a meeting of 
economists (Melville, Giblin, Copland, Coombs, Clark, Walker, Isles, Hytten, Butlin, and Wilson), 
8-9 November 1943, RBA S-43-1.  
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becoming less' and 'it may force a strong and continuous rise in prices'.748 Taxation 
increases were used to soak up much of this spending power. 
Nugget Coombs argued that Chifley ‘took a broadly Keynesian approach’.749 Chifley's 
first biographer went as far as to call him a 'Keynesian-of-the-first-hour'.750 
Journalist-historian Paul Kelly argues that the Chifley era was ‘unique, a rare mix of 
minister and bureaucrats who implemented Keynesian economics and the welfare state 
with genuine claims to international prominence’.751 
These claims, however, overstate the extent of Chifley’s Keynesianism. Chifley did not 
refer to Keynes in a parliamentary speech until 1943 – and this was a sceptical reference 
to Keynes’ support for post-war credits, the policy advocated by Fadden.752 The Chifley 
family believe Chifley was a regular correspondent with Keynes, perhaps from as far back 
as 1917; Martin (2015, pp 84, 134). This seems very unlikely; there are no references to 
Chifley in the many volumes of Keynes’ collected writings or in the major biographies 
by Skidelsky (1983, 1992, 2000, 2003), Moggridge (1992) and Harrod (1951). Nor do 
Markwell’s (1985) paper on ‘Keynes and Australia’ nor Day’s (2001) biography of 
Chifley refer to any correspondence. There is also no correspondence in the Keynes 
archives at King’s College, Cambridge.753  
Chifley did think enough of Keynes, however, to attend his memorial service in 
Westminster Abbey.754   
As Bowen (2015, p 132) puts it, ‘deep down, Chifley was a reluctant adherent to 
Keynesian economics’. While he believed fiscal policy could be deployed for 
counter-cyclical purposes, Chifley did not rely on it. Price controls were introduced ‘to 
prevent profiteering and minimise the rise in prices’ and rationing by coupons (initially 
of clothing, tea and sugar, later extended to meat, butter and drapery) were imposed under 
wartime powers. Subsidies were paid to stabilise the prices of tea, potatoes and milk. 
                                                          
748 Hansard, 11 February 1943, p 553. 
749 Coombs (1986, p 50). 
750 Crisp (1960, p 169).  
751 Kelly (1989b, p 8). 
752 Hansard, 22 June 1943. Indeed before 1946 it was Menzies who was the stronger advocate of Keynes 
in the parliamentary arena, having referred to him as a ‘very brilliant and progressive writer and thinker’; 
Hansard, 21 March 1945. Admittedly Menzies was citing the Keynes of the Treatise rather than the 
General Theory. 
753 Personal correspondence, May 2017.  
754 Skidelsky (2000, p 473). 
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Measures were also taken for the control of rents and land sales. Under the National 
Economic Plan announced in February 1942 real wages were to be frozen. Rents were 
also frozen from end-1941 to mid-1945.  
Chifley had therefore rejected advice from his most Keynesian advisors that 
macroeconomic measures alone could prevent inflation.755 As the end of World War II 
came into view Chifley was pondering the risk that with deferred spending unleashed 'and 
a short supply of goods, inflation can very easily be caused'.756 Even Keynes himself 
conceded to Australia’s Treasury secretary that ‘one is also, simply because one knows 
no solution, inclined to turn a blind eye to the wages problem in a full employment 
economy’.757 Chifley viewed this as grounds for retention of controls, especially as the 
inflationary boom could be followed by a slump, as occurred after World War I.758 In this 
he was following the advice of Australia’s leading economists who at a meeting in 
November 1943 all ‘seemed to feel that controls would be inevitable for some time after 
the war’, some to maintain full employment, some to prevent excess spending power 
leading to inflation.759 
Curtin was inspired by the UK government's May 1944 White Paper on Employment 
Policy and on his return from there in July initiated production of an Australian 
equivalent.760 Coombs was in charge of drafting it and Chifley was the only minister to 
                                                          
755 Cornish (1993a, p 48). Keynes (1939a, p 43) had described rationing (except for some essential goods) 
as a mere ‘pseudo-remedy’ to inflationary pressures. Chifley (1941, especially p 108) wrote of the need 
for price controls and some nationalisation to manage the domestic economy in the post-war period 
without mentioning Keynes.  
756 Hansard, 13 October 1943, p 484. 
757 Keynes (1945b), letter to Stuart Macfarlane, 5 June 1945. 
758 Stephens (1976). Whitwell (1994, p 216) says '...at the end of World War II it was widely assumed in 
Australia that there would soon be a slump after an intense but short-lived boom'. As John Stone recalled 
‘everyone feared that the war-time boom would be succeeded, perhaps after a few years “false 
prosperity” during the readjustment period, by the kind of post-war slump by which, throughout all 
history, wars had been succeeded’; cited by Whitwell (1986, p 83). Millmow (2015c, p 61) described this 
as a ‘general fear’. Macintyre (2015, p 67) writes ‘most economists in Australia and overseas anticipated 
a slump’. Waters (1970, p 51) and the notes of a meeting of economists (Melville, Giblin, Copland, 
Coombs, Clark, Walker, Isles, Hytten, Butlin, and Wilson), 8 9 November 1943, RBA S-43-1, demonstrates 
how widespread was the concern about a post-war slump. Keynes had the same concerns in the UK; 
Davenport-Hines (2015, p 319), Skidelsky (2000, pp 61-62). 
759 Notes of a meeting of economists (Melville, Giblin, Copland, Coombs, Clark, Walker, Isles, Hytten, 
Butlin, Wilson) 8-9 November 1943, RBA S-43-1. In 1947 Wheeler argued that ‘price controls should 
definitely be retained to guard against a runaway psychology’; notes 17 April 1947, RBA 
C.3.7.6.10.06/16368. 
760 Nugget Coombs had been thinking along similar lines as far back as 1938 and expounded his thoughts 
publicly in Coombs (1944). Douglas Copland was also impressed by the British white paper and urged 
Curtin to produce something similar; Harper (2013, p 243). Cornish (1981b) describes the development of 
the UK White Paper. Millmow (2015c, p 61) argued the Australian paper ‘was a more circumspect and 
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be given an early draft. Apparently initially very supportive of Coomb’s draft, Chifley 
was later influenced by Treasury to be more restrained. Cabinet referred a revised draft 
to a subcommittee of Chifley, Dedman, Holloway and Calwell. There had been a tension 
throughout the drafting about whether the paper was an ‘economic’ or ‘political’ 
document, and by the end it was a far more cautious and political document than it had 
started out.761   
Australia's representatives were strong advocates at international fora of other countries 
also adopting the full employment objective and Keynesian policies, reflecting a mix of 
altruism and a fear that balance of payments constraints would prevent Australia 
achieving full employment unless other countries shared the goal.762 As Chifley (1947, 
p 8) put it, ‘only second to full employment and rising living standards in our own country 
do we want to see those conditions in other countries, both for our own sake and for the 
sake of a peaceful and thriving world’.763 
Keynes commented in 1945 that when he heard Australians at a conference urging that 
world powers should undertake to maintain full employment they were asking them to 
promise to be ‘not only good but clever’.764 Indeed, it has been suggested that 'Keynes 
found the Australians more Keynesian than he was himself'.765 
 
 
                                                          
considered document than its British counterpart.’ Merry and Bruns (1945) argue that the UK, Australian 
and Canadian white papers are similar, although Australia placed greater emphasis on the role of 
government investment as a means of influencing aggregate demand. Keynes (1943, p 319) himself 
argued that changes in government investment were a more effective means of adjusting demand than 
changing tax rates to influence consumption. 
761 Cornish (1981a) describes the drafting process in detail. Sections containing statistical projections in 
early drafts were first relegated to an appendix then dropped altogether. Butlin and Schedvin (1977, 
p 679) describe the final result as ‘an amalgam of ministerial statement and specialist report which served 
neither purpose adequately’.  
762 Beresford and Kerr (1980, pp 152, 158-9); Chifley (1943, pp 4-7); Cornish (1981a, p 10; 1993a, pp 52-53 
and 2015a); Grant (1996, chapter two); Lee (1991, chapter one), Maddock and Penny (1983, pp 43-44) 
and Turnell (1999). Among the conferences where Australia promoted full employment were the UN 
conference of food and agriculture in 1943, the International Labour Organisation conference in 1944, the 
Bretton Woods negotiations in 1944 and the San Francisco conference on world security in 1945; 
Mamchak (1981, p 82). 
763 Chifley (1947, p 8). 
764 A letter to TS Eliot, 23 March 1945 reproduced as Keynes (1945a). 
765 Edwards (2005, p 153), drawing on Markwell’s (1985, p 59) interpretation of the letter to TS Eliot. 
Keynes was very complimentary of the advocacy by Wilson and Melville; Cornish (2015a, pp 3-6). 
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Relations with their prime ministers 
One key difference between Chifley and Fadden was the relationship with their prime 
minister. A cabinet colleague observed that 'Curtin was very loyal to Chifley and Chifley 
was very loyal to Curtin’.766 It was said that Curtin discussed all important decisions with 
Chifley.767 Curtin trusted Chifley and delegated to him a significant part of economic 
management, although views differ about how far this delegation went.768 Chifley being 
himself ‘calm, well grounded, unperturbed by criticism’769 complemented the anxious 
Curtin. As Curtin's health deteriorated, with Forde overseas, Chifley became acting prime 
minister in April 1945.770 
By contrast Fadden had a more vexed relationship with Menzies. In the early 1940s when 
Fadden was the leader of the opposition parties, he regarded Menzies as disloyal.771 They 
went on to work together tolerably well in government in the 1950s but Dame Enid Lyons 
recalled 'neither particularly admired the special gifts of the other, and each was slightly 
out of his depth in the other's intellectual sphere'.772 Fadden felt Menzies failed to 
                                                          
766 Arthur Calwell (1972a, p 60), who relates that ‘Curtin told Chifley that if he would not become treasurer 
Curtin himself would not become prime minister'.  
767 Day (2007, p 94), Bennett (1973, p 12) and Chifley’s private secretary Murray Tyrrell (1975, p 31). Tyrrell 
recalled ‘…Curtin never made a decision of any importance that he didn’t consult Chifley about…normally 
it was Mr Chifley’s view that prevailed’; cited in Thompson (1964, p 73). 
768 McMullin (1991, p 234) states that Chifley ‘took responsibility for the economy…allowing Curtin to 
concentrate on defence and war strategy’. The war historian Paul Hasluck (1995, p 119) opines that 
…when one turns to economic policy…it would seem that Chifley was a more significant wartime figure 
than the Prime Minister'. Curtin's first biographer suggested 'Curtin accepted unhesitatingly Chifley's 
views on financial issues'; Ross (1977, p 387). A latter biographer challenges this, arguing that Curtin was 
'the ultimate source of authority in economic affairs' even if he delegated details of finance to Chifley; 
Edwards (2005, pp 124-132). One contemporary journalist wrote: ‘Mr Curtin, however, holds more than 
a watching brief whenever Labor comes to discuss finance. He is himself a crisp financial thinker’, although 
the writer also says of Chifley ‘on finance, none more authoritative’; Sydney Morning Herald, 29 October 
1941, p 10. Nugget Coombs’ recollection was that ‘Curtin relied very much on Chifley's economic and 
financial knowledge and was guided by him, but there was no uncertainty as to where the final yes or no 
lay and that was with Curtin’; Rowse (2003). Beazley (1971, p 5) opines that 'it was Curtin, however, who 
accurately defined in practice the acceptable limits of a radical financial policy'. 
769 Hirst (2010, p 197). Curtin found in Chifley 'with his complete self-mastery, steady consistency of 
temperament and dogged loyalty, the sort of emotional sheet-anchor he required and he could rely on 
absolutely…Curtin chose him to be the confidant, the companion, the shock absorber of a highly strung 
prime minister of a nation at war for its life'; Crisp (1960, pp 143-4). 
770 Bolton (2014, p 134) and Macintyre (2015, pp 282, 298) suggest Curtin sent both Forde and Evatt 
overseas to give Chifley a clear run as acting prime minister and establish himself as Curtin’s successor. 
771 When Menzies criticised Fadden's policy of post-war credits, Fadden publicly referred to 'this stab in 
the back, another betrayal in the series for which Mr Menzies has become notorious'; Chamberlain (1972, 
p 1:1/11), Golding (1996, pp 117-8), Joske (1978, p 131) and Souter (1998, p 357). Privately he referred to 
Menzies as 'that big bag of ----'; Perkins (1968, p 143). 
772 Enid Lyons (1972a, p 99). John Howard (2014, pp 77-78, 265-266) formed a similar view, saying of 
Menzies and Fadden that the latter’s ‘knockabout personality’ provided a foil to the ‘more cerebral and 
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appreciate his work covering for him as acting prime minister while he went on lengthy 
overseas trips.773 When in 1954 the Commonwealth Finance Ministers meeting was held 
in Sydney, the first time it was held outside Britain, it was Menzies rather than Fadden 
who chaired it. While Menzies did heed Fadden’s views on the economy, and respected 
his political judgement, he would not admit it publicly.774 A contemporary writer claimed 
Menzies and Fadden ‘maintained a semblance of amity for political expedience, but on 
Fadden’s part there has been an instinctive and deep-rooted dislike’.775 
Chifley as treasurer and prime minister 
After Curtin's death in July 1945, Chifley reluctantly became the new prime minister; he 
would have preferred to have stayed a powerful treasurer.776 Chifley remained treasurer 
while prime minister, a workload no future leader shouldered for more than a few days.777 
Knowing his health was deteriorating,778 Chifley intended if he won the 1949 election to 
                                                          
urbane’ Menzies but while ‘their different personalities blended well at a professional level…there is little 
evidence that they were close away from the office’. Tyrrell (1975, p 8), who worked for Fadden, recalled 
he and Menzies were ‘temperamentally poles apart’. As their parliamentary colleague, Jo Gullet (1992, 
p 247) recalled it, Fadden and Menzies were publicly loyal to each other but ‘both at times found the 
exercise rather difficult’. Arthur Calwell (1972a, p 59) recalled Fadden relating a conversation with John 
Curtin where they agreed that the problem with Menzies and Evatt was that they were ‘both clever 
lawyers, but, because they spend their time pleading one time for one cause and another time for 
another, neither of them has any deep-seated convictions’. Menzies had never been keen on the Country 
Party as they had been responsible for his uncle, his father and his father-in-law losing their parliamentary 
seats; Calwell (1972a, p 74). 
773 Fadden (1969, pp 60-62) and Davey (2011, p 51). Once when Fadden welcomed Menzies back from an 
overseas trip Menzies jumped into the official car and left Fadden behind without a ride; Fadden (1969, 
p 60). 
774 Fitchett (1977, p 26). 
775 Watson (1956, p 13). 
776 Martin (2015, p 112). A dying Curtin entrusted to Scullin persuading Chifley to stand despite Mrs 
Chifley's objections; Crisp (1960, pp 221-2), Langmore (1992, p 519), Reid (1980b, p 38). Treasury 
Secretary Watt recalled Chifley telling him that he felt, despite medical advice that he should not take on 
extra responsibilities, a duty to the party to take the leadership given misgivings about alternative leaders; 
cited in Thompson (1964, p 72) and Breen (1974). Chifley’s nephew John (1992, p 24) said his uncle did 
not want the publicity and limelight of being prime minister; he ‘worked to be the planner – the treasurer’. 
Daly (1977, p 32) recalled Chifley termed standing for leader ‘joining the suicide squad’. 
777 Among his Labor predecessors as prime minister, Watson and Fisher had simultaneously been 
treasurer, Curtin had simultaneously been defence minister during World War II, Hughes had been 
attorney-general and Scullin minister for external affairs and industry minister (and for a while treasurer). 
On the other side of politics, Barton, Deakin, Reid and Bruce had simultaneously been external affairs 
minister and prime minister and Menzies and Fadden (and for a while Lyons) both prime minister and 
treasurer. With Scullin in poor health, there was no obvious experienced candidate for treasurer. 
Nonetheless, Colin Hughes (1976, p 145) argued that it was a serious mistake for Chifley to take on both 
positions. 
778 Howard (1985, p 424) says Chifley by 1947 ‘had a sense of urgency for his medical advisers had alerted 
him to his state of health’. 
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hand over the Treasury portfolio to Dedman but bring the economics unit from the 
Department of Post-War Reconstruction into the Prime Minister’s Department.779   
While Chifley's frugality may have commended him to Treasury, it sometimes frustrated 
his ministers. Evatt is claimed to have said exasperatedly 'It's almost impossible to get 
money out of Ben. You'd think it was his own.'780 
Macroeconomic policy and the expansion of Keynesianism 
Chifley as prime minister continued to seek economic advice. He chaired the Investment 
and Employment Committee from its establishment in late 1946 to its last meeting in 
November 1949. It brought together leading economic advisers from a number of 
economic departments and agencies. While it provided useful analysis, Cornish (1993a, 
pp 56-57) judges it was not influential. Chifley’s industrial relations legislation provided 
for an economic bureau to assist the arbitration commissioners.781 In Scalmer’s (1998, 
p 184) view, under Chifley ‘the bureaucracy was reforming rather than obstructionist’. 
Chifley faced internal party opposition to Australia joining the World Bank and the IMF 
but patiently and adroitly gained approval from cabinet, federal executive and caucus.782 
With the war finally over, Chifley was concerned in his 1945 budget that the 'existence 
of excess spending power will be a dominant feature of the whole transition period'.783  In 
the 1946 budget, while pleased 'the first stage of the post-war transition has been 
completed successfully', Chifley warned 'the danger of inflation is still 
present...[reflecting] the increased demand which has arisen from higher employment'.784  
He warned “I do not know of a greater menace than inflation and I know who suffers the 
                                                          
779 Makin (1961, p 130), Smith (1974, p 221), Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2016, pp 230-1). In the event, 
Chifley lost the 1949 election and Dedman lost his seat. Similarly, Nelson Lemmon was reportedly Chifley’s 
preferred successor as leader but he was also defeated at the 1949 election; Ellis and McLachlan (2007, 
p 7). 
780 Holt (1969, p 52). 
781 Eggleston (1953, p 160). 
782 Weller (2007a, pp 80-82) describes the process. One of his ministers, John Dedman (1968, pp 153-4) 
described Chifley’s success as ‘an achievement in statesmanship…which has never been excelled and 
seldom equalled in the years since Federation’. 
783 Chifley recalled the 29 per cent increase in consumer prices in the two years following World War I; 
Hansard 9 March 1945, p 548. 
784 Hansard, 14 November 1946, pp 241-242. Chifley had made similar warnings to the ALP NSW 
conference in June; reprinted in Chifley (1952, p 20). This was a widely held fear. Back in 1940 Menzies 
warned ‘unless we learned from past experience this war will be succeeded by boom just like the last 
one’; Cornish (1981a, p 12). 
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most…and those are the people that I represent in Parliament’.785 Removing subsidies 
pushed up some prices and Chifley did not get much support from the states in fighting 
inflation.786 
Chifley was successful in maintaining low unemployment, even during the period of 
demobilising the large defence forces. He established the Commonwealth Employment 
Service to help the unemployed find work. By 1948 he said 'for the first time in my life, 
the country has almost achieved full employment'.787 He also succeeded in stabilising 
prices in the immediate post-war period. But to do this he retained some wartime 
rationing, which became increasingly unpopular.788 Also highly controversial was 
Chifley's deployment of troops to mine coal during a strike by miners, but it has been 
argued it was necessary to avoid a wage boom ratcheting up inflation.789 
The Keynesian response to an overheating economy would be to move the budget into 
surplus. But this was hard to sell politically. A war-weary populace would see surpluses 
as the government holding onto money they did not need that could be given back as tax 
cuts. The Government practiced ‘Keynesianism by stealth’, with the extent of the surplus 
disguised by treating an accumulation of reserves as though it were an expenditure 
item.790 An interdepartmental committee described the budgetary stance in early 1949 as 
having a ‘mild deflationary influence’.791 
In September 1949 Australia followed the rest of the sterling area by depreciating the 
Australian pound by 30 per cent against the US dollar.792 This added inflationary 
pressures to the economy. By this time inflation was up to 9 per cent, and was likely to 
rise further as the inflationary pressures that had been supressed by controls manifested.  
                                                          
785 Speech in June 1948, reprinted in Chifley (1952, p 30). In his cinema advertisement for the 1946 
election (‘In the wake of the storm’) Chifley promised to ‘take no risks with inflation’. 
786 Macintyre (2015, p 392) comments that while Chifley’s budgets ‘were framed to dampen demand, 
those of the states undid any deflationary impact’. 
787 Speech in June 1947, reprinted in Chifley (1952, p 24); and Hansard, 29 September 1948, p 968. 
788 Chifley maintained rationing in part to support the UK which was short of dollars to buy fuel; Crisp 
(1960, pp 309-314). Lee’s (1990) interpretation is that he feared a US recession dragging the Australian 
economy down and so wanted to maintain close links with the UK. 
789 Carr (1989, p 61). 
790 Whitwell (1986, pp 90-93). 
791 Paper prepared for the Investment and Employment Committee, January 1949, cited by Whitwell 
(1986, p 93). 
792 Chifley emphasised that Britain (and other countries with currencies linked to the pound) was 
Australia's most important export market; Hansard, 20 September 1949, p 339. The devaluation was 
against the advice of Coombs and some other advisers; Howard (1978, p 418). 
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Chifley rejected advice to tighten policy further, due to the impending election793 and 
concern about the risk of recession. In Australia, as in the UK, many feared that the 
post-war pattern would follow that of World War I with initial inflation being replaced 
by recession and rising unemployment.794 
Chifley cut taxes in his post-war budgets, but also repaid debt. He explained, however, 
that 'war costs do not end when fighting ceases. Some of these items, such as debt charges 
and war pensions, will continue for many years'.795 Yet by 1949 Chifley was able to say 
that ‘the majority of taxpayers now pay considerably less than half the tax which would 
have been payable at war-time rates’.796 
Chifley was loyal to the English, notwithstanding his Irish ancestry, and was especially 
friendly with his UK counterparts Hugh Dalton and Stafford Cripps.797 This was one 
reason he followed their lead in maintaining rationing after the War, a policy Bowen 
(2015, p 133) regarded as ‘a significant factor in his government’s defeat in 1949’.  
As one of Chifley’s ministerial colleagues John Dedman (1972, p 1) put it, there had been 
‘no conscious effort on our part to use the wartime situation to make radical reforms’ but 
the ‘end of the war would be a very satisfactory time to introduce some of the reforms we 
had in mind’. Chifley attempted to increase federal powers through referenda, but with 
limited success. In August 1944, a referendum proposing to grant fourteen additional 
federal powers (including over employment and for the curbing of monopolies) for five 
years after the end of the war was rejected.798 Three separate questions were put 
concurrently with the 1946 election, proposing federal power over social services, 
marketing of primary produce and conditions of employment. Despite Labor being 
                                                          
793 He feared that, as in 1946, the Liberals would make a big issue of high taxation, especially if Labor 
increased tax rates; Lee (1991, p 133). 
794 Dell (1996, p 65), Howard (1978, p 148), Kuhn (1985, p 249), Stephens (1976, p 259). Clarke (1983, 
p 34) refers to the post-war boom being generally expected to peter out. Chifley in 1949 was still worried 
that 'following upon the very great boom conditions that have obtained throughout the world since the 
end of the war, some measure of recession could be expected'; Hansard, 31 May 1949, p 296. The United 
States had entered a recession in 1949, which was feared to be the start of such a pattern recurring; 
Whitwell (1986, p 86). 
795 Hansard, 14 November 1946, p 244. 
796 Hansard, 7 September 1949, p 27, repeated in his 1949 election policy speech; reprinted in Chifley 
(1952, p 78); Smith (1974, p 221). 
797 Bowen (2015, p 132), Crisp (1960, pp 309-314), Dell (1996, p 40), Green (1959, p 80) and Martin (2015, 
p 229). Hugh Dalton (1962, pp 73, 286), the UK chancellor of the exchequer (1945-1947), described Chifley 
as a ‘personal friend’.  
798 The additional powers were already held by the national governments of Canada, New Zealand and 
the United Kingdom; McMullin (1991, p 232). 
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comfortably returned at the election, and a national majority for all three questions, only 
the first proposition was approved.799 In May 1948 a referendum to give the federal 
government power over prices and rents was rejected overwhelmingly.  
Nation-building 
An air of 'tremendous optimism' was manifest in nation-building projects such as the 
Snowy Mountains scheme.800 Menzies later generously described the Snowy Mountains 
Scheme as ‘a living memorial to the courage, enterprise and drive of Mr Chifley’.801  
Chifley founded the Australian National University in 1946,802 introduced direct grants 
to other universities, and a university scholarship scheme. As chair of the Historical 
Memorials Committee, Chifley decided that plans should be commenced for a national 
gallery.803 
The Chifley government initiated the post-war immigration programme and established 
a large scale Australian car industry in 1948 by encouraging General Motors in the 
production of the Holden and providing them with decentralisation grants as they located 
their main plant in Adelaide. In addition, the Curtin and Chifley governments are credited 
by Hawke (1985, p 5) with having 'accepted, for the first time, a share of Commonwealth 
responsibility for education, health, housing, power and transport’. 
Bank nationalisation  
On 16 August 1947 Chifley announced his plan to nationalise the banks.804 The direct 
trigger was the High Court ruling three days earlier that Section 48 of the Banking Act, 
which allowed the government to direct local governments to conduct their banking with 
the Commonwealth Bank, was invalid. Chifley believed the banks would next challenge 
the special accounts provisions and so remove the ability to use monetary policy to guide 
                                                          
799 Queensland, South Australia and Tasmania voted against the second and third propositions so they 
failed to meet the approval by a majority of states criterion. 
800 Beazley (c2000, p 16). 
801 Starr (2000, p 185). 
802 Literally laying the foundation stones for two buildings there. 
803 Whitlam (2002, pp 132-3). 
804 Whereas the 1945 banking bills were considered by cabinet clause-by-clause over five days, cabinet 
and then caucus both agreed unanimously to bank nationalisation without notice at single meetings a day 
apart: Weller (1975b, p 427); Weller (2007b, p 89); Crisp (1960, pp 323-8). Cabinet ministers overseas at 
the time was incredulous when told of the decision; Coombs (1981, p 116) and Daly (1977, p 58). 
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the economy.805 Chifley informally approached the banks and said he would not resist the 
Court's decision if the banks assured him that they would not go on to challenge the 
special accounts provisions but the banks would give no such assurance.806  
Views differ about how reluctantly Chifley turned to nationalisation and what it said of 
his state of mind. As Curtin’s treasurer, Chifley held strong views but was not regarded 
as stubborn.807 But by 1947 one contemporary journalist reported rumours that Chifley's 
'heart condition was having its effect on his temper and his moods' making him 
'indifferent to public opinion'.808 Nugget Coombs (1970, p 46) reflected that in the latter 
stages of his career Chifley became ‘insensitive to criticism’ and received too little of it 
from his cabinet ministers. While Henderson (2015, p 194) described the decision to 
nationalise was ‘effectively a fit of pique’, Chifley’s ministers strongly rejected such a 
view.809  
A bill was brought before the House in October 1947. Chifley argued that 'since private 
banks are conducted primarily for profit and therefore follow policies which in important 
respects run counter to the public interest, their business should be transferred to public 
                                                          
805 Haylen (1969, pp 43-51); Hansard 15 October 1947, pp 802-803; speech in September 1947, reprinted 
in Chifley (1952, p 95). In 1945 the banks wrote to the Commonwealth Bank indicating their compliance 
with the special reserve requirement did not imply any contractual agreement, hinting they might in 
future challenge the legislation; Butlin (1983, pp 124-125). Kelly (2001, p 127) suggests Chifley may have 
been exaggerating the danger to build support for nationalisation but Stephens (1976, p 268) argues that 
had Chifley being ideologically committed to nationalisation, he would have moved immediately after the 
1946 election win. Myers (1959, p 177) suggests Chifley was ‘infuriated by what he considered the 
ingratitude of the banks for the fact that he had saved them from nationalisation in 1945’. She also 
suggests he had just realised that taking over both assets and liabilities of the banks would mean the cost 
to the government of nationalisation would not be that great. John Howard (2014, p 108) believes 
Chifley’s concerns that the central banking powers of the Commonwealth Bank could be undermined 
were ‘understandable’. Johnson (1986, p 41) argues that the banks ‘were seen to be starving industry of 
finance for development’. 
806 Coombs (1981, pp 115-116 and 1986, p 52), Howard (2014, p 109). Commonwealth Bank governor 
Armitage suggested to the banks that they persuade the Melbourne City Council to transfer their banking 
to the Commonwealth Bank as a means of defusing the dispute but they would not do so; Armitage 
reminiscences, 1949, RBA archives RBA SA-65-84. 
807 Denning (c1952a, p 11) remarks Chifley was ‘always ready to be argued out of a position he had taken 
up – if the other person had better arguments’. 
808 Holt (1969, p 58). In 1949 Armitage described Chifley as having ‘some preconceived and quite 
immovable ideas’; Armitage reminiscences, RBA archives, SA-65-84. Bob Ellis (2002, pp 406-7) went much 
further, calling Chifley a ‘late blooming ego-tripper’ who ‘believed too much in what was right’ and did 
not really understand salesmanship. 
809 John Dedman (1972, pp 5,9) is insistent that Chifley never acted in ‘pique’, while Arthur Calwell (1972b, 
p 3) described such a suggestion as the ‘greatest piffle I’ve ever heard…completely untrue’. Allan Fraser 
(1961, p 21), one of Chifley’s backbenchers, believed Chifley ‘had no wish to nationalise the banks for the 
sake of nationalisation’ and at the relevant cabinet meeting he asked every cabinet member’s view before 
expressing his own. 
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ownership'.810 The bank nationalisation policy was unpopular and divisive; being 
supported by only around half of Labor voters and only 2-7 per cent of non-Labor 
voters.811 It led to a massive campaign against the government by the banks and many of 
their employees.812 The legislation did not take effect, however, as the High Court, and 
on appeal the Privy Council,813 ruled that nationalisation was unconstitutional. 
Fadden in opposition 
After his short period as prime minister, Fadden was unanimously chosen as leader of the 
opposition, with Billy Hughes taking over the leadership of the United Australia Party 
from Menzies. Fadden led the divided opposition to a landslide defeat in the 1943 
election.  
Menzies became leader of the opposition and set about forming a new Liberal Party. 
Fadden remained leader of the Country Party, which declined overtures to merge with the 
new party. Fadden campaigned against Labor’s economic (particularly banking) policies 
and its referenda proposals to increase Commonwealth powers.   
As opposition leader, Fadden was very critical of Chifley's wartime banking regulations: 
'we are fighting dictatorships today and we should not constitute the Commonwealth 
Treasurer a dictator of the financial policy of this country'.814 A common theme was the 
danger of 'insidious inflation, which is the worst possible form of taxation' and 'the worst 
enemy of the worker and the poor man'.815 He cited Keynes in critiquing rationing.816     
 
 
                                                          
810 Hansard, 15 October 1947, p 798. This was very similar to the arguments he had made in his minority 
report of the 1937 Royal Commission. In the meantime, the Commonwealth Bank would buy any shares 
of the private banks their owners wished to sell at the price prevailing on 15 August 1947; May (1968, 
p 17). 
811 Opinion polls in 1947 and 1948 reported in Goot (1969, pp 106, 176). 
812 May (1968) gives a detailed account. 
813 The hearing there was a marathon; Attorney-General 'Doc' Evatt's opening address lasted for 14 days 
and two judges died during the hearing. 
814 Hansard, 5 November 1941, p 82. 
815 Hansard, 8 October 1943, p 287 and 22 June 1943, p 19.   
816 Hansard, 10 September 1942, pp 166-7. 
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Fadden’s second stint as treasurer  
Labor lost the 1949 elections, with petrol rationing (an issue highlighted by Fadden), bank 
nationalisation, a coal strike and inflation among the main reasons.817 Fadden as Country 
Party leader and unofficial deputy prime minister could choose his portfolio and his 
choice was to be treasurer.818  
Inflationary pressures were building.819 The incoming Menzies government removed all 
rationing and long pent-up demand was finding expression in a consumption and 
construction boom. The inflow of immigrants and a post-War ‘baby boom’ added to the 
demand pressures. Large capital works projects such as the Snowy Mountains Scheme 
were underway. Wages were accelerating. A number of economists were arguing that 
more deflationary policies were needed.820 By the time the Korean War boom came along 
it was described as 'like a bee stinging a runaway horse'.821 The public was also becoming 
more concerned.822 One of the main promises of Menzies and Fadden at the 1949 election 
was to 'put value back in the pound'. By comparison with the Chifley government, the 
new government had less fear of recession but more fear of a third world war.823 
The Korean War boom and the ‘horror budget’ 
Australia was still ‘riding on the sheep’s back’ in 1950. A blow had just been struck 
against the sheep’s traditional rival, the rabbit, with CSIRO scientists successfully 
introducing the lethal disease myxomatosis. A new rival in the form of synthetic fibres 
was only just emerging.  
                                                          
817 Menzies believed that bank nationalisation was the key reason for Chifley’s defeat; Jones (2016a, p 35). 
Lee (1994) argues many commentators overstate the importance of bank nationalisation as an issue and 
highlights the coal strike and petrol rationing. 
818 McEwen and Jackson (1983, p 41). 
819 Liberal intellectual Fred Eggleston (1953, p 181) referred to the main inflationary factors after the 
election were 'devaluation, the boom in wool prices, excessive immigration, public works, rearmament, 
the soldiers' bonus and the increasing costs of falling production'. 
820 Whitwell (1986, pp 97-100) gives examples of minutes from the Commonwealth Bank and Treasury to 
this effect. 
821 Badger (1955, p 78). 
822 In an opinion poll in December 1949 about the major issue the Government needed to address during 
the coming year, 'living costs' was only nominated by 10 per cent of those polled. By December 1951 it 
was nominated by 48 per cent; Hazlehurst (1979, p 328). 
823 Lee (1991, p 176). 
 167 
 
While the relative size of the rural sector had been in gradual decline for decades, it still 
accounted for around a fifth of GDP.824 Wool alone accounted for almost half of 
Australia’s exports in 1949, with other rural products making up a further third. It 
therefore had a marked impact on the economy when the outbreak of the Korean War saw 
a surge in the global demand for wool.825 The greasy wool price rose from 49 pence per 
pound in 1949 to almost a pound per pound at its March 1951 peak.826 At the same time 
the price of wheat, Australia's second most important export, also rose strongly. 
Notwithstanding some large increases in import prices, these developments meant the 
terms of trade had increased by 64 per cent from 1945-46 to 1949-50 and they rose a 
further 46 per cent in the following year. The increase in the terms of trade added a 
massive 7 per cent to real gross domestic income in 1950-51. Unsurprisingly, this fuelled 
already strong demand; real private consumption almost doubled between 1943-44 and 
1953-54. Real spending on household durables increased by 26 per cent in 1950-51 alone. 
The unemployment rate fell to very low levels in 1951, probably the lowest since the 
‘gold rush’ a century earlier and never matched since. The consumer price index increased 
by 13 per cent in 1950-51, an increase also not experienced since the gold rush, and went 
over 20 per cent the following year. 
Despite its rhetorical concern with inflation, the Menzies government shared its 
predecessor's enthusiasm for national development and the provision of infrastructure 
which made it hard to cut back government spending significantly and its political 
criticisms of Chifley made it hard to increase taxes.827 It was not until after the April 1951 
election that a more restrictive fiscal policy was adopted. 
                                                          
824 Cashin and McDermott (2002) argue that wool dominated the Australian business cycle before World 
War I, but its importance had diminished by the 1950s. The Australian wool sector was mentioned as an 
example of an export sector driving economic growth in an influential article by Chambers and Gordon 
(1966). 
825 The wool stockpiles that accumulated during the second world war had been run down by 1951, and 
the United States government announced plans to rebuild its stockpile to meet military needs for 
uniforms. There was also a backlog of demand for woollen products for consumers; Little (1966, p 168). 
While the US had once been self-sufficient in wool, its sheep numbers were now at their lowest in almost 
a century and it was importing two thirds of its wool.  Commercial users of wool, and even the public, 
started to fear that wool and woollen clothing would become unavailable or prohibitively expensive and 
there was a rush to purchase them; Goldbloom, Hawkins and Kennedy (2008). 
826 The decimal currency equivalents are 41 cents rising to $2.  
827 Schedvin (1992, pp 173 and 297) and Whitwell (1995, pp 171-2 and 1996, p 97) argued that Treasury 
shared this preference for development. See also Cornish (1992, pp 43-44) and Millmow (2015c, p 62). In 
his 1950 budget speech Fadden referred to inflation as 'the familiar growing pains of a vigorous economy' 
and said that 'the Government has been determined that migration and essential development should go 
on, and, as far as possible, be accelerated'; Hansard, 12 October 1950, pp 763-4. 
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While Fadden decried the 'dangerous rate' of inflation,828 economic policy was slow to 
respond. In a confidential memo to the cabinet in February 1951 Fadden referred to the 
'certain prospect of further and very substantial rises in the domestic price level'.829 He 
gave as possible responses reducing credit, increasing interest rates, voluntary or 
compulsory increases in savings, budgeting for a surplus, price controls, increasing 
imports, currency appreciation and price subsidies.830   
Menzies wanted to appreciate the pound but Fadden refused.831 One of his arguments was 
that the high wool price might prove temporary and there would be opposition to any 
subsequent devaluation.832 As an alternative, a wool sales deduction scheme was 
introduced in 1950, under which 20 per cent of the value of wool sold or exported was 
paid to the Treasury and credited against woolgrowers’ income tax obligations.833 It was 
very unpopular with farmers and repealed the following year. 
Notwithstanding the important role promises of removing controls had played in their 
1949 election campaign, the government introduced the Defence Preparations Act 1951 
and used it to reintroduce capital issue controls in the 1950 budget, both restraining total 
investment and directing it to priority areas, arguing the prospect of another war 
constituted exceptional circumstances.834 A short-lived National Resources Board, based 
on a similar body in the US, was established to set the desired total investment and prepare 
plans for controls required in any future war, which many ministers thought could be 
soon. The board included public servants, business leaders and a trade unionist and was 
                                                          
828 Hansard, 21 June 1950, p 4667. His speech put more emphasis on the need to 'destroy the menace of 
communism as the first and fundamental prerequisite to putting value back in the pound'. 
829 19 February 1951, Menzies papers, NLA MS 4936, box 438, folder 5. 
830 Coombs had suggested many of these measures to Fadden in May 1950; Rowse (2002, pp 206-7). 
831 Fadden said in cabinet that the Country Party ‘can’t stay in cabinet…if we appreciate’; Weller (2007b, 
p 106). A measure of the strength of his opposition was that reflecting in retirement on his 22 years in 
federal parliament, he named preventing an appreciation as his most notable achievement. By contrast 
the long-serving central bank governor Coombs (interviewed by David Love, Australian Financial Review, 
23 July 1968, p 2) nominated failing to appreciate as the major regret of his governorship. As Ellis (1963, 
p 288) points out, there was an implicit threat: the Labor Party had said they opposed appreciation too 
and the combined Labor and Country Party vote in the House exceeded that of the Liberals. Davey (2010, 
p 87) and Fadden (1969, p 116) report that during this tense period, some Country Party ministers carried 
signed letters of resignation in their pockets. 
832 Fadden (1969, p 115). 
833 Fadden (1969, p 117) describes how he initially wrote up the plan on lavatory paper, all that he had 
available on the night he had the idea. 
834 Boyd and Charwat (2014), Butlin (1983, p 138). 
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chaired by the prime minister. Casey, the Minister for National Development, wanted the 
board to have executive functions, but Menzies restricted it to an advisory role.835  
In the September 1951 budget the government responded to the inflationary pressures 
with the first explicit use of Keynesian anti-inflationary fiscal policy.836 There were 
increases in income tax, company tax, sales tax and excise duty and special depreciation 
allowances were removed. One estimate put its impact on personal income at almost 
6 per cent.837 The government budgeted for a significant surplus. Fadden had argued to 
his colleagues that ‘a budget surplus is one of the most effective weapons currently 
available to the government – and also one which interferes as little as possible with the 
freedom of the economy to shape its own course’.838  Import licensing was also lifted. 
An explicitly Keynesian stance was adopted in the budget speech:  
the financial operations of governments can, if appropriately 
directed, do a great deal to redress unstable conditions developing 
within the economy … modern thought on the relation of public 
finance to economic stability is quite clear … that, in times of 
excessive demand and scarcity of labour, governments should 
draw away from the public in taxation and loans more than they 
spend for current purposes.839  
Fadden concluded, in a somewhat mixed metaphor, that ‘the whirlwind of rising prices 
may be exhilarating for the few who can ride it out, but for many inflation can become a 
whirlpool which ever more rapidly engulfs their savings and ultimately their jobs’.840   
The reaction was sharp. A tabloid headline screamed ‘huge sales tax rise in horror 
budget’, a sobriquet coined by Arthur Calwell that was forever attached to it.841  Fadden 
                                                          
835 Butlin (1983, p 138), Crisp (1978, p 383), Lee (1995, pp 128-9). 
836 See Goldbloom, Hawkins and Kennedy (2007) and Whitwell (1994). Perhaps surprisingly given his 
respect for Theodore and Chifley, Chris Bowen accords Fadden the title of ‘the first Keynesian treasurer’; 
Clark (2015, p 18). 
837 Artis and Wallace (1967, p 423). Auld’s (1967, p 344) study concludes the 1951-52 budget was 
deflationary but much less so than the 1960-61 budget, and similar to the 1955-56 and 1956-57 budgets. 
838 A memo in January 1951 cited in Whitwell (1986, p 105). 
839 Hansard, 26 September 1951, pp 53-54. 
840 Hansard, 26 September 1951, p 66. 
841 The News (Adelaide), 26 September 1951, p 1. A more measured but just as critical tone was adopted 
in the broadsheets; ‘Drastic budget revision is imperative’ was the heading of the editorial in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, normally a government supporter; 3 October, p 2. It was described as ‘one of the worst 
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later judged the budget as one of the two best of the eleven he presented.842 But at the 
time he felt ‘I could have had a meeting of all my friends and supporters in a one-man 
telephone booth’.843 In rather an understatement, Fadden said ‘it was not intended to make 
anyone giggle’.844 But despite these humorous ripostes, Fadden was feeling the pressure 
and hurting more than he showed, feeling especially sharply the attacks from country 
folk.845 He suffered a minor collapse at a state dinner, and a long sea voyage to attend the 
Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ meeting in London was a welcome break.846  
After earlier rejecting advice at the Commonwealth Finance Ministers Conference to 
reintroduce import licensing, Menzies and Fadden did so in March 1952, and the controls 
were varied with the business cycle over the remainder of the decade.  
Menzies rejected backbench suggestions of blocking wage increases, suggesting any 
interference by the government in the deliberations of the Arbitration Court would be 
highly improper.847  
The timing of the government’s counter-cyclical moves proved very unfortunate as rather 
than standing against an ongoing boom, it reinforced a weakening resulting from a 
collapse in wool prices from April 1951.848 The greasy wool price almost halved from an 
average price of 175 pence per pound during 1951 to an average of 89 pence in 1952. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the peak of the boom has been placed around early- to 
mid-1951.849 The economy went into recession from around mid-1951 to end 1952. The 
                                                          
budgets the Commonwealth has ever seen’ in the Daily Telegraph, 28 September, p 8. Apparently Menzies 
himself had earlier referred to the need for a ‘horror’ budget and Calwell reminded the house of this; 
Hansard 3 October 1951, p 286. 
842 Fadden (1969, p 66). The other was the 1941-42 war budget. 
843 Cribb (1996). Opinion polls suggested the budget halved Fadden’s popularity and some graziers called 
for Fadden to be expelled from the Country Party; Arklay (2014, p 163). 
844 Advertiser, 29 September 1951. 
845 His obituary in the Sydney Morning Herald, 23 April 1973, said the criticism of the horror budget ‘so 
upset him that he showed signs of severe nervous strain for months afterward. His hair became greyer 
and he became physically run-down’ while that in the Canberra Times, 24 April 1973, said the criticism 
‘hurt him deeply’. 
846 The dinner was on 16 October 1951. He left Australia in December for the conference starting on 
15 January 1952 and while there was invested with his knighthood; Arklay (2010, pp 215-6). 
847 Martin (1999b, p 211). 
848 The US military sharply cut back its purchases of wool in April 1951 and the resolution of a dock strike 
in New Zealand soon after increased the supply of wool to the world market; Little (1965, pp 173-4). With 
the benefit of hindsight, Karmel (1956, p 59) judged ’the action in this budget was along the right lines, 
but it was long overdue’. 
849 Waterman (1972, p 12) puts it in June-July; Boehm and Moore (1984, p 42) put it in April 1951 and 
Kennedy’s (1969, p 235) estimates have nominal GNP (seasonally adjusted) peaking in the June quarter 
1951. 
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turnaround was both reflected in and amplified by a stock cycle. With hindsight, 
economists regard this recession as relatively mild.850 But it had a marked impact on 
sentiment at the time: the majority of respondents in an October 1953 opinion poll said 
their living standard had dropped over the past year; less than a tenth reported any 
progress.851    
As Schedvin remarked, ‘it is difficult to explain why so little note was taken of the 
collapse in the price of wool around April 1951’.852 He suggested that ‘as the government 
had been so difficult to persuade, senior officials were unwilling to encourage backsliding 
by softening their recommendations in the light of altered circumstances’.   
It was not until the second half of 1952 that policy responded to the changed 
circumstances. In August 1952, the fiscal measures of the horror budget were largely 
reversed. The 1952-53 budget was brought forward several weeks and included cuts to 
company and sales tax. Fadden opened by remarking that ‘it has now become traditional 
… that the budget speech should deal also with the impact of the budget, and of the 
measures associated with it, on the progress and prosperity of the country’, a tradition 
that would have surprised his predecessors of the early days of Federation.853 Fadden 
stressed the ‘dramatic changes in basic economic conditions’ since the previous budget; 
the fall in wool prices, the surge in imports and the subsequent fall in international 
reserves. Business, he noted, had ‘passed into a phase of slackness and uncertainty’ while 
‘demand for some types of goods is inadequate to absorb the supplies available and, in 
consequence, some unemployment has emerged here and there’.  
Fadden lamented the: 
great change of attitude on the part of businessmen. A year ago 
many believed that monetary demand for goods would go on 
increasing at a tremendous rate so that ready markets would be 
found for almost anything that could be produced or imported 
                                                          
850 Whitwell (1986, p 107) comments ‘the recession of 1952-53 was neither particularly deep … nor 
protracted’. Schedvin (1992, p 174) agrees ‘the downturn was moderate’. It was also partly attributable 
to a minor drought. It is hard to be sure of its size as while the income-based estimates of real GDP show 
a fall of around 1 per cent in 1952-53, the expenditure-based estimates show an increase. 
851 Murphy (2000, p 107). 
852 Schedvin (1992). In his speech presenting the 'horror budget' Fadden himself remarked 'wool prices 
have already fallen a long way from the peak reached early in 1951'; Hansard, 26 September 1951, p 52. 
853 The budget speech extracts in this section are from Hansard, 6 August 1952, pp 65-78. 
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from abroad, and large and easy profits made in the process. A 
very different outlook prevails today and there is in some quarters 
a good deal of fear about the economic future. I believe it to be 
basically unfounded, but the fact that it exists is something we 
cannot ignore. Psychology is enormously important in economic 
affairs and can never be safely disregarded.  
Fadden was aware of the danger of allowing inflationary expectations to become 
entrenched and the large output costs that would then be necessary to tame them: 
Plans and commitments are built upon the belief that prices will 
continue to rise and scarcities to persist. When these conditions 
are brought or come to an end, as they must some time, 
expectations are falsified, plans go wrong and losses are incurred. 
Left to run its own course, inflation will inevitably bring its own 
drastic solution in bankruptcies and mass unemployment. 
Given the change in economic circumstances, Fadden explained the government intended 
to ‘reduce taxation as far as the Commonwealth budgetary position makes possible, but 
we are not going to go into deficit’. Views differ about how effective was this fiscal 
response. Whitwell (1986, p 108) suggests the budget was ‘mildly expansionary’. Auld’s 
(1967, p 339) study concludes that the automatic stabilisers were helpful and were 
augmented by discretionary tax reductions but substantially offset by cuts in government 
spending, leading to the conclusion that ‘in terms of discretionary anti-recession policy, 
the government’s decisions were destabilising’.854  
By the time of the 1953-54 budget in September 1953, inflation had been checked, 
international reserves had been rebuilt and the Korean War was over. It was back to 
business as usual with a balanced budget. Fadden opened his budget speech by 
announcing cuts to a range of taxes and was able to congratulate himself on how his 
Keynesian tools had handled the collapse of the boom; ‘equilibrium has now been 
restored … the action taken proved both timely and adequate … we have now practically 
attained that stability we set out to achieve in the strenuous days of 1950 and 1951 … the 
recent boom, one of the sharpest in our history, was brought under control without 
                                                          
854 Auld (1967, p 339). 
 173 
 
incurring anything, that, by any stretch of imagination, could be called a slump. That, I 
venture to claim, was a quite unprecedented achievement’.855  
There was further fiscal largesse in the 1954 budget, with income tax cut and sales tax 
lowered or scrapped on a range of items including furniture, toys, musical instruments, 
confectionery and aircraft parts.856   
Banking and monetary policy 
Fadden introduced banking bills in 1950 making the Commonwealth Bank governor 
answerable to a board rather than to the government. When these were rejected by the 
Senate, they formed the trigger for the 1951 double dissolution election which gave the 
Liberal-Country coalition a Senate majority.  
Monetary policy had a smaller role than did fiscal policy in fighting the Korean War 
inflation. Interest rates were increased for the first time since the start of the second world 
war, but there was ‘virtually unquestioned dogma that interest rates should be low’,857 in 
part due to concerns about inflicting capital losses on those patriotic citizens who had 
bought war bonds. Furthermore, both the prime minister and the Treasury apparently did 
not regard monetary policy as very potent.858 There was an increase in special accounts 
and a lending directive to rein in credit, which were reversed after the economy moved 
into recession.  
When re-establishing the Commonwealth Bank board, Fadden said he had no intention 
of separating its central banking function from its commercial banking activities.859  But 
ever since the Commonwealth Bank gained more central banking powers during the War, 
                                                          
855 Hansard, 9 September 1953, pp 41-2. Similarly, when presenting the 1954 budget Fadden was able to 
refer to 'real and substantial material progress [with]…retail and wholesale prices generally steady 
throughout the year…we have tasted the fruits of stable progress'; Hansard, 18 August 1954, pp 384-5. 
856 Waterman (1971, p 126). 
857 Butlin (1983, p 140). 
858 Treasury argued in February 1951 that ‘a government decision deliberately to raise interest rates unless 
carried to very high levels could not be regarded as an important contribution to anti-inflationary policy’; 
cited by Whitwell (1986, p 104). Menzies wrote to Fadden in June 1950, ‘I have very little faith in the virtue 
of a rise in interest rates as such a means of restraining excessive investment demands’; cited in Schedvin 
(1992, p 169). 
859 In 1955 Fadden wrote ‘the Commonwealth Bank should continue to have direct contact with current 
trends in finance and business and thus be equipped with first-hand knowledge to reshape its central 
bank policy to the requirements of changing economic conditions’ and that the central bank should be in 
a position to direct the trading bank to lend for nationally necessary but ‘commercially unattractive’ 
projects; Simms (1982, pp 65, 95). Butlin (1983, p 183) added that some in the Country Party feared 
separation would jeopardise the concessional finance provided to rural interests.  
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the private banks had complained it had an unfair advantage in its commercial operations 
and particularly resented the special accounts. In 1953 the Commonwealth Trading Bank 
was made a separate entity, but still under the overall control of the Governor of the 
Commonwealth Bank. The private banks maintained their pressure, leading to the Liberal 
Party’s federal council pushing Menzies for action860 and in 1957 Fadden introduced 
legislation for a split. The central banking functions were retained in a renamed Reserve 
Bank of Australia. The commercial banking activities were transferred to a new 
Commonwealth Banking Corporation comprising the Commonwealth Savings Bank, 
Commonwealth Trading Bank and a new Commonwealth Development Bank which 
Fadden regarded as his 'own brainchild… designed to overcome the lack of adequate 
long-term borrowing finance for farm development and small industries’.861 The 
legislation was initially rejected by the Senate. The bills were much like Theodore's 
proposals almost three decades before, which were then frustrated by the non-Labor 
parties in the Senate. Labor and the non-Labor parties had therefore now swapped sides 
on the argument! The bills were passed when the Government gained control of the 
Senate after the 1958 election. 
Macroeconomic policy in the latter 1950s 
Privately Menzies wished Fadden had retired in 1954 after a serious road accident, which 
required five operations, but felt obliged to keep him on as treasurer.862 By 1957 Fadden 
was himself tiring of the job, describing himself as 'about as tired and overworked and 
often as lonely as a drover's dog'.863 Nonetheless Fadden continued to achieve results. He 
merged the income tax and social services contribution, making the tax system simpler. 
He also introduced many changes favourable to farmers such as increasing depreciation 
rates and abolishing land taxes. 
By the mid-1950s inflationary pressures were again building.864 Once more electoral 
considerations inhibited action. The 1955 budget was called ‘the most inert one presented 
                                                          
860 May (1968, p 136). 
861 Fadden (1969, p 147). In another concession to the Country Party, the rural credits function was left 
with the Reserve Bank; Butlin (1983, p 186). 
862 Davey (2010, p 95), Martin (1999b, p 367). 
863 Fadden, letter to Harrison, cited in Martin (1999, p 367). 
864 Menzies wrote to his daughter in July 1955, 'inflation is once more on the way and some faintly heroic 
measures will be needed'; Henderson (2011, p 6). Fadden only referred to 'a mild and incipient from of 
inflation' in his 1955 budget speech; Hansard, 24 August 1955, p 29. 
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to parliament in living memory’.865 It was only after the Menzies government was 
re-elected in December 1955 that a package of deflationary measures was announced in 
a mini-budget in March 1956.866 Spending was cut, company and sales tax were raised, 
additional taxes were levied on alcohol and tobacco and interest rates were increased. 
With the economy judged to have slowed to 'a state of substantial balance',867 the 1957-58 
budget increased government spending and cut taxes. Again, the measures were delayed 
until after the economy had already peaked.868  
While critics described these responses as 'stop/go', overall the Fadden era appeared 
economically a golden age; with unemployment averaging under 2 per cent and economic 
growth around 4½ per cent in the 1950s. After the Korean War boom, inflation averaged 
around 2½ per cent.  
The record looks less impressive when compared internationally. The 1950s were a 
golden age across most of the western world with Australia slipping behind; its average 
annual growth in real per capita GDP of 1.7 per cent was below the Western European 
average of 4.2 per cent and slightly slower than that of Canada.869 
Chifley as opposition leader 
While Labor lost its lower house majority in 1949 it retained control of the Senate and 
Chifley served as opposition leader. The 1951 double dissolution election arose due to 
Chifley’s resolve to oppose legislation replacing the Commonwealth Bank governor by a 
board. Chifley was apparently influenced by his memories of the role played by a board 
during the Depression but, as Beazley (1966, p 22) pointed out, the means of appointment 
and ability of the government to direct the Bank are more important than whether its 
decisions are taken by a board or individual. Chifley attempted to make rising inflation 
the major election issue but it became dominated by communism, an issue that divided 
the Labor Party and their trade union supporters. Menzies won majorities in both houses. 
                                                          
865 Sydney Morning Herald, editorial, 25 August 1955. 
866 Karmel (1956, p 59) believed the 1955 budget repeated patterns of acting too late in addressing 
inflationary pressures and only offered ‘a token cut in its own expenditure’. 
867 Hansard, 3 September 1957, p 215. 
868 The peak is estimated at around June-September 1955; Waterman (1972, p 12).  
869 The global average was 2.8 per cent; based on estimates in Maddison (2001). See Table 10.4 below. 
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Chifley was still opposition leader on 13 June 1951, when Menzies halted the dancing at 
the ball commemorating fifty years of federal parliament to announce the passing of his 
great rival, who had suffered a heart attack in his modest room at the Hotel Kurrajong. 
Chifley was ‘mourned by a whole nation’.870 
Fadden’s latter years 
With his health suffering from the strains of office,871 Fadden stood down as Country 
Party leader and deputy prime minister in March 1958, did not contest the elections that 
year and handed over the treasurership to Harold Holt in December.872 Unusually, he held 
the treasurer’s job for a little while after he ceased to be a member of parliament. 
Fadden lived for almost 15 years after his retirement from parliament but without any 
prominent public role. He was hurt not to be given the chair of the Commonwealth 
Banking Corporation and was privately critical of the direction in which the Country Party 
was taken by his successor McEwen.873 He accepted a number of directorships and 
published a very anecdotal memoir.874 Fadden died on 21 April 1973, survived by his 
wife, two daughters and a son. 
Commemoration of Chifley and Fadden 
Chifley and Fadden both have Canberra suburbs and federal electorates in their home 
states named in their honour. Chifley Library at the ANU is an apt memorial given Chifley 
once said he would have preferred a university education to a million pounds and his 
                                                          
870 Denning (c1952a, p 2), Marr (2001), Martin (2015, chapter 1) and Reid (1951a, p 1) provide detailed 
accounts of his passing, the funeral and mourning.  
871 McEwen and Jackson (1983, p 57); Whitington (1964, p 77). In his memoirs, Fadden gave as his reason 
for retiring only that he was physically tired and wanted a long holiday, although he noted that many in 
politics stay too long. Arklay (2014, p 197) and Reid (1961a, p 12) also refer to the loss in 1956 of his deeply 
loved son Gordon. Opperman (1977, p 344) recalled him as ‘physically he was far beyond his mileage. 
Family bereavements, a close brush with death…[and his political workload] had eroded his energy, frayed 
his nerves and lowered his morale’. Arthur Calwell (1972a, p 59) recalls Fadden saying in March 1957 that 
he feared his health ‘would break down completely’ if he continued in politics. By his final year,  there 
were also increasing concerns about excessive drinking; Arklay (2010, p 237). Whitington (1964, p 27) 
believed Fadden had ‘very little heart for the job’ from the mid-1950s. 
872 As he noted in his memoirs, Fadden (1969, p 148) was one of the few treasurers to step down 
voluntarily and know when they are presenting their last budget, and was able to refer to his then record 
term in his final budget speech; Hansard, 15 August 1958, p 20. 
873 Arklay (2014, pp 207-8). 
874 With the assistance of journalist Elgin Reid and historian of the Country Party Ulrich Ellis (who had also 
assisted with Page’s autobiography). 
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government’s role in establishing ANU.875 More surprising, Torrens University has a 
Chifley Business School. ASIO’s new headquarters has been named after Chifley, as has 
Chifley Tower, Sydney’s tallest building, in Chifley Plaza. The ALP’s think tank is called 
the Chifley Research Centre. One of the Jenolan caves was renamed in his honour. There 
have been a series of Chifley Memorial Lectures, mostly held in Bathurst, notable 
examples including Whitlam (1957 and 1991), Keating (1992) and Hawke (1995). A 
memorial garden to Fadden was created in Brisbane, although much of it was later taken 
up by a freeway. 
Synkrisis 
Chifley and Fadden could both be regarded as successful managers of the economy. 
Chifley oversaw both the direction of resources to the war effort while containing 
inflation and the subsequent redeployment of them back to civilian uses without 
significant unemployment. Fadden was able to avoid the spike in inflation from the 
Korean War boom becoming imbedded in inflationary expectations and do so without a 
large rise in unemployment. For the rest of his term largely benign international 
conditions made it easier for him to maintain both low average rates of inflation and 
unemployment. 
Despite some similarities in their backgrounds and natures, however, the two men 
differed in their approaches to being treasurer. Chifley was more far more activist and far 
more driven to make changes to correct what he saw as the deficiencies in the economic 
system that led to the scourge of unemployment. This led him to seek fundamental 
changes to the operation of both monetary and fiscal policy. Influenced by his advisers, 
his reading and his time on the Royal Commission, he was sympathetic to Keynesian 
views but did not fully trust in the ability of Keynesian policies to steer the economy, 
continuing to see a role for more direct controls.876 Fadden was not critical of the capitalist 
economy but accepted the advice of Treasury to use Keynesian methods to manage it, 
albeit subservient to a political agenda which often meant the policy measures were 
implemented too late.  
                                                          
875 A proposal to name the new university in western Sydney after him was scrapped by a state Liberal 
government. 
876 Cornish (1993a). 
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Chifley had the advantage of strong support from his prime minister Curtin, with whom 
he had a warm rapport, in his early years as treasurer and then the status of prime minister 
himself for the remaining time. Fadden in the 1950s had a less warm relationship with his 
prime minister but Menzies did not fear him or repress him, as has been the case with 
some other prime minister-treasurer relationships. Fadden had the advantage of the 
brilliant economist Wilson as his Treasury secretary.  
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Chapter Seven: Paul Keating and John Howard: 
young treasurers from the Sydney suburbs 
 
Prologue 
Labor’s Paul Keating and the Liberals’ John Howard share a similar background in many 
ways. Indeed, O’Brien (2015, p 48) described them as having led ‘parallel lives’. Both 
grew up in post-war suburban Sydney; the Keating home in Bankstown was only about 
ten kilometres away from the Howard home in Earlwood. Both their fathers were small 
businessmen while both mothers concentrated on raising the family. Both had three 
siblings (although Paul was the eldest child and John the youngest). They shared an 
admiration of Winston Churchill.877 Both were first generation politicians and, unlike 
contemporaries such as Kim Beazley Jnr, Simon Crean, Alexander Downer and John 
Spender, neither could claim parliamentary ancestors, yet had fathers who were members 
of a political party and political discussion was a common occurrence around the dinner 
table. Both entered parliament relatively young and both were among the handful of 
treasurers who attained the post before they were forty.878 Both were astute political 
operators and good at reading the public mood. They were both very good in their own 
ways at handling the media and could distil complex arguments into simple messages. 
While they each wanted the economy to perform well under their management, they had 
grander aspirations about reform, and not just limited to the economy. The two are 
regarded by Quiggin (2012, p 212) as the leading proponents and implementers of 
‘economic rationalism’. They championed ‘free market’ economic reforms, both within 
their own parties and to the wider public. Commentators such as George Megalogenis 
(2006, p 1) have referred to their ‘consistency on economics’. For a considerable period 
in parliament they were regarded as ‘quite close’.879 On issues such as financial 
deregulation Keating implemented as treasurer policies to which Howard had aspired. 
                                                          
877 Keating was inspired by Churchill’s career and his writing in the Strand Magazine; Watson (2002, p 14), 
Day (2015, pp 53-54). On at least one occasion Howard compared himself to Churchill; ‘I am the bloke 
who ultimately wins the last battle and in political terms that is Churchill’; Marr (1998, p 147). 
878 The others were Chris Watson, SM Bruce and Peter Costello. See Tables 8.1 and 8.2 for further 
comparisons. 
879 Masters (1990b, p 10). Megalogenis (2006, p 301) reports ‘Keating says that he enlisted Howard to his 
economic-reform mission, and that Howard, in turn, encouraged him ‘behind the scenes’ on the path of 
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Table 7.1: The parallel lives of John Howard and Paul Keating  
 John Howard Paul Keating 
Born July 1939 Jan 1944 
First elected to federal parliament May 1974 Oct 1969 
First appointment as minister Dec 1975 Oct 1975 
Treasurer Nov 1977- Mar 1983 Mar 1983 – June 1991 
Opposition leader Sept 1985 – May 1989; 
Jan 1995 – Mar 1996 
n.a. 
Prime minister Mar 1996 – Dec 2007 Dec 1991 – Mar 1996 
Left parliament Nov 2007 April 1996 
Source: derived from 44th Parliamentary Handbook. 
But they came to be bitter political rivals with marked policy differences (perhaps most 
notably on taxation and the republic) and were almost polar opposites in their political 
style. Keating was a self-described exciting ‘maddie’ whereas Howard was the archetypal 
‘straight man’.880 Keating has been described as ‘utterly fearless, utterly determined, 
utterly indefatigable and, quite possibly, utterly mad…no sane self-interested politician 
would have taken the political risks that he did to reform the Australian economy’.881 He 
was a man of contrasts; ‘the brawler-statesman…the kid from the fibro suburb in the 
Armani suit’882, the ‘larrikin aesthete’883, and the man with the mix of ‘public lethality’ 
                                                          
deregulation…Howard went as far as playing de facto mentor to Keating. He had advised the new Labor 
treasurer to move his young family to Canberra, warning that the job would keep him away from home 
for long periods’. The initial breach between them occurred when Howard acquiesced in Wilson Tuckey 
making accusations in parliament about Keating’s personal life; Megalogenis (2006, p 302).  
880 The classification of politicians as straight men, fixers and maddies is discussed in Chapter 2. Keating 
described himself as a maddie in a phone call to Mark Latham, 12 October 1999, related in Latham (2005, 
p 117) and in an interview with O’Brien (2013).  
881 Hartcher (2011, p 108). Oakes (1993) makes similar comments. As treasurer, Keating’s boldness divided 
public opinion. Labor pollster Rod Cameron believed that in 1990 a third of voters admired Keating greatly, 
a third detested him and a third disliked but respected him; Craven (2017, p 18). Keating himself later said 
‘to be any good at this game, you must possess the crazy gene’; Bramston (2016, pp 4, 15). 
882 Graeme Richardson, cited in Ellis (1997a, p 135). Jim Chalmers (2004, p 11), now a Labor MHR, used 
the term ‘Brawler Statesman’ as the title of his PhD thesis on Keating. 
883 Leser (1998, p 46). Cabinet colleague Gareth Evans referred to him as ‘a globally unique combination 
of statesman, showman, aesthetic and street fighter’; Australian Financial Review, 28 August 2014, p 56. 
Journalist and political historian Paul Kelly (1994, p 233) called him ‘a savage by day and a connoisseur by 
night’. Barry Jones (2016, pp 78-81) recalls some of Keating’s cultural enthusiasms. 
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with ‘private softness’.884 Throughout his political career Keating remained a powerful 
political orator.885 Howard, by contrast, is known for his ‘awesome ordinariness’.886 
Indeed he was once called ‘boring as batshit’ – and this was by one of his supporters!887 
While constantly available to the media and a more than competent debater, Howard has 
never been regarded as an inspiring orator, speaking in what Kelly (2009, p 16) calls a 
‘dull monotone’. 
Family and childhood  
John Winston Howard was born in the Sydney suburb of Earlwood on 26 July 1939, his 
middle name reflecting his father's opposition to appeasement and support for Winston 
Churchill.888 John (or Jack as he was often called then) grew up in what he recalls as ‘a 
stable, lower middle-class home’.889 Both his father and grandfather had enlisted in World 
War I; it was a family that placed a weight on duty to the British Empire. His father Lyall 
owned a small business, a service station, and his mother Mona looked after the family. 
His was a comfortable upbringing but his father died suddenly when John was only 16. 
Paul John Keating was born in Bankstown, a western suburb of Sydney, on 18 January 
1944, the eldest of four children of Matt, a boilermaker who built up a successful 
engineering business, and Min, a packer at a factory. Keating recalled his mother as 
having ‘great ambitions for me’ even though ‘she didn’t quite know what they were’.890 
                                                          
884 Kim Beazley cited by Bramston (2016, p 603). 
885 Future treasurer, and arguably Keating protégé, John Dawkins said there was an ‘intensity about his 
discourse that was engaging’; D’Alpuget (2010, p 222). Even as a mere backbencher in the Whitlam 
Government he was known for ’tearing into the opposition in the manner of a starving dingo on a newborn 
lamb’ and ‘his body language served to provide added firepower for his words – the jabbing finger, the 
slight swaying motion of a boxer putting his whole torso into every punch; FitzSimons (1998, p107). Brett 
(2005, p 21) said Keating was ‘energised by conflict and brilliant at marshalling his aggression…arguing 
passionately for reform, he could make people feel that he had no respect for their views and experiences, 
and his verbal skills could leave them floundering’. His language, usually free of jargon, could be ‘a 
shillelagh or a paint brush’ and ‘he could make phrases that stuck’ and ‘he could remind you of what 
language can be and what it can do’; Watson (2002, p 24). 
886 Press gallery doyen Michelle Grattan, cited by MacCallum (2007, p 168). Price (2006, p 61) calls him 
‘astonishingly ordinary’ and cites former premier Carmen Lawrence as calling him ‘the most deeply 
ordinary person that I’ve ever confronted in Australian politics’. Journalist Laurie Oakes (1997, p 10) 
remarked ‘anyone who believes that John Howard is a grey boring one-dimensional figure should read 
the Barnett (1997) biography. They’ll be reassured about their judgement.’ 
887 The Liberal federal director Lynton Crosby, cited in MacCallum (2014a, p 187). 
888 Howard was to live up to the name with a 'Churchillian-like stubbornness' according to one of his chiefs 
of staff, Gerard Henderson (1990, p 155). 
889 Howard (2010, p 10). 
890 Keating interviewed in O’Brien (2015, p 9). 
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Education 
A good memory helped offset the difficulties John’s poor hearing caused at school. But 
his hearing difficulties left him with a degree of shyness.891 Despite this, he 'had from the 
earliest age a flair for debate'892 and was already aspiring to be prime minister when at 
primary school.893 But at high school he could not win enough votes to become one of 25 
prefects.894 To his future embarrassment, he also failed mathematics in his final year at 
Canterbury Boys High School.895 While his school results were not good enough to win 
a scholarship, they sufficed for him to enter the University of Sydney Law School where 
his mother paid his fees for the first year. He recently told Megalogenis (2017, p 130) that 
had he not studied law he may have become a journalist. 
Looking back Howard reflected ‘one of my real educational regrets is that I never did an 
arts or economics degree'.896 His hearing problems, and the location of the law school 
away from the main university campus, discouraged him from getting involved in student 
politics.  
Paul also had a happy childhood with supportive parents. He attended local St Brendan’s 
school where, remarkably in hindsight, the nuns recalled him as a ‘docile little chap’,897 
and De la Salle College where his strength was in maths and science although his main 
interest was history. Again, the recollections of a teacher were that Paul was ‘very shy’ 
and classmates recalled him as bright but quiet.898 The class were encouraged to take in 
interest in politics, as tapes of Question Time were played to them for discussion.899  
                                                          
891 Leser (1998, p 44) and Jones (2016, p 86). 
892 Haupt (1979, p 9), Cockburn (1989, p 35), Leser (1998, p 44), Marr (1998, p 140), McGregor (1987, 
p 44). His high school year book refers to his ‘Churchillian oratory’.  
893 Howard (1996), Barnett and Goward (1997, p 6); Cockburn (1989, p 35), Leser (1998, p 44). Maddox 
(2005, p 21) gives examples of the teenage Howard’s notoriety for being obsessed with conservative 
politics. 
894 Wainwright and Stephens (2004, p 25). 
895 Errington and van Onselen (2007, pp 15, 29), Murray (2010, p 38), Wild (1978, p 8). Howard got a B in 
Economics. 
896 Howard (2010, p 18), Grattan (2010, p 443). This was partly a regret he had not enjoyed campus life 
instead of being restricted to the law school in the central business district; Henderson (1995, p 33). This 
contrasts with his view while treasurer that ‘I haven’t found the lack of formal economics training a 
handicap’; Wild (1978, p 8). 
897 Baker (1988, p 65), Edwards (1996, p 43), Lyons (1987, p 1). 
898 Sunday Telegraph, 13 September 1992, p 7; Bramston (2016, p 23). 
899 Knightley (1989, p 153), Bramston (2016, p 23). 
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Problems with his tear ducts caused by peritonitis made sustained reading difficult, 
although Keating rejects claims that he was mildly dyslexic.900 This may have contributed 
to his decision to leave school at 15 (and to his preference as treasurer for oral 
briefings).901 He had been academically undistinguished at school and while he ran and 
swam was not a star at sport either. He later studied for the equivalent of the HSC at night 
at Belmore Technical College but did not sit the final exam.902 
When Whitlam suggested to Keating in parliament that he should get a university degree 
an affronted Keating replied ‘what for? Then I would be just like you’.903 But Keating 
later expressed some regret about leaving school early.904  
Religious and political beliefs 
Howard’s political views stemmed from the circumstances of his upbringing rather than 
any intellectual endeavour, argues Murray (2010). Howard described his credo as 
'traditional social values of Australian egalitarianism, strong families, entrepreneurial 
opportunity, hard work, Protestant work ethic'.905 Like his predecessor as Liberal leader 
and treasurer Joseph Cook, Howard had 'a strong Methodist upbringing'906 and moved 
away from the ‘kindly brand of Methodism’ of his youth to develop a ‘determinedly old 
testament view of the world’.907 His marriage brought Howard from Methodism to the 
Church of England. This was an easy transition for him as he attached little importance 
to denominational differences within Christianity. 
                                                          
900 Ellis (2002, p 389) and Day (2015, pp 40-41). Day has subsequently withdrawn the claim and remaining 
copies of the first edition of Day (2015) have been pulped. 
901 D'Alpuget (2010, pp 141-2), Day (2000, p 411), Day (2015, pp xiii, 40-41), Edwards (1996, pp 10, 43-44), 
Chalmers (2004, pp 177-8), Keating (2015). His chief of staff Allan Hawke described him as a ‘listener’ 
rather than a ‘reader’; Rhodes and Tiernan (2014, p 20). 
902 Day (2015, pp 57-58). Love (2008, p 64) describes Keating as studying in ‘a dilettantish sort of way’. 
903 FitzSimon (1988, p 107). 
904 Interviewed by Gerard Henderson (1990, p 178). In Gordon (1996, pp 34-35) Keating remarked ‘I could 
have been better off with a more structured education…a degree would have helped me’. In O’Brien 
(2015, p 56) he mused ‘I think if I had my time over I would have probably done a degree in philosophy; 
the history of human thought’. 
905 Henderson (1995, p 31). In 1987 he said ‘working for yourself is the ethic I grew up with’; McGregor 
(1987, p 44). To Sheridan (1984, p 19) this comprised 'a coherent and consistent view of the world'. 
Howard was old-fashioned; Keating referred to him as a ‘pre-Copernican obscurantist’; Carroll (2010, 
p 137), Marks (2014, p 19). But he lived up to the ‘hard work’ ethos; Paul Kelly refers to Howard’s 
‘enormous energy levels for such a mature politician’; interview 22 November 1996 cited in Bennister 
(2012, p 136). 
906 Howard interviewed in O'Brien (1985, p 82). Maddox (2005, pp 18-19) argues that the Methodist 
Church at the time had more progressive views than are generally associated with John Howard. 
907 Williams (2013, p 24). 
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Howard (1980, p 39) argued in his Menzies Lecture that 'the very essence of our economic 
philosophy as Liberals is that as little as possible of the nation's resources should be 
claimed by government'. He held these traditional beliefs steadfastly, but critics argued 
he did not contribute much on an intellectual level.908 Brett (2005, p 41) called him a 
tribal Liberal; ‘if something is championed by Labor, then this is sufficient reason to 
oppose it’. Howard was ‘awestruck’ by the long-serving Liberal prime minister Sir Robert 
Menzies.909  
Keating by contrast 'had an intuitive, artistic mind that arrived at conclusions through 
leaps of insight, often of dazzling originality.'910 His speechwriter Don Watson (2002, 
p 59) noted that ‘Keynes said that he took up economics because it suited a man who had 
an artist’s temperament but not his facility’ and argues this is true of Keating too. Keating 
would sketch furiously on economic charts to illustrate his arguments; Ramsey (1987, 
p 22) styled him ‘the Van Gogh of treasurers’. Keating had ‘a poet's ability to make the 
business cycle sound like a symphony'  and ‘the mind of an artist in the body of a 
politician’.911 Indeed his criticism of his opponent John Hewson was that ‘he will never 
lift economics and politics to an art form’.912 It is perhaps fitting that he is the only 
treasurer to be the subject of an eponymous musical.913 He also had, in Kelly’s (1994, 
p 26) words ‘an architect’s mind in its penchant for clean lines and pure constructs’.914   
                                                          
908 When asked whether any book was particularly influential on his political thinking, Howard replied ‘no, 
I learned my politics from experience in the field, and in my family and at my school. I’ve read a lot of 
books over the years that have confirmed prejudices and modified them, but my politics have been 
instinctive and remain so’; Haigh (2013, p 59). Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 80) suggest Simon 
(1978) was an influential book on Howard with the former US treasury secretary making the case for 
deregulation. Haupt (1979, p 9) remarked 'it may be true to say that John Howard has never had an 
original idea in his life'. Abjorensen (2007) regarded Howard as 'possessed of no discernibly distinguished 
intellect'. Leser (1998, p 46) terms him ‘bright but unreflective’. Peter Reith confided to his diary that ‘I 
really wonder about John’s grasp of detail. In IR he was the spokesperson for five years. He had little idea 
how the system worked’; 13 August 1997, reprinted in Reith (2015, p 157).  
909Samuel (1978, p 44). According to Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 20) Howard saw Menzies 
campaigning in 1955 and 1958. Howard said 'I think of the Menzies period as a golden age'; Henderson 
(1990, p 155 and 1995, p 30). Errington (2008, p 221) called him an ‘unquestioning Menzian’. In a similar 
vein, Keating (1994, p 15) has referred to Howard as an 'incorrigible Menzoid'. In retirement Howard 
(2014) wrote a book on the Menzies era and presented a television documentary on his hero.  
910 D'Alpuget (2010, p 76). Bill Hayden (1996, p 481) called him ‘a powerhouse for lateral thinking’. 
911 Megalogenis (2011, p 29) and Kelly (2009, p 148). 
912 Keating (1990, p7). He went on to compare himself to Placido Domingo and Hewson to the attendant 
at the back of the theatre. 
913 The eponymous musical, Bennetto (2005), debuted in 2005 and is described in Carroll (2010, 
pp 173-182). Keating is also the subject of a poem by John Forbes (1988) and a series of instrumental 
pieces for piano and clarinet known as the ‘Keating tangos’ with titles such as ‘tango we had to have’, 
‘world’s greatest tango’ and even ‘tango for micro-economic reform’; Marcellino et al (2000).  
914 Kelly (1994, p 26).   
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While his reputation was for an arrogant certitude, he was ‘far more open to ideas and 
contrary opinions than you might expect’.915 Keating himself said ‘my views can be 
shifted. If I’ve got a clear view it will take a bit of shifting but the moment I think it’s 
wrong I will junk it in a second because the moment you start parroting a view you know 
is wrong your whole self-respect goes down’.916 Keating once reflected ‘I’ve always been 
a good listener; in public life you have to be’.917 Barry Jones (2016, p 82) recalled ‘it was 
said that Keating had a two-metre charm circle around him, even people deeply hostile to 
Keating found him attractive and compelling once they had met and talked’. 
Especially once treasurer, Keating favoured market forces to a degree then regarded as 
unusual in Labor circles. But he drew a distinction between his support for markets and 
the Liberals’ support for business: 
The Liberals were always interested in business bodies, cabals, 
monopolies, duopolies. I wasn’t. I was interested in markets, not 
business. I had faith in markets, in competition…there’s a great 
difference between markets and business.918 
Keating was never obsessed with money. As he put it, ‘like most people I have always 
wanted enough money not to have to punch the bundy. But I’ve never considered the 
accumulation of wealth an interesting way to spend one’s life’.919 
Other than Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt, the political figures who most influenced 
Keating were former treasurer Ted Theodore, depression era premier Jack Lang and 
WWII prime minister John Curtin; 'achievers' who 'charged into the party, did things, 
                                                          
915 McGregor (1977, pp 4-5). Keating once described himself to Kevin Rudd as ‘a whore for a good 
idea…don’t care where it comes from’; Carroll (2010, p 67). 
916 Interview with Gerard Henderson (1990, p 184). He made similar comments when interviewed by Fia 
Cumming (1991, p 329). Keating resented what he regarded as ‘pride in his craft’ being represented as 
arrogance; Love (2001, pp 134-5), Knightley (1989, p 153) and interview in O’Brien (2015, p 386). 
917 Watson (2002, p 105). 
918 Keating cited in O’Brien (2015, pp 48, 647). 
919 Knightley (1989, p 155). 
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took unusual attitudes, took risks'.920 He also admired the British Labour politician Tony 
Crosland.921   
Keating came from an Irish catholic background on his father’s side and he ‘accepted 
without any real question or examination the principal beliefs…though he did not then or 
later exhibit the slightest zealotry’.922 He recently described himself as not being ‘spiritual 
in a deeply religious sense’.923 The social values of the church, however, influenced his 
political stance. Keating (1997, p 313) has described these as ‘the whole ethos of a fair 
go or our sense of justice and social inclusion’ and remarked that ‘my political life was 
influenced by the commitment’ of the catholic clergy, nuns and teachers. 
Young adulthood 
After graduating Howard spent about a year travelling through Singapore, India, Israel 
and Europe, and while in Britain assisted the Conservatives in an election campaign. On 
his return, he joined the large law firm Clayton Utz as a solicitor, before moving to a 
smaller firm which became Truman, Nelson and Howard. 
Howard married his ‘soul partner’924 Janette Parker after they met at a Liberal Party 
function. On this first meeting Howard boasted that he would be prime minister one day, 
and it has been claimed that Janette’s 'ambitions for him matched his own'.925 They would 
go on to have three children. 
His early political career was not without setbacks. In 1958 an eighteen-year-old John 
Howard was working on the unsuccessful campaign by the Liberal candidate for the 
Sydney electorate of Parkes and by 1963 he was campaign manager for the successful 
Liberal candidate there. In 1964 he became president of the NSW Young Liberals. In 
                                                          
920 Bowman and Grattan (1989, p 145); Carr (1979, p 83); Lyons (1987, p 6), McGregor (1977, p 5), O’Reilly 
(1979, p 61) and Watson (2002, p 12). While Theodore and Curtin came from modest backgrounds, 
Roosevelt was a patrician reformer. As Keating put it 'these people didn't need to be walking around with 
the arse hanging out of their pants to understand running a sensible, well balanced society'; Bowman and 
Grattan (1989, p 146). 
921 Keating told Knightley (1989, p 153) that Crosland ‘wrote wonderful clear-headed pamphlets that were 
like a breath of fresh air compared to the tripe we had in Australia at that time’. 
922 Edwards (1996, p 53). 
923 Interviewed in O’Brien (2015, p 764). 
924 Price (2006, p 62). 
925 Grattan (2010, p 443); Wainwright and Stephens (2004, p 25). Some would say her ambitions for him 
exceeded his. Howard has called Janette his ‘one person focus group’; Price (2006, p 62). For a portrait of 
Janette and her influence on John, see Mitchell (2007).  
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1968 he unsuccessfully contested the state seat of Drummoyne. Losing the contest for a 
seat the Liberals expected to win left Howard 'devastated' at the time but later eternally 
grateful.926 
Keating, who had not gone to university, was working in less prestigious jobs but was 
also busy politically. After some clerical jobs at Sydney County Council and elsewhere, 
Keating worked as industrial officer for the Federated Municipal and Shire Council 
Employees' Union for a year. His main interest away from politics was managing 
blues-pop band the Ramrods which, in his own words, he took from ‘nowhere to 
obscurity’.927 He also liked flying and was on the verge of getting his pilot’s licence when 
elected.  
Keating joined the Labor Party of which his father was an active local member.928  
Keating was president of the Australian Labor Party’s NSW Youth Council at 18 and 
soaked up Labor history (what he termed ‘congealed wisdom’929) by meeting twice a 
week with the former premier Jack Lang, whose political career went back before 
Federation and the birth of the Labor Party.930 He single-mindedly worked towards 
winning pre-selection for a federal Labor seat.  
 
                                                          
926 Howard (2010, p 41 and 2014, p 610). He lost to a popular local candidate but once preselected for a 
federal seat regarded it as fortunate he did not end up in a marginal seat in state politics. 
927 Brown (2002, p 184). ‘When his ambitions for the Ramrods exceeded their own, they parted’; 
Euromoney (1984, p 42). The Ramrods once had the Bee Gees as a support act; Carew (1988, p 18), Day 
(2015, p 65). Paul recalls occasionally singing with the band and did so again at their 1996 reunion; Baker 
(1987), Corbett (1996, p 13), Edwards (1996, p 47), Day (2015, p 65). The Ramrods’ guitarist recalled 
Keating was ‘very good with the housekeeping’; Bulletin, 31 May 1988, p 40. 
928 Love (2008, p 56) suggests that had Paul Keating grown up in Melbourne instead of Sydney his father 
may have joined the DLP and we may never have heard of him. 
929 Keating interviewed by O’Brien (2013). 
930 Lang had attended rallies by Henry Parkes. As Keating (Hansard, 30 September 1975, p 1452) recalled 
‘he started his association with the Labor movement with people like the Leigh House socialists and the 
McNamaras of McNamara's Bookshop in Sydney. He married one of McNamara's daughters and Henry 
Lawson married the other’. He had been a strong supporter of railway workers such as Keating’s 
grandfather William; Day (2015, p 9). Lang’s meetings with Keating continued for six to seven years and 
one of the lessons he passed on was ‘the force of language’; Hansard 30 September 1975, p 1452, Keating 
interviewed in O’Brien (2013). Keating recalled Lang once saying ‘he had met someone who admired me 
greatly and that in the end would be the only person I could trust. I asked him who it was and he said it 
was me’; Hewitt (1981, p 7). In 1971 Keating successfully moved for Lang’s readmission to the ALP. At the 
time, he regarded Lang as ‘the greatest living Australian’; Day (2015, p 61). In 1969 Keating had referred 
to Lang as ‘his mentor’; Glascott (1969, p 7). But as treasurer Keating said Lang ‘had very little influence’; 
Lyons (1987, p 1). As prime minister, Keating claimed Lang’s influence on him had been ‘very much 
overstated’; Curran (2004, p 260). See also Carr (1979, p 83); Cumming (1991, pp 14-15). 
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Into federal parliament 
Keating was the youngest member of parliament when elected for Blaxland in 1969.931 
He won a 9 per cent swing after a campaign that drew some inspiration from that of John 
F Kennedy.932 As a backbencher, Keating would visit the offices of the Australian 
Financial Review, talk to senior executives from manufacturing industry and read works 
by Adam Smith and Paul Samuelson at home to learn about economics.933 His first speech 
called for better urban services, remarking ‘I would like to be able to describe my 
electorate as a scenic district, as something of beauty, but I cannot’.934 He spent time with 
Rex Connor, who shared his interest in economic development, but denied being his 
disciple.935 Keating described his interests then as ‘the structure of society and the 
economy…what made it tick and how it could tick better’.936 But he was then far from 
the economic rationalist he would later become. Upon election, he advocated social 
ownership of key industries and price controls.937 In 1973 Keating moved in caucus to 
direct the trading banks to exempt home mortgages from interest rate rises.938 In April 
1973 he successfully moved for an inquiry into the public service and especially Treasury, 
                                                          
931 He later reflected that he ‘got into parliament too early, at 26, but the train only pulls in once every 
twenty years in safe Labor seats…you have to jump aboard’; Mark Latham diary entry 30 January 1994; 
Latham (2005, p 25). 
932 Bob Carr recalls Keating referring to White (1961)’s account of the Kennedy campaign; West and Morris 
(2003, p 46). Keating’s placards and his campaign bus were based on those used by Kennedy; Glascott 
(1969, p 7); O’Brien (2013). 
933 Day (2015, pp 164, 196), Edwards (1986, p 23 and 1996, p 105); Carew (1988, p 34). Kelly (2009, p 105) 
says economic journalist Max Walsh was a ‘de facto tutor’ and Keating recalls that as a backbencher ‘I 
used to go up to the Financial Review bureau and chat with Max Walsh and Fred Benchley in the days 
when you had to walk over the old parliament house roof to get to their offices…they were getting stuff 
from inside the government and I was tapping into their sources and their views’; O’Brien (2015, 
pp 62-63). Walsh recalled that Keating was one of the few politicians of the era with an interest in 
economics; Bramston (2016, p 91). 
934 Hansard, 17 March 1970, p 513. 
935 Interview in Henderson (1990, p 175); Cumming (1991, p 206). Oakes (1976, p 138) referred to Keating 
as a ‘Connor protégé’ and MacCallum (2014a, p 180) claimed Keating held up Connor as a ‘mentor’. 
O’Reilly (1979, p 61) described Keating as ‘virtually an assistant minister to Connor’. When Whitlam once 
asked him about his fascination with old men like Connor, Keating replied that he was ‘trying to suck 
experience from them’; O’Brien (2015, p 59). 
936 Cumming (1991, p 120), Hansard, 17 March 1970, p 514. He was no feminist. As a candidate, he 
expressed concerns about the cost of housing which sometimes led to the ‘wife forced to work’; Keating 
(1969, p 26), Glascott (1969, p 7). Once elected he decried the circumstances under which a working man 
‘has to send his wife out to work’ and arguing that ‘increasing numbers of women in the workforce…is 
something of which we should be ashamed’; Hansard, 17 March 1970, p 515. 
937 Jones (1969, p 15). 
938 After Whitlam argued against it, the proposal was merely referred to a caucus committee; Oakes and 
Solomon (1974, p 151); Edwards (1996, p 205). 
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which was manifested in the Coombs Royal Commission. But he had little time for the 
Left’s views on economic planning.939 
After the 1972 election Keating fell just short of being elected to the ministry.940 He was 
not close to Whitlam, who regarded him as ‘one of the guys in dark suits from Sussex 
Street’, a NSW Right numbers man.941 By 1975 Keating had a strong interest in 
economics, and was a strong supporter of the Hayden budget, but did not at this time see 
himself as a future treasurer.942        
Keating was one of the youngest ever ministers when he served for three weeks as 
minister for Northern Australia in the twilight of the Whitlam government.943 There is a 
common (though perhaps untrue) story that returning to parliament house after his 
dismissal, Whitlam passed Keating in the corridor and snapped ‘you’re sacked’, leaving 
a bewildered Keating wondering what he had done wrong.944  
In 1975 Keating had married Annita von Iersel and they were to have four children. 
Keating’s long absences in Canberra were difficult for Annita, and when he became 
treasurer, the Keating family moved to Canberra. 
Meanwhile, after unsuccessfully seeking pre-selection for Berowra, Howard had 
accompanied Prime Minister McMahon on his ill-fated 1972 election campaign. He was 
then pre-selected for Bennelong, to which he was elected in 1974.945 In his first speech, 
after the customary words praising his electorate, he concentrated on criticising the budget 
and quoted (twice) then leader Billy Snedden's words that 'the individual's success is the 
                                                          
939 He derisively referred to ‘those old guys couldn’t fill in a TA form let alone plan an economy’; Mark 
Latham’s diary entry 5 December 1994; Latham (2005, p 29). 
940 He was the highest polling candidate not to make it; Lloyd and Reid (1974, p 54), Day (2015, p 126), 
O’Brien (2013). 
941 Keating (2005, p 5). 
942 He also realised Whitlam was unlikely to give an economic portfolio to someone without a university 
degree; Cumming (1991, p 167). He later recalled ‘while I thought my political life would be a life which 
assumed at some stage responsibility for Treasury or Treasury issues, I wanted to do it at my own pace’; 
Gordon (1996, p 70). 
943 Charles Frazer, Harold Holt and Andrew Peacock had been younger ministers before Keating and Gary 
Punch, Kate Ellis and Wyatt Roy have been younger ministers since. 
944 Bowen (2015, p 299), Brown (2002, p 184), Daly (1977, p 232), MacCallum (2014b, p 108), Oakes (1976, 
p 10) and Ralph Willis (2013, p 123, citing Keating himself) have told the story. On the other hand, 
Cumming (1991, p 174, also citing Keating), Kelly and Bramston (2015, p 287, also citing Keating) and 
Edwards (1996, p 124) claim the incident did not occur. 
945 He beat Peter Coleman, the local state member supported by the retiring federal member, 28-20 for 
the pre-selection. Coleman was later NSW opposition leader, a federal MP and Peter Costello’s 
father-in-law and co-author of his biography. 
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community's success' which Howard viewed as encapsulating the difference between 
Liberal and Labor views of the world.946   
In his early days, the 'boyish'947 Howard was recalled as 'an ambitious, competent, 
articulate person who is determined to go places'.948 Fraser brought Howard to the front 
bench as shadow minister for consumer affairs and commerce in March 1975. After the 
1975 election Fraser appointed Howard minister for business and consumer affairs, with 
responsibility for competition policy.949 He handled the portfolio 'competently but 
without showing a special capacity for dealing with economic questions'.950 He was 
responsible for operating a three-month wage and price freeze, from April 1977, although 
he had no say in formulating the policy. He was also appointed minister assisting the 
prime minister in May 1977. 
In July 1977 Howard was moved to special trade negotiations, an unusual post with only 
a notional department attached, but designed to give the holder more status to negotiate 
with the European Community to secure better access for Australian exporters, 
particularly farmers. 
Howard as treasurer   
Allegations about speculative financial activities and dubious real estate transactions, and 
ill health, led Phillip Lynch to stand aside as treasurer during the 1977 election campaign. 
Howard was initially appointed ‘spokesman on treasury matters’, acting treasurer and 
then actual treasurer.951 This made him the eighth treasurer in eight years. Howard 
acquitted himself well during the election campaign.952 While Lynch returned to cabinet 
after the election it was as industry minister. Howard remained treasurer, although then 
ranked only eighth in cabinet seniority, which rankled with Treasury.953 He was often 
                                                          
946 Hansard, 26 September 1974, p 1912. 
947 Haupt (1979, p 9). 
948 Snedden and Schedvin (1990, p 189). 
949 As Bowen (2015, p 256) observed, the ministerial responsibilities made him in effect an assistant 
treasurer. 
950 Schneider (1980, p 103). 
951 This surprised some commentators who had seen Eric Robinson as Lynch's likely successor, but Fraser 
was concerned that Robinson also had complex business dealings which could attract unhelpful attention; 
Cameron (1990, p 771) and Samuel (1978, p 48). 
952 Schneider (1980, p 103); Cameron (1990, p 818); Snedden (1986, p 49:17); Michelle Grattan, The Age, 
13 February 1978, p 9. 
953 Almost invariably the treasurer is one of the four top ministers. The only treasurers with a comparably 
low ranking were Spender in 1940 and Snedden in 1971-1972. And this was ‘a government where such 
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perceived as 'very much a Fraser-man'954 and Weller (1989, p 268) suggested he had less 
authority in cabinet than most treasurers and 'control over the details and direction of 
economic policy was …firmly in the hands of the prime minister'. Haupt (1979, p 10) 
argued Howard was therefore 'identified as the manager rather than the architect of 
economic policy'. In cabinet, 'Howard would get rolled. Cabinet ministers would sway 
the debate on the basis of an anecdote in the non-members' bar the night before'.955 He 
could not even get through cabinet a proposal for a $1 coin.956 Howard later claimed ‘I 
had to be the instrument for gathering the tax for the larger government that I didn’t 
want’.957  
The political challenges that faced Howard are illustrated by a 1978 opinion poll which 
showed that two-thirds of voters wanted the deficit reduced but majorities wanted 
increased spending on education, increased spending on health, increased spending on 
welfare and taxes cut (at least for lower income earners).958  
The cabinet committee on monetary policy was chaired by Fraser and the committee on 
wages by Lynch, who also chaired the 'razor gang' (see below). It was not until April 1982 
that Howard moved up to the deputy Liberal leadership, and hence the third cabinet 
ranking.959 While Lynch had briefly been both treasurer and finance minister, Howard 
lost the latter portfolio at the start of his tenure. 
 
                                                          
things mattered’; Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 74). Treasury was dismayed by the new treasurer's 
low rank and feared that he would be dominated by the prime minister; Abjorensen (1993, p 75). 
954 Samuel (1978, p 44). Howard rejects this saying he differed from Fraser sometimes, 'I'd be a hopeless 
treasurer if I let the prime minister get away with everything he wanted'; cited by McGregor (1982, p 16). 
Bob Ellis (1997a, p 226) claims that Howard’s colleagues recalled ‘only craven submission and craven 
flattery’ in Howard’s dealings with Fraser. 
955 John Hewson, cited Australian Financial Review, 6 July 1987, p 8. For example, Howard unsuccessfully 
opposed in cabinet in 1981 a decision to maintain high levels of protection for the car industry, clothing 
and textiles; Howard (2010, p 121). 
956 Howard proposed this in 1978 but it was not adopted until the Hawke Government; Peake (2009, p 4). 
957 Cited in Brandis (1998, p 62). 
958 Gallup poll reported in The Advertiser, 17 July 1978, p 8. 
959 Fraser wanted to secure the support of the free market ‘dries’ when his leadership was under challenge 
from Andrew Peacock; Ayres (1987, p 424). There were also those in the party who did not want both the 
leader and deputy coming from Victoria; Howard (2010, p 125), Summers (1983, p 49). Fraser had first 
sounded out backbenchers about replacing Lynch with Howard as deputy after the 1980 election but the 
numbers were not there; Summers (1983, pp 49-50). A different account is given by Fraser and Simon 
(2010, p 600) which quotes Fraser as saying 'Phillip was getting tired…I would have had to persuade him 
to stand'. 
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The macroeconomy and the early budgets 
One early act of Howard as treasurer was the first of some uncomfortable announcements 
on tax indexation. In the June 1978 ministerial statement Howard referred to an inflation 
rate of 10.9 per cent, subtracted the effects of higher indirect taxes, health care changes 
and devaluation to give 7.6 per cent and then halved it to get an indexation factor of 
3.8 per cent. In March 1980 it was again announced that the tax scales would only be 
indexed for half of inflation. In March 1981 it was announced that even half-indexation 
of income tax was to be abandoned. Howard wrote to Fraser that, while he had 'never 
been an enthusiast about tax indexation', he was concerned about the 'political 
implications' of this 'broken promise'.960 In public Howard still called tax indexation 'one 
of the most significant changes ever made to the Australian personal income tax 
system'.961  
In August 1978 Howard delivered 'a budget speech he had been rehearing all his life', but 
in which he saw himself as having to 'after nine months of drift, reassert maximum 
government control over the economy'.962 But there was one 'severe disappointment' for 
Howard.963 Fraser had insisted the 1977 budget include income tax cuts, which were 
famously spruiked in the ‘fist full of dollars’ election advertisements. Howard believed 
the cuts were both politically and economically unnecessary and resented the damage to 
his credibility when one of his early acts as treasurer was effectively to reverse them in 
the 1978 budget.964   
The 1978 budget reaffirmed the 'fight inflation first' strategy.965 In his speech Howard 
blamed excess wages as the main cause of unemployment.966 The budget introduced 
import parity pricing for domestically produced crude oil, one of a number of measures 
that led to the budget being very unpopular.967  
                                                          
960 Ayres (1987, p 406) reproduces the letter. 
961 Hansard, 2 June 1978, pp 3017-8. 
962 Haupt (1979, p 9). 
963 Hansard, 15 August 1978, p 40. 
964 Howard later reflected ‘the tax cuts in ’77 were not necessary and I was surprised by them, and of 
course, they unravelled very quickly and I had the problem’; Megalogenis (2012, p 105). Howard had to 
convince the cabinet to drop them and described the experience as ‘awful’; Megalogenis (2006, p 90). 
965 Howard declared 'both for its own sake and as the only real basis for achieving our other objectives, 
we are determined that Australia will have still lower inflation'; Hansard, 15 August 1978, p 38. 
966 Samuel (1978, p 50) and Hansard, 15 August 1978, p 39. 
967 58 per cent of respondents to a Morgan poll rated it ‘bad’, and it would be 1993 before there was a 
budget with a comparable amount of disapproval; McAllister, Mackerras and Boldiston (1997, p 296). 
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The 1979 budget again referred to an 'uncompromising attack on inflation.'968 Howard 
argued the budget strategy was vindicated by the 'steady improvement in Australia's 
economic health' but warned of 'fresh inflationary pressures' from higher oil prices. While 
aiming to reduce the deficit, he lamented 'no one should be under any illusion that the 
task is easy'.969 He was able to return the standard income tax rate to 32 per cent from 
December 1979. 
Embarrassingly for Howard, the entire 1980 budget was leaked to journalist Laurie 
Oakes. Again Howard started his speech by referring to the focus of policy being 'our 
relentless effort to control inflation' despite it still being in double digits.970 Defence was 
highlighted as a priority expenditure area, and increased by 7 per cent in real terms.  
After the 1980 election, a Review of Commonwealth Functions committee, known as the 
‘razor gang’, was announced with the aim of cutting some spending programmes and 
selling off government enterprises. Howard was on the committee, but it was led by 
deputy Liberal leader Lynch, rather than Howard.971 An early idea of abandoning the 
construction of the new Parliament House was vetoed by Fraser and when the 
committee’s report was released on 30 April 1981 the main features were the abolition of 
the Prices Justification Tribunal, the transfer of some activities to the states, cuts to 
overseas embassy staff and the sale of some minor government operations.972 While the 
opposition denounced it as a 'massive liquidation sale of national assets'973, a more 
common view was that 'its results were insubstantial'.974 Howard (2010, p 120) now views 
it as 'one of the great damp squibs of the Fraser Government’. 
The 1981 budget expressed concern about accelerating wages and once again gave 
‘priority to constraining and reducing inflation'.975 Sales tax was increased and its 
coverage expanded as part of a plan for a balanced budget. 
                                                          
968 Hansard, 21 August 1979, p 47. 
969 Hansard, 21 August 1979, p 48. 
970 Hansard, 19 August 1980, p 49. 
971 The other members were the finance minister Guilfoyle, the National Country Party's Peter Nixon and 
employment minister Ian Viner. 
972 Bendigo Ordnance Factory, Australian Wool Testing Laboratory, Australian Government Clothing 
Factory, Housing Loans Insurance Corporation, Mugga quarry, Belconnen Mall and some surplus land; 
Hansard, 30 April 1981, pp 1830-53; Wanna, Kelly & Forster (2000, p 130) and Weller (1989, pp 245-251). 
973 Bill Hayden, Hansard, 30 April 1981, p 1880. 
974 Richardson (2001, p 201). Among ideas discussed but not recommended were the sale of the two 
airlines and the Commonwealth Bank; Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, p 130). 
975 Hansard, 18 August 1981, p 53. 
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The Campbell report and financial deregulation 
Fraser first promised an inquiry into the capital market as part of his election manifesto 
in November 1975. After renewing the promise at the 1977 election, Fraser, partly 
influenced by his advisers John Rose, Ian Castles and Ed Visbord, commissioned the 
Campbell Report, which covered the broader topic of the whole financial system, despite 
a lack of enthusiasm from Treasury.976 The inquiry was established 'with committee 
members and terms of reference that guaranteed a report advocating substantial 
deregulation'.977  
Fraser was pushed by his department, and advised by Nobel prize-winner Friedrich von 
Hayek978, to float the dollar. Treasury and the Reserve Bank argued that the managed 
float was flexible enough and that a floating rate might be too volatile. Fraser pushed for 
Treasury and the Bank to set out how a more market-oriented exchange rate system could 
be implemented and while at that stage Fraser opposed a full float he was open to 
debate.979 But Howard did not push for floating the dollar because Treasury, and in 
particular his permanent head John Stone, opposed it.980   
The Reserve Bank board recommended deregulating interest rates before the Campbell 
Committee reported. Howard initially refused to take the idea to the relevant cabinet 
committee and when he did it was first rejected and then restricted to deposit rates. 
Interest rate ceilings on bank deposits were removed in December 1980, but the more 
sensitive ceiling on loan interest rates remained. 
                                                          
976 Barnett and Goward (1997, p 93); Guttmann (2005, p 130) and Weller (1989, p 377); Bell (2004, p 21). 
John Hewson, then in Howard’s office, was also pushing for the inquiry and claims ‘I basically wrote the 
terms of reference myself’; Love (2001, p 59). 
977 Quiggin (2012, p 213). Hewson (2011) recalled he helped choose the members. 
978 Millmow (2015b, p 5). 
979 Fraser and Simons (2010, pp 532-5). Cornish (2014, p 5) notes that Fraser ‘expressed some interest in 
floating the $A when it was explained to him that domestic monetary expansion could be better controlled 
if exchange rates were allowed to fluctuate according to market pressures’. He asked Austin Holmes, then 
a consultant economist in his department and a long-time advocate of floating, to prepare a paper on 
moving to a foreign exchange market; Ayres (1987, p 410). Howard believes that a re-elected Fraser 
Government would never have floated the dollar; interviewed for Bowen (2015, p 287). 
980Fraser and Simons (2010, p 526), Megalogenis (2012, p 129). Howard brought a submission to cabinet 
arguing that ‘comparison of Australia’s recent experience with that of other countries where exchange 
rates are determined more directly by market forces does not present a convincing case for a basic change 
from our present foreign exchange arrangements’; Fraser and Simons (2010, p 533). Even Hewson was at 
the time apparently a little nervous about the 'risk' of floating the exchange rate; Christine Wallace, citing 
a letter sent to Campbell Committee secretary Fred Argy, 24 June 1981; Australian Financial Review, 
10 March 1993, p 5.  
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While Fraser was initially supportive of the Campbell inquiry, Howard claims that ‘Fraser 
seemed to go cold on the idea of financial deregulation as Campbell’s work proceeded’.981 
Howard claims ‘I wanted to go a lot further with things like financial deregulation’.982 On 
this view, Howard, supported by John Hewson, an advisor he inherited from Lynch, was 
an 'enthusiastic advocate of financial deregulation' while Fraser was 'more cautious'.983 
By the time the report was released in November 1981, Howard claims Fraser would not 
commit to supporting its recommendations.984 The controversial circumstances in which 
Fraser first became prime minister have been suggested, including by Howard, as making 
him cautious.985  
On the other hand, there are accounts in which it was Fraser who pushed for a tender 
system of selling government bonds in the face of opposition from Howard and 
Treasury.986 Treasury notes were first offered by tender in December 1979 and Treasury 
                                                          
981 Howard (2010, p 114), Haigh (2013, pp 58-59). Howard has referred to those in cabinet 'who believed 
in the benign hand of government' while claiming himself to be an 'unregenerate free marketer on 
economics' who 'would have liked to do a lot more'; cited in Sheridan (1984, p 19). Howard (1989, p 34) 
has called Fraser 'by nature an interventionist' with senior ministers who as 'products of the 
Menzies-McEwen period had seen a relatively interventionist approach to economic policy apparently 
produce good results'. Similar views are reported as put by Howard in Kelly (2001, p 244) and Megalogenis 
(2012, p 145).  
982 Masters (1990b, p 10). As Megalogenis (2006, p 301) put it, as treasurer ‘Howard had power, but didn’t 
use it, because he was stomped on by Malcolm Fraser’. Howard himself later reflected to Peter Reith that 
he knew ‘what’s it like to have a PM who doesn’t support you’; Reith’s diary entry 28 August 1997, 
reprinted in Reith (2015, p 160). Neil Brown (1993, p 189), a contemporary MHR support’s Howard’s claim 
to have been a ‘frustrated reformer’ but was not in the Fraser cabinet himself. 
983 Quiggin (2012, p 214). Keating believes Fraser is ‘the most maligned person in the Liberal Party’s 
history’ and subject to a ‘re-writing of history’, believing that Howard overstates the extent to which it 
was Fraser’s dominance rather than weak presentation by Howard that led to so little of the deregulation 
agenda being implemented.  Keating claims Howard would ‘slither out of the cabinet room like a mangy 
maggot’; Carroll (2010, p 48). Fraser and Simons (2010, p 543) argue 'any idea that Howard was forcing 
the pace of change against reluctance from Fraser and cabinet is obviously false'. Ayres (1987, pp 408-9) 
presents a similar story. Weller (1989, p 383) comments ‘no one tried to push along the implementation 
of the [Campbell] report’. Future Liberal treasurer Peter Costello's view is that ‘Howard…had not been a 
great reformer'; quoted in Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 387) and Hartcher (2007b). Howard's one 
time chief of staff Gerard Henderson (2003, p 41) believes the outlawing of secondary boycotts by trade 
unions is 'perhaps the only significant economic reform of the Fraser years'.  
984 Howard (2010, p 126). Snedden (1986, p 56:5) claimed Fraser 'as good as ignored' the Campbell Report. 
985 Howard said in 1980 ‘in retrospect it was a mistake not to let the Whitlam Government run its full 
term…there was a feeling we had pushed Australia to the brink…that induced a sense of hesitancy in the 
reforms’; Masters (1990b, p 10). Journalist Michelle Grattan (2005, p 162) comments ‘Fraser was more 
cautious than one would have expected, given his majority, and a reason was because of the legitimacy 
issue’. Other Liberal leaders – Peacock, Hewson, Downer and Nelson -- agreed that the controversial 
manner in which Fraser took power made him more cautious, but Fraser himself and some of his advisers 
such as Tony Eggleton, David Kemp and Dale Budd, reject this; Kelly and Bramston (2015, pp 276-282). 
986 Fraser and Simons (2010, pp 535-538) presents a detailed account where Fraser and his department 
push for the measure while Treasury opposes it and Howard appears inactive. Among the drivers within 
Fraser’s advisers were John Rose, Ian Castles and Eddie Visbord. Bowen (2015, p 280) refers to Howard as 
‘highly resistant’ to the reform. 
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bonds in July 1982. Macfarlane (2006, p 41) says this reform 'has not been accorded the 
importance it deserves' and regards it as 'second only in importance to the float of the 
Australian dollar' as a monetary reform. Morony (2007, p 63) says Fraser tried to give his 
department the right to veto bids in the bond tender but a Treasury officer ignored the 
direction.  
On financial deregulation more broadly, Fraser's adviser Professor John Rose argues 'the 
action, the drive, the change came from Fraser, it did not come from Howard'.987 A Fraser 
biographer has referred to the ‘enduring myth’ that Fraser resisted the efforts of Howard 
towards deregulation.988 Shortly before his death Fraser, interviewed by Megalogenis 
(2015), recalled ‘there were a lot of letters I wrote saying “why is this taking so long?”’ 
In an earlier interview, Fraser (1987, p 35) called Howard ‘very lethargic’ and similar 
views are cited by Malone (1987, p 3). Fraser’s authorised biography points out that even 
when Howard suggested some deregulation of banks he said it was ‘neither necessary nor 
desirable’ to make sudden changes.989 Treasury was not pushing Howard to argue for 
deregulation and there were concerns within the cabinet about the political popularity of 
deregulation.  
Love (2008, p 26) questions Howard’s role as a strong advocate for change by pointing 
to the absence of cabinet submissions by Howard arguing for deregulation. Wallace 
(1993, pp 125-132) attributes this lack of cabinet submissions to Howard’s practice of 
discussing ideas with Fraser and not bringing forward ideas which Fraser would oppose 
and to a somewhat chaotic management style in Howard's office where Hewson was 
juggling his role as adviser with professorial responsibilities at the University of New 
South Wales. One defence made is that Howard's gradualism reflected guile rather than 
sloth; 'Campbelling by stealth' through a 'quiet, almost clandestine' campaign to have a 
'doubting cabinet' implement the Campbell recommendations.990 Journalist and political 
historian Paul Kelly (1992, pp 78-79) shares the blame around; ‘Fraser would never 
                                                          
987 Quoted in Ayres (1987, p 413) and Kelly (1992, p 78). 
988 Ayres (1987, p 408). Peter Costello says of Howard’s approach to deregulation ‘if he had really wanted 
to push it he could have pushed it’; Hartcher (2007b). 
989 Fraser and Simons (2010, p 539). 
990 Barnett and Goward (1997, p 204), Barton (1982, p 13) and Kelly (1994, p 78). Gittins (1984, p 9) also 
sees a strategy behind Howard's 'cunning approach'; 'pulling out all the boards and struts which no-one 
regarded as particularly important…[so that] the edifice became more unstable and it became easier to 
justify continuing the demolition job.' 
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become a pure deregulator; Howard lacked a reforming drive and clout in cabinet; and 
Stone was obstructionist’.  
But as Howard's biographers concede ‘the glacial pace of developments surrounding the 
Campbell Report doesn’t indicate a treasurer in a hurry for reform’.991 Howard took about 
a year to develop the terms of reference and suggest members for the inquiry and more 
than a year (toing and froing with Treasury and the Reserve Bank) to translate the 
recommendations into proposals for cabinet.992  
One area where Howard was bolder than Fraser was over foreign bank entry. Howard 
boosted the case for this by allowing mergers between the largest domestic banks. Stone 
was wary and Fraser (reflecting his rural background) was cautious about giving banks 
more power, but it again took Howard months to prepare a cabinet submission on the 
matter.993 By early 1983, when Howard announced the Government would allow about 
ten foreign banks to enter the market, the Fraser Government was about to fall. 
Tax reform 
Howard floated the idea of a consumption tax in 1978 but by January 1979 had to 
announce the government would not be proceeding with it, on the grounds of its impact 
on inflationary expectations and the uncertainty it could create.994 After the 1980 election 
Howard announced an examination of the taxation system including the possible 
introduction of a broad-based indirect tax, which Howard hoped to implement before the 
government lost control of the Senate in July 1981. Fraser and Country Party leader 
Anthony were not attracted to the idea. In February 1981, Fraser gave a radio interview 
criticising the inflationary impact of any increase in indirect tax, which signalled the 
Government would not take any action.995 Howard (1989, p 34) regarded this as 'a crucial 
failure of nerve'. 
                                                          
991 Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 90). Kelly (1994, p 79) opines that ‘Howard lacked reforming drive’. 
Bowen (2015, p 279) describes Howard as ‘not a particularly enthusiastic or fast worker for financial 
deregulation’. 
992 Ayres (1987, p 411) and Weller (1989, pp 377-382). One factor was the lack of enthusiasm of Treasury 
and/or the Reserve Bank for specific measures, even though in principle they supported deregulation; 
Weller (1989, p 382). 
993 Ayres (1987, pp 412-3). Henderson (1995, p 42) calls Howard 'not resolute in pushing for change' and 
'indecisive' at this period. 
994 Barnett and Goward (1997, pp 96-97). 
995 Howard first heard of this when journalist Michelle Grattan rang him at his holiday accommodation 
and said ‘your indirect tax is dead, cobber’; Howard (2010, pp 118-9). It remained a long term ambition 
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In 1978 Treasury proposed a resources rent tax on oil and uranium but industry opposition 
persuaded Howard against it.996 Howard called a Labor policy of a super tax on banks as 
'socialistic'.997  
In the 1978 budget Howard introduced a means test on family payments based on the 
income of children with the intention of stopping the wealthy putting income in the names 
of children. The press dubbed it the ‘newspaper boys tax’ and it was scrapped. 
When the Costigan Royal Commission uncovered evidence of bottom-of-the-harbour tax 
avoidance schemes,998 the government introduced retrospective laws against the schemes 
in April 1978. This was furiously resisted by some in the business community and the 
Liberal Party, with former prime minister McMahon leading some backbenchers to cross 
the floor. Howard once said 'I had a real wrestle and I still haven't resolved in my own 
mind whether I was right or wrong'.999 In general Fraser was more supportive of 
retrospective legislation against blatant tax evasion than was Howard.1000 
Monetary policy 
While John Howard was treasurer monetary policy was essentially determined by 
cabinet’s Monetary Policy Committee, four of whose seven members were farmers. It 
effectively set maximum interest rates on most bank loans. The Treasury secretary and 
the governor of the Reserve Bank usually attended its meetings.  
When Reserve Bank governor Harry Knight was about to retire, media reports floated the 
name of Lynch as governor but the Reserve Bank board was opposed.1001 John Stone 
(2007, p 14) recommended to Howard that deputy governor Don Sanders be appointed. 
                                                          
for Howard, finally being introduced when he was prime minister almost two decades later; as 
Megalogenis (1999, p 99) put it, ‘Howard felt the GST would be what Citizen Kane was to Orson Welles or 
Blonde on Blonde was to his favourite singer, Bob Dylan – a shot at making history’. 
996 Barnett and Goward (1997, p 83). 
997 As Oakes (1982) noted, 'a somewhat surprising claim given that Britain's Margaret Thatcher imposed 
just such a tax' the previous year. 
998 'These involved highly artificial arrangements in which companies were stripped of assets and passed 
through a number of hands to avoid tax liabilities'; Fraser and Simons (2010, p 587). Costigan’s report 
observed ‘this [tax avoidance] industry has developed in Australia…at a rate far in excess of any other 
industry and has brought with it profits comparable only to the heady days of the Victorian gold rush’; 
cited by John Dawkins, Hansard, 18 May 1983, p 639. 
999 Oakes (1985). Bowen (2015, p 252) regards Howard’s stance on tax evasion as the high point of his 
treasurership. 
1000 Weller (1989, p 388). 
1001 Fraser and Simons (2010, p 550). Ramsey (1984, p 6) reports the external board members wrote to 
Howard opposing appointing an outsider as governor. Marr (1982) suggests some threatened to resign. 
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Instead the Bank's secretary, Bob Johnston, who had told Fraser's adviser Rose he was 
personally more supportive of financial deregulation than were other senior Bank officers, 
was appointed at Fraser's initiative.1002  
In October 1978, the Monetary Policy Committee decided that the ceiling on bank lending 
rates should be reduced but the Reserve Bank’s board believed ‘it would not be in the 
public interest’ and indicated it would say so publicly if pushed and the government 
backed off.1003 The committee contemplated using section 11 of the Banking Act to direct 
the Reserve Bank to loosen monetary policy to assist the housing industry in 1982, but to 
Howard’s relief decided not to do so.1004  
The Howard treasurership was the highpoint of monetary targeting, which former Reserve 
Bank governor Ian Macfarlane (1998, p 10 and 2006, p 39) dates as operating from 1976 
to 1985. Cornish (2010, p 26) observed that the Reserve Bank itself 'was never convinced 
that a key assumption of monetarism – that a stable relationship existed between monetary 
growth and the growth of income and prices – would hold in all circumstances'. 
The Campbell Committee recommended in favour of retaining monetary targeting, 
despite recognising that ‘special problems will occur during the transitional period of 
deregulation’.1005 In 1978 Treasury said in the Budget papers that the monetary targets 
'have made an important contribution to the success of anti-inflation policy.'1006 By the 
1980 budget some wariness was expressed with the targeting approach, as monetary 
growth exceeded the 10 per cent target by three percentage points. A new target of 
9-11 per cent was set but Howard cautioned that 'M3 is not a totally definitive measure 
of monetary growth'.1007 In his 1982 budget speech, Howard revealed 'the government 
gave serious thought this year to formally abandoning the announcement of a monetary 
projection' but unenthusiastically retained it, arguing it is 'generally seen by the market as 
important to expectations'.1008  
                                                          
1002 Fraser and Simons (2010, p 550); Bell (2004, p 26). 
1003 Cornish (2010, pp 126-127). 
1004 Cornish (2010, p 128), Howard (2010, p 106). 
1005 Guttmann (2005, p 131), who observes that the discussion of monetary targeting took up less than 
1 per cent of the report with only light analysis provided. 
1006 Budget statement no 2, p 23. 
1007 Hansard, 19 August 1980, p 49. 
1008 Hansard, 17 August 1982, p 73. 
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The 1982-83 recession and Howard’s final budget 
During 1980 and 1981 real GDP grew strongly and the economy appeared to have left 
behind the sluggishness of the 1970s and was on the threshold of a resources boom. These 
sentiments were soon reflected, however, in an acceleration in wages, which was followed 
by a rise in inflation back into double digits1009 and a slowing of economic growth. Real 
GDP contracted in 1982-83 for the first time since 1952-53 and unemployment reached 
its highest rate since the 1930s.1010 
1982 was a turbulent year for the Fraser government as it lost the Lowe by-election, 
Andrew Peacock challenged for the leadership, the Costigan Report led to controversy 
over tax evasion, the damming of the Franklin River became a major issue, the global 
economy weakened and the drought became severe. The 1982 budget was regarded as a 
pre-election budget where the Fraser Government in a ‘series of decisions on the run’ did 
a U-turn on its long-term goal of deficit reduction.1011  
Treasury wanted a deficit of under $500 million, but Howard suggested between 
$500 million and $1,000 million, warning that a larger deficit would damage the 
Government's economic credibility. In December 1982 Howard said ‘it is no answer to 
current problems for the Government to expand the budget deficit’.1012 Fraser, however, 
for a combination of political and economic motives wanted an even larger deficit. Fraser 
had been an admirer of Keynes, whom he felt had been misrepresented in some 
conservative political circles, since his student days in Oxford.1013 He therefore 
determined to respond to the weakening economy with a loosening of fiscal and monetary 
policy.1014 Fraser's view was reinforced when he held a lunch at the Lodge for leading 
business leaders and bankers who advocated a stimulatory budget at the time (although 
some were subsequently critical in public).1015 In the event a deficit of 1 per cent of GDP 
                                                          
1009 Peter Costello caustically remarked ‘the Howard treasurership was not a success in terms of interest 
rates and inflation’; quoted in Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 387) and Hartcher (2007b). 
1010 Derived from data in Butlin, Dixon and Lloyd (2015). 
1011 Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, pp 142-5), Weller (1989, pp 251-2, 264-5). Fraser planned a late 1982 
election, partly due to concerns that the global economy was deteriorating and partly as he preferred to 
face then opposition leader Bill Hayden (whom he'd beaten in 1980) than the charismatic Bob Hawke. A 
combination of the Costigan report, opposition from party officials and a bad back forced him to delay 
until early 1983; Ayres (1987, pp 425-6). 
1012 Davis (1989, p 72). 
1013 Fraser and Simons (2010, p 52). 
1014 Wanna (1994, p 228). 
1015 Weller (1989, pp 257-9). 
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was budgeted but the final outcome was twice that, the largest ever in dollar terms at the 
time and the largest as a percentage to GDP since 1977-78. Further spending measures 
were announced in early 1983. 
In the budget speech, the emphasis on inflation was dropped. Instead it was noted 'the 
international recession is hitting us hard' and so 'we have done all we can to provide relief, 
assistance and incentive'.1016 Income tax was reduced, and capital works spending and 
family allowances increased. Noting 'the Government has always seen merit in gradually 
moving away from an overreliance on personal income tax', there was some increase and 
broadening of the base of the sales tax.1017 There was criticism of wage increases which 
meant 'Australia has priced herself out of many world markets'.1018   
Howard considered resigning as he regarded the budget as irresponsible and he was 
opposed to Fraser’s suggestion of overriding the Reserve Bank.1019 Further aggravating 
tension between them, Fraser approved spending initiatives without reference to Howard. 
Fraser and Howard were reportedly snarling at each other over the cabinet table as the 
budget was developed.1020 In a cabinet submission, Howard warned ‘what is at stake here 
is our economic credibility’.1021 Some of his supporters among the ‘Dries’ – the more 
zealous free market supporters – even mused about a leadership challenge against 
Fraser.1022 But he ultimately decided against resignation. This partly reflected a view that 
it would be too disloyal and could greatly damage the government and partly that 'at that 
time, Howard was none too keen on taking really tough decisions'.1023  
                                                          
1016 Hansard, 17 August 1982, p 59. 
1017 Hansard, 17 August 1982, p 70. 
1018 Hansard, 17 August 1982, p 59. 
1019 John Stone advised Howard to resign; Megalogenis (2012, p 133). John Hewson encouraged Howard 
to resign when Fraser tried to force the Reserve Bank to make a special reduction in SRDs and direct the 
funds into housing; Abjorensen (1993, pp 82-83). But the ‘dries’ argued that it was better for Howard to 
stay; Kitney (2015, p 15). Costello doubts this story: ‘he was threatening resignation a long time after the 
event but there was no evidence at the time’; Hartcher (2007b).  
1020 Kelly (1992, p 51). Howard approved a section in the budget papers regarded as implicitly critical of 
Fraser, attributing the spike in wages to exaggerated expectations of a resources boom; Megalogenis 
(2012, p 134). The Reserve Bank’s John Phillips (2001, p 44) opined that ‘I don’t think anybody could have 
been a great treasurer under Fraser’. 
1021 Kitney (2015, p 15). In Howard (1989, p 33) he wrote 'it seriously damaged the credibility of the Fraser 
Government'. In 1983 he said of the ‘fight inflation first’ strategy that ‘the error of the former government 
was not that its policy was wrong but that on occasion the policy was pursued with insufficient zeal and 
enthusiasm’; Hansard, 22 September 1983, p 1191. 
1022 King (2015, p 50). 
1023 Errington and van Onselen (2007, pp 93-4); Howard (2010, p 128); Henderson (1995, p 43 and 2003, 
pp 42-43). 
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Howard clashed with Fraser in the dying days of his government about whether Treasury's 
projections about a widening in the prospective budget deficit should be made public but 
Fraser prevailed and they were not disclosed until after the election.1024 During the 
campaign Howard described as ‘colourful’, but refused to endorse, a claim by Fraser that 
savings would be safer under the bed than in the banks under Labor.1025  Journalist Paul 
Kelly (1985, p 409) suggests that during the campaign ‘the split between Fraser and 
Howard over economic policy widened dramatically; a re-elected Fraser government 
would have become quickly involved in a deep brawl over economic direction’. 
Keating in opposition 
After the 1975 election, Keating stood for deputy leader but was narrowly beaten by Tom 
Uren.1026 After briefly being shadow minister for agriculture, he was promoted in 1977 
to spokesperson on minerals and energy and he ‘visited virtually every resource project 
in Australia’ and promoted a profits-related resources tax, which in 1977 became part of 
the ALP platform.1027 Stone (2013, p 44) recalled he ‘won golden opinions from the 
business community’.1028 Bramston (2016, p 137) describes how Keating aspired to an 
economics portfolio and hired economist Barbara Ward to his staff to help prepare him. 
From 1979 to 1983 Keating was NSW state president of the ALP. He was prominent in 
the then powerful NSW Right faction, dismissing the Left as ‘Balmain basket 
weavers’.1029 Keating lashed the Fraser government’s ‘pre-Copernican preoccupations’ 
with small government and cutting real wages.1030    
Keating was fond of and respected Bill Hayden and hoped to succeed him as prime 
minister. He was, therefore, unenthusiastic about Bob Hawke’s entry into parliament and 
leadership aspirations, once remarking ‘the first Labor leader I tear down will be the one 
                                                          
1024 Barnett and Goward (1997, pp 238-9), Fraser (1987, p 142), Haupt and Grattan (1983, p 114), Kelly 
(1985, p 411), Summers (1983, p 159). The '$9.6 billion deficit for 1983-84' was used to discredit Howard 
for years. 
1025 McGregor (1983, p 101). In private Howard asked Fraser’s office ‘what the f—k is this “money under 
the beds” line?’; Tingle (2015, p 39). Hawke’s riposte that people could not put their money under the 
beds as ‘that’s where the Commies are’ only made Fraser seem more foolish; Kelly (1985, p 407). 
1026 He later said that he only ran to stay ahead of Mick Young in the running for a future leadership 
position and was relieved not to win; O’Brien (2015, p 100). 
1027 Carr (1979, p 84), Day (2015, p 176). 
1028 Stone (2013, p 44). 
1029 Carr (1982, p 24), Carew (1988, p 53), Day (2015, p 199). 
1030 Hansard, 26 May 1976, p 2476. 
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I replace’.1031 In time Keating joined with his NSW right faction in switching support to 
Hawke but it was Graeme Richardson rather than Keating who lobbied others to support 
Hawke. 
In shadow cabinet Keating emphasised promoting economic growth to allow 
redistribution and spending on Labor priorities and warned ‘if profits or retained earnings 
are squeezed unduly in favour of wages, investment slows and growth fades’.1032 Keating 
and Willis were appointed by Hayden to a ‘shadow razor gang’ to vet spending 
proposals.1033 
Keating recalls asking Hayden after the 1980 election to be made shadow treasurer but 
Hayden preferred to stick with Ralph Willis.1034 In the dying days of his leadership in 
January 1983 Hayden replaced Ralph Willis with Keating as shadow treasurer to bring 
his ‘attacking style’ to the cause.1035   
Keating was one of the few shadow ministers to support the Campbell Report 
recommendations in 1981.1036 But in public he had to follow the party line. In early 1983, 
Howard announced the government would allow about ten foreign banks to enter the 
market. As newly appointed shadow treasurer Keating criticised this as ‘ad-hoc 
                                                          
1031 Day (2015, p 184), Edwards (1996, p 152). 
1032 Carr (1982, p 24). 
1033 Haupt and Grattan (1983, p 67). 
1034 Keating, cited by O’Brien (2015, p 122), commented ‘I believed I had a much better model developing 
in my head for the economy and was in a better position to sell that model than anybody else’. In contrast 
Carew (1988, p 65) and Freudenberg (2005, p 209) believe it was Hayden who raised the idea with Keating 
in 1980 but Keating was unenthusiastic. Hayden was also dissuaded by some left-wing members; Weller 
(1999, p 141). 
1035 Bowen (1990, pp 12:21, 22:17 and 32:1). Bowen and/or Uren suggested the idea to Hayden and told 
Keating it would assist his prime ministerial aspirations. Hayden told Keating ‘you’re the only bastard 
tough enough to handle [then Treasury secretary] John Stone’; Carew (1988, p 69), Day (2015, p 311), 
Edwards (1996, p 159) and Kelly (1994, p 27). Hayden also thought about moving Hawke to the shadow 
treasurer position but the left of the party strongly opposed this; Kelly (1985, p 339) and Summers (1983, 
p 25). As Kelly (1985, p 352) put it, the switch was because ‘Willis had all the expertise but no wham’. 
Bramston (2016, p 167) recalled being told by Hayden that his press secretary Alan Ramsey was the 
strongest advocate of the move. Keating claims in O’Brien (2015, p 122) that by then he was 
unenthusiastic about the idea but Haupt and Grattan (1983, p 53) claim the move lifted Keating out of a 
temporary period of gloom. Edwards (1988, p 71) believed Keating was unsure enough to discuss with 
four Labor identities before accepting but Keating told O’Brien (2015, p 122) it was the leader’s right to 
appoint whomever he wished and so he thought ‘I’ve got to go up the big learning curve but what else 
can I do?’. 
1036 Bowman and Grattan (1989, p 149), Garnaut (1994, p 61). As shadow minister for natural resources 
Keating came to believe the local banks were starving miners of finance and this inclined him to support 
foreign bank entry; Megalogenis (2012, p 164). 
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decision-making which…will effectively change by stealth the whole structure of the 
Australian financial system’.1037  
Keating as treasurer  
Hawke thought about shifting Keating after the election and appointing Willis, his former 
ACTU colleague, as treasurer.1038 But Keating threatened ‘massive retaliation’, New 
South Wales figures in the party insisted that with a Victorian as prime minister, the 
treasurer should be from NSW, and Hawke realised Keating was a more effective 
salesman than Willis, and so Keating was confirmed as treasurer.1039 
Keating became the driver of economic reform.1040 Keating acknowledges that Hawke 
was more supportive of economic reforms than were many other prime ministers.1041 
They formed an effective team, agreeing on most issues and with what ‘t Hart and Walter 
(2014, p 4) termed ‘distinctive but highly compatible skill sets’. Hawke shone at gaining 
popularity with the public, thereby winning elections, negotiating compromises and 
chairing cabinet which allowed Keating (and some other senior ministers) to shine at 
introducing reforms. Keating brought to the partnership an ability to win over cabinet and 
caucus ‘with charm, aggression, chutzpah and sheer command of detail’, dominate the 
parliament and enthral influential members of the press gallery.1042 
 
                                                          
1037 Keating argued ‘any logical examination of this issue leads to the inescapable conclusion that over 
time foreign bank entry will force up interest rates for individual borrowers’; cited by Gittins (1984, p 9). 
This stance had been drafted for Ralph Willis by his adviser John Langmore; Edwards (1996, p 206). 
1038 Day (2015, p 223) and Bramston (2016, p 183) claimed the ACTU’s Bill Kelty pressed Hawke to appoint 
Willis. Chris Bowen (2015, p 302) reveals Hawke had his political adviser Peter Barron attempt to convince 
Keating to give up the treasury portfolio. 
1039 Keating interviewed in O’Brien (2015, p 132), Keating comments to Mark Latham, 12 May 2003, in 
Latham (2005, p 221), Bramston (2016, p 184), D'Alpuget (2010, p 26), Day (2015, p 224), Hawke (1994, 
p 158), Kelly (1994, p 55), Mills (1998, p 52), Richardson (1994, p 137) and Tink (2014, pp 299-300). 
1040 As Keating put it, Hawke ‘actively supported the policy that I recommended to him. But the philosophy 
of the policy, the execution of the policy came from me’; interview February 1998, cited in S Martin (1999, 
p 155). He has recently called them ‘a great partnership’; cited in Gordon (2014, p 5). Fellow 
parliamentarian Leo McLeay said; ‘Keating was the driver of most of it…what drove him were the Treasury 
people. Hawkie went along with things most of the time, that chairman of the board attitude. Keating was 
the engine, Hawke was a participant’, interview March 1988, cited in S Martin (1999, p 154). 
1041 Keating interviewed by O’Brien (2013). Paul Keating once remarked ‘you can’t preside over such 
fundamental adjustments without a substantial and deep unity of purpose between the prime minister 
and the treasurer‘; Bramston (2014, p 124). Weller (2007b, p 171) notes Hawke 'generally helped Keating 
hold the economic line, more certainly when Keating was actually present'. 
1042 ‘t Hart and Walter (2014, p 5). 
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Revising priorities and the Economic Summit 
A Treasury insider had leaked to Hawke news of the large budget deficit during the 
election campaign but Hawke did not disclose it.1043 But after the election, the revision in 
the projected budget deficit from $6 billion to $9.6 billion was used to justify reviewing 
Labor’s $1.5 billion of promises. Keating thought this was no bad thing as ‘the 1983 
policy speech that Bob gave was hopeless…it was a shopping list’.1044 
To help set a new agenda, a National Economic Summit was held in April 1983, at which 
Hawke stressed the need for reconciliation and consensus. This led to the abandonment 
of the Fraser government’s ‘fight inflation first’ policy and agreement that inflation and 
unemployment needed to be fought simultaneously.1045 The Summit agreed to the 
establishment of the Economic Planning Advisory Council. A ministerial statement on 
the summit was presented by Hawke. As Barry Jones (2006, p 338) remarked, with 
hindsight it is striking the issues not addressed by the Summit, such as floating the dollar, 
foreign bank entry and taxation reform. 
Notwithstanding his desire for the post, Keating reputedly had remarked on becoming 
treasurer, 'I've been handed the poisoned chalice, mate'.1046 In his early days in the role 
Keating felt ‘a substantial degree of discomfort’ and agreed to leave responsibility for tax 
policy with Willis and Dawkins.1047 He started in a subdued fashion, was tentative at the 
Economic Summit, and on his own admission ‘it took me a while to find my feet’.1048 But 
as Hawke put it, Keating was ‘a quick learner’ and ‘his customary confidence and 
assurance’ soon returned.1049 By 1984 he was confident enough to face an audience of the 
Economics Society and field questions for an hour.1050  
                                                          
1043 Bongiorno (2015, p 15), D’Alpuget (2010, p 14); Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003, p 243). 
1044 Keating interviewed in Megalogenis (2015). 
1045 See also Keating’s ministerial statement, Hansard 19 May 1983, p 803 and his first budget speech. 
1046 Carew (1988, p 67), D'Alpuget (2010, p 26). Edwards (1996, p 160) suggests ‘Keating’s reluctance to 
take the job was more feigned than real’. 
1047 Kelly (1985, p 352), Bowen (1991, p 22:17). By July Keating regained control of tax policy; Walsh (1995). 
1048 Keating quoted in Cumming (1991, p 311). John Button described him as ‘extraordinarily hesitant’; 
Gordon (1996, p 96). Keating has conceded ‘it took me a while to find my position’, Spencer and Chubb 
(1993), but recently put reports of his initial nervousness in context, arguing ‘you’d need to be on valium 
not to be nervous’; interview in Megalogenis (2015). Bob Carr observed ‘the Keating learning curve is one 
of the masterpieces of recent Australian politics’; Lyons (1987, p 1). 
1049 Kitney (2012, p 45), Megalogenis (2012, p 165); McMullin (1991, p 418). Treasury officials described 
how Keating grew into the job as they schooled him in economics; Campbell and Halligan (1992, pp 24 
and 26).  
1050 Carew (1988, p 88). 
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Keating’s early budgets: out of recession 
Treasury described the fiscal imbalance facing the incoming government as 
'unprecedented in Australia during peacetime', with the deficit projected to exceed 6 per 
cent of GDP.1051 Keating explained the need for expenditure restraint as ‘because there is 
an economic need for that to happen in the context of a maturing economy, not because 
obeisance needs to be paid to any dogma’.1052 Keating never had time for those he called 
‘deficit daleks’, which he defined as ‘somebody who believes that the Budget deficit can 
never be small enough, or the surplus large enough, in any circumstances’.1053  
Keating sat on the Expenditure Review Committee (Labor’s version of the 'razor gang'), 
chaired by Hawke, from its inception in 1983. He worked closely with John Dawkins, the 
finance minister, on the 1983 budget, which aimed 'to provide a floor of activity in the 
economy while the private sector recovers' by providing 'a substantial economic stimulus 
within an acceptable balance of risks'.1054 It included some tough decisions on tax 
expenditures, abolishing rebates for health insurance premia and terminating the housing 
interest rebate. Some excises were raised and it was announced that they would be 
indexed to maintain their real value. These revenue measures allowed increased funding 
for employment schemes and an increase in the unemployment benefit while reining back 
the deficit. A target of creating 500,000 jobs in the first three years was announced, 
regarded as ambitious at the time, but easily achieved.1055 Restoring economic growth 
was assisted by the breaking of the drought.  
In 1984 Keating was named Euromoney's 'finance minister of the year',1056 or as the 
Australian press often referred to it 'world's greatest treasurer'.1057 When he was presented 
with the award, he was called Australia’s ‘most impressive treasurer since the war’.1058 
                                                          
1051 Hansard, 19 May 1983, p 736. 
1052 Keating (1985, p 20). 
1053 Interview with John Laws, 13 February 1995. 
1054 Hansard, 23 August 1983, pp 44, 57. 
1055 Stutchbury (1990, p 55). In the event employment increased by around 650,000 between March 1983 
and March 1986. 
1056 The award was principally in recognition of his deregulation of the financial system but also recognised 
his presiding over rapid economic growth; Euromoney (1984, p 40). The only other Australian treasurer 
so honoured since the award started in 1981 has been Wayne Swan. 
1057 A phrase also used by Hawke in the 1984 election campaign launch; FitzSimons (1998, p 257). 
1058 Kelly (1994, p 10), Megalogenis (2012, p 167). 
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The markets also paid a tribute to Keating’s performance: rumours of his resignation in 
early July 1984 were enough to drive the dollar down.1059  
In the 1984 budget Keating noted that the economy had grown 10 per cent from June 
1983 to 1984 as the Accord (discussed below) enabled the government to run an 
expansionary fiscal policy without a wages breakout. The budget included income tax 
cuts and tax concessions for business but the budget deficit was still reduced. Keating 
later conceded his 1984 budget had been his worst as treasurer and should have been 
tighter; it was 'an election one'.1060  
Floating the dollar and financial deregulation 
The government devalued the Australian dollar by 10 per cent in March 1983, soon after 
its election, in response to speculative outflows of capital. The Reserve Bank, and 
Hawke’s economics adviser Ross Garnaut, encouraged the government to float the 
dollar.1061 The Reserve Bank governor, Bob Johnston, was also supportive but Treasury 
secretary John Stone was not. Keating regards the float as ‘probably the most important 
thing I did as treasurer.’1062 Accounts differ about whether it was Keating or Hawke who 
talked the other around to supporting a float.1063    
                                                          
1059 Carew (1988, pp 138-9). 
1060 Henderson (1990, pp 179-180). Long-serving finance minister Peter Walsh (1995, p 117) ranks the 
1984 budget ‘the most permissive of all the 1980s Labor budgets’. 
1061 Megalogenis (2012, p 153), Walsh (1995, p 99). Keating’s economic advisor Tony Cole and PM&C were 
also supportive.  
1062 Craven (2017, p P18). 
1063 Keating (1999, 2012, 2015b), and interviewed by Kerry O’Brien (2015, pp 148-149), claimed that  the 
Reserve Bank governor, Bob Johnston, discussed floating the day after the devaluation and he had moved 
to supporting a float from April-June 1983 (and according to Bramston (2016, p 197) Johnston confirmed 
this) but Hawke says it was his initiative and Keating ‘had to be brought along’; Spencer and Chubb (1993), 
Hawke (1994, pp 240-242), Hywood (1989b, p 8), Kelly (1994, p 90), Megalogenis (2012, pp 154-5). 
Edwards (1996, pp 217-218) notes that both versions are supported by some of their advisers, but 
dismisses Hawke’s version as ‘quite wrong’ and says Reserve Bank governor Johnston supports Keating’s 
version. Kelly (1992, p 81) says key players from Keating’s office told him Keating had supported a float 
from at least May and this was a key motive behind establishing the Martin Review. Cornish (2013, p 5) 
reports that Keating and Johnston had discussed a float in May 1983. Love (2001, p 110) says by May 1983 
Keating had asked Johnston ‘to prepare a manual for a change in currency policy’. McCarthy and Taylor 
(1995, p 220) argue that the float was ‘championed’ by Keating and he had discussed the idea upon 
becoming treasurer. Garnaut (2003, p 13) believed by mid-1983 Hawke and Keating agreed on a float. 
Graeme Richardson thinks ‘it was more Hawke’; Kim Beazley that ‘Bob drove the currency issue…off his 
experience as a member of the board of the Reserve Bank’, Brian Howe and Bob McMullan see it as a joint 
decision, with the latter remarking ‘I was never able to reconcile the conflicting stories between them’; 
interviews cited in S Martin (1999, pp 181-4). Peter Walsh (1995, p 99) believes ‘there were elements of 
truth in both versions’. John Hewson is adamant ‘Hawke should be given the credit for the actual float of 
the dollar’; Love (2001, p 60). Day (2015, p 242) finds it ‘impossible to say’ whether the float was first 
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The pressure to act became more acute with massive capital inflows in late 1983. At the 
October 1983 discussion on floating the dollar Stone continued to oppose it (preferring a 
more gradual and delayed response1064) and cabinet was unsure about the consequences, 
with John Button and three other ministers reportedly having doubts but Hayden, Willis 
and Dawkins all in agreement.1065 But the decision was taken to close the foreign 
exchange markets for a day and then when the markets opened on 12 December 1983 it 
was in a new world of a floating rate and with exchange controls abolished. Macfarlane 
(2006, p 42) regarded these reforms as representing a ‘bold stroke' that 'was the final step 
necessary to enable the Reserve Bank to conduct monetary policy in the orthodox way' 
and ‘represented a whole change of attitude about how Australia viewed its relations with 
the rest of the world.' From now on, Keating said, ‘speculators can now speculate against 
themselves and not against the Australian government’.1066  
Having floated the dollar, Keating turned to other aspects of the Campbell Committee 
report into the financial system that he had inherited from Howard.1067 While Labor had 
                                                          
proposed by Keating or Hawke. Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003, p 258) judge ‘they obtained the float 
together’.  Journalist Paul Kelly (1985, p 445) believes Keating ‘educated’ Hawke about the merits of the 
float. Delahunty (2014, p 181) takes the Keating line unambiguously, describing the Government as having 
‘finally agreed to Treasurer Paul Keating’s plan to float the dollar’. Keating pointed out in his interview 
with O’Brien (2013) that he did the press conference announcing the float with the Reserve Bank 
governor, not with the prime minister. 
1064 In a memo to Keating, Stone said ‘a complete and wholesale leap to a full market system overnight 
would be an act of faith to which the government has no need to commit itself at this time and the 
consequences of which cannot clearly be foreseen’; Bongiorno (2015, p 48) and Stone (2012, p 17). 
Hywood (1989a, p 9) claimed Stone made three objections: as the currency of a small country the 
Australian dollar could be manipulated by speculators and so be very volatile; in the short term it would 
appreciate adding to unemployment (in the event it was fairly steady in the months after the float and 
then depreciated) and there was a lack of due process in rushing the decision. It has also been suggested 
that Stone ‘was territorial and correctly foresaw the effect this would have on the relationship between 
the Treasury and the Reserve Bank – strengthening the latter and freeing it from the former’; Charlton 
(2007, p 132). Whitwell (1990, p 129) writes that many critics felt Stone’s opposition to the float was 
‘dressing up in economic jargon an excuse for maintaining the department’s sphere of influence’. As 
Malcolm Fraser put it, Stone 'believes in the deregulation of everything he does not regulate'; Hayden 
(1996, pp 222-3). Stone (2003, p 75, 2012a, 2012b) has since tried to downplay his opposition to the float, 
claiming to have only opposed the timing of it, but Keating’s adviser Barry Hughes recalls Stone being 
‘absolutely adamantly opposed at the time’ as does Fraser cabinet minister Peter Nixon (2012, p 167) and 
the Reserve Bank’s John Phillips; Martin (2013, p 7), Phillips (2001, p 37). Day (2015, p 241) asserts Stone 
claimed the float ‘would destroy the Australian economy’ and warned Hawke he will regret this ‘terrible 
decision’. Keating described Stone as ‘a black cobra sitting in the Treasury ready to spit venom’ in his 
opposition to the float; O’Brien (2013). Bowen (2015, p 306) comments ‘no other participant in the 
process…detected any subtlety in his [Stone’s] approach or nuance in his opposition’. 
1065 Marr (2012, p 104). 
1066 Keating cited in Love (2008, p 45). 
1067 He literally inherited it; a faded copy of the report sitting on a shelf was one of the few things Howard 
left behind in the treasurer’s office; Keating quoted in Love (2001, p 275) and O’Brien (2015, p 173). 
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been sceptical about financial deregulation, privately Keating was more supportive.1068 
Keating established the Martin Review Group to assess the Campbell recommendations 
in the light of Labor policies and rejuvenate the reform process.1069 His family history 
helped shape Keating’s attitudes towards the banks. Keating recalled his father’s business 
being ‘strangled by the banks because they would only lend to you against your collateral 
asset base, never on cash flow; if you were wealthy you could borrow, if you were smart 
you could not’.1070 He had a poor view of the bankers; whom he described as ‘pretty 
ordinary’1071 and ‘deadbeats’1072. He believed ‘banking is the artery of the economy and 
we’ve had hardening of the arteries for too long in this country.’1073 Carol Johnson (1989, 
p 107) argues that Keating’s push for bank deregulation was driven by a similar motive 
as Chifley’s push for bank nationalisation: a view that the banks were not providing 
adequate funds for investment. 
The remaining restrictions on bank deposit rates were removed in April 1984. The interest 
rate ceiling on small business loans was removed in April 1985 and the even more 
politically sensitive ceiling on home loans was scrapped in April 1986. In June 1984 forty 
new foreign exchange licences were issued. In July 1984 Keating won approval from the 
ALP National Conference for foreign bank entry.1074 Keating surprised commentators by 
allowing sixteen banks to enter. In 1988 he announced the removal of the outdated 
distinction between trading and savings banks.  
                                                          
1068 Keating said Hawke and he were the only Labor MPs that expressed support for the Campbell 
recommendations in caucus; O’Brien (2013). His then economics adviser recalls ‘Paul wanted to 
implement the recommendations under the Campbell Report’; St Anne (2012, p 53). 
1069 Keating claims that when he became treasurer the impetus for financial deregulation ‘was absolutely 
dead, it was gone, absolutely gone’; interview by McCarthy and Taylor (1995, p 226). Similarly, he told 
Love (2001, p 276) ‘the Campbell Report was a dead letter by the time I became treasurer’. 
1070 Keating interview by McCarthy and Taylor (1995, p 227). See also Keating’s reminiscences in O’Brien 
(2013). 
1071 Keating interviewed in Till (2011, p 229). 
1072 Keating interviewed in O’Brien (2013). Interviewed in Megalogenis (2015) he referred to inheriting a 
‘complacent, smug, uncompetitive banking system’. 
1073 Cited by Carew (1990, p 39). Similarly, in Keating (1985, p 21) he said the ‘life juices of the competitive 
system were severely diluted simple because new ventures appeared to be risky’. He held a ‘very healthy 
respect for the advantages of market processes but that respect falls short of deification’; Keating (1985, 
p 22). 
1074 Keating argued to the Left that the domestic banks had been no friends of the Labor Party so should 
not be protected from competition; Carew (1988, pp 134-5). He asked the national conference ‘how often 
has anyone been to a bank in this country and felt like a mendicant walking through the door?’ and why 
the Party owed the big four Australian banks any favours and said that only the limited competition from 
subsidiaries of overseas banks had stimulated their performance, arguing ‘if it was not for the merchant 
banks, for 15 years gingering them up, we would still be back with quill pens and ledgers, up at the high 
tables making the folio entries’; S Martin (1999, pp 204, 211). 
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Keating was regarded as the most influential figure in financial deregulation.1075 In 1990 
Bob Carr opined 'Paul Keating has also clearly won the debate on foreign bank entry and 
on deregulation, the exchange rate – Keating has clearly won intellectually to the point 
that I don't know anyone on the left mounting a serious challenge to these 
propositions'.1076  
Keating blocked the proposed merger between ANZ and National Mutual and introduced 
a ‘four pillars’ policy, still in place today, of prohibiting mergers between the big four 
banks. He believed this helped isolate Australian banks from the problems seen overseas 
during the GFC: ‘managements did not try to do foolish things to grow by 
acquisition…they had to grow organically.’1077  
The foreign banks did not compete much in retail banking but, in a panic reaction to the 
loss of market share in commercial lending, the Australian banks loosened their credit 
standards. Deregulated banks behaved ‘like a bunch of kids set loose for the first time’.1078 
As Martin and Hawkins (1992, p 12) explained, the banks ‘went from rationers of credit 
to marketers of credit. This change not only caused problems for the banks. It was not 
understood by many customers. Some borrowers clung to the view of banks as intensely 
conservative organisations which would not allow them to borrow imprudently.’ 
Unfortunately the banks ‘didn’t know how to risk-assess and nobody knew how 
incompetent they were.’1079 One indication that the banks badly misjudged things is that 
‘once they ceased to ration credit and charged riskier borrowers a correspondingly higher 
margin, banks could have reasonably expected higher interest income and a 
commensurate increase in bad debts’,1080 but judging by their failure to increase general 
provisions for bad debts they did not understand this.   
The middle budgets: avoiding the ‘banana republic’ 
The 1985 budget’s spending priorities were jobs training, financial support for students 
and more places in higher education. In response to lower commodity prices, farmers 
                                                          
1075 In a series of interviews the most influential figures were named as Keating, Hawke, RBA governor 
Bob Johnston and Hawke’s economic adviser Ross Garnaut; Goldfinch (1999, 2000). 
1076 Carr, interviewed in Henderson (1990, p 90). 
1077 Keating interviewed in Till (2011, p 229). 
1078 Then Reserve Bank deputy governor John Phillips, cited by Bell (2004, p 47). 
1079 Tony Cole, cited in Kelly (1994, p 89). 
1080 Martin and Hawkins (1992, p 5). 
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were given a rebate of fuel excise. Keating conceded there would be higher inflation due 
to the depreciation but would be arguing for this to be discounted from wage indexation. 
He called it a ‘budget for growth’.1081 The public was told to ‘set their sails for 
growth’.1082 Keating talked up the economic policy; ‘if we were providing these policy 
settings and outcomes in western Europe, they’d be lighting candles to us in the 
cathedrals’.1083  
In May 1986, Keating made his famous 'banana republic' statement about the current 
account of the balance of payments in a radio interview: 
If…Australia is so undisciplined, so disinterested in its salvation 
and its economic well-being that it doesn't deal with these 
fundamental problems, then the fallback solution is inevitable 
because you can't fund $12 billion a year in perpetuity every year, 
and then the interest on the year before that, the only thing to do 
is to slow to a canter. Once you slow growth under 3 per cent, 
unemployment starts to rise again. And then you have really 
induced depression. Then you have gone. You know, you are a 
banana republic.1084   
The Australian dollar fell US 4 cents in response. At a cabinet meeting on 28 July 1986, 
Keating had a portable Reuters screen on the table in front of him and, as Bob Hawke 
recalled: 
…he began calling the drop in the dollar like a referee calling the 
count on a boxer who's hit the canvas. It had been at 63 cents, then 
it went through 60, 59, 58…It finally stopped at 57.15. We felt 
like stunned mullets. It was very depressing.1085   
                                                          
1081 Hansard, 20 August 1985, p 71. 
1082 Kelly (1994, p 205). Edwards (1991, p 5) characterised the focus of economic policy in the mid-1980s 
as ‘to use the depreciation as the engine of growth through a rapid rise in exports, while domestic demand 
was contained through tight wages, budget and monetary policies’. 
1083 Interview, Australian Financial Review, 30 September 1985, p 10. 
1084 D'Alpuget (2010, p 142). The interview has been classed as one of the 17 ‘turning points in Australian 
history’; Broomhill (2009). Keating recently referred to the line being ‘blurted out’ but he had used the 
phrase in a speech overseas earlier that was little reported; O’Brien (2015, pp 242, 244). 
1085 D’Alpuget (2010, p 149).  At one point in the mid-1980s the real exchange rate reached its low point 
in the twentieth century; Kelly (1994, p 196). In December 1986 Standard and Poors cut Australia’s credit 
rating from AAA to AA+.  
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The Reserve Bank rarely intervened in the foreign exchange market since the float. 
Keating believed the Bank ‘were always in the virility business [of making a rate]. And I 
take a large measure of the personal responsibility for knocking that out of the Bank’.1086  
Macfarlane (2006, p 50) argued that one result of the 'banana republic' remarks was that 
'the climate of opinion was such that the government was able to take some quite tough 
decisions that might have been more difficult in other circumstances'. Tingle (2012a, 
p 10) commented that Keating and Hawke 'persuaded voters not only that they were not 
entitled to regular pay increases, but that they needed to accept [real] pay cuts to lower 
Australia's inflation rate'. 
The 1986 budget followed a collapse in export earnings as commodity prices fell. 
Australia needed to ‘invest more and consume less’ so the government both restrained its 
own spending and adopted policies ‘designed to restrain the growth of private 
consumption’.1087 While merely maintaining existing programmes would have seen 
outlays up by a real 2½ per cent, they were held to no growth.1088 The Medicare levy was 
increased, 2,000 public servants cut, tax cuts delayed, sales tax increased and bank 
accounts debit tax and petrol excise introduced. Keating admired the ‘commendable 
income restraint’ of the unions.1089   
The May 1987 economic statement included means testing family allowances, cuts to 
defence spending, and asset sales such as long-term leases for international airports. With 
the capital gains and fringe benefits taxes succeeding in strengthening the income tax 
base, the budget deficit was cut by $4 billion.  
While Kelly (994, p 363) viewed the 1987 budget as Keating ‘in a holding pattern’ 
showing ‘masterly inactivity’, the Daily Mirror’s headline was ‘Keating’s brilliant 
budget’ and Keating himself referred to a ’24 carat budget’.1090 To retain the element of 
surprise, and so ensure a positive reaction from the financial markets, Keating had not 
                                                          
1086 Interview with Keating cited in Bell (2004, p 92). 
1087 Hansard, 19 August 1986, p 260. 
1088 Hansard, 19 August 1986, p 261. The decision was taken in late July as the dollar plummeted; Kelly 
(1994, pp 220-1). 
1089 Hansard, 13 August 1986, p 263. 
1090 Edwards (1996, p 313). 
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even told the finance minister that the budget envisaged a surplus.1091 Another economic 
statement with further spending cuts followed in May 1988. 
The late 1980s saw an asset price boom. As Ian Macfarlane (2006, p 53) saw it, 'the more 
borrowing increased, the more asset prices rose; the higher asset prices were then used as 
collateral for further borrowing'. The boom in house prices was ‘associated with the 
re-introduction of the ability to negatively gear investment in residential property’. The 
asset price boom was accompanied by an ‘associated company takeover frenzy [and] the 
surge in bank lending … [due to] rapid financial deregulation, the persistence of high 
inflationary expectations, the rise in business profitability and a generally supportive 
international environment.' As a result, 'the economy was clearly vulnerable to any 
contractionary shock'.1092  
When speculating on asset price rises, observed Macfarlane (2006, p 52), 'the best way of 
doing so was to maximise the use of debt, the interest on which was tax deductible'. These 
speculators, often but inaccurately referred to as 'entrepreneurs', became household 
names.1093 They were famed for their high salaries and extravagant lifestyles. For a time, 
they were very successful as 'genius is leverage in a rising market'.1094 But as Keating put 
it ‘there was a lot of spivvery’1095 and the paper empires of most of these spivs collapsed 
with many ending up in gaol or on the run. Their collapses were to contribute to the 1990 
recession. As business journalist Trevor Sykes (2006, p 9) put it ‘never before in 
Australian history has so much money been channelled by so many people incompetent 
to lend it, into the hands of so many people incompetent to manage it’. Bernie Fraser 
(1990b, p 4) commented that ‘most bankers concede that a lot of common sense went out 
the door during the latter years of the 1980s, along with a lot of their money’.  
The asset price boom provided a ‘false dawn’1096, which led Keating to claim victory 
prematurely. Delivering the first budget in the new parliament house (and the one Keating 
hoped would be his last before assuming the prime ministership), Keating proclaimed the 
                                                          
1091 Bell (1997, p 29). 
1092 Macfarlane (2006, pp 51-53). He had earlier described the rise and fall in asset prices in Macfarlane 
(1990, pp 28-29). 
1093 Macfarlane (2006, p 52) refers to Alan Bond, Laurie Connell, John Elliott, John Frederich, Abe Goldberg, 
Russell Goward, George Herscu, Ian Johns, Bruce Judge, Christopher Skase, John Spalvins and Brian Yuill. 
1094 Quiggin (2012, p 217). 
1095 Keating interviewed by Kerry O’Brien (2013). At the time, however, he said ‘I like all the goers’; Toohey 
(1994, p 242). 
1096 Kelly (1994, p 366). 
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1988 budget as ‘the one that brings home the bacon’1097 by ‘lifting the yoke of debt from 
our necks’.1098 The centrepiece was large income tax cuts which Keating aimed to use to 
replace a wage increase. Family allowances were also increased and some sales taxes 
were cut. 
The April 1989 economic statement announced further income tax cuts and increases in 
family allowances (which would henceforth be indexed to the CPI) in exchange for wage 
restraint; ‘the very essence of reason and order’.1099 A programme of award restructuring 
was announced.  
In his 1989 budget Keating was aiming for the third surplus in a row and real cuts in 
government spending for the fourth year in a row. Superannuation was restructured and 
would be preserved when people switched jobs. The pension was lifted to 25 per cent of 
average earnings. The taxation and social security income testing systems were 
integrated. Keating recalled the 1989 budget as about ‘holding the game together’, trading 
off tax cuts to maintain wage restraint.1100   
In February 1989 Keating had described the economy as ‘the glass is now full and the 
effervescence is spilling over and that effervescence is the current account and 
inflation’.1101 He now called the current account deficit the ‘gap which must be closed’ 
and promised the full force of this government’s resolve will be directed to this end’ by 
‘bringing high demand down to a more reasonable level’.1102  
In the approach to the 1990 election, Hawke mused about a scheme to provide taxation 
relief for mortgagees. Keating successfully argued against the scheme, which he 
dismissed as mere ‘embroidery’, on the grounds that 'voters would see the money as an 
admission that Labor had hurt them and that it no longer had faith in its own policies', and 
that it would mean interest rates needed to stay higher for longer.1103  
                                                          
1097 Keating to the media, cited by Carew (1992, p 245), Day (2015, p 305), Kelly (1994, p 441) Megalogenis 
(2012, p 187) and Walsh (1995, p 193). 
1098 Hansard, 23 August 1988, p 183. Privately he referred to it as ‘the most important budget in the 
nation’s history’; Kelly (1994, p 445). 
1099 Hansard, 12 April 1989, p 1496. 
1100 O’Brien (2013). 
1101 Australian Financial Review, 17 February 1989, p 2. 
1102 Hansard, 15 August 1989, pp 53 and 55. 
1103 Bowen (2015, p 322), Megalogenis (2010, p 19), Tate (2014). 
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Monetary policy in the 1980s 
Keating consulted Hawke, but not cabinet, about his discussions on monetary policy with 
the Reserve Bank.1104 At the Economic Summit Keating (1983, p 26) remarked ‘we do 
not eschew the use of soundly based targets for the growth of the money supply’ and in 
the 1984 budget Keating announced an M3 target of 8 to 10 per cent while commenting 
‘the Government will pay increased attention to broader monetary aggregates’.1105 By 
February 1985 he set aside the target, referring to the ‘enormous upheaval in the 
relationship between the monetary aggregates and the GDP as a result of this 
government’s historic deregulation of the financial system’.1106 
Around the world, partly reflecting the increased availability of credit following financial 
deregulation, ‘the previously estimated econometric relationships between movements in 
the money stock and in nominal incomes increasingly came apart at the seams’.1107 As 
the Bank of Canada’s governor put it, ‘we didn’t abandon the monetary aggregates, they 
abandoned us’.1108  
In May 1985, with monetary targets abandoned and the exchange rate no longer a 
potential anchor, the Reserve Bank devised the ‘checklist’. As expounded by Reserve 
Bank governor Bob Johnston, the checklist included the balance of payments, asset 
prices, inflation, interest rates, the exchange rate and monetary aggregates and a vague 
reference to the ‘state of the economy’.1109 The following governor Ian Macfarlane later 
                                                          
1104 Kelly (1994, p 368). Edwards (1996, p 251) commented that while Keating was treasurer, ‘there was 
virtually no cabinet discussion of monetary policy’. John Dawkins recalled ‘there have been some 
discussions over the years about the general stance of monetary policy, but the individual decisions, as 
far as I know, have been taken by the prime minister and treasurer’; Sydney Morning Herald, 9 August 
1991, p 4. Peter Walsh suggested that one reason Keating kept economic policy discussion out of cabinet 
was that he ‘deep down always recognised that his conceptual grasp of economic issues was weaker than 
Ralph Willis and in a serious cabinet discussion that would become apparent’. 
1105 Hansard, 21 August 1984, p 70. 
1106 He added that the Government rejected what he described as the Opposition’s policy of ‘mindlessly, 
foolishly and irresponsibly chasing a fictitious and cosmetic number, leading to a credit squeeze’; Hansard, 
26 February 1985, p 197. The decision had the support of the Reserve Bank; Cornish (2010, p 67). Treasury 
was more inclined to keep setting targets, perhaps because it meant retaining more power in Treasury 
rather than increasing the discretion of the Bank; Guttmann (2005, especially p 240). 
1107 Goodhart (1989, p 298). While financial innovation and deregulation were important parts of the 
story, this was also an example of ‘Goodhart’s Law’; ‘any observed statistical regularity will tend to 
collapse once pressure is placed on it for control purposes’; Goodhart (1975, p 5). 
1108 Governor Bouey, cited by Macfarlane (1997, p 26). 
1109 Johnston (1985, p 812 and 1987a, p 6). The exact list varied. 
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conceded the Bank ‘floundered around with the checklist which just brought ridicule on 
us’.1110  In Macfarlane (1998, p 10) he provided the following critique: 
Its problem was that it did not have a sufficiently well thought-out 
economic rationale or any criteria for determining which 
indicators were more important. In particular, it failed to 
distinguish between the instrument of monetary policy, 
intermediate targets and ultimate targets …They were all in there, 
along with at least one variable that did not fit into any of these 
categories. The checklist was introduced in haste – barely four 
months after the end of monetary targeting. It had not undergone 
close economic analysis within the Bank, and had not been 
exposed to prior public scrutiny. 
A domestic monetary expert described the checklist as ‘a piece of political subterfuge of 
which Sir Humphrey Appleby would be proud’ and a global monetary expert said its 
detractors would see it as ‘a reversion to a muddled discretion’.1111 Around 1987 the 
checklist was quietly abandoned, leaving the Bank with a purely discretionary policy, but 
it started research on an alternative anchor for policy.1112 
The interbank cash rate dropped from around 16 per cent in 1986-87 to below 12 per cent 
by September 1987.1113 Bernie Fraser (1992, p 6) opined ‘in hindsight, it can be argued 
that the easing went too far’.1114 The global stock market crash of October 1987 led the 
Bank to lower rates a little further and they were still below 11 per cent in March 1988. 
Treasury, the Bank and the BIS shared the view in early 1988 that ‘monetary conditions 
post the stock market crash should be left accommodating’.1115   
                                                          
1110 Bell (2004, p 6). 
1111 Harper (1990, p 279) and Goodhart (1989, p 340). 
1112 Cornish (2010, p 69). It was perhaps understandable then that Keating would believe ‘this is all bulls__t 
about the science of monetary policy’; Edwards (1996, p 320) relating a conversation with Keating. 
1113 Kelly (1994, p 371) suggests three reasons why the Reserve was easing; concerns about high interest 
rates generating a recession, to reward fiscal rectitude and to weaken the Australian dollar to prevent 
Australian competitiveness being eroded. 
1114 Fraser (1992, p 6). 
1115 Hansard, 11 March 1991, p 1644. The Reserve Bank (1988, p 14) explained ‘emerging misgivings about 
whether the general settings of policies had become too accommodating were put aside by the October 
share-market crash’. Keating refers in O’Brien (2013) to the Bank for International Settlements warning 
of a market implosion and Love (2008, p 157) reports that Bob Johnston returned from a BIS meeting 
‘convinced we were going back to 1929 conditions’. With the benefit of hindsight, the former deputy 
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Like most policymakers and commentators, the Bank was surprised how little impact the 
stock market crash had on the real economy. The Bank decided there should be no further 
loosening and began to tighten in response to an asset price bubble being pumped up by 
an over-expansion of bank lending.1116 While the Bank has pointed out it moved earlier 
and more decisively than most of its international peers, it still moved slowly.1117  
At this time the Bank had not started its practice of announcing changes in its preferred 
cash rate, but ‘snugged’ up rates. The Reserve Bank sometimes even seemed to deny it 
used the overnight interest rate as an operating instrument. Governor Johnston (1985, 
p 810) referred to the ‘assertion that the Bank is “interest rate targeting”. This is not so. 
The Bank’s day-to-day actions are in terms of quantities and are targeted to affect 
quantities at the end of the transmission chain’. Deputy Governor John Phillips (1985, 
p 12) described the Bank’s response to a need to tighten monetary conditions as being 
‘more sparing in providing cash to the market on days when there was a cash deficit’ but 
‘that does not mean we have an interest rate objective although interest rates are important 
indicators’. Grenville (1997, p 133) described such comments as an approach which ‘did 
nothing for transparency of policy’. 
Asked in April 1988 whether monetary policy was being tightened, Keating referred to 
seasonal factors.1118 By denying policy was being tightened, Keating reduced the 
effectiveness of a tightening he later agreed had indeed commenced around April 
1988.1119  
It is generally agreed with the benefit of hindsight that the Bank should have moved rates 
up faster and further in 1987 and 1988.1120 But it is a matter of some debate whether at 
                                                          
governor of the Bank regarded the delay in raising rates as a ‘lost period that in retrospect was fairly 
costly’; Spencer and Chubb (1993). 
1116 Cornish (2010, pp 68-69). 
1117 Tingle (1994, p 324). The Reserve Bank’s John Phillips (2001, pp 65-66) agrees that with hindsight it 
was a mistake not to increase interest rates sooner. 
1118 Hansard, 21 April 1988, p 1967 and responses to questions at a press conference; see Tingle (1994, 
p 29). Tingle (1994, p 41) claims Keating again denied the Bank was tightening in October 1988 but Fraser 
(1994c, p 7) says this account ‘does not accord with the facts as I recall them’. Walsh (1991, p 11) believes 
‘the Government’s refusal during 1988 to publicly acknowledge that policy had been tightened extended 
the time lag’ before the policy became effective. Keating claims the Bank insisted on not announcing 
publicly the tightening; Edwards (1996, p 329). Johnston later accepted some of the blame, admitting that 
he had encouraged this lack of transparency; Kelly (1989c, p 13 and 1994, pp 489-490). 
1119 Hansard, 11 March 1991, p 1644. Kelly (1994, p 383) suggests that the NSW election was a factor in 
delaying or obscuring the tightening but Keating rejects this. 
1120 This view is now shared by Keating (1991b, p 11), Bob Johnston (1989, p 19), and Don Russell –cited 
in Gordon (1996, p 118.). Hawke (1994, pp 472-3) describes this as ‘the worst mistake of my time in office’. 
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the time Keating had been pushing the Bank to raise rates faster.1121 Keating later claimed 
when he met with the Bank on 30 March 1988 he put the view that policy should be 
tightened ‘but did not push it’.1122 He has more recently claimed that he considered issuing 
a formal instruction to the Bank to push up rates further in 1988 but was dissuaded by 
Treasury and was concerned about eroding perceptions of the Reserve Bank’s 
independence.1123 But at the time he proclaimed ‘at no stage in my three years have I been 
at difference with the central bank about monetary policy – at no stage’.1124 Senior 
Reserve Bank officials claim there was agreement between Keating and the Bank on 
interest rate decisions.1125 Don Russell (2005, p 17) argued that ‘Keating was on the right 
side of the argument…when the authorities were slow in lifting rates in 1988’. 
Some poorly-chosen (admittedly supposedly off-the-record) words by Keating in 1990, 
that he had the Bank ‘in my pocket’, and an earlier remark at a press conference in 
February 1989 that ‘they do what I say’, fuelled concerns that Fraser would be soft on 
inflation.1126 In the context, the remarks were obviously hyperbole.1127 While Keating 
never repeated the remarks the media did incessantly and Fraser was dismayed by the 
                                                          
1121 Tingle (1994, p 25) calls this ‘one of the great controversies of the recent economic debate’. Watson 
(2002, pp 79-80) says ‘it is not as clear as one might expect’ just who was responsible for hiking rates and 
keeping them high’. 
1122 Kelly (1989c, p 13). Keating said ‘I actually argued against the Treasury and the Reserve Bank to 
increase interest rates in January 1988 and again formally in March 1988’; Hansard, 11 March 1991, 
p 1644. Keating (1991b, p 11) said ‘with the benefit of hindsight…I would have also have been more 
insistent…to lift interest rates earlier and harder’. Kelly (1994, pp 375-7) says Keating was in the vanguard 
internationally in recognising that the share market crash was having only a minor impact, but Treasury 
and the Bank were cautious. Tingle (1994, p 27) reports Keating told colleagues at the end of March that 
he had finally convinced the Bank to lift rates. Russell recalls the Bank agreeing to 1 per cent, but bank 
officials recall Johnston not being clear what was agreed; Edwards (1996, pp 327-8). The rate increase did 
not occur despite Russell chasing it up every day. 
1123 Keating interview with Kerry O’Brien (2013). 
1124 Press conference on 5 April 1990, referred to in Hansard 16 Oct 1990, p 2913. 
1125 Ian Macfarlane (2006, p 65) argued that Keating, Treasury and the Bank agreed on the need to raise 
interest rates to the level they reached in 1990. Kelly (2009, p 111) believes that ‘Keating and the Bank 
had been in broad agreement on the monetary tightening of the late 1980s’. Bob Johnston (1989, 
pp 18-19), in a valedictory address, claimed ‘no matter of any consequence has proceeded without 
agreement’ between the Bank and Keating and ‘as policy was modified in response to the unfolding 
events, the Bank and the Government were not seriously at odds’. Bernie Fraser, interviewed in Bell (2004, 
p 122), referred to the ‘very few’ times in his seven years as governor when the treasurer disagreed with 
the Bank over interest rates. This view is shared by other writers, such as journalist Paul Kelly’s (1994, 
pp 383, 488) and John Edwards (1996, p 394). 
1126 Fraser (1996, p 15). 
1127 ‘I walk around with the world financial markets as much in my pocket as any finance minister has ever 
had them anywhere in the world. Anywhere. I walk around with organised labour. I walk around with the 
central bank and the most committed bureaucracy in the history of the country, an interested press and 
a conscientious electorate’; Keating (1990, p 7). He contrasted this with what shadow treasurer Reith 
could do. 
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impact on the Bank’s reputation.1128 As Fraser (1994c, p 4) later commented ‘too much 
emphasis is placed on what Keating has said, rather than on what he has done’. 
The 1990 recession 
Over the course of 1990 it became evident that the economy was entering a recession. 
Treasury (but not the Reserve Bank) still believed it would be mild.1129 In his budget 
Keating said the economy ‘paused for breath’.1130 Ken Henry (2012) has reflected ‘my 
recollection of that period of the early 1990s recession is that Treasury stood on the 
sidelines’. Garnaut (2013, p 73) believed ‘while recession should be expected when 
short-term interest rates approach 20 per cent and the terms of trade are falling, its arrival 
surprised the government and was hardly anticipated in the media or by big business’. 
Pitchford (1993, p 102) reflected ‘the severity of the 1990-92 recession appears to have 
come as a surprise’.  Recently Keating, interviewed in Megalogenis (2015), has said ‘in 
hindsight we could have had fiscal policy more accommodating’. 
In the 1990 budget Keating said ‘the economy has slowed…economic policy has worked 
and is working’.1131 More bluntly, and politically unwisely, he referred to 'the recession 
we had to have' in November 1990.1132 This was a remark that would haunt him and his 
                                                          
1128 Interview cited in Bell (2004, p 116). Fraser (1996, p 15) said ‘I believe Mr Keating regretted being 
associated with those throwaway lines’. But while Keating told Fraser he regretted the comments, he did 
not publicly withdraw them; Kelly (2009, p 109). In his interview with Kerry O’Brien in 2013 he admitted 
he ‘could have chosen the words better’. But there are a number of other instances where Keating 
downplays the independence of the Bank. In Keating (1991a, p 18) he says the Bank was only ‘consulted 
and involved with government decision-making’. Keating said he was ‘prepared to wear the responsibility 
for the policy settings’ but ‘the notion that appointed officials can do what elected governments cannot 
do is nothing more than gibberish’. In McMullin (1991, p 419) he is quoted as saying ‘we run the place, 
we run the departments, we run the policy’. In an interview much later, he said ‘let’s not have any of this 
naivety that the person who had to stand in the marketplace to have themselves elected, and carry the 
ultimate responsibility for the economy, was in some way subordinate to someone he appoints to the 
central bank. That is not real. It’s political nonsense’; cited in Bell (2004, p 113). 
1129 Keating interview with Kerry O’Brien (2013). 
1130 Hansard, 21 August 1990, p 1158. 
1131 Hansard, 21 August 1990. p 1153.  He described the 1990 budget as giving ‘the kind of outcome the 
Government was seeking, delivered without the misery and despair of high unemployment and a savage 
recession’. 
1132 Carew (1992, p 283), Megalogenis (2012, p 209). While Hawke disputes this, Keating says he had 
cleared the remark with Hawke before he made it; interviews in Spencer and Chubb (1993), O’Brien (2013) 
and Bramston (2016, p 349). As Megalogenis (2006, pp 11-12) observes, subsequent revisions have shifted 
the second quarter of falling real GDP that prompted this remark from 1990 to 1991. On the latest ABS 
numbers, two consecutive quarters of falls in real GDP, which the media often use as their indicator of 
recession, does not occur until the March and June quarters of 1991. Keating later became somewhat 
repentant in his comments about the period more recently; referring to a ‘policy mistake’ of ‘a lacerating 
recession which bore down heavily on people who deserved better’ in Keating (1999, p 193).  
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critics continued to fling it in his face. Bowen (2015, p 323) revealed that Keating 
regarded this as the one thing he said as treasurer that he regretted. 
In February 1991 Keating referred to wanting to ‘snap the inflation stick’,1133 perhaps 
because by then he could foresee a fall in inflation and wanted to take the credit.1134 
Keating himself argues his structural changes created the low inflation environment 
prevailing since the 1990s, ‘not a bit of shifty management up the top of Martin Place’, 
although he concedes ‘that helps’.1135 
Keating budgeted for a surplus of over $8 billion. There were income tax cuts but 
pharmaceutical charges were increased, and there were a number of economically sound 
but unpopular measures: an assets test was applied to family allowances, pensioners’ 
saving accounts over $2,000 would be deemed to earning 10 per cent interest and the First 
Home Owners Scheme was abolished. 
Keating claimed the budget would ‘de-spiv’ Australia.1136 But he and Treasury badly 
underestimated the number of others, such as small business owners, that it would also 
ruin.1137 In terms of GDP the recession was milder than in the early 1980s but a number 
of financial institutions failed.1138   
Monetary policy in the early 1990s 
The cash rate peaked around November 1989 and then was steadily reduced. In January 
1990 Keating and the Bank agreed to cut interest rates with the Board holding a special 
                                                          
1133 ‘I don’t just want to bend inflation a little bit and see it spring back, I want to snap the inflation stick 
and bring Australia back into the community of its OECD partners’; The Australian, 23 February 1991, p 1. 
He also downgraded the importance of the current account deficit, arguing ‘to the extent we achieve and 
maintain a low inflation path we can diminish, to an extent, our concern with the current account deficit 
because we will have more confidence that investment and saving decisions are rational and efficient’. In 
private he now described the ‘twin deficits’ approach (the argument that the current account deficit of 
the balance of payments could be eliminated by reducing the government’s budget deficit) as ‘utter crap’; 
Edwards (1996, p 375). 
1134 It was likely the only chance he would have to do so; as Macfarlane (2006, p 70) said,’ no country with 
an entrenched inflation problem has significantly reduced inflation without it occurring in the context of 
a recession' 
1135 Keating interview cited in Bell (2004, p 97). 
1136 Cited in Bell (2004, p 73), Megalogenis (2006, p 20) and Tingle (1994, p 109). 
1137 Watson (2002, p 101). 
1138 Macfarlane (2006, pp 63-64) lists the State Bank of Victoria, the State Bank of South Australia, the 
largest credit union (Teachers Credit Union of WA), the second-largest building society (Pyramid), several 
merchant banks (Tricontinental, Rothwells and Spedleys), a mortgage trust (Estate Mortgage) and a 
friendly society (Order of the Sons of Temperance). 
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meeting on 22 January and a public announcement of the cut by the Bank. It was seen in 
some quarters as a political decision with an eye to the 1990 election. 
From January 1990 the Reserve Bank announced an explicit target for the cash rate. This 
was lowered in fifteen steps (many of 1 per cent at a time) to 4.75 per cent by July 1993 
as inflation came under control and the extent of the recession became apparent. Reserve 
Bank governor Bernie Fraser observed ‘almost every one of these reductions was 
criticised by the Coalition and by media commentators’.1139 But in hindsight, many 
economists would agree with Garnaut (2013, p 49) that ‘monetary policy was tightened 
too late to stop the emergence of boom conditions, and then excessively and for too long 
so that it precipitated a deep recession’. 
As with the increase in rates, there is disagreement about Keating’s role in their reduction. 
As noted above, Macfarlane argues that Keating, Treasury and the Bank agreed on the 
timing of interest rate moves and Keating claimed at the time to have had no differences 
with the Bank.1140  Indeed he sometimes spoke as thought the interest rate reductions were 
his initiative alone; ‘the Government has decided to see rates come down because the 
economy is slowing’.1141                              
As early as mid-1990, however, there were reports that Keating was pushing the Bank to 
cut rates faster, while publicly trying to maintain confidence by saying there was no 
                                                          
1139 Costello and Coleman (2008, p 47) describe the Coalition’s criticism of interest rate cuts as ‘a rare 
double – wrong on the politics and wrong on the economics as well’. See also Megalogenis (2012, p 211). 
See also, Bell (2004, p 73), Kelly (1994, p 495) and Maley (2009, p 24). Tingle (1994, p 322) concludes 
‘monetary policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s was not unduly influenced by politics’. 
1140 Macfarlane (2006, p 65). Ross Garnaut’s (2013, p 50) view is that ‘perceptions did not vary much across 
the senior echelons of the official family’.  Bernie Fraser’s (1992, p 7) recollection is that ‘at the time I 
recall few people arguing that the tightening in 1988/89 had gone too far, and even fewer suggesting that 
the monetary easings which commenced in January 1990 should have been started earlier or pushed 
harder’, but he did not say whether the treasurer was one of the few. John Phillips said the decision to 
cut rates was ‘very much an initiative of the Bank’s’ while Keating said it was a decision taken by him and 
Fraser; Kelly (1994, p 557). 
1141 Hansard, 15 October 1990, p 2809. 
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urgency.1142 Keating claims it was his commitment to central bank independence that 
stopped him from directing the Bank to cut rates.1143 
Even if with hindsight the Bank might have lowered rates more promptly, Cornish (2010, 
p 71) assessed ‘there is no evidence to suggest that it deliberately set about to create a 
recession for the purpose of eliminating inflation’.1144 But as Ian Macfarlane put it, ‘once 
it was apparent that it was going to happen, it was reasonably quickly realised that there 
was an opportunity to achieve something of lasting value out of the unfortunate 
events’.1145 
In the 1988 budget Keating had declared ‘the balance of payments deficit is Australia’s 
number one economic problem’.1146 In 1990 Keating criticised then RBA deputy 
governor John Phillips for saying monetary policy was not the right tool to address the 
current account, referring to the ‘erroneous notion…that monetary policy is not an 
effective [short-term] weapon for correcting the balance of payments’, adding ‘whatever 
                                                          
1142 Bell (2004, p 64). Shortly after he said ‘with the benefit of hindsight…I should have been even more 
insistent than I was against Treasury and Reserve Bank advice in getting interest rates down more quickly. 
I had to argue the case for lower interest rates in front of the prime minister in his office with members 
of his staff and his department’. He went on to argue that ‘officials…are too slow in lifting rates and too 
slow in getting them down. Too flat-footed altogether’; Keating (1991b, p 11). Bramston (2016, p 323) 
referred to an RBA minute which observed ‘the Treasurer expressed a greater degree of urgency… than 
the Governor’. Responding to a question at a press club address in 1993 Keating said ‘I would have brought 
the rates down much more rapidly, but I could only do it by dragging the Reserve Bank along with 
me…monetary policy is actually decided by an appointed board’; The Age, 12 March 1993, p 10. Reflecting 
back in 2001, Keating said the Bank was ‘far too slow on the way down’; interview reported in Bell (2004, 
p 73). Similarly, Don Russell recalls ‘we were arguing very strongly through that period that interest rates 
had to be brought down…the monetary authorities…didn’t pick the impact of collapsing asset prices in 
the downswing’; cited in Gordon (1996, pp 117-8.) Keating has attributed this to ‘Bernie’s desire to build 
unison in the Bank’; Love (2008, p 159) and Maley (2009, p 24), with one businessman on the board 
reluctant to go along with rate cuts. 
1143 Keating reflected ‘when a government uses the Reserve Bank Act and tables in the House of 
Representatives an instruction to alter monetary policy, then the Bank’s standing as an independent 
vehicle is finished. Despite what I sensed then, that his policy change was going to do me in, I wasn’t 
prepared to do that: I’d spent a decade trying to build the Bank, to take it from the bond-selling agent it 
was to the stand-alone institution of quality it is today. I couldn’t pull the carpet straight from under them’; 
cited in Love (2008, p 174). Don Russell (2005, p 17) argued ‘the precedent would have been dreadful’ if 
Keating had instructed the Reserve Bank. 
1144 Cornish (2010, p 71). 
1145 Macfarlane (2006, pp 70-71) noted that 'in the United States, the Volcker deflation of the early 1980s 
is viewed, at least by the economics profession, as a successful example of economic policy, which yielded 
long lasting benefits despite its short-term costs. In Australia, however, the equivalent disinflation of the 
early 1990s tends to be viewed as a monetary policy mistake'. 
1146 Hansard, 23 August 1988, p 143. 
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the theoretical analysts may think, what matters is what the international markets think – 
and their message is clear’.1147  
Keating had referred to a 4 per cent inflation objective, getting Australia’s inflation rate 
back to the average of its peers through a wage/tax trade-off, in his 1988 budget 
speech.1148 His failure to achieve it may have been one factor turning him against adopting 
inflation targeting. 
Keating wanted to reduce inflation as it was ‘the monkey on the back of working 
Australians…that drives up interest rates and cuts their savings’.1149 But as Bernie Fraser 
observed, ‘people generally felt that inflation is bad but, for the most part, not so bad that 
they want the authorities to get too serious about eliminating it’.1150 In 1990 Fraser 
suggested that an inflation rate that met the Greenspan criterion of being low enough to 
‘not materially enter business and household financial decisions’ would be less than half 
the then current rate of 6-7 per cent and that ‘an inflation rate of around 2 per cent over 
the medium term might be thought of as constituting price stability’, but it was ‘not for 
the Bank to unilaterally announce any explicit medium-term objective’.1151  
The Reserve Bank of Australia, like many other central banks, gradually came to the view 
that a form of inflation target might be the best form of nominal anchor for monetary 
policy.1152 The question got tangled in politics though, when John Hewson, a former Bank 
officer and Howard adviser now opposition leader, adopted a 0-2 per cent target as his 
policy. While the Bank regarded this as too strict, it was hard to argue for a milder target 
without being seen to be either siding with the thrust of the opposition policy or criticising 
                                                          
1147 Phillips (1990, p 17) said ‘monetary policy is not primarily about resolving, in any structural sense, 
Australia’s balance of payments problem…monetary policy is not an effective weapon to fight a balance 
of payments problem’. An abridged version of Keating’s response is given in Tingle (1990, pp 1-2). 
1148 Success in these areas will secure for Australia an inflation rate of 3 to 4 per cent in 1990. This will put 
us back with the rest of the world, an achievement which has eluded us for a generation’; Hansard, 
23 August 1988, p 185. 
1149 Keating interview cited in Bell (2004, p 55). 
1150 Fraser (1990a, p 20). 
1151 Fraser (1990a, pp 20, 24-25). 
1152 The Bank and Treasury suggested a formal inflation target of say 3 per cent in early 1991; Edwards 
(1996, p 403). Ian Macfarlane recalls that he, Steve Grenville and Glenn Stevens had been supportive of 
some form of inflation target from the late 1980s, albeit not as narrow and demanding a target as that 
advocated by John Hewson; Maley (2009, p 25). 
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the specifics of it.1153 In the event, the Reserve Bank gradually evolved an inflation target, 
reflected in a series of speeches from 1992 to 1994.1154 
Keating was critically involved in the evolution of the Reserve Bank into an institution 
being perceived as independent of government and responsible for monetary policy. 
Former Reserve Bank Governor Macfarlane later recalled Keating saying he ‘loved this 
institution’.1155 Keating reflected ‘I saw my job as being to create a new institution. I 
wanted a Reserve Bank able to stand on its reputation and to assist in the fight against 
inflation’.1156 Bernie Fraser has admitted ‘we needed to be a bit political to achieve 
independence and to keep it, but we got to the point where everybody…accepted the Bank 
was best placed to make those decisions’.1157 As Ian Macfarlane put it, ‘if you don’t like 
how monetary policy has turned out, if you think it is a terrible mess, blame Martin 
Place’.1158        
Microeconomic reforms 
While once calling himself 'by and large, a macroeconomic person'1159, Keating also 
undertook a lot of microeconomic reform as treasurer; as he put it to ‘clear all the bloody 
crap out of the pipes’.1160 Changes were introduced ‘to make markets more competitive 
and so put pressure on firms and their workforces to meet global best practice. They were 
also designed to make businesses confront market realities by improving their 
commercial performance rather than appealing to governments for some form of 
protection’.1161 Keating later reflected ‘we had productivity coming out of the very pores 
of the skin of the economy, through airlines, electricity, wharves, telephones, cars’.1162 
Indeed so much change eventuated that he once commented ‘if you walk into any pet 
                                                          
1153 At times Bernie Fraser was quite outspoken in criticising opposition policy, most notably when he said 
‘I won’t go just to appease some dickhead minister who wants to put Attila the Hun in charge of monetary 
policy’; Sydney Morning Herald. 23 November 1991, p 1. 
1154 Fraser (1992, 1993a, 1993b, 1994a, 1994b). 
1155 Macfarlane, speaking in 2006; Kelly (2009, p 109). 
1156 Interviewed in 2005, in Kelly (2009, p 114). 
1157 Interviewed in 2008, in Kelly (2009, p 109). 
1158 Australian Financial Review, 25 May 1992, p 5; Bell (2002, p 120); Tingle (1992, p 1). 
1159 Keating in an interview with Henderson (1990, p 181). 
1160 Keating cited in Ramsey (1987, p 25). 
1161 Macfarlane (2006, p 44). 
1162 Love (2001, p 122). 
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shop in Australia, what the resident galah will be talking about is microeconomic 
policy’.1163 
Keating adamantly rejects those who feel his embrace of deregulation and market forces 
was a rejection of Labor values1164, arguing ‘in truth, it’s where Labor reclaimed its future 
and where it underpinned...its commitment to egalitarianism’ by enabling strong growth 
in employment and improving real incomes for working families.1165 To Keating the 
emphasis on economic growth and job creation put them ‘completely in concert’ with the 
Curtin-Chifley tradition.1166 Keating argued that the aberration was the 1950s and 1960s, 
which he characterised as ‘that long dark period when the party was uncertain as to 
whether it was a party of dogma and ideology or a party of economic progress and 
practical social reform’.1167 Johnson (1989, p 95) assesses the reality as lying between the 
positions of Keating and his critics; that while the Hawke-Keating government was more 
right-wing than the preceding Labor governments, it nonetheless did not break decisively 
with the traditions of those governments, which ‘all stressed the common interest all 
sections of the Australian community had in a healthy capitalist economy’. 
Structural adjustment 
Along with the float, Keating regards tariff reform as the key reform of his time as 
treasurer.1168 The May 1988 economic statement saw the first major tariff cuts announced 
since Whitlam in 1973. Tariffs were cut to 25 per cent for textiles, clothing and footwear, 
motor vehicles to 15 per cent and others to 5 per cent. The average tariffs on manufactures 
were reduced from 23 per cent in 1980-81 to 13 per cent by the mid-1990s.1169  
The Hawke Government was notable for a series of industry restructuring plans led by 
industry minister John Button; the Steel Plan (1984-1988), Shipbuilding Plan 
(1984-1989), Car Plan (1985-1992), Heavy Engineering Adjustment and Development 
                                                          
1163 Tingle (1994, p 58). 
1164 Johnson (1989, pp 92-93) gives Nugget Coombs and Nick Bolkus as examples of critics making this 
case. 
1165 Keating interviewed in Kelly (2001, pp 87-88).  
1166 Keating (1987, p 173), Johnson (1989, p 94). 
1167 Keating cited in Johnson (1989, p 94). He added that the Whitlam Government was ‘the bridge 
between the Curtin and Chifley administrations and the Hawke Government’. 
1168 Interview with Paul Kelly (2001, p 90). Treasury secretary Tony Cole and adviser Don Russell were 
influential on Keating in pushing for lower tariffs while Ross Garnaut was an influential advocate in 
Hawke’s office; Leigh (2002, pp 500, 504). 
1169 In 1970-71, prior to the Whitlam Government’s tariff cuts, the average manufacturing tariff had been 
36 per cent; M Keating and Dixon (1989, p 48). 
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Program (1986-1989) and Textiles, Clothing and Footwear Industries Plan 
(1986-1996).1170   
Competition policy and privatisation 
Following a report by a committee chaired by Fred Hilmer, the Council of Australian 
Governments agreed to the National Competition Reform which led to privatisation of 
many state-owned enterprises. 
Keating and Hawke had discussed privatising the Commonwealth Bank at least as early 
as 1987 but sentiment within the Labor Party was then against it.1171 Initially 30 per cent 
of it was sold, with the funds used to absorb the troubled State Bank of Victoria.1172 While 
at the time it was said there would be no further sales, a further 20 per cent was sold in 
1993 and the remaining half in 1995. 
Some government operations were ‘corporatised’; with commercial practices adopted, 
managers (often recruited from the private sector with higher salaries) given more 
discretion and community service obligations being clarified and either paid for directly 
out of the budget or through expected rates-of-return.1173   
A common view is that ‘once you have put competition and corporatisation in place, 
privatisation is almost inevitable’.1174 But privatisation was politically difficult for the 
government. It ran counter to the ALP platform and Hawke (1985, p 9) himself had 
described it in 1985 as ‘the height of irrationality…based on a blind and mindless 
commitment to a narrow, dogmatic and discredited ideology’. But Keating was able to 
argue successfully that modern Labor wanted government to ‘steer the boat’ rather than 
                                                          
1170 Capling and Galligan (1992), Leigh (2002, p 497). 
1171 As Bill Hayden put it, ‘it’s in our history, it’s the psyche of our party and if there is going to be any 
debate, all these things must be handled very tenderly in respect for the feelings and history of our party 
and its traditions’; cited by Carew (1992, p 240) and S Martin (1999, p 238). After the decision was taken, 
John Button recalls ‘in the Labor branches it was like the abolition of the Latin mass’ and Graham 
Richardson recalls ‘the branches…went completely berserk’; interviews cited in S Martin (1999, p 248). 
1172 This was the main stated reason but S Martin (1999, p 243) believes it was partly used as ‘cover’ for 
Keating’s privatisation agenda. In interviews by Goldfinch (2000, p 190) Keating was seen overwhelmingly 
as the driver of the privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank (and Qantas), with Hawke, Beazley and Willis 
playing smaller roles. 
1173 Goldfinch (2000, p 190). 
1174 Mike Keating, quoted in Goldfinch (2000, p 190). 
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‘row the boat’.1175 The privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank paved the way for other 
privatisations, such as Qantas and Telstra under the Keating and Howard governments. 
Superannuation and retirement incomes 
In his 1983 ministerial statement Keating announced tax reforms to superannuation to 
encourage annuities rather than lump sums. He also imposed an income means test for 
the age pension for those over 70 years. 
The expansion of the coverage of the superannuation system was a joint project of 
Keating and ACTU secretary Bill Kelty, a trained economist with whom Keating formed 
a close bond.1176 Kelty was initially surprised when Keating suggested superannuation 
could be expanded to the whole workforce1177 but in September 1985 the ACTU agreed 
to a 2 per cent real wage cut in exchange for a 3 per cent employer contribution into an 
industry fund.  
Tax reform 
Initially, and briefly, under the Hawke government tax policy was the responsibility of 
the finance minister but it was moved back to Treasury in June 1983. Keating inherited a 
tax system largely unchanged since the 1940s and characterised by growing tax avoidance 
and evasion and a ‘growing disrespect for the tax system’.1178 
The Hawke government indicated its desire to replace the various mining taxes and 
royalties with a resources rent tax in 1984 but the scheme was restricted to offshore 
petroleum in the face of opposition from state governments.1179  
Taxation became an important issue during the 1984 election campaign and to defuse it 
Hawke gave a 'fiscal trilogy' commitment; to reduce the budget deficit, not increase 
Commonwealth taxation as a per cent to GDP and keep government spending growth 
                                                          
1175 Carew (1990, p 22), Marks (2014, p 44). 
1176 Keating appointed Kelty to the Reserve Bank board in 1987. Keating (1987, p 13) said the 
superannuation initiatives made ‘most other social reforms look limp by comparison’ and that ‘it was Bill 
and I who really got the show on the road’; St Anne (2012, p 49). Kelty returned the compliment saying 
‘unless we had Paul Keating we would not have got it’; St Anne (2012, p 70). 
1177 Keating, interviewed by O’Brien (2013). 
1178 Fraser (1989, p 18) who notes this was ‘not only eroding the revenue base but also resulting in more 
and more resources being attracted to ventures because of their tax-induced rewards, rather than their 
economic returns’. 
1179 Smith (1993, p 89). 
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below the rate of economic growth.1180 As a way of deferring taking hard positions in the 
midst of the campaign, Hawke announced that a tax summit would be convened after the 
election. Hawke had not discussed this idea with Keating before he announced it, which 
annoyed the treasurer mightily.1181 
The National Taxation Summit was held in July 1985, to which the government presented 
three options. All involved widening the income tax base to encompass capital gains and 
fringe benefits. Option B in addition proposed rationalising and widening the 
consumption tax base and cutting income tax for low income earners. The government's 
preferred Option C replaced the wholesale sales tax with a broad based 12.5 per cent 
consumption tax, funding large income tax cuts and increased social security payments. 
For differing reasons, none of the interest groups at the Summit would support Option C 
and business groups did not support any of the options.1182 Hawke abandoned Option C 
in what Edwards (1996, p 277) called ‘the bitterest blow of Keating’s career’. Bongiorno 
(2015, p 178) believes ‘Keating never fully forgave him’. Nonetheless the summit did 
support tax reform in principle and Keating was able to use it as the basis for a reform 
package. Keating used the metaphor of the ‘tax cart’ and referred to the difficulty of 
keeping Hawke in it.1183 As Keating put it at the time, ‘it’s a bit like Ben Hur. We have 
crossed the line with one wheel off, but we’ve crossed the finish line’.1184 He has more 
recently referred to the Tax Summit as ‘an abortive event’.1185   
In September 1985 a package of tax reforms was announced, including a fringe benefits 
tax and capital gains tax.1186 The company tax rate was lifted to match the highest income 
                                                          
1180 PM’s press release 31 October 1984. The trilogy was developed in consultation with the Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet but not with Keating or Treasury. Stone (1984) did not believe they could 
be achieved. 
1181 O’Brien (2015, pp 205-6). Keating later called the Summit ‘the antithesis of political efficiency’ as there 
is ‘nothing worse than making tax policy in public’; Spencer and Chubb (1993), Boston and Uhr (1996, 
p 56), O’Brien (2015, p 206). 
1182 Smith (1993, pp 113-4). Mathews (1985, p 416) is critical of the Business Council for failing to support 
Option C, which was very close to what they had advocated in a submission to EPAC. He described the 
opposition to capital taxes as ‘one of the worst examples of political opportunism and special pleading’. 
1183 Keating interviewed in O’Brien (2013), Kelly (1994, pp 162-3). 
1184 Keating, 4 July 1995, cited in Kelly (1994, p 155) and Richardson (1994, p 182). 
1185 Keating, quoted in Australian Financial Review, 2 January 2013, p 16. 
1186 The capital gains tax was on real capital gains, and excluded the family home and existing assets. The 
tax arrangements applied to realised gains and losses on assets acquired after 19 September 1985. An 
averaging system was also in place to reduce the impact of the progressive income tax on realised gains 
accrued over a period of years. Reinhardt and Steel (2006) place the tax changes in historical perspective. 
Howard described the fringe benefits and capital gains taxes as ‘anti-incentive’ taxes; Hansard 14 May 
1987, p 3256. Hawke had left Keating to negotiate the package through the full ministry, an episode 
Keating referred to as a ‘low point’ in their relationship; O’Brien (2013). 
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tax marginal rate which was reduced to 49 per cent. The marginal income tax rate on 
average earnings dropped from 46 to 40 per cent. Concessional expenditure rebates were 
replaced. A national identification scheme called the Australia Card was proposed to aid 
compliance, and when it was blocked by the Senate much of its goals were achieved by 
the introduction of a tax file numbering system.1187 The wholesale sales tax was 
rationalised into three rates. Various industry concessions were abolished. Full dividend 
imputation was introduced to remove the ‘double taxation’ of dividends.1188 Provisional 
tax payments were shifted from annual to quarterly. Public finance expert Russell 
Mathews (1985, p 424) opined that the changes 'probably represent the most far reaching 
and politically courageous shift in the direction of taxation policy ever attempted in 
Australia'. Keating looked back on the 1985 package as ‘broadly the shape of the 
Australian tax system’ today.1189  
Keating removed negative gearing which he called an ‘outrageous rort’ in July 1985 and 
drew attention to comparable countries which only allowed interest to be deducted from 
the rent earned on the property.1190 But, bowing to political pressure, he restored it in 
September 1987, in an attempt to help re-elect the NSW Labor Government, a move 
Bramston (2016, p 292) revealed Keating now regards as a mistake. 
The May 1988 economic statement slashed the company tax rate from 49 to 39 per cent 
by reducing concessions such as accelerated depreciation and R&D tax concessions and 
requiring gold miners to pay tax. Dividend imputation was extended to superannuation 
funds but a 15 per cent tax was placed on them.  
Keating’s marketing of his tax reforms was damaged by the embarrassing revelation in 
1986 that he had been late lodging his own tax returns.1191 While conceding this was ‘a 
                                                          
1187 The idea of the card had emerged from the Tax Summit and was the trigger for the 1987 double 
dissolution election. But despite winning the election, growing public opposition and the likely inability to 
get the required regulations through the Senate led the Government to drop the plan; Bongiorno (2015, 
pp 238-240). 
1188 This was one of the few suggestions from business at the Tax Summit. As Keating recently put it, he 
wanted ‘to create a better and more profitable tension between managers and owners, between 
managers and shareholders. Where formerly capital gains were tax free and dividends taxed twice there 
was no incentive for managers to pay dividends’; Anderson (2015, p 20). 
1189 Keating, quoted in Australian Financial Review, 2 January 2013, p 16. 
1190 Megalogenis (2012, p 191). 
1191 Kelly (1994, p 225), Carew (1988, pp 166-8). 
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mistake’, his explanation was that he was ‘painting the big picture and I may splash a bit 
of paint’.1192 
The accords 
Keating’s view upon becoming treasurer had been that Australia ‘had flawed wage 
arrangements which meant that, whenever activity picked up in any major or substantial 
way, wages accelerated to the point where profits and employment collapsed’.1193  
The government’s initial response to this problem was to agree a prices and incomes 
'accord' with Hawke's former colleagues at the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
embodying wage restraint in exchange for improvements in the ‘social wage’.1194 While 
initially unenthusiastic about the accord,1195  Keating later became an ‘Accord zealot’.1196 
Former Reserve Bank governor Ian Macfarlane (2006, p 40) offers this assessment of the 
Accord; 'although the Accord had many critics, and they made some good points about 
its unintended side effects, it did succeed in its central task of restoring strong 
employment growth and lowering unemployment'.1197 It did this by reducing real wages 
as a cost to business while tax and social welfare policy ensured that real household 
incomes were maintained. 
By 1991 Keating believed the accords with their focus on centralised wage fixation were 
outliving their usefulness. He and Bill Kelty agreed the system had to develop towards 
enterprise bargaining, with the Australian Industrial Relations Commission restricted to 
                                                          
1192 Carew (1990, p 45) and Carroll (2010, p 57). 
1193 Keating (1991a, p 17). 
1194 For example, Keating said the income tax cuts in the 1984 budget ‘will assist in the quest for continuing 
income restraint and to that extent will underpin the Prices and Incomes Accord’; Hansard, 21 August 
1984, p 62. Johnson (1989, p 97) sees the accord as attempting to enshrine this principle, which the 
Whitlam Government had failed to promote successfully. The initial accord was generally seen as primarily 
the work of Willis, Kelty and Hawke; but by Accord Mark VI in 1990, Keating and Kelty were seen as the 
major influences; Goldfinch (2000, pp 154, 179). 
1195 Keating initially had ‘severe doubts’ about the Accord; Kelly (1994, p 68). He told Kelty he ‘didn’t think 
much’ of incomes policies; Megalogenis (2012, p 168). Keating was worried that such agreements ‘had 
broken down in every other place in the world they’d been tried’; interview with Kerry O’Brien (2015, 
p158). Willis was blunter saying Keating ‘thought [the Accord] was a load of crap basically because he had 
never been involved and his department was very sceptical’; Goldfinch (2000, p 156). See also Day (2015, 
p 232). In what was first seen as a gaffe, but later as refreshing honesty, during the 1983 election campaign 
Keating admitted he was not absolutely sure the prices and incomes accord would work; Day (2015, 
p 220), Ellis (1983, p 116), Haupt and Grattan (1983, p 108), Kelly (1985, p 409), Summers (1983, pp 162-5). 
1196 Kelly (1994, p 73). In Keating (1992, p 150) he said strong economic growth could not be achieved 
‘without the lower interest rates and low inflation which an incomes policy alone can harmoniously 
provide’. 
1197 Macfarlane (2006, p 40). 
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providing a safety net.1198 But constructing the new system would take place after Keating 
had ceased to be treasurer. 
Mounting leadership frustrations 
Keating was never modest about his ambitions; ‘if you’re not going to get the big job, 
there’s not much point in staying’.1199 But despite their personal rivalry Keating and 
Hawke were mostly able to work effectively together for many years.1200 After the 1990 
election Keating became deputy prime minister in name as well as substance (allowing 
him to act as prime minister in May 1990). Keating felt he had been effectively leading 
the government for five years.1201  
By 1986 some of Keating's pleasure in the exercise of power had 'diminished with 
familiarity' and was replaced by the 'enjoyment of beautiful things'.1202 He broadened his 
interests by developing a friendship with historian Manning Clark.1203 By late 1987 
Keating was clearly the successor to the Labor leadership and impatient to take over. But 
Labor then had a history of sticking even with unsuccessful leaders1204 and Hawke had 
won three elections. Keating began to talk about leaving politics for what he called ‘the 
Paris option’.1205 Hawke goaded him the day after the August 1988 budget by publicly 
saying he may stay prime minister for another six years and that Keating could be 
replaced.1206  
                                                          
1198 Edwards (1996, pp 418-421).  
1199 Keating, cited by Carew (1990, p 35). In 1985, though, he claimed that ‘journalists have attributed 
more ambition to me than I have myself’; Carew (1990, p 36). 
1200 As Megalogenis (2010, p 32) put it, 'the argument between these two giants is about who deserves 
the greater credit for what economists and political scientists around the world agree is the Australian 
miracle.' Yet as early as November 1985, Gareth Evans recorded in his diary that the Hawke-Keating 
relationship was ‘a marriage of convenience and no more’; Evans (2014, p 223). 
1201 Keating cited in Gordon (2014, p 5). 
1202 Edwards (1986, p 22). Gareth Evans recorded in his diary on 30 January 1985 that Keating reflecting 
on the prime ministership told him ‘of course I’ll have a go if it comes along, and particularly if I have to 
keep out people like Dawkins who would make a real mess of the country. But I don’t really give a stuff 
anymore and I would just as soon be up there making a squillion and talking about antiques’; Evans (2014, 
p 51). One reflection of the frustration was that, according to the Reserve Bank’s John Phillips, from 1987 
Keating ‘stopped listening as closely to people’; Love (2001, p 82). 
1203 Day (2015, pp 305-6, 342); McKenna (2011, pp 609-611). 
1204 Evatt and Calwell had both been retained for a third election after losing two (and both lost the third 
as well). Whitlam was retained after the heavy loss in 1975. 
1205 Keating told Bob Carr in 1990 he might resign in the middle of the term if Hawke did not retire; Bob 
Carr’s diary entry, 18 September 1990, cited in West and Morris (2003, p 208). But Day (2015, p 419) 
doubts Keating would have relocated to Paris as he loved Australia. 
1206 Carew (1992, pp 246-7), Gordon (1996, p 76), Kelly (1994, p 443); Tingle (1994, p 39). That evening, 
under prompting by Richardson, Hawke tried to dismiss the remarks as a joke; Gordon (1996, p 82). 
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In an attempt to resolve simmering leadership tensions, in November 1988 Keating and 
Hawke made the ‘Kirribilli agreement’ with Bill Kelty (Keating’s nominee) and 
businessman Sir Peter Abeles (Hawke’s nominee) as witnesses. This committed Hawke 
to an orderly handover of the leadership before the 1993 election.1207  
In December 1990, in a supposedly off-the-record address the day after the death of 
Treasury secretary Higgins, Keating vented his frustrations, claiming Australia had never 
had a great leader.1208  Hawke was offended by this slight, not only to himself but to his 
idol Curtin, whom Keating referred to as a ‘trier’. In January 1991 Hawke told Keating 
he was reneging on the Kirribilli agreement. According to Gordon (1996, p 115), Hawke 
had made remarks in private suggesting he was already planning to renege on the 
agreement before Keating’s speech. It was becoming clear that the party would soon have 
to choose between them.1209 As Bramston (2016, p 360) put it, ‘an irresistible force was 
about to meet an immovable object’. 
In May 1991 Keating overtook Ben Chifley to become the longest-serving Labor 
treasurer. Shortly thereafter he challenged Hawke, after making public the Kirribilli 
Agreement. In launching his challenge, Keating promised 'dare I say it, a touch of 
                                                          
Ramsey (1988, p 33), Watson (2002, p 81), and Bob Collins in Spencer and Chubb (1993), say Keating was 
‘driven to fury’ by Hawke’s remarks. Hawke had discussions with senior colleagues about moving Keating 
in a reshuffle to set Beazley up as a successor as prime minister; O’Brien (2015, pp 332-3). 
1207 Bowen (1991, p 32:3) said that Keating claimed there had been an earlier unwitnessed agreement in 
mid-1988. There are also reports of an understanding between them as far back as 1980 that, in exchange 
for Keating’s support, Hawke would only serve five years as prime minister then hand over to Keating; 
Edwards (1996, pp 152-3) and Hawke (1994, p 438) present differing recollections of this conversation. 
1208 The speech, dubbed the ‘Placido Domingo speech’, was later printed as Keating (1990). Keating denies 
any lingering influence from Jack Lang’s views in his attitude to Curtin, as suggested by Hawke (1994, 
p 499); Watson (2002, p 12). There were reports that in the speech he had also dismissed Chifley as ‘a 
plodder’ (eg Australian Financial Review, 10 December 1990, p 17) but Gordon (1996, p 279) denies that 
Keating referred to Chifley at all and there is no reference in the written version or in the account by Lewis 
(2014, p 88). In Keating (1987, pp 172, 176) he had referred to Chifley and Curtin as ‘giants’ leading a 
‘triumphant’ government but said the party in the 1950s and 1960s had ‘reduced the light on the hill to a 
smouldering incandescence’. In Keating (1992, p 143) he called Chifley ‘one of the great men in Australian 
history’. But he later told Paul Kelly (2001, p 96) that Chifley was ‘goodhearted but flatfooted’ and told 
journalist George Megalogenis (2006, p 233) that Chifley was ‘a very modest performer’ who ‘simply 
squandered the Curtin inheritance’. Carr (1979, p 83) classes Keating as an admirer of Curtin. In another 
phrase taken as a slight to Hawke, Keating said that leadership ‘is not whether you go through some 
shopping centres, tripping over TV crews’ cords’. While the vivid language is often attributed to Keating’s 
shock at Higgins’ unexpected collapse and death, Keating had made many of the points in a call to 
journalist Laurie Oakes the day before Higgins’ death; Oakes (1996). 
1209 One wit remarked it was a choice between an egomaniac and a megalomaniac; Day (2015, p 344). 
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excitement'.1210 He lost the first challenge by 44-66 and went to the backbench where he 
gave a strong speech on superannuation advocating a goal of 12 per cent contributions by 
20001211 and criticised Hawke for conceding control of some of the revenue base to the 
states. Keating started to plan his retirement from politics but after the government 
floundered in his absence, Keating won a second challenge in December by 56-51.1212 
Howard and Keating’s evolving economic philosophies 
Howard came to the treasurer's job without a strong economics background. Indeed, he 
had long held some scepticism about economists. He believed 'economic advice is far 
more a question of assertion than fact, because economics is a very inexact science'.1213As 
treasurer, asked in parliament why an advertisement for his advisor said that formal 
economics training was not essential, Howard replied 'I belong to that school of thought 
which does not necessarily believe that economic expertise is coincidental with formal 
economic training'.1214 In his early days one minister reportedly said that (Howard’s 
predecessor) Lynch used economic jargon because he understood it while Howard 
avoided it because he possibly didn't.1215  
While Treasurer, Howard’s economic thinking evolved in response both to the economic 
difficulties of the mid-1970s and the need to craft a political persona once he started to 
position himself as a leadership successor to Fraser.1216 He 'became progressively drier' 
in his stance on economic issues but always leavened with pragmatism.1217 Howard 
                                                          
1210 Carew (1992, p 292), Day (2015, p 344), Kelly (1994, p 635); Richardson (1994, p 320). Keating has 
remarked that even leaders in decline tend to be stuck to their seat and ‘you either put the sword through 
them or let the people do it’; cited in Brett (2007, p 24). 
1211 Hansard, 25 July 1991. As prime minister he advocated an increase to 15 per cent. 
1212 As Keating put it, Hawke failed to ‘get the zing back in the thing’. Keating believed ‘he was in the coffin’ 
but the Hawke supporters ‘forgot to put the nails in the lid’; Spencer and Chubb (1993). 
1213 Cited in McGregor (1982, p 16). 
1214 Hansard, 30 April 1981, p 1805. On becoming prime minister, he said his experience as treasurer led 
him to believe ‘if you only listen to Treasury and official advice on the state of the economy you don’t 
always get the full picture’; Savva (1996, p 3). 
1215 Schneider (1980, p 103). 
1216 Errington (2008, p 221). 
1217 Grattan (2010, p 445). He was influenced by the ‘dry’ MPs such as Bert Kelly, John Hyde and Jim 
Carlton. Kelly (1994, p 102) describes Howard’s conversion to an economic reformer as ‘slow but decisive’. 
Brandis (2008, p 60) refers to Howard’s gradually becoming increasingly attracted to ‘dry’ economic views, 
but without any sudden epiphany. Howard once described himself as ‘the most conservative leader the 
Liberal Party has ever had’ but at other times referred to a mix of social conservatism and economic 
liberalism; but others have characterized him as pragmatic and opportunistic rather than ideological; 
Rundle (2001, especially p 14). His chief of staff Arthur Sinodinos has contrasted the evolution of Howard’s 
views with his own; ‘because I was trained as an economist probably I was more market oriented to begin 
with than he would have been’; cited in Rhodes and Tiernan (2012, p 53). 
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'concedes as treasurer his conversion to the economic rationalist cause was a gradual 
one'.1218 When first appointed Howard was a protectionist, criticising tariff cuts as 
'exporting jobs'.1219 He later was pushing, albeit ineffectively, in cabinet for tariff cuts. 
As Peter Reith, who knows him well, wrote in his diary, ‘Howard may be rational by most 
standards but he is no economist and certainly not an economic rationalist’.1220    
Keating, by contrast, was more enthusiastic. With his love of ‘the big picture’, Keating 
‘embraced economic rationalism as if it were a Mahler symphony’.1221 But he leavened it 
with social responsibility, reflected in his description of his private office as ‘a mixture 
of econocrats and bleeding hearts’.1222 
Keating and Howard as prime ministers 
Keating contemplated being treasurer as well as prime minister1223 but, after deciding 
against that, opted for the ‘energy, flair and weight’ of John Dawkins rather than take the 
‘safe and easy option’ of leaving Ralph Willis in the position.1224 He decided to ‘govern 
boldly rather than try to court popularity’1225 and led Labor to victory in 1993.1226 As 
prime minister, Keating’s achievements included building up a national superannuation 
scheme, labour market reform, the Mabo legislation recognising the land rights of 
indigenous people, establishment of APEC and legislation protecting endangered species. 
He raised the issue of Australia becoming a republic. But in 1996 he was, as Millmow 
                                                          
1218 Henderson (1990, p 157). Jim Carlton believes Howard was only converted to a 'dry philosophy' after 
he became treasurer; O'Brien (1985, p 90). Grattan (2010, p 445) regards Treasury and Hewson as the 
major influences. Howard looking back on his record as an economic reformer included the caveat of 
‘particularly my time from the early 1980s' in an interview cited by Kelly (2001, p 243), implicitly conceding 
his early record as treasurer was less reforming. 
1219 Hansard, 4 November 1977, p 2899. Howard (2014, p 599) concedes he entered parliament supporting 
the status quo on tariffs. In 1976 he argued that ‘the Australian community happens to be interested in 
jobs and a strong manufacturing industry’ and quoted Fraser’s promise to ‘give Australian industry the 
protection it needs’; Hansard, 7 June 1976, pp 2959-60. 
1220 Peter Reith’s dairy entry, 1 August 1996, reprinted in Reith (2015, p 96). 
1221 Ryan (1999, p 249). 
1222 Keating, 1993, cited by Watson (2002). 
1223 Don Russell persuaded him against the idea; Bramston (2016, p 410), O’Brien (2013).  Some colleagues 
warned him that taking on both jobs from 1945 to 1949 drove Chifley to an early death. Hawke had 
laughed at this suggestion when Keating made it in 1988; Hawke (1994, pp 450-1). Yet Keating suggested 
to Mark Latham he be both opposition leader and shadow treasurer; Latham’s dairy 13 December 2003, 
in Latham (2005, p 255). Given the problems caused by the 1993 budget Keating now apparently regrets 
not taking both jobs; Bramston (2016, p 519). 
1224 Edwards (1996, p 459). He had long before promised Dawkins the job; Day (2015, p 308). 
1225 This was how he advised Queensland premier Anna Bligh to govern when she similarly faced the 
prospect of taking over a long-serving Labor government; cited in Bligh (2015, p 177). 
1226 He described this as 'the sweetest victory of all…for the true believers…[who] kept the faith'. 
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(2005) put it, '…banished from office by an electorate unappreciative of the new 
streamlined and reformed economy he had designed and instituted'.  
Keating’s defeat brought to the Lodge the indefatigable Howard. After the defeat of the 
Fraser government in 1983, a 'spent and exhausted'1227 Howard had been beaten by 
Peacock for the leadership but continued as deputy leader and was shadow treasurer.1228 
Peacock felt that Howard was disloyal1229 but when the party would not drop Howard 
from the deputy's position, Peacock resigned the leadership. Howard was elected leader 
but, in part due to a bizarre short-lived campaign by Queensland premier Bjelke-Petersen 
to become prime minister, Howard was defeated by Bob Hawke at the 1987 election. 
Howard retained the leadership after the election, but his popularity slumped1230, and he 
was overthrown in 1989, with Andrew Peacock returning to the leadership. After Peacock 
lost the 1990 election, Howard was defeated 30-47 for the leadership by John Hewson, 
who appointed him shadow minister for employment and industrial relations. Hewson 
lost the 1993 election, but beat Howard to retain the leadership. When confidence in 
Hewson's leadership waned, the party turned to Alexander Downer instead. But after 
Downer's leadership also faltered, the party turned back to Howard, 'the last man 
standing', who was elected leader unanimously in January 1995. 
Howard led the coalition back into government in 1996 and became Australia's second 
longest-serving prime minister, achieving his long-held ambitions of introducing a goods 
and services tax and reforming industrial relations. Howard is generally regarded as 
having a better record on economic reform as prime minister than as treasurer. He 
governed with a mix of ideology, most manifest in his controversial industrial relations 
reforms and the introduction of a GST, and pragmatism, demonstrated in expansions of 
family welfare payments. But to his critics, Howard squandered the revenue from the 
resources boom and delayed action on climate change. 
                                                          
1227 Henderson (1995, p 43). 
1228 Howard initially wanted a different shadow portfolio but was persuaded to keep Treasury; Howard 
(2010, p 140). As well as personalities, the Howard-Peacock rivalry reflected a conflict between 
conservative NSW free traders and more socially progressive Victorian protectionists that went back to 
before the formation of the first Liberal Party in 1909. 
1229 Fraser (1987, p 80). Fraser and Simons (2010, p 618) claim Howard was saying in early 1985 'my people 
will get rid of' Peacock. 
1230 The Bulletin of 20 December 1988 famously asked on its cover; ‘Mr 18%. Why on earth does this man 
bother?’ as only 18 per cent of voters preferred him to Bob Hawke as prime minister, although the 
accompanying article actually gave him 'an excellent chance of winning the next election'. 
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Keating and Howard after parliament 
After resigning from parliament shortly after the election loss, Keating took on the role 
of public intellectual, making speeches on politics, economics, foreign affairs, 
architecture and town planning.1231 He was also involved in some investment banking.1232 
and took an active interest in the Barangaroo development in Sydney, which he envisaged 
as a global financial centre.1233 He declined to publish his memoirs, regarding most as 
unreliable and self-serving and remarking ‘if you’re any good, someone else will write 
about you’.1234  
There were some difficult times. Following the 1996 election Labor seemed to distance 
itself from the Keating record of economic reform and called for a freeze on tariff 
reductions.1235 Keating and Annita separated. Keating reportedly mused about making a 
political comeback but felt Labor’s ineffective campaigning had left him too associated 
with unpopular high interest rates.1236  
Keating (2004, pp 499-501), with remarkable prescience, forecast that the global 
economic buoyancy induced from new digital technology would soon run its course and 
warned that risk premia in financial markets had unduly narrowed, concluding with his 
advice: ‘don’t be exposed in or after 2007. It could be dangerous’. In December 2013 the 
30th anniversary of the float was commemorated by Keating addressing the Labor caucus 
                                                          
1231 Many of his speeches are compiled in Keating (2011). His book on foreign affairs, Keating (2000), has 
been translated into Chinese and Japanese. He was appointed a Visiting Professor of Public Policy at the 
University of New South Wales. 
1232 He commented ‘there’s a lot of cleverness in it; I enjoy that. And there’s an honest dollar to be earned’; 
Love (2008, p 220). He also served on the international advisory board of the China Development Bank. 
1233 Clark (2012). 
1234 Day (2015, pp vii, 475 and 541). It is not a reflection of any lack of confidence in his ability to write 
one; launching Megalogenis (2006), Keating (2006, p 46) commented ‘would I write a better book? Well 
of course I would. I write better than George and I know more’. He recently remarked ‘it was one thing 
reforming the country for these people. But needing to entertain them 25 years later I will not do’; 
Australian Financial Review, 28 August 2014, p 56. 
1235 Forman and Way (1997, p 40). Party elder John Faulkner called this ‘a massive, massive mistake’; 
McKew (2013, p 4), Kelly (2014, p 54). Keating lamented, ‘fundamentally the Labor Party never believed 
in the model…[and so] the Labor Party has given up the middle-class, middle-ground, sole-employer, 
self-employed, small business voter that Bob Hawke and I generated for it’; Hartcher (2005, p 34). It was 
not until 2006 that Labor tried to ‘bring him in from the cold’ and ‘take head-on the accusation that 
Keating’s record was worse than the Coalition’s’; Hartcher (2007a, pp 37 and 40). But he lamented that 
Labor had created a new society and must be open to its beneficiaries; Kelly (2014, p 52). 
1236 Keating reportedly said to ALP National Secretary Tim Gartrell in 2006 ‘because of you guys I’m now 
Mr 17 per cent…and you’ve f___ed my comeback’; Carroll (2010, p 129). But he denied any such thoughts 
in Hartcher (2005, p 35), claiming ‘I took that decision in 1996 [to leave parliament] and I’ve been happy 
with it’. 
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and he received a standing ovation. He now talks every few days to Labor’s shadow 
treasurer Chris Bowen.1237 
In 2007, Howard lost the election and became only the second prime minister to lose his 
own seat. In enforced retirement he made an unsuccessful attempt to lead the International 
Cricket Council. Unlike Keating, Howard chose to write his memoirs and they sold very 
well. He then wrote an account of the ‘Menzies Era’. In 2012 he received the Order of 
Merit from the Queen. 
Synkrisis 
Keating and Howard took very different lessons from their upbringing and the challenges 
faced by their families in post-war Australia. To Howard the problems were due to 
ill-judged government interventions such as petrol rationing. To Keating the problems 
were caused by a cosseted banking system and subject to government amelioration. While 
their upbringing was not dissimilar, Howard mixed more with the sons of the middle class 
and Keating with the working class. These factors reinforced the leads given by their 
parents and made it inevitable that Howard would make his political home in the Liberals 
and Keating in Labor.  
As treasurers they both started out with the goodwill of their prime ministers and in both 
cases the relationship was strained by the end, with Keating resigning and challenging 
Hawke for the leadership and Howard also contemplating resignation. Keating was more 
fortunate in that Hawke was more willing to use up political capital in defending a 
reformist treasurer. Keating also had talented and progressive cabinet colleagues whereas 
Howard faced many agrarian conservatives. But Keating also made his own luck, pushing 
reform much more vigorously than did Howard both internally in cabinet and to the 
public. As a result, while both are recalled as successful politicians, Keating is generally 
viewed as a better treasurer than prime minister while Howard is recalled as a better prime 
minister than treasurer. 
 
  
                                                          
1237 Clark (2015, p 18). 
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Chapter Eight: The Australian treasurers as a class 
 
Introduction 
The eight treasurers singled out for detailed discussion in the previous four chapters both 
share many characteristics with and have some differences from the other thirty-one 
treasurers. One major distinction is their longevity of tenure; three of the four 
longest-serving treasurers are included among the eight chosen for close study. They were 
precocious; the majority entering parliament by 30 or younger. It will be argued in a later 
chapter that the eight selected also include a majority of the most successful and admired 
treasurers. They were also more politically successful and powerful than the average 
parliamentarians of their era and all but one also served as prime minister. 
Table 8.1: Comparison of selected treasurers with others 
Age at which 
first… 
Elected to 
state 
parliament 
State 
minister 
Elected to 
federal 
parliament 
Federal 
minister 
Treasurer 
Andrew Fisher 30 37 38 41 46 
Joseph Cook 30 33 40 48 59 
Ted Theodore 24 30 42 44 44 
Joseph Lyons 29 34 50 50 52 
Ben Chifley na na 43 45 56 
Arthur Fadden 37 na 42 46 46 
Paul Keating na na 25 31 39 
John Howard na na 34 36 38 
Others (median age)      
1901-1958 na na 40 45 46 
1959-2016 na na 35 43 52 
 
Among features they share with other treasurers are all being men, and mostly from an 
Anglo-Saxon background. The eight selected treasurers are wider read (even if not 
formally qualified) in economics and finance than the typical parliamentarian. Their key 
features are summarised in Table 8.2.  
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Table 8.2: Biographic data on the Australian treasurers 
 Born Occupation State Appointed
d 
Years Budgets Died 
George Turner 8.08.51 lawyer Vic 1.01.01 4.5 4 13.8.16 
Chris Watson 9.04.67 union official NSW 27.04.04 0.3 0 18.11.41 
John Forrest 22.08.47 surveyor WA 5.07.05 5.3 6 2.09.18 
William Lyne 6.04.44 farmer NSW 30.07.07 1.3 2 3.08.13 
Andrew Fisher 29.08.62 miner Qld 13.11.08 4.8 4 22.10.28 
William Higgs 18.01.62 printer/editor Qld 27.10.15 1.1 1 11.6.51 
Alexander Poynton 8.08.53 miner SA 14.11.16 0.3 1 10.01.35 
William Watt 23.11.71 accountant Vic 27.03.18 2.3 1 13.09.46 
Joseph Cook 7.12.60 miner NSW 28.07.20 1.4 2 30.07.47 
SM Bruce 15.04.83 businessman Vic 21.12.21 1.1 1 25.08.67 
Earle Page 8.08.80 doctor NSW 9.02.23 6.7 7 20.12.61 
Edward Theodore 29.12.84 union official NSW 22.10.29 1.6 1 9.02.50 
James Scullin 18.9.76 grocer Vic 9.07.30 0.6 1 28.01.53 
Joseph Lyons 15.9.79 teacher Tas 6.01.32 3.7 3 7.04.39 
Richard Casey 29.8.90 businessman Vic 3.10.35 3.6 4 17.06.76 
Robert Menzies 20.12.94 lawyer Vic 26.04.39 0.9 1 15.05.78 
Percy Spender 5.10.97 lawyer NSW 14.03.40 0.6 0 3.05.85 
Arthur Fadden 13.04.94 accountant Qld 28.10.40 9.9 10 21.04.73 
Ben Chifley 22.09.85 train driver NSW 7.10.41 8.2 9 13.06.51 
Harold Holt 5.08.08 lawyer Vic 10.12.58 7.1 7 19.12.67 
William McMahon 23.02.08 lawyer NSW 26.01.66 3.8 4 31.03.88 
Leslie Bury 25.02.13 economist NSW 12.11.69 1.4 1 7.09.86 
Billy Snedden 31.12.26 lawyer Vic 22.03.71 1.7 2 27.06.87 
Gough Whitlam 11.07.16 lawyer NSW 5.12.72 0.0 0 21.10.14 
Frank Crean 28.02.16 accountant Vic 19.12.72 2.0 2 2.12.08 
Jim Cairns 4.10.14 academic Vic 11.12.74 0.5 0 12.10.03 
Bill Hayden 23.01.33 policeman Qld 6.06.75 0.4 1  
Phillip Lynch 27.07.33 businessman Vic 11.11.75 2.0 2 19.06.84 
John Howard 26.07.39 lawyer NSW 19.11.77 5.3 5  
Paul Keating 18.01.44 union official NSW 11.03.83 8.2 8  
Bob Hawke 9.12.29 union official Vic 3.06.91 0.0 0  
John Kerin 21.11.37 economist NSW 4.06.91 0.5 1  
Ralph Willis 14.04.38 union official Vic 9.12.91 2.3 2  
John Dawkins 2.03.47 union official WA 27.12.91 2.0 2  
Peter Costello 14.08.57 lawyer Vic 11.03.96 11.7 11  
Wayne Swan 30.06.54 academic Qld 3.12.07 5.6 6  
Chris Bowen 17.01.73 union official NSW 27.06.13 0.2 0  
Joe Hockey 2.08.65 lawyer NSW 18.9.13 2.0 2  
Scott Morrison 13.05.68 manager NSW 21.9.15  2 so 
far 
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Who becomes a treasurer? 
An examination of over 2,000 post-war cabinet ministers in western Europe showed that 
they differed markedly from the population as a whole, being disproportionately male, 
over 50, university educated and having been lawyers, teachers or civil servants.1238 The 
prominence of lawyers in the cabinets of the English-speaking countries has been noted 
by many writers since the time of de Tocqueville in the 1830s.1239 De Tocqueville opined 
that ‘democracy is favourable to the political power of lawyers’ which has been attributed 
to their high status and income, ability to work part-time and skills in advocacy.1240 
Similar patterns can be found among Australian ministers1241 and treasurers; Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3: Comparison of treasurers with parliamentarians and the public 
 Treasurers Members of House 
of Representatives 
Adult population 
 1901-1949 Dec 1925 1921 census 
% female 0 0 49 
% aged 50 or over 51 57 27 
% with university degrees 27 15 <1 
% lawyers 12 12 <1 
 
 Treasurers Members of House 
of Representatives 
Adult population 
 1950-2016 Sept 1985 1981 census 
% female 0 5 51 
% aged 50 or over 48 39 36 
% with university degrees 74 61 4 
% lawyers 49 20 <1 
Sources: ABS; Parliamentary Handbook, 5th, 23rd, 44th issues; Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
                                                          
1238 Thiébault (1991, pp 19-20). Blondel (1985 and 1987, p 117) reaches a similar conclusion globally, 
although with the addition of the occupation ‘army officer’.  
1239 See, for example, Lasswell (1948, pp 35, 137), Blondel (1985, p 49 and 1987, p 117), Economist (2009, 
p 63), Kerby (2009, p 598) and Ludwig (2002, p 3). Lawyers are particularly dominant in the United States; 
Pedersen (1972, p 25). By contrast the politburo in China is predominantly composed of engineers, civil 
servants are more common in South Korea and doctors in Brazil; Economist (2009, p 63). An extreme case 
of recruitment from a narrow base was Eden’s British cabinet in the 1950s, over half of whose members 
came from the one school, Eton; Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2012, p 64). 
1240 Cited by Pedersen (1972, p 31).  
1241 Encel (1974, pp 159 and 166) notes the preponderance of lawyers among ministers. 
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While Australia has had a female prime minister, there has been no female treasurer.1242  
Female ministers have tended to be disproportionately allocated to the ‘caring’ portfolios 
such as education (Ryan, Vanstone, Bishop, Gillard, Ellis), health (Lawrence, Paterson, 
Roxon, Ley), family and community services (Vanstone, Patterson, Macklin), housing 
(Rankin, Plibersek), social security (Guilfoyle, Newman) and social inclusion (Gillard, 
Plibersek), rather than defence, foreign affairs or the economy.1243 Julia Gillard had been 
spoken of as a potential treasurer, and Rudd had indicated to her she could have claimed 
the post as deputy leader, but she chose not to do so, partly as she saw the merit of uniting 
the party after the leadership change by not moving Beazley supporter Swan, and partly 
because she was more interested in her existing area of industrial relations.1244 European 
cabinets have also tended to be predominantly male although there has been a substantial 
representation of women in the Nordic countries. Women tend to be more represented in 
countries with proportional representation electoral systems.1245 As in Australia, in other 
European and American countries women are also concentrated in ‘domestic portfolios’.   
Dalvean (2012, p 6) notes those entering parliament younger are more likely to achieve 
cabinet rank. This may be because they accumulate more parliamentary experience or 
because those entering parliament young are unusually focused, talented and ambitious. 
Members in safe seats are also more likely to become a cabinet minister.1246 This is also 
true of treasurers; Theodore is the only sitting treasurer to lose his seat whereas two prime 
ministers, Bruce and Howard, have suffered this indignity. The direction of causation 
between the safety of a seat and its incumbent’s chance of entering cabinet is unclear. It 
may be that members in safe seats need to devote less time to local campaigning and so 
are more able to advance their ministerial careers. It may be that parties find safe seats 
for their most talented recruits. Or it may be that the status and name recognition from 
                                                          
1242 Holt (2001, p ix) notes the same is true of the UK. He nominates Barbara Castle in the 1960s and 
Margaret Thatcher in the 1970s as plausible possibilities for the role. Dell (1996, p 361) also discusses 
Barbara Castle as a possible chancellor and opines that she was one of the most effective cabinet ministers 
of the time.   
1243 There has been only one female foreign minister (Julie Bishop, who was able to claim it as deputy 
Liberal leader), two finance ministers (Guilfoyle, Wong), one defence minister (Payne) and no industry 
minister. 
1244 Gillard (2015, p 338). 
1245 ‘The literature on established democracies has long suggested that the most women-friendly electoral 
systems are list-proportional representation’ as in such systems ‘parties have an incentive to broaden 
their overall electoral appeal by making their candidate list as diverse as possible’; Reynolds (1999, p 555). 
1246 Dalvean (2012, p 68). 
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being a cabinet minister, or the opportunity for pork-barrelling, tends to render a seat safer 
than it would otherwise be. 
As well as expertise and competence (and loyalty), in selecting a cabinet the prime 
minister will need to bear in mind the need for a balance between members and senators. 
Most prime ministers have strived to keep at least one representative from each state in 
the cabinet. Labor prime ministers need to balance the left and right (and sometimes 
centre) factions and at times sub-factions while a coalition prime minister has to balance 
Liberal and National party representation.1247 Most modern prime ministers will strive to 
have a proportion of female cabinet ministers. Seniority is also recognised. These factors 
constrain the choice of cabinet members and sometimes result in the exclusion of potential 
ministers who would qualify on purely merit considerations. Given the importance of the 
Treasury portfolio, these considerations will, arguably, less affect the selection of a 
treasurer than filling other posts. 
The most common pre-parliamentary occupations of Labor treasurers has been trade 
union officials (Watson, Theodore, Keating, Willis, Dawkins, Bowen) while the most 
common occupations for non-Labor treasurers have been lawyers (Turner, Menzies, 
Spender, Holt, McMahon, Snedden, Howard, Costello, Hockey) and business people or 
managers (Bruce, Casey, Lynch, Morrison). As shown in Table 8.2, there has been a range 
of other professions such as miners (Fisher, Poynton, Cook, Theodore), accountants 
(Watt, Fadden, Crean), policemen (Cairns, Hayden), academics (Cairns, Swan), 
economists (Bury, Kerin), one farmer (Lyne), one grocer (Scullin), one schoolteacher 
(Lyons), one doctor (Page), one surveyor (Forrest), one newspaper editor (Higgs) and one 
train driver (Chifley). The overrepresentation of lawyers is not surprising given their 
overrepresentation in parliament as a whole, as illustrated in Table 8.3.1248  
Enel’s (1961, p 101) comparison of the occupations of fathers of ministers with those of 
business leaders and officials and the general public, as at 1947, found that professionals 
and farm-owners were overrepresented among ministers’ fathers. 
                                                          
1247 In some countries, a balance of ministers from religious, language or ethnic backgrounds is also 
important but this has not been an issue in Australia. 
1248 Dalvean (2012) notes that those members with law degrees are more likely to become cabinet 
ministers. 
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Unsurprisingly given the distribution of the population, most treasurers have come from 
New South Wales and Victoria, as shown in Table 8.2. Only two have come from Western 
Australia (Forrest and Dawkins), only one from Tasmania (Lyons) and one from South 
Australia (the short-serving Poynton). Five came from Queensland (Fisher, Higgs, 
Fadden, Hayden, Swan).1249 These nine represent less than a quarter of the treasurers; 
whereas the smaller four states have accounted for a third of Australia’s population and a 
higher proportion of MPs. It seems unlikely this represents a conscious bias. More likely 
is that, especially before modern transport and communications, it was harder for 
politicians from more remote areas to ‘network’ as effectively and therefore harder for 
them to press their claims to a senior portfolio. Most treasurers have represented capital 
city seats. The main exceptions are the Country Party treasurers (Page and Fadden) and 
Lyons. 
In the corporate world, Sinclair and Wilson (2002, chapter 2) noted that leaders 
disproportionately have missing fathers, are first born in their families and as a child or 
teenager moved between countries or at least states. Simonton (1987, p 20) observed that 
in the US ‘both presidents and vice-presidents tend to be first-born children’. Blondel has 
developed this point, arguing that first-born sons are best suited to leadership in situations 
of expansion while younger sons are better suited to dealing with societal problems 
requiring compromise (and the youngest child ‘may be the natural champion of the 
oppressed’).1250 Among the longer-serving Australian treasurers, Chifley, Fadden, Holt 
and Keating were the eldest child, Fisher and Costello the second, Forrest and Page were 
around the middle of large families while only Howard was the youngest. 
It has been observed of both Australian and British prime ministers that an unusually high 
proportion lost a parent in childhood or early adolescence, or suffered other early 
emotional deprivation, a phenomenon sometimes called the ‘Phaethon (or Phaeton) 
complex’.1251 Paxman (2002, p 36) remarked of UK prime ministers that many 
experienced ‘a childhood deprived of affection, unusual sensitivity, an outstanding 
mentor, extreme self-discipline, an overdeveloped religious sense, aggression and 
timidity, overdependence on the love of others’. Grattan (2013, p 13) noted this has meant 
                                                          
1249 While representing a NSW electorate, Theodore was a former premier of Queensland. 
1250 Blondel (1997, pp 118-9) and Stewart (1977). 
1251 Berrington (1974), Fricke (1990, p 4), Grattan (2013, p 13), Iremonger (1970, especially pp 308-9), 
Leigh (2015, p 90), Paxman (2002, pp 34-35). 
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they have been ‘forced to become adults before their time, assuming responsibilities and 
making decisions’. Fricke (1990, p 4) suggested that this manifests in a reckless desire to 
attract attention. 
Among the longer-serving Australian treasurers, there is no pattern of losing parents 
young, although Chifley grew up on his grandfather’s farm and did not spend much time 
with his parents. What was common among the early treasurers was parental illness or 
financial difficulties forcing teenagers or young men to assume responsibility for 
providing for their families. This was true to varying degrees for Fisher, Cook, Page and 
Lyons. Forrest had a stable upbringing but showed exceptional leadership skills early on, 
successfully leading expeditions across vast distances in the uncharted West Australian 
desert. Theodore also left home early and travelled around the country working as a 
miner.  
Training for treasurers  
As noted above, few treasurers have had relevant formal qualifications.1252 In this they 
are like ministers in general. Tiernan and Weller (2010, p 42) find 'analysis of the 
educational background of ministers reveals little relationship between the type of degree 
and the portfolio held'. Australia shares this preference for the ‘amateur’ in cabinet 
ministers with the UK, Ireland, Italy and New Zealand whereas in much of western 
Europe and the United States at least a significant number of cabinet ministers are 
appointed for their expertise.1253 
Treasurers have generally had previous ministerial experience, the exceptions being after 
their parties have had long periods in opposition. Junior ministries, particularly within the 
Treasury portfolio, may act as an apprenticeship. Among recent treasurers, Hockey served 
as minister for financial services and small business. Bowen held both those ministerial 
                                                          
1252 This has been particularly the case on the conservative side of politics. Joseph Lyons once remarked 
'those who give their lives to the study of economics rarely become tory or conservative’; Hansard, 
13 March 1931, p 232. It is also the case in the United Kingdom. Harold Wilson had a first in PPE from 
Oxford, worked as a research assistant to Beveridge, was an economist/statistician in the public service 
and had been an economics fellow, and after entering parliament was the youngest cabinet minister in 
over a century. Yet Atlee overlooked him for the chancellor’s post in 1950. More fortunate was Nigel 
Lawson, another PPE graduate from Oxford, who had been tutored there by Keynes’ pupil and biographer 
Roy Harrod, and went on to be a financial journalist, who was appointed chancellor by Margaret Thatcher.  
1253 Blondel (1993a, p 327). Larsson (1993, p 220) observes that In the UK and Ireland only a minority of 
the politicians holding the treasury portfolio had specialist knowledge in economics whereas in France, 
Germany and the Netherlands the majority did so. 
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posts as well as assistant treasurer and minister for competition policy. By contrast 
Keating, Costello and Swan lacked ministerial experience.1254  
A survey of European ministers found that 70 per cent believed that experience as junior 
ministers aided their performance as cabinet ministers and they rated it more useful than 
a technical background in the subject matter of their department.1255 
Among earlier treasurers, Casey, Spender, Fadden, Bury and Lynch had all been assistant 
treasurers (the exact title differed) before taking on the substantive role.1256 Using an 
assistant treasurership as an apprenticeship had been suggested to Menzies by 
Copland.1257 But the majority of assistant treasurers do not make the transition. Those 
who were assistant treasurer to a treasurer who was also prime minister (Richard Casey, 
Walter Massy-Greene, Percy Spender, Hubert Anthony, Nelson Lemmon) were likely to 
have more responsibilities delegated to them.  
A period as acting treasurer can also help prepare a junior minister for being treasurer. 
Hayden, who was a particularly active acting treasurer during six stints, stands out as 
someone who made the most of the opportunity before becoming treasurer himself. Watt, 
Cook, Lyons, Casey, Menzies, Spender, Bury, Dawkins, Willis and Hockey all served as 
acting treasurer before taking on the substantive role. Some prime ministers (Bruce, 
Menzies, Holt, McMahon – all previous treasurers) preferred to take on the role 
themselves when their treasurer was away. Since the finance ministry was split off from 
Treasury in 1977, it has been common for the finance minister (eg Robinson, Guilfoyle, 
Fahey, Tanner, Cormann) to act as treasurer. 
Blondel notes ‘specialist [parliamentary] committees…are providing 
potential…ministers with a substantial degree of expertise’.1258 Service on the House 
economics committee may also provide a useful introduction to the issues faced by future 
treasurers. The three most recent treasurers (Bowen, Hockey and Morrison) all served on 
this committee, but none of their predecessors.  
                                                          
1254 Keating had been minister for northern Australia in the Whitlam Government for three weeks before 
it was dismissed. 
1255 Blondel (1993b, pp 190-1). 
1256 SM Bruce was uniquely assistant treasurer after being treasurer.  
1257 Copland suggested to Menzies ‘you should take the treasury yourself for at least a few months, with 
an assistant treasurer who could be trained to take over the Treasury himself’; Harper (2013, p 219). 
1258 Blondel (1993a, pp 324, 329). 
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The immediate previous job of almost all Australian treasurers has been shadow treasurer 
or another ministry and prior to that they were mostly parliamentary backbenchers. As 
Rose (1987, p 80) remarked, parliamentary experience, while undoubtedly useful for a 
ministerial role, ‘does not lead naturally to the work of a minister, as primary school leads 
to secondary school’. 
There have only formally been 'shadow treasurers', as the Opposition's principal 
spokesperson and putative nominee for the treasurer's job is called, since Whitlam became 
opposition leader in 1967.1259 There were of course front benchers who specialised to 
some extent in economic or financial matters before this and former treasurers still on the 
front bench would often be approached by the media to comment on economic issues. As 
shown by Table 8.4 only seven (shown in bold) of the 25 shadow treasurers have gone on 
to become treasurer. 
There is not much on-the-job training for ministers provided by their predecessors. As 
one British minister noted, even when the transition is within the same political party, the 
‘outgoing minister is either so anxious to get on with the new ministerial job…or so 
despondent at being sacked’.1260 In the few cases when treasurers or prime ministers have 
tried to train a future treasurer they have lost office or the protégé has lost their seat (or 
died) before the transition can be implemented.1261 Spender, Holt and Willis are arguably 
the only examples of ‘trained’ treasurers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1259 There had been one earlier instance of a ‘shadow minister’ in Australia when in 1921 caucus assigned 
responsibility for speaking on financial matters to Frank Anstey. 
1260 Former UK minister Lord Crowther-Hunt in Kellner and Crowther-Hunt (1980, p 212). As Table 3.2 
shows, most incoming Australian treasurers’ predecessors have been either from the other side of politics 
or have been demoted. 
1261 Charles Frazer and John Dedman were protégés of Fisher and Chifley but never became treasurers. 
 247 
 
Table 8.4: Shadow treasurers 
Frank Crean1262 Feb 1967 5 Dec 1972 
Billy Snedden* 5 Dec 1972 14 June 1974 
Phillip Lynch 14 June 1974 11 Nov 1975 
Bill Hayden* 11 Nov 1975 13 Dec 1975 
Chris Hurford 27 Jan 1976 29 Dec 1977 
Bill Hayden* (economic management) 2 June 1977 29 Dec 1977 
Ralph Willis 29 Dec 1977 14 Jan 1983 
Paul Keating 14 Jan 1983 11 Mar 1983 
John Howard* 16 Mar 1983 5 Sep 1985 
Jim Carlton 9 Sep 1985 14 Aug 1987 
Andrew Peacock 14 Aug 1987 12 May 1989 
John Hewson 12 May 1989 11 Apr 1990 
Peter Reith 11 Apr 1990 7 Apr 1993 
Alexander Downer 7 Apr 1993 26 May 1994 
Peter Costello 26 May 1994 11 Mar 1996 
Gareth Evans 20 Mar 1996 19 Oct 1998 
Simon Crean 20 Oct 1998 25 Nov 2001 
Bob McMullan 25 Nov 2001 2 Jul 2003 
Mark Latham 2 Jul 2003 8 Dec 2003 
Simon Crean 8 Dec 2003 26 Oct 2004 
Wayne Swan 26 Oct 2004 3 Dec 2007 
Malcolm Turnbull 6 Dec 2007 22 Sept 2008 
Julie Bishop 22 Sept 2008 16 Feb 2009 
Joe Hockey 16 Feb 2009 18 Sept 2013 
Chris Bowen* 18 Oct 2013  
*Former treasurer. Source: compiled from Parliamentary Handbooks, various issues. 
  
                                                          
1262 Whitlam (1985, pp 212-3) comments that Crean had been ‘vaguely accepted’ as effectively the shadow 
treasurer for a decade before this. 
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Comparison of actual with potential treasurers 
A number of prominent politicians who themselves greatly desired to be treasurer, had 
some parliamentary support, took more interest in economics and finance than most 
members and were mentioned by political commentators as possible treasurers are listed 
in Table 8.5.  
Table 8.5: Potential Australian treasurers 
 (In federal 
parliament) 
 
George Edwards (1901-19061263) Expert on currency matters 
Charles Frazer (1903-1913) Fisher protégé; acting treasurer 
King O’Malley (1901-1917) Financier; central banking advocate 
Frank Anstey (1910-1934) Monetary radical; finance spokesperson 
spokesman Walter Massy-Greene (1910-1938
1264) Banker; ssistant treasurer 
Harry Gullett (1925-1940) Journalist, historian, trade minister 
Bertram Stevens Unsuccessful 
bid in 1940 
NSW treasury official, treasurer and 
premier; early Keynesian and planner 
Charles Hawker (1929-1938) Studied economics; minister for markets 
John Curtin (1928-19451265) Monetary radical; journalist 
John Dedman (1940-1949) Chifley protégé; studied economics 
Tom Burke (1943-1955) Chifley protégé 
Nelson Lemmon (1943-19491266) Chifley protégé 
Arthur Calwell (1940-1972) Victorian treasury official 
William Wentworth IV (1949-1977) Economist 
Harry Edwards (1972-1993) Professor of economics 
John Stone (1987-19901267) Treasury department head 
John Hewson (1987-1995) Economist; professor; shadow treasurer 
Mark Latham (1994-2005) Economist; shadow treasurer 
Malcolm Turnbull (2004-        ) Lawyer; banker; shadow treasurer 
                                                          
1263 Edwards was member for South Sydney from 1901 until he retired in 1906. He briefly returned to 
parliament as member for North Sydney in April 1910 but died in February 1911. 
1264 Massy-Greene was MHR for Richmond 1910-1922 and senator 1923-1925; 1926-1938. 
1265 Curtin was MHR for Fremantle 1928-1931 and 1934-1945. 
1266 Lemmon was MHR for Forrest in WA from 1943 until defeated in 1949. He returned to parliament as 
MHR for St George in NSW in 1954 but was defeated again in 1955. 
1267 Stone resigned from the Senate and stood unsuccessfully for the Queensland House of 
Representatives seat of Fairfax. 
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This group of ‘couldabeen’ treasurers share many of the characteristics of the actual 
treasurers; being male, Anglo-Saxon and educated, but collectively are more trained in 
economics. The reasons they did not become treasurer are varied. Curtin, Calwell, 
Hewson, Latham and Turnbull were all promoted to party leader while in opposition 
(although only Curtin and Turnbull went on to become prime minister). Of the others, 
some died young (Edwards in an accident, Frazer from a sudden illness, Hawker in a 
plane crash); Stevens was unable to find a winnable federal seat; Massy-Greene, Dedman 
and Lemmon lost their seats; and while O’Malley, Anstey and Wentworth all had enough 
party support to serve as ministers they were seen as too radical or eccentric for their 
prime minister to entrust them with the Treasury.  
The main general contrast between the actual and the potential treasurers is that the former 
as a group are more politically adroit, confirming the view that this is regarded as more 
important than economic expertise.  
Conclusion 
There are some characteristics more common among those who aspire to and/or achieve 
the office of treasurer then among their parliamentary peers (political experience and 
savvy, education, representing NSW or Victoria and capital cities, and masculinity) but 
training or preparation is not one of them. 
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Chapter Nine: The Treasury and its relations 
with treasurers 
 
The Department of the Treasury  
In countries with a Westminster tradition, Treasury is always an important department. A 
UK study claimed their Treasury was ‘unquestionably the most important department of 
central government’.1268 It has even been described as ‘God at the cabinet table’.1269 In its 
earliest days Alfred Deakin referred to Australia’s Treasury as ‘one of our greatest and 
most important departments’.1270 Treasury has been called the ‘most influential of 
Australia’s federal departments…beyond dispute’ by Weller (1977b, p 1) and ‘able to 
sway decisions one way or the other through its monopoly over advice, intellectual power 
and bureaucratic ruthlessness’ by Wanna (2002, p 99). 
Such praise may have contributed to Treasury’s reputation for arrogance, something it 
shares with many European treasury departments.1271 The department has also had a 
reputation within the bureaucracy for only offering one option to ministers and holding 
                                                          
1268 Chapman (1997, p 11). Hugh Dalton (1962, p 17), UK chancellor of the exchequer 1945-1947, described 
the British Treasury as one of ‘the two most powerful and Olympian departments’. Chancellor Darling 
(2011, p 169) reflected ‘the Treasury has always had a high self-regard. It sees itself as the big beast of 
Whitehall, patrolling the corridors of governments of whatever political hue, fiercely guarding the 
economic stability of the country’. UK studies of government departments have concluded ‘Treasury is 
the mightiest’; Paxman (2002, p 198). More poetically It has been called ‘a uniquely powerful department 
– monolithic, mysterious and sometimes a little menacing’; Roseveare (1969, p 10). In its commitment to 
fiscal responsibility, it has even been called ‘the Day of Judgement institutionalised’; Simon Jenkins (1995, 
p 223). It has long been said to have demanding standards; a member of the Royal Commission on Civil 
Establishments in 1888, cited in Kynaston (1980, p 58), claimed ‘the Treasury are not satisfied with an 
ordinary first-class man, but they want a double first-class man of Balliol’. But it has been acknowledged 
as hard-working; Michael Heseltine once remarked that ‘the Treasury never sleeps’; cited in Hennessy 
(1989, p 392). Keynes (1918, p 297) regarded the UK Treasury’s role as ‘one of the most splendid parts of 
our constitution’ and its prestige allowed it to deploy the weapons of ‘precedent, formalism, aloofness 
and even sometimes obstruction by the process of delay’. Stanley Baldwin once said that ‘there are three 
groups that no British prime minister should provoke: the Vatican, the Treasury and the miners’; cited by 
FitzSimons (1998, p 135). 
1269 This view within government is based on its ability ‘to sway decisions one way or the other through 
its monopoly over advice, intellectual power and bureaucratic ruthlessness’, according to Wanna (2002, 
p 99). 
1270 Hansard, 20 August 1912, pp 2348-2349. 
1271 Larsson (1993, p 213) observes ‘treasury officials tend to believe that they are the elite of the civil 
service and that they therefore would run other departments far better and more efficiently’. Shann 
(1987, p 25) suggests ‘sometimes wrong, always certain’ as an epitaph for Treasury. 
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entrenched views.1272 The department has tended to stress ‘loyalty’ and the need to 
present ‘a united front’.1273 A royal commission referred in 1976 to the ‘widely held view 
that the Treasury…approaches its task of informing and advising the treasurer 
with…some would say almost doctrinal force’.1274 Weller (1977b, p 91) accused Treasury 
of inappropriately pushing its own views into the broader community; ‘Treasury has 
always been able to get its 'line' out to those who will listen, especially to key economic 
writers in the newspapers, and this 'line' has sometimes departed from that of the 
government or even the treasurer himself’. 
Treasurers are often criticised for being too close to, and reliant on, their departments.1275 
As a European academic observed, ‘it is truly difficult to know who ‘socialises’ whom in 
the interchange between ministers and treasury officials’.1276 There are good reasons why 
treasurers may be reliant on their departments. Most treasurers lack economic training or 
relevant business experience, while since Roland Wilson’s appointment in 1951 all 
Australian Treasury secretaries have had economics degrees. Furthermore, treasurers may 
want to use the department as a scapegoat; ‘it may appear safe to follow departmental 
advice. If that advice appears later to be misconceived, the relevant department officers 
can be blamed.’1277 
As observed in Chapter 3, the tenure of treasurers is less than half that of their department 
heads. Since federation there have been 39 treasurers but only 17 Treasury secretaries. 
And a much higher proportion of the secretaries have left the position by retiring after a 
long tenure; compare Tables 3.2, 8.2 and 9.1.1278 At one extreme Sir Frederick Wheeler 
remained as secretary while Snedden, Whitlam, Crean, Cairns, Hayden, Lynch and 
                                                          
1272 Weller and Grattan (1981, pp 62, 81). Ian Castles commented ‘the presentation of a single view by 
Treasury, as if it were the only possible view that an intelligent person could take…upset the prime 
minister’; Weller (2001, p 92). 
1273 Weller (1977b, p 9). 
1274 Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (1976, p 366). Wanna (2002, p 100) 
notes it has been easy to demonise Treasury as a ‘bully department’. 
1275 On closeness, a UK chancellor went so far as to claim ‘‘the relations between a minister and his 
secretary are, or at least should be, among the finest that can exist between two individuals. Except the 
married state, there is none in which so great a confidence is involved, in which more forbearance ought 
to be exercised, or more sympathy ought to exist’; Disraeli in Endymion (1880), cited approvingly by a 
later chancellor Hugh Dalton (1962, p 16). On reliance, as far back as 1690 the British Chancellor admitted 
to the Commons while going through some complicated figures that 'a man of better understanding than 
I may not understand my trade, but it may be explained to him by his officers'; cited by Kynaston (1980, 
p 6). 
1276 Larsson (1993, p 221). 
1277 Anonymous (2000). 
1278 Spry (2000, p 10). 
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Howard were successively treasurer. Treasury secretaries traditionally stayed in the post 
until retirement, by when they were often in poor health, although Harry Sheehan and 
Bernie Fraser served as governors of the central bank after being Treasury secretary. In 
recent years there has been more turnover. Chris Higgins died young after one year in the 
job, Tony Cole was transferred, Ken Henry retired early while Martin Parkinson was 
dismissed by Tony Abbott only to be resurrected as head of Prime Minister & Cabinet by 
Malcolm Turnbull. 
Table 9.1: Treasury secretaries 
 Date appointed Length of 
tenure 
Reason left post 
George Allen 1 Jan 1901 15 yrs, 2m Retired 
James Collins 14 March 1916 10 yrs, 3m Retired 
James Heathershaw 3 August 1926 5 yrs, 2m Ill health 
Harry Sheehan 29 April 1932 5 yrs, 9m Appointed CB governor 
Stuart McFarlane 24 March 1938 9yrs,10m Appointed to IMF/WB 
George Watt 23 Nov 1948 2 yrs, 4m Retired 
Roland Wilson 1 April 1951 15 yrs, 6m Retired 
Richard Randall 28 Oct 1966 5 yrs Retired 
Fred Wheeler 1 Nov 1971 7 yrs, 2m Retired 
John Stone 8 Jan 1979 5 yrs, 6m Resigned 
Bernie Fraser 19 Sept 1984 5 yrs Appointed RBA governor 
Chris Higgins 19 Sept 1989 1 yr, 4m Died 
Tony Cole 14 Feb 1991 2 yrs, 1m Transferred to DHHLGCS 
Ted Evans 24 Mar 1993 8 yrs, 1m Retired 
Ken Henry 26 April 2001 9 yrs,10m Retired 
Martin Parkinson 7 March 2011 3 yrs, 9m Dismissed 
John Fraser 15 Jan 2015   
Main source: Treasury (2001). CB: Commonwealth Bank; RBA: Reserve Bank of Australia; IMF/WB: 
International Monetary Fund/World Bank executive director; DHHLGCS: Department of Health, Housing, 
Local Government and Community Services. 
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The longest serving Treasury secretary was the brilliant Sir Roland Wilson, a Rhodes 
scholar with doctorates from both Oxford and Chicago, who held the post from 1951 to 
1966. This was during the heyday of secretaries as ‘permanent heads’ of the 
department.1279 This status helped them give the ‘frank and fearless advice’ for which 
they were renowned. More recently, secretaries have been on contracts and the emphasis 
has switched to ‘responsiveness’.1280 One former department head, cited in McAuley and 
Lyons (2015, p 263), even suggested the term ‘public servant’ would be more accurately 
replaced by ‘ministerial servant’. 
Treasury’s initial role as bookkeeper 
In Australia Treasury started at Federation as a book-keeping department, ‘the 
government’s accountant’.1281 Treasury followed ‘Gladstonian principles’,1282 in accord 
with treasurers who shared the Gladstonian tradition of fiscal conservatism.1283 The 
                                                          
1279 This nomenclature was dropped in 1987. 
1280 M Keating (2003, p 369) notes the symbolic importance of the amendments to the Public Service Act 
by the Hawke Government which inserted the words ‘under the minister’ to the description of secretaries’ 
responsibility for managing their departments. Further amendments in 1999 required public servants to 
be ‘responsive to the government’; McAuley and Lyons (2015, p 263). While these terms have 
subsequently been removed from the act, ‘under the minister’ is still in the regulations and used by 
ministers and their staff when dealing with secretaries. Weller and Wanna (1997) observe that 
permanence was effectively removed in 1984 when the ‘permanent heads’ were also symbolically retitled 
‘departmental secretaries’ and in 1993 they were put on limited term appointments (with incumbents 
offered a 20 per cent pay rise if they agree to the change in terms). The standard term was reduced to 
three years under the Howard Government (with exceptions) but restored to five under Rudd. Security of 
tenure was demonstrated to no longer hold after the incoming Howard Government in 1996 dismissed 
six secretaries. There is now a presumption that most departmental secretaries will only head a 
department for (at most) five years, although there are sometimes decisions to reappoint them. For an 
illustration of how appointment processes can operate in practice, see Podger (2007b). The use of 
performance pay tends to increase the focus on responsiveness to the government, particularly on issues 
prominent in the media, to the possible detriment of longer term capacity development; Podger (2007a, 
pp 499-500, 2007b, p 143). M Keating (2003, p 377) noted ‘there is increasing concern that public servants 
now feel less able to give frank and fearless advice’ and ‘the balance may have swung too far in favour of 
responsiveness’. Podger (2005, p 10) sympathises with this view, observing, ‘I doubt there are many 
today, however, who would argue that the APS needs to shift the balance further towards 
responsiveness’; see also Podger (2009, pp 29, 156). This view is also shared by some former prime 
ministerial chiefs of staff; Rhodes and Tiernan (2014, p 146). For a contrary view, see Shergold (2004, 
p 10). 
1281 Wanna (2002, p 102). In a similar vein Blainey (2016, p 274) refers to Treasury as ‘little more than the 
government’s department of accounting’. 
1282 Crisp (1961, p 316). As was said of the UK Treasury in the nineteenth century, the ‘main functions 
were prudent housekeeping’; Chapman (1997, p 56). 
1283 Wanna, Ryan and Ng (2001, pp 5-6). Gladstone had a ‘desire for strict accounting and accountability’ 
and has been described as ‘the epitome of Victorian parsimony’; Chubb (1952, pp 32, 34). He famously 
referred in 1879 to the ‘saving of candle-ends and cheese-parings’, as the mark of a good chancellor; cited 
by Hirst (1931, p 243) and Bridges (1950, p 6). Roseveare (1969, p 186) refers to ‘the Gladstonian tradition 
of rigid economy’. The man Gladstone appointed as his chancellor, Robert Lowe, once claimed his 
qualification for the job was ‘I possess the faculty for saying No as well as anyone, and in that and not in 
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treasurers, like their overseas counterparts, ‘took the ups and downs of the trade cycle 
almost like acts of God and no more tried to claim credit for the good years than to accept 
blame for the bad ones’.1284  
Upon appointing George Turner as Australia’s first treasurer, the first prime minister 
Edward Barton explained ‘the treasurer will superintend all matters relating to customs 
and finance, commonwealth loans, the taking over of state loans and cognate matters’.1285 
Treasury was the smallest of the original seven departments. Using personnel seconded 
from state treasuries, Turner set to work before his department was formally established. 
George Allen,1286 with whom Turner had worked at the Victorian Treasury, was 
appointed Secretary of the Treasury in July 1901 with four other staff.1287 By January 
1902, Treasury had taken on another four staff and all bookkeeping functions were then 
performed in-house. By 1903 staff had reached twenty, and it including four future 
secretaries.1288 This may be a tribute to the initial recruitment process and it meant the 
successive secretaries could draw on long experience. But it was also a sign of insularity 
and may have discouraged innovation and fresh thinking. 
Turner described Treasury’s work as ‘being chiefly ledger keeping and the inspection of 
accounts’.1289 In this they were quite rigorous; in the 1901-02 Budget, government 
expenditure was budgeted to the pound as £3,777,207.  
While Barton and Deakin had been minister for external affairs as well as prime minister, 
Chris Watson, the first Labor prime minister, chose instead to be treasurer1290 and 
thereby gave more status to the department.  
                                                          
super finance lies the real secret of financial prosperity’; cited in Winter (1976, p 244). He expressed his 
agreement with a Treasury official of the era who believed that ‘a great part of the good we do in the 
world might properly be measured by the evil we prevent’ and was delighted when the chancellor of the 
University of Oxford, presenting him an honorary degree, called him ‘frugalissimus’; cited in Winter (1976, 
pp 255, 285). In New Zealand the treasury official had the image of the ‘abominable no man’; McKinnon 
(2003, p 17). 
1284 Former UK chancellor, and biographer of chancellors, Roy Jenkins (1998, p 8). 
1285 Reported in Sydney Morning Herald, 31 December 1900, p 7. 
1286 See Anonymous (1909b), Cunneen (1979) and Treasury (2001, p 14) for short biographical essays on 
Allen. 
1287 Allen had said of the department’s staffing needs prior to his appointment ‘if the office chosen had 
one or two clerks who understood accounts and another good man to keep the correspondence, that 
would do very well’; Treasury (2001, p 8). 
1288 Together with Allen, they provided almost fifty years of leadership; Treasury (2001, p 18). 
1289 Hansard, 23 January 1902. 
1290 He purportedly had first asked George Turner, the treasurer in the Barton and Deakin governments 
to stay on; Hawkins (2007a, p 122). 
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Allen reportedly was closely involved in drafting budget speeches for the early 
treasurers.1291 William Lyne is reported as having driven Allen hard.1292 Andrew Fisher 
took him along as adviser to the 1911 Imperial Conference. John Forrest apparently 
relied heavily on him, commenting ‘Allen does all the written work’.1293  
Allen continued as secretary under Turner’s five successors until 1916, through multiple 
changes of governing party – Protectionist, Labor, Free Trade and Liberal – establishing 
a pattern of incoming governments respecting the impartiality of the Treasury department 
by retaining the secretary that endured until 2013. Staff numbers grew but Treasury 
remained a small department.  
Table 9.2: Treasury: number of employees 
1901 5  1976 (a) 1,480 
1903 20  1976 (b) 640 
1927 45  1986 504 
1936 55  1996 537 
1959 326  2011 1,018 
1970 668  2016 844 
(a) Before Finance was split off; (b) after Finance was split off. 
Sources: Treasury (2001); Treasury, Annual Reports 1985-86, p 39; 2015-16, p 54. 
In 1910 Treasury became responsible for the note issue, which had formerly been handled 
by the private banks. It maintained this role until it was transferred to part of the 
Commonwealth Bank in 1920. The first potential challenge to Treasury’s hegemony over 
financial advice to the government came with the establishment of the prime minister’s 
department in 1911.1294 
                                                          
1291 Culleen (1979). 
1292 It was claimed that Lyne’s first budget speech ‘is still remembered with horror’ by Treasury officials 
for the speed with which it needed to be prepared. It was claimed Lyne ‘stormed and commanded and 
drove, so that, by sitting up late at night and working hard all day, the Treasury was able to produce within 
ten days the famous budget speech which accompanied the tariff’; Punch, 16 September 1909, p 428. 
1293 Crowley (2000, p 359). 
1294 For a history of this department, which in practice did not become a major challenger until the 1960s, 
see Weller, Scott and Stevens (2011). 
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Allen’s successor James Collins1295 was also a key adviser and more intellectual, reading 
widely on finance and studying in the US and Canada in 1908 and 1915, and with Allen 
relying on him, Collins was regarded as the ‘dominant force’ in Treasury matters for over 
a quarter of a century.1296 In 1927 Treasury moved from Melbourne to West Block, near 
Parliament House, in Canberra.  
Under Earle Page as treasurer and Bruce as prime minister, Treasury’s influence was 
enhanced. Treasury officials had proposed a change to cabinet procedures so that ‘the 
[Cabinet] Secretary will not place questions on the list of waiting subjects until they have 
been discussed in their financial aspects between the Department and the Treasury.’ Bruce 
softened the stance to ‘it would greatly facilitate Cabinet business if, before submitting 
questions for Cabinet decision, they have been discussed between the Department 
concerned and the Treasury.’1297   
Treasury’s monopoly over financial advice to government came under another challenge 
during Page’s treasurership, when prime minister Bruce produced a bill to establish a 
Bureau of Economic Research in 1929.1298 The proposal could be interpreted as 
suggesting 'Treasury was viewed not as a policy-making body but as an agency to manage 
the accounts'.1299 But before it could be established, incoming prime minister Scullin, who 
regarded economists as ‘unworldly’, abandoned the idea.1300  
Treasury and the depression 
A big change for Treasury was the appointment of Edward Theodore as treasurer in 
1929. Depression chronicler Boris Schedvin (1970, p 119) wrote that ‘whereas most 
inter-war treasurers were content to ‘approve’ a recommendation or otherwise, Theodore 
                                                          
1295 See Page (1981) and Treasury (2001, p 20) for brief biographical essays on Collins. Hugh Armitage from 
the Commonwealth Bank recalled in 1949 that Collins was ‘a man of very great ability but this was 
unfortunately marred by his egotism, conceit and vanity’; RBA archives SA-65-84. 
1296 Treasury (2001, p 20). He also represented Australia at the International Finance Conference in 
Brussels in 1920.  
1297 Cited by Weller (2007b, p 55). 
1298 Economic Research Act 1929. Edwards (1965, p 156); Castles (1997a); Marshall (1987, pp 401-5). The 
Bureau’s establishment was supported by a British Economic Mission to Australia, which Bruce had also 
organised; The Economist, 1 June 1929, pp 1201-2. It was also supported by the Brigden report 
economists; Harper (1989, p 21). Pearce was a strong supporter according to his biographer; Heydon 
(1965, p 98). 
1299 Marshall (1987, p 404). 
1300 Castles (1997a, p 28), Millmow (2004, p 148). Sawer (1956) says the British advisers who had suggested 
the Bureau suspected that Labor opposed it on the grounds the Bureau would likely criticise 
protectionism. 
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examined every clause in detail and commented extensively on any provision that needed 
alteration or clarification’. By the late 1920s the Treasury secretary was James 
Heathershaw1301, an accountant who, partly due to illness, could not play a strong role in 
developing economic policy responses to the depression.1302  
As noted in Chapter 5, Theodore had 'a firmer theoretical grasp of the situation than his 
senior Treasury officials'.1303 As well as extensive reading of the works of Keynes, 
Hobson and others, Theodore held discussions with economists outside Treasury such as 
Irvine and Giblin in developing his proto-Keynesian ideas. But, as discussed in Chapter 5, 
Theodore was prevented by the Senate and the Commonwealth Bank board from 
implementing his ideas  
Heathershaw’s deputy Harry Sheehan1304, also an accountant but with more relevant 
experience and better health, could make a larger contribution and succeeded to the 
secretary's role in 1932.1305 Treasury at this time was, however, still dominated by 
accountants and clerks facing the ‘round eternal of the cash-book and the journal’. 
The Depression inevitably led to an increased role for Treasury, in part at the expense of 
state treasuries, through the growth in importance of the Loan Council for which Treasury 
provided the secretariat.   
Joseph Lyons as treasurer often sought advice from Stuart McFarlane, known ironically 
as ‘Sunshine’ or more aptly as ‘Misery Mac’ for his gloomy manner, whom he promoted 
to secretary in 1938.1306 Sheehan left Treasury to become governor of the Commonwealth 
Bank, leading to a ‘more harmonious’ relationship between the two organisations.1307 
                                                          
1301 See Page (1983) and Treasury (2001, p 28) for brief biographical essays. 
1302 Schedvin (1970, p 88); Treasury (2001, p 28); Page (1983, p 250).  
1303 Schedvin (1970, p 119). Souter (1998, p 265) and Johnston (1987, pp 60-61) hold similar views. As 
noted in Chapter 5, the only official in government service with economic expertise had been the 
statistician Wickens and he was unavailable from February 1931; Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006, 
p 120). 
1304 See Cornish (1988b) and Treasury (2001, p 35) for short biographical essays. 
1305 Cornish (1988b) describes Sheehan as 'the Treasury’s chief adviser to the Commonwealth 
government’ during the depression' and the architect of the plan Lyons took to caucus in October 1930. 
Schedvin (1970, p 88) and Treasury (2001, p 35) also refer to him as the Government's chief economic 
adviser at this time. He was appointed governor of the Commonwealth Bank in 1938. Theodore suggested 
his ‘devotion to duty and great ability’ entitled him to be Heathershaw’s successor; Cornish (1988b). In 
1933 he was chief financial adviser to Bruce at the World Monetary and Economic Conference.  
1306 White (1987, p 137). See Cornish (2000) and Treasury (2001, p 46) for short biographical essays.  
1307 Treasury (2001, p 35). His successor Armitage recalled that Sheehan’s lack of knowledge of banking at 
the time of his appointment to the Commonwealth Bank caused him great stress and contributed to an 
early death; Armitage reminiscences, 1949, RBA archives RBA SA-65-84. 
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Treasury officials again attempted to enhance their influence over cabinet deliberations. 
Lyons wrote to his ministers; ‘I would be glad if Ministers would be good enough to 
submit all such proposals [involving expenditure] to the Treasury before they take the 
form of submissions to Cabinet’.1308 Millmow (2010b, pp 177-8) observed that Lyons 
delegated much of the Treasury work to the assistant treasurers and was said to have only 
set foot in Treasury once in 18 months. 
Treasury and the influence of Keynes 
When Richard Casey became treasurer in 1935, having earlier served as assistant 
treasurer, Treasury again had a more active treasurer. Unlike most members, who lived 
in their electorates, the Caseys based themselves in Canberra, moving to a 'resident 
minister's house' in Yarralumla.1309 This allowed Casey to 'sit on the doorstep of the 
Treasury and made their lives a misery’.1310 
Casey wanted to improve the quality of economic advice he received and kept in touch 
with academic economists. ‘Unimpressed with the Treasury's expertise, he longed for an 
economic secretariat to service cabinet’.1311 Casey appointed an economics graduate, Ian 
Potter, as his personal secretary and the brilliant Roland Wilson as his economic adviser; 
'besides knowing all the economic nonsense…has a good head, good judgement and 
general balance'.1312  
As prime minister, Lyons established a committee of economists in December 1938 
chaired by Giblin, which was known as the 'F&E'.1313 Its initial membership was Giblin, 
Melville and Wilson, who were later complemented by Brigden, Copland and Coombs.  
It was initially located in the Defence Department but transferred the next year to 
Treasury. Their initial task was considering the implications of disruptions to overseas 
trade in the event of war and appropriate responses. Giblin had joined Treasury as a 
statistician in 1930 and was involved in the recruitment of economists such as Roland 
                                                          
1308 Cited by Weller (2007b, p 55). 
1309 Langmore (1997); Millmow (2007a). 
1310 Cited by Hudson (1986, p 86). 
1311 Hudson (1986, p 213). 
1312 Millmow (2004, p 171) and Casey to Bruce, 20 February 1935, cited by Millmow (2010b, pp 169-70). 
1313 The Financial and Economic Committee, to give it its full name, is described in Maddock and Penny 
(1983), Butlin (1955), Millmow (2010b, pp 259-63) Treasury (2001, pp 44-45) and Whitwell (1986, 
pp 65-79).  
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Wilson.1314 This increasing role for economists attracted some favourable comment 
overseas, with Australia called the 'utopia of practical economists' and the land where 'the 
plans of the Economic Men have been put in place’.1315  
Reflecting the growing influence of Keynes, in 1937 Casey argued that to 'expand public 
works in depression and contract them in better times was the broad advice given by 
economists', with which he agreed.1316 Millmow (2010b, p 3) argued that ‘the first threads 
of comprehensive economic management in Australia came with the 1939-40 budget, 
which put into circulation the Keynesian technique of estimating the inflationary gap’. It 
has been observed that ‘Australian economists were ahead of their counterparts elsewhere 
in adopting Keynes’ insights into demand management’.1317 
Upon becoming prime minister in 1939 Robert Menzies initially also took over as 
treasurer. He established an Economic Cabinet, which he chaired, in December 1939 but 
it appears to have fizzled out around May 1940.1318 Percy Spender as assistant or acting 
treasurer gradually assumed the substantive duties of treasurer and took the formal title 
in March 1940.1319  
A man of whom his biographer believed 'economics, generously defined, remained a 
preoccupation'1320, Spender was arguably Australia’s first Keynesian (assistant) treasurer. 
                                                          
1314 Treasury (2001, pp 36-37). The Commonwealth Bureau of Census and Statistics (from 1974 the ABS) 
was moved to Canberra in 1928 and administratively to the Treasury portfolio in 1932 and the 
Commonwealth Statistician was often also an important economic adviser to the government.  
1315 Goodwin (1974, pp 235-7). See also Millmow (2010b, pp 21-22, 156). 
1316 The Age, 24 September 1937. 
1317 Millmow (2015c, p 53). In the UK arguably the first budget based on an overview of the country's 
resources was that of Kingsley Wood in 1941, which was influenced by Keynes; Jenkins (1998, p 399), 
Kynaston (1980, pp 147-8). Stafford Cripps’ biographer argues his explicitly Keynesian deflationary budget 
of 1948 makes him ‘the first modern chancellor’. Cripps described in his budget speech that the ‘new task 
of chancellors is not merely to balance the budget, it is a much wider one – to match our resources against 
our needs so that the main features of our economy may be worked out for the benefit of the community’; 
Bryant (1997, p 417). Joan Robinson (1959, p 1) pithily puts Keynes in the context of other great 
economists; ‘Marx seeks to understand the [capitalist] system in order to hasten its overthrow. Marshall 
seeks to make it acceptable by showing it in an agreeable light. Keynes seeks to find out what has gone 
wrong with it in order to devise means to save it from destroying itself’. 
1318 The Economic Cabinet's terms of reference and a description of its history is given in Hasluck (1952, 
pp 424-435). It comprised the prime minister, treasurer, minister for supply, postmaster-general and 
others with two assistant ministers and Sir Ernest Fisk as secretary later added; Crisp (1978, p 376). It was 
not a success as it was hard to isolate purely economic matters from other cabinet business. 
1319 Spender (1968, 1972, p 46) felt he was ‘in full charge of Treasury throughout’ and his wife concurred; 
'it was common knowledge that the Prime Minister, who was then also the Treasurer, had given him a 
more or less free hand'; J Spender (1968, p 5). 
1320 Lowe (2010, p 15). Harper (2013, p 235) cites Copland as describing Spender as having ‘taken his 
economic advisers literally’ and adopting ‘an economist’s approach’. 
 260 
 
Spender (1972, pp 42-43) recalled how as assistant treasurer he was presented by the 
Treasury secretary with his ‘sums’, estimates of government spending based on existing 
programmes and revenue based on existing rates of tax, but no indication of how the 
economy should be organised for war. Spender instead pushed the recommendations of 
the F&E committee of economists against Treasury advice and injected funds into 
defence-related projects that would soak up unemployment, initially funded by central 
bank credit, then from borrowing and then from taxation.1321 Unsurprisingly, Spender 
(1972, p 44) reported that this was ‘hardly pleasing’ to McFarlane. 
Bowen (2015, pp xiii-xiv) commented that Spender had started the process of developing 
the economic expertise within Treasury, but he also sought advice outside it, notably from 
Giblin and the F&E. Prior to 1938-39 ‘one gathered that the general level of economic 
activity had an effect on budget totals but hardly the reverse’1322 and this started to change 
during Spender’s brief reign. In 1939 economists Fred Wheeler and ‘Nugget’ Coombs 
joined Treasury. Menzies (1942, p 6) reflected that 'in the economic history of the last 
fifteen years nothing will be more notable than the rise in influence and authority of the 
professional economist’. 
The years from 1939 to 1941 were unstable ones for Treasury with five different 
treasurers. Menzies’ next treasurer Arthur Fadden was not temperamentally compatible 
with McFarlane. 
The spread of Keynesian ideas accelerated under Ben Chifley,1323 who ‘liked being 
surrounded by clever people who could do things’.1324 Under Chifley’s ‘tender care…the 
predominance of the Treasury in formulating economic and fiscal policy became 
increasingly marked’, according to Encel (1974, p 197).1325 In 1945, for the first time, the 
government published statistics on national income and expenditure.  
Crisp (1961, p 322) observed that Treasury became more Keynesian as more economists 
joined the department, the most talented of whom could rise quickly as a large proportion 
                                                          
1321 Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006, p 185); Millmow (2010b, p 263); Cornish (1993a, p 47); Watts 
(1983, p 259). 
1322 Crisp (1961, p 321). Spender thought McFarlane failed to understand Keynesian economics; Cornish 
(2000). 
1323 Encel (1974, p 197). 
1324 Russell (2003, p 10). 
1325 Encel (1974, p 197). 
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of the staff were World War I veterans reaching retirement. Indeed King (1997, p 298) 
suggested that ‘by 1945 there was no more totally Keynesian economic profession in the 
world’ than in Australia. 
Treasury in the long boom 
Chifley worked well with Treasury secretary McFarlane and his successor George 
Watt1326 and also dealt with more junior officers. By one account Fred Wheeler, one of 
the first economists recruited to Treasury, in 1939, was the ‘man on whom Chifley mostly 
relied’.1327 In 1950 he referred to having assembled 'a group of outstandingly able 
officers'.1328 As well as his advisers within Treasury, during his first fortnight in the 
portfolio Chifley solicited briefings from leading economists such as 'Nugget' Coombs, 
Copland, Giblin and Melville.1329 
In 1946 Treasury was re-organised, with eleven sections rearranged into five divisions, 
including one devoted to economic policy. While initially the economic policy division 
only had five officers, they were all trained economists and Whitwell (1986, p 7) observed 
they ‘formed the nucleus of economic expertise within the department’. Staff numbers 
rose steadily over the long boom of the 1950s and 1960s and into the 1970s, both at the 
top (Table 9.3) and overall (Table 9.2). 
Table 9.3: Senior staff of Treasury 
 1946 1968 1984 
Secretary 1 1 1 
Deputy secretary 1 2 3 
First assistant secretary 1 5 7 
Assistant secretary 5 13 23 
Source: derived from Whitwell (1986, p 7); Treasury Annual Report 1983/84, p 30. 
 
                                                          
1326 See Treasury (2001, p 56) and Nethercote (2012) for brief biographical essays. 
1327 Treasury official and later secretary G Watt, cited in Howard (1978, p 148). Wilson was less influential 
due to his ‘icy demeanour’; Howard (1978, p 416). 
1328 Crisp (1960, p 257). 
1329 M Howard’s (1978, p 147) interviews ‘thoroughly and vividly verified’ that Chifley was ‘a minister 
thriving on consultation of a rich network of political and departmental contacts’. John Howard (2014, 
p 102) suggests Chifley established ‘contacts with professional economists as well as Treasury boffins’. 
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As well as being treasurer, from December 1942 to February 1945 Chifley was minister 
for post-war reconstruction, a new department headed by Nugget Coombs and including 
a number of talented progressives.1330 The new department developed a strong economic 
team and Chifley intended if he won the 1949 election to relinquish the Treasury portfolio 
but bring this economics unit into the Prime Minister’s Department.1331 But in the event 
Chifley lost the election and the incoming prime minister Menzies did not share his 
interest in economics so the economics unit was left to wither.1332 
On Watt’s retirement, Fadden appointed the first economist as secretary, Roland 
Wilson.1333 As his hometown newspaper presciently put it, ‘it is a good bet that…all his 
successors will be economists’.1334 Wilson was 'the epitome of the "good Treasury man"; 
confident, authoritative, resolute, academically gifted, coldly logical, acerbic and 
quick-witted'.1335 Wilson’s wife opined that his relationship with Fadden was the ‘closest 
ever experienced between a minister and a secretary’ as ‘each appreciated the other’s 
strengths’.1336 Fadden also had a warm relationship with Wilson's deputy Richard 
Randall. But Fadden remained a ‘shrewd assessor’ of their advice.1337 Fadden also got on 
                                                          
1330 'Long-haired men and short-skirted women', as Chifley joked; Crisp (1960, p 187). The staff of the 
department are listed in Hansard, 26 April 1945 pp 1153-6, and include a number of prominent 
economists and intellectuals such as Coombs, Crawford, Crisp, Firth, Nimmo, Swan and Tange, then mostly 
in their 30s or late 20s. Mamchak (1980) describes the origin and work of the department with special 
reference to its role as an economic planner. Most of its administrative staff came from the reconstruction 
division of the Department of Labour and National Service. 
1331 Lee (1995, p 127); Weller (2007b); Weller, Scott and Stevens (2011, p 45). 
1332 Another factor was that Treasury was now under a Country Party minister and Menzies wanted to 
maintain a harmonious coalition government; Whitwell (1986, p 19). Things could have turned out 
differently if Trevor Swan, who moved from Post-War Reconstruction to head the new Economic Division 
in the Prime Minister’s Department had not left for an academic post after a few months. 
1333 See Cornish (2002) for a biography of Wilson; Coleman, Cornish and Hagger (2006) for a joint 
biography of Wilson and three of his peers; Castles (1997b, 1997c), Cornish (2007c, 2015b), Farquharson 
(1996), Hetherington (1965), Treasury (2001, p 57) and Weller (2001, pp 183-188) for shorter sketches; 
and Wilson (1984) for his own reflections. Weller (2001, p 1) referred to Wilson as ‘perhaps the most 
influential public servant in federal history’. Keynes had ‘the greatest respect for his wisdom’; Cornish 
(2015b, p 125). 
1334 Launceston Examiner, March 1951, cited by Cornish (2002, p 30). 
1335 Whitwell (1986, p 23). Wilson was a strong personality; the formidable 'Black Jack' McEwen, an 
opponent of Treasury as trade minister, once remarked to Wilson 'you don't terrorise easily'; Golding 
(1996, p 12). A leading financial journalist called Wilson 'the outstanding public servant of his generation'; 
cited by Cornish (2002, p 24). Hasluck (1997, p 56) described Wilson as the 'power behind the throne' on 
fiscal policy, helped by the 'scientific detachment' he displayed when addressing cabinet. 
1336 Arklay (2014, pp 64, 140). 
1337 Cribb (1996). Hasluck (1985, p 189) said Fadden ‘was not a slave of the Treasury’. Coombs (1981, 
p 132) judged that Fadden ‘greatly admired Roland Wilson’s capacity, and depended heavily on his 
judgement, but he found Roland too cold and unyielding for a wholly satisfactory partner. Indeed, it could 
almost be said that he was a little afraid of Wilson’s razor-sharp intellect, his intolerance of human frailty, 
and his acid tongue’. Fadden’s preference, therefore, was to be accompanied by deputy secretary Randall 
on his overseas trips. Fadden was not however so overawed by Wilson as to be above a practical joke, 
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well with Nugget Coombs at the Commonwealth Bank.1338 He provided an alternative 
prospective to the Treasury, which tended to be more pro-growth and longer-term, while 
the Bank was generally concerned about fine-tuning the economy to avoid the short-term 
risk of inflation.1339 Treasury was criticised by Whitington (1964, p 151) as 
'ultra-conservative, essentially cautious and almost timid during the fifties'. In January 
1956, dissatisfied with Treasury advice, Menzies established an advisory committee of 
business leaders and academics. Treasury had opposed the powerful new Department of 
Trade created in 1956.1340 
Fadden’s successor Harold Holt was pleased to be reunited with Wilson, who had been 
his departmental secretary in the Labour portfolio around two decades before. Wilson was 
‘a source of strength for him’1341, although one cabinet colleague has suggested Holt 
‘perhaps succumbed too much to orthodox Treasury advice’.1342 Holt's tenure coincided 
with the peak of both Treasury's power and that of the public service 'mandarins'. Other 
                                                          
once planning to leave a fish in his hotel bed; Fadden (1969, p 141). He was once heard at a premiers’ 
conference telling Wilson ‘will you keep your f…ing mouth shut?’; Cameron (1985, p 188). Fadden had 
dubbed Wilson, Randall and Commonwealth Bank governor Nugget Coombs as among the ‘seven 
dwarves’ when they had worked for Chifley; Arklay (2014, p 140), Barry Jones, Hansard, 24 November 
1997, p 11148. Millmow (2015a, p 5) is more sceptical of Fadden’s contribution, suggesting ‘it was 
Treasury that ran the show with officials like Roland Wilson and Richard Randall pulling the strings. All 
Fadden had to do was to sign off on the budget’. 
1338 Arklay (2010, p 263) and Coombs (1981, p 131). While Menzies was urged to drop Coombs on the 
grounds he was too close to the former Labor government, Menzies replied that ‘I have any number of 
people around me who will tell me what they think I want to hear. I need to have access to people who 
will tell me the opposite’ and Fadden held a similar view; Jones (2006, p 514). Fadden reportedly rang 
Coombs after the election to say ‘don’t take any notice of all that bull---- I was talking during the election; 
we’ll be needing you’; Souter (1998, p 411). A then fellow Country Party member recalls asking Fadden in 
1949 why he kept Coombs on and being told ‘Nugget has changed his attitude and is most helpful. We get 
along very well and he knows which side his bread is buttered’; Russell (1976, p 65). 
1339 Cornish (2007b, p 231). 
1340 McEwen and Jackson (1983, p 49). 
1341 Nugget Coombs (1981, p 270). It was said of Wilson that 'no other senior public servant was so deeply 
respected by officers of his own department. They regarded Treasury as the senior department in 
intellectual power, and Wilson as the man responsible for elevating it to that position'; Whitington (1964, 
p 153). A future treasurer called Wilson 'probably the most able and cleverest man the public service has 
ever employed'; Bury (1975). Wilson was known for his formidable intellect and wit; see Cornish (2015b) 
and recollections of Treasury colleagues in Treasury (2001, pp 57-59). Whitington (1964, p 153) tells of 
Menzies asking Wilson for an opinion on an economic report. Wilson replied it was written by a 'bloody 
fool', which was embarrassing as the author had been Menzies himself. 
1342 Downer (1982, p 68). Schedvin (1992, p 296) suggests Holt was 'not well versed in the wider economic 
issues and was heavily reliant on Treasury'. McFarlane (1968, p 7) agrees. Coombs (1981, p 268) said Holt 
'relied strongly upon' Wilson. John Howard (2014, p 360) describes Holt as ‘by temperament happy to 
follow most of the advice he was given’. According to Weller and Cutt (1976, pp 99-100), Holt often just 
read out a Treasury brief at cabinet without comment. 
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than Wilson, Holt’s main advisers were Treasury deputy secretaries Richard Randall1343 
and Lenox Hewitt.1344   
As in the UK, the early 1960s was a time when interest grew in Australia in longer term 
economic planning, although there was never any enthusiasm for it within Treasury.1345 
In 1963 a committee was appointed to examine longer run economic issues. It was headed 
by Sir James Vernon, managing director of the Colonial Sugar Refining Co.1346   
The report was given to the government in May 1965. In September Holt was explaining 
their failure to release it on the grounds it would be 'quite unsatisfactory…to table the 
report without first having taken time to study it closely'.1347 When its voluminous report 
was finally tabled some days later, Menzies was dismissive, declaring it had exceeded its 
brief by commenting on policy, and taking especial opposition to its support for a degree 
of economic planning.1348 Through Holt, Treasury had sent cabinet highly critical 
submissions about the Vernon Report, in Whitwell’s (1986, p 167) view effectively a 
‘demolition job’, which may have been motivated by concerns that the Report's 
recommendations could have established alternative sources of economic advice to 
Treasury.1349 Wilson had also opposed a proposal by Coombs for the Australian National 
University to produce regular reports on the Australian economy. 
                                                          
1343 Randall, a 'quiet, reserved, taciturn man, had passed up opportunities to head other departments to 
stay in Treasury; Whitington (1964, p 154). See Cornish (2007b, 2012), Fitchett (1966), Whitwell (1986, 
p 145) and Treasury (2001, p 64) for short biographical essays. 
1344 The upper ranks of Treasury were remarkably stable, with Wilson (appointed secretary back in 1951) 
and Randall holding their posts for the whole seven years Holt was treasurer.  
1345 Whitwell (1995, pp 176-7; 1996, pp 139-40). The conservative government in the UK established the 
National Economic Development Council. Treasury (1962, pp 26-32) publicly set out the Department's 
disdain for formal economic planning.  
1346 Menzies' preference for chair had been Sir John Crawford, former head of the Department of Trade. 
Crawford (1962, p 189) had publicly recommended a 'public inquiry into the requirements of growth in 
the next decade'. Wilson, however, persuaded Menzies against it. Crawford was vice-chair but in effect 
still the principal author; Cornish (2015b). 
1347 Hansard, 16 September 1965, p 964. 
1348Hansard, 21 September 1965, pp 1078-87. In his statement, Menzies proclaimed 'the 
Committee…predicated a degree of planning and direction of the economy which in our opinion would 
not either be appropriate or acceptable…the Committee has also suggested the formation of an Advisory 
Council on Economic Growth…we unhesitatingly reject this idea'.  Earlier Holt had been sufficiently open 
to the idea of planning to talk to the Italian finance minister in the context of 'recent Australian discussion 
about the possibilities of a greater degree of national planning' in Australia; Holt's diary, 5 September 
1962, NLA MS 8431. At the end of his tenure as treasurer, Holt took pride in 'the new division we have 
established in Treasury to take a longer look forward in economic matters'; interview in The Age, 21 
January 1966, p 3. Holt did not speak in the parliamentary debate on the Report. 
1349 Martin (1999b, pp 530-4), Corden (1968, p 54), Whitwell (1986, pp 164-8) and Howard (2014, p 602). 
A potential supporter of the report, McEwen, was out of the country when it was released; McEwen and 
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William McMahon was the first treasurer with an economics degree and was ‘fascinated’ 
by economics.1350 He commented while treasurer: 'I had always felt I was cut out for the 
life. I was born in a financial and economic mould. I trained myself for it. No one does 
more work in the Treasury. I know it backwards…I speak the lingo'.1351 Reid (1971, 
p 126) reported that McMahon 'fought relentlessly to maintain Treasury's influence, 
prestige and power'. But the greatly respected Wilson resigned in part because he could 
not abide McMahon and Randall became secretary.1352 Views differ about McMahon's 
willingness to dispute and reject Treasury advice.1353 He talked to as many as a hundred 
Treasury officials in the course of preparing the budget but this reflected indecisiveness 
as much as rigour.1354  
Under McMahon, Treasury had its first major reorganisation since the Second World 
War, in November 1969, with an additional three divisions (Overseas Economic 
Relations, Financial Institutions and Defence & Works) added to the existing five to 
reflect the expansion in the department's responsibilities.1355 Around this period Treasury 
also moved into its own office building in Parkes Place where it still resides. 
By the 1960s, even Milton Friedman was conceding at least some Keynesian ideas, saying 
that ‘in one sense, we are all Keynesians now’.1356 The Keynesian approach had entered 
the public mainstream too. As Blondel (1987, p 197) puts it, ‘modern political leaders do 
not choose to be concerned with the continuous improvement of their societies: they have 
                                                          
Jackson (1983, p 66). Fellow minister Peter Howson (1984, pp 166-7) recorded 'very firm disagreement 
with conclusions' in Holt's cabinet submission, which Howson interpreted as part of the battle between 
Treasury and Trade. Whitwell (1990, p 129) believes there was ‘an important element of departmental 
rivalry and retaliation involved in Treasury’s discrediting of the Vernon Committee’. 
1350 Rodan (1977, p 223) and Reid (1969, p 31). His wife recalled 'he loved the world of economics’; Mitchell 
(2007, p 46). 
1351 Interview cited in Williams (1968, p 2). 
1352 Cornish (2007c, p 314). Relations between McMahon and Treasury could be strained by McMahon’s 
attitude. He once rang treasury secretary Wheeler after midnight requesting information. Wheeler rang 
McMahon back at 2.30 am and when McMahon asked why he was being called at such an hour, Wheeler 
replied that McMahon had said he needed the information as soon as possible; Brown (2002, p 107). 
1353 McEwen and Jackson (1983, p 79) describe him as 'always been very willing to accept the guidance of 
his treasury advisers', while Frame (2005, p 161) suggests he would dispute it. John Howard (2014, p 503) 
judges that McMahon ‘respected Treasury advice but was not as dependent on his department as had 
been Holt’. Sonia claimed 'I changed the budget once. I didn't think there was enough in there for mothers 
and families and I convinced him to give them more money'; Mitchell (2007, p 25). 
1354 Canberra Times, 11 March 1971, p 2. 
1355 Treasury (2001, p 66).  
1356 Friedman was cited in Time, 31 December 1965, as saying ‘we are all Keynesians now’. In a letter to 
Time, 4 February 1966, he clarified that his full statement was ‘in one sense, we are all Keynesians now; 
in another, nobody is any longer a Keynesian’.   
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to take this concern on board or they may not stay in office. The population often demands 
that their lot be improved and, even if they do not, the leaders themselves believe and are 
repeatedly told by others that it is their duty to achieve social and economic progress’.1357 
A 1975 review concluded ‘governments are now generally expected to lead, to 
coordinate, to assist and to regulate many facets of economic life’.1358 This is not to say 
that there were no doubters about how much influence the treasurer wields. There is a 
peculiar irony in the fact that although governments are expected to be effective and 
responsible economic managers, they are nevertheless not in total command of the 
economy, have limited knowledge of what they are doing, and often even less idea of the 
consequences of their actions.1359 
Leslie Bury was the first professional economist to become treasurer and the only 
treasurer to have previously been a Treasury employee.1360 Bury (1975) described Randall 
as having been 'a friend for thirty years'. Unusually (possibly uniquely), Bury worked 
from his office at Treasury rather than in a ministerial office in Parliament House. But 
unfortunately all this was not enough to guarantee success as, by the time he held the post, 
coronary arteriosclerosis and hypertension was affecting his energy and mental 
sharpness.1361 MacCallum (1971) said that 'Treasury despaired of him early as he lost too 
many cabinet fights'. 
Gorton, the prime minister, however, had a dislike of Treasury which he regarded as 
'conservatively sterile' and an 'obstructive and slow moving' organisation which 
intervened to prevent worthwhile initiatives in areas such as education. Gorton appointed 
a disgruntled former Treasury deputy secretary Lennox Hewitt to head his department, 
who established a revitalised economic division.1362 Gorton insisted that he and Hewitt 
                                                          
1357 Blondel (1987, p 197). 
1358 Task Force on Economic Policy (1975, paragraph 1.5). 
1359 Davis, Wanna, Warhurst and Weller (1993, p 225). 
1360 Former prime minister George Reid had worked in the NSW treasury, and became NSW treasurer. 
Paul Hasluck, Alexander Downer and Kevin Rudd served in the department of foreign affairs before 
becoming the minister, and Billy Snedden served in both the immigration and attorney-general's 
departments before becoming minister for both, but such transitions have been most uncommon. John 
Stone entered parliament with the intention of becoming treasurer but his career ended when he failed 
to make the transition from the Senate to the lower house. Mark Latham, an aspiring (and shadow) 
treasurer, had hoped to be an economist at Treasury during his early years at university, but achieved 
neither; Duffy (2004, p 49). 
1361 Millmow (2010a, p 11), Peter Howson's diary entries for 24 November 1970 and 1 February 1971, in 
Howson (1984, pp 676 and 690), and Hasluck (1985, pp 100-101). 
1362 Reid (1971, pp 119, 123). 
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were closely involved in preparation of the budget. But when Gorton’s successor 
McMahon replaced Hewitt with Bunting, the economic division ceased to a significant 
rival to Treasury. 
Bury’s replacement Billy Snedden was regarded by most commentators as 'a competent 
follower of departmental advice' but not a driver of innovative policy or a champion of 
reform.1363 Snedden recalled Randall as having 'really lost his drive' as secretary by the 
time Snedden became treasurer.1364 In September 1969 the highly regarded deputy 
secretary Maurice O'Donnell died of a heart attack.1365 This removed the likely successor 
to Randall and instead Fred Wheeler1366 returned to Treasury after an almost 20-year 
absence.1367 In November 1971, with Snedden's support, John Stone was appointed 
Deputy Secretary (Economic), setting the tone of Treasury analysis for the 1970s and 
early 1980s.1368 Snedden regarded as ‘marvellous’ being able to get a number of Treasury 
officers together to debate issues.1369 But after his term as treasurer, Snedden seemed a 
little disillusioned. During a 1974 interview, he said 'we'll abandon the idea that all 
wisdom is in a four-storey building on the banks of Lake Burley Griffin'.1370 
The 1972 budget sowed the seeds of future troubles as it tried to stimulate the economy 
for electoral reasons and added to an emerging inflationary impetus that the mid-1970s 
oil shock would greatly exacerbate.1371 
Treasury gradually developed a system of forward estimates so it could better predict 
budgetary outcomes and emerging pressures, with varying degrees of input from the 
                                                          
1363 Tiver (1978, p 247); Oakes and Solomon (1974, pp 65, 74 and 75). Snedden’s own view was that he 
'liked to be the man in charge and was not a passive recipient of departmental advice'; Snedden and 
Schedvin (1990, p 250). 
1364 Snedden and Schedvin (1990, p 113). 
1365 McMahon (1973, p 15) recalled O'Donnell as 'probably the most intelligent public servant, certainly in 
financial matters, that I had the good fortune to be associated with'. 
1366 See Hancock (2015), Hawkins (2007b), Farquharson (1994) and Treasury (2001, p 75) for short 
biographical essays.  
1367 Wheeler had been groomed by Chifley as a future secretary; Horsfall (1974, p 58). He had been acting 
treasury secretary; Treasury (2001, p 75). But he was passed over in favour of the brilliant Roland Wilson 
and left for the International Labour Office in Geneva until returning to Canberra in 1960 to chair the 
Public Service Board. Snedden had argued for John Stone, whom he knew from their days together at the 
University of Western Australia, to get the job but McMahon rejected this idea; Kelly (1978, p 9). Jack 
Garrett, the other deputy secretary, did not have a strong economics background. McMahon had offered 
the job to Bunting who declined it; Snedden and Schedvin (1990, p 117). 
1368 Snedden (1983, p 13:10) called Stone 'the intellectual force in the department'. 
1369 Snedden (1983, p 13:8), Snedden and Schedvin (1990, p 125). 
1370 Interview by David Frost, cited in Oakes and Solomon (1974, p 432). 
1371 Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, p 253). 
 268 
 
spending departments.1372 These began as informal estimates in 1965, became more 
formalised in 1971 and were first published in the 1980s. 
As macroeconomic management became a more important part of its role, Treasury 
developed econometric models of the economy to assist in its forecasting and analysis.1373 
Chris Higgins, later to be Treasury secretary, was heavily involved in this work as he had 
done his PhD under modelling pioneer and Nobel Laureate Lawrence Klein. 
Treasury goes neo-liberal 
In the 1970s the Treasury moved away from Keynesianism towards ‘neo-liberal’ or 
‘neoclassical’ thought, emphasising a greater role for market forces and wanting to reduce 
the size of government.1374 This was perhaps most clearly expressed in its 1973 paper 
Economic Growth: Is It Worth Having?, which argued that any apparent problems 
attributed to economic growth were in fact manifestations of a failure to allow market 
forces to operate. 
But around the same time the political pendulum was swinging in the opposite direction 
with the 1972 election bringing back to government a Labor Party committed to a 
programme of expanding the public sector. This raised the risk of a serious clash between 
Treasury and the government. The risk was increased because some incoming ministers 
suspected that after 23 years since the fall of the Chifley Government the public service 
had become too used to working for the Liberals.  
Treasury had an initial victory. While briefly serving as both prime minister and treasurer 
in the ‘duumvirate’, Gough Whitlam split the department of trade and industry, reducing 
the power of this rival to Treasury.1375 But it was not to last. 
The new treasurer, Frank Crean, had been effectively the shadow treasurer for most of 
Labor’s time in opposition and was respected for his knowledge and calm temperament 
but did not prove to be tough enough.1376 Coming into the job, Crean (1983, p 7:10) had 
been 'always very highly impressed by the calibre both of Treasury staff and the Reserve 
                                                          
1372 Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, pp 54-68). 
1373 Hawkins (2005) contains a brief history. 
1374 Such views had been reflected in the 1960s in some Treasury publications written by John Stone’s 
Economic and Financial Surveys Branch.; Whitwell (1986, p 156). 
1375 Hocking (2012, p 36). 
1376 Hawkins (2013). 
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Bank'. Crean (1993, chapter 14) expressed sympathy for Treasury as ‘everybody’s 
favourite whipping boy’. Initially Crean worked well with Treasury but over the course 
of 1974 relations with the government soured, reflecting policy differences, a view that 
Treasury was not keeping the Government sufficiently informed and the monolithic 
nature of the department’s advice.1377 Treasury was cut out of the process of developing 
the policy of a 25 per cent across-the-board tariff cut and their arguments against it were 
rejected.1378 Crean gradually became estranged from Treasury and 'failed to argue 
strongly or effectively for his department's views'.1379 Later he was reputedly dissociating 
himself from their views, claiming that papers brought before cabinet were the 
department's views not his own.1380 In particular he gave little support to the Treasury 
recommendation in July 1974 for a ‘short sharp shock’. Treasury made some attempt to 
reflect the government’s views about the unacceptability of allowing higher 
unemployment to dampen inflationary pressures. For example in one submission to 
cabinet the phrase ‘some unemployment will emerge’ in an early draft was replaced with 
‘we will experience difficulties in the labour market’.1381 But Treasury was regarded as 
using euphemisms tactically to cover its reluctance to change its policy recommendations 
and it was accused of flatly refusing to present alternative options or even educate 
ministers in why Treasury’s option was preferable to alternatives.1382 By the time of the 
1974 budget Treasury was regarded as sulking, preparing only a perfunctory draft of the 
budget speech and not helping explain it to the press.1383 
In October 1974, Whitlam decided that as Jim Cairns was effectively determining 
economic policy through his influence in cabinet, he should bear responsibility for it by 
being appointed treasurer. Asked after his appointment ‘do you think it will be your job 
to convert Treasury?’, Cairns replied ‘it will certainly be to make clear to Treasury what 
                                                          
1377 Nethercote (2013, p 140) and Freudenberg (2009, p 285). Barrett (2001, p 200) exaggerates, however, 
when he refers to ‘a total lack of co-operation between economic bureaucrats and the Government’s 
free-spirited ministers’.   
1378 The policy was developed by a committee of Rattigan from the Tariff Board, Taylor from PM&C, Harris 
from Overseas Trade and two academic consultants at PM&C, Gruen and Brogan; Whitwell (1993, 
pp 43-44). 
1379 Freudenberg (2005, p 169 and 2009, p 309); Whitlam (1985, p 210); Edwards (1975, p 5). 
1380 Australian Financial Review, 27 August 1974, p 3; Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, p 268). 
1381 Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, p 262). 
1382 Oakes and Solomon (1974, p 541); Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, p 262). The latter add that ‘there 
was considerable debate within the Treasury about the wisdom of the “short sharp shock” ‘but this was 
not reflected in advice to the treasurer where a monolithic view was put. 
1383 Freudenberg (2005, p165), Menadue (1999, p 123). 
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the policy of the government really is’. Then asked ‘do you think Treasury has failed in 
that in the past?’ he replied just ‘yes’.1384 
It has been claimed that Cairns’ appointment as Treasurer was not popular within 
Treasury and the November 1974 mini-budget ‘marked the virtual eclipse of Treasury as 
a source of economic advice’.1385 Cabinet colleague Clyde Cameron (1985, p 276) 
revealed that Cairns would sometimes table a Treasury paper in cabinet and then argue 
against it. Feelings of ‘sullen resentment’1386 by some Treasury officers would not have 
been improved by Cairns’ criticisms of the department.1387 Some senior Treasury officials 
reputedly held ‘background briefings’ for journalists where they would push Treasury’s 
preferred approach and criticise the government’s proposals.1388 Some are alleged to have 
started leaking information to the Opposition, using the pseudonym of Mr Williams.1389  
Wheeler’s position came under threat. Initially, Whitlam had shared Crean's high regard 
for his ‘capacity and integrity’.1390 But by 1974 Whitlam wanted to replace Wheeler with 
John Menadue, who declined1391, or Lenox Hewitt1392 whom Crean rejected. Whitlam 
dropped the idea, deciding it would damage the government’s already poor relations with 
                                                          
1384 Ormonde (1981, p 187). Much later Cairns was asked if he had success with Treasury. He replied ‘No. 
None at all. Treasury had a lot of success with me. They were instrumental in getting rid of me in very 
quick time, really’; interview for Australian Biography, 25 May 1998. Cairns’ closest friend in politics, and 
fellow minister, Tom Uren (1994, p 246) remarked ‘in the end it was Treasury and the responsibility of 
being treasurer that destroyed Jim. He was up against Canberra mandarins who were protecting their 
domain and whose influence within conservative political forces was enormous’. Cairns himself later 
regarded taking on the treasurer's job as 'a mistake. I should have known, for whatever were the 
limitations on being in government, on being a minister, they would be much more severe on being 
treasurer'; Bowman and Grattan (1989, p 74). 
1385 Strangio (2002, p 291). Similar sentiments are expressed in Freudenberg (1977, p 307). Treasury’s 
influence was weakened when a document they presented to cabinet appeared to have an incorrect or 
misleading number for the budget deficit; Hocking (2012, p 167); Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, 
pp 267-8). 
1386 Freudenberg (1977, p 307). 
1387 The Age, 22 November 1974. 
1388 Hawker, Smith and Weller (1979, p 260). 
1389 Freudenberg (1977, pp 307-8), Killen (1989, p 230), Menadue (1999, p 145). Henderson (2015, p 293) 
claims that Mr Williams was actually catholic activist BA Santamaria. Apparently Treasury officers were 
using Santamaria as a conduit. 
1390 Crean (1983, p 7:13). Looking back much later Whitlam (1985, p 184) himself said ‘I believed that the 
Australian Treasury could be relied on for loyal, disinterested and frank expert advice. I shared that 
mistake with my immediate predecessor and my immediate successor’. 
1391 Weller, Scott and Stevens (2011, p 84).  
1392 Hewitt was a former Treasury officer married to a school friend of Whitlam whose intellect he 
admired; Hall (2003, chapter 2, pp 14-15). 
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Treasury.1393 While Cairns thought Wheeler ‘hasn’t the kind of philosophy that I would 
like to see running a department like Treasury’, he thought this was true of Treasury as a 
whole and did not want to move against Wheeler until he had got to know him better.1394 
A factor complicating virtually all Cairns’ term as Treasurer was his involvement in the 
possible raising of a foreign loan from unorthodox sources for major resource 
developments. Wheeler, always uncomfortable with what he termed Labor’s ‘instant 
coffee’ decisions, strove mightily to warn Cairns of the folly of what became known as 
the ‘Khemlani Loans Affair’.1395 Cairns felt ‘that the Treasury line was too timid and 
conservative’.1396 
It has been claimed that 'the Whitlam era marked the end of the Treasury's unrivalled 
dominance of economic advice', with rival sources of advice established in the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the Department of Labour and the new 
Department of Urban and Regional Development and Nugget Coombs and academics 
such as Fred Gruen, Eric Russell, Geoff Harcourt and Trevor Swan also influential.1397 
One view was that ‘Cairns and other ministers were being forced to go to outside experts 
                                                          
1393 Crean (1983, pp 16:5-6); Hocking (2012, p 130); Menadue (1999, p 124). Whitlam had contemplated 
but decided against setting up a new economic policy department leaving Wheeler as permanent head of 
a one-man Treasury. 
1394 Cairns, interviewed in Nation Review, 25 July 1975, retained among the Wheeler papers in the National 
Library (MS 8096).  
1395 On 7 March a Melbourne businessman, George Harris took from Cairns’ office a letter offering a 
2.5 per cent commission on any foreign loan he arranged. The departmental liaison officer found a copy 
of a letter and sent it to Treasury. Wheeler forwarded the letter to his frequent lunch partner Clarrie 
Harders, the head of the Attorney-General’s Department, for a legal opinion and asked Scotland Yard 
for information on Khemlani. The Solicitor-General later described Wheeler’s actions as ‘not consistent 
with responsible government’; The Age, 21 December 1978, p 9. Wheeler’s actions reputedly annoyed 
Prime Minister Whitlam. In late 1974, Whitlam is supposed to have told Wheeler ‘Fred, you are on the 
skids’. Wheeler is supposed to have replied ‘I wish to inform you of facts, your ignorance of which will 
bring you down’; Brown (2002). Whitlam offered Wheeler the job of Reserve Bank Governor in 1975, 
but Wheeler declined, although accounts vary of his reasons; Nethercote (2013, p 141). According to 
Schedvin (1992) he ‘refused’ as he did not want the more interventionist Lenox Hewitt appointed 
Treasury Secretary, whereas in other accounts he declined for family reasons. 
1396 Cairns (1976, p 94). A later Labor treasurer, Chris Bowen (2015, p 218) argues Cairns ‘deserves the 
lion’s share of the blame’ for the loans affair as ‘the treasurer must ensure that full economic rigour is 
applied to all decisions’. Sexton (2005, p 63) says that ‘rapport between treasurer and Treasury was 
non-existent’. 
1397 Edwards (1975, p 5), Whitwell (1993, p 43). Oakes and Solomon (1974, p 541) also refer to Cairns 
consulting Henderson, Wheelwright and Snape in an effort to get a broader range of views. In November 
1974 Whitlam established an Economic Council as a formal alternative source of advice. Hawker, Smith 
and Weller (1979, pp 258, 268-9) refer to Cairns and Hayden having discussions with economists outside 
Treasury and cabinet appointing a committee, chaired by Nugget Coombs and including Wheeler, the 
taxation commissioner and three other outside economists, on possible tax measures to restrain inflation 
and encourage saving and investment. 
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because the Treasury, stubbornly intransigent, flatly refused to present the government 
with alternative options to its “horror budget” recommendations aimed at creating 
unemployment’.1398 Whitlam and Cairns successfully put forward to the Labor Party’s 
national conference a proposal to establish a Department of Economic Planning1399 as a 
rival to Treasury but Cairns lost the treasurer’s job before the new department could be 
established. Incoming treasurer Bill Hayden was not supportive and the Whitlam 
Government was dismissed not long after.1400  
Hayden’s appointment in June 1975 led to 'a degree of reconciliation' between the 
Government and Treasury.1401 Hayden ‘had regard for Wheeler’1402 and Wheeler 
'regarded Hayden highly'.1403 Hayden was seen as a more influential treasurer than 
Crean1404  and Weller and Cutt (1976, p 26) believed he had ‘respect for Treasury’s 
competence’. Hayden was a treasurer with his own economic ideas, and he liked to test 
them with Treasury and other advisers.1405 
But Hayden was frustrated by Treasury's monolithic views, once observing tartly 'I've 
never before seen a group of economists to be so much in agreement as you seem to 
be'.1406 Hayden was the first treasurer to have an economist on his ministerial staff, 
retaining Dr Peter McCawley who had worked for him when Hayden was minister for 
social security. 
By this time, Treasury’s views had evolved considerably from its post-war advocacy of 
Keynesianism. Lowering inflation was prioritised over full employment, balancing 
                                                          
1398 Oakes and Solomon (1974, p 541). 
1399 Whitlam favoured Lenox Hewitt to lead it, while Cairns had in mind his former student, Cambridge 
academic Geoff Harcourt, neither of whom would have pleased senior Treasury officials. 
1400 Hocking (2012, p 199). Whitlam (1972, p 271) had committed in his 1972 policy speech ‘to setting up 
economic planning machinery’. Crean had commented soon after the 1972 election that ‘we’re believers 
in economic planning’; Luck (2005, p 12).  
1401 Whitwell (1993, p 44 and 1996, p 215). Stekete (1975, p 11) reported 'Treasury's elation’ over the 
appointment and that Hayden ‘knew senior economists in the department personally’ and 'his economic 
knowledge is respected'. Don Russell (2003, p 8), then a junior Treasury officer, recalls 'Hayden appeared 
to immediately appreciate that involving the Treasury would not only help stabilise the Whitlam 
Government but would also make it easier to achieve the government's policy goals'.  
1402 Reid (1976, p 254). 
1403 Murphy (1980, p 131). 
1404 Jolley (1978, p 17). 
1405 Steketee (1975, p 11) observed 'to pave his way in cabinet he prefers a well-reasoned argument…he 
is prepared to listen to any logical piece of advice'. Murphy (1980, p 67) says he engaged in a 'voracious, 
if eclectic, search for knowledge'. 
1406 Murphy (1980, p 129). 
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budgets was seen as preferable to using them counter-cyclically and microeconomic 
reform was accorded greater emphasis.1407  
The dismissal of the Whitlam Government brought Malcolm Fraser to the prime 
ministership (confirmed by the 1975 election) and Phillip Lynch as treasurer. Lynch was 
regarded as being heavily influenced by his department.1408 It was said that 'Lynch learnt 
the best part of his economics from Treasury briefing notes'.1409 In 1976 Lynch's 
economics adviser observed that Lynch 'tended to argue the Treasury line in general 
policy discussion'.1410 As Wheeler's retirement approached, Fraser chose John Stone1411 
as successor, a man for whom Lynch had 'an enormous regard'.1412 Some viewed Stone 
as 'the archetypal representative' of the 'conservative tight-fisted and humourless' 
Treasury.1413  
Initially relations between treasurer and Treasury were much improved over what they 
had been for much of the Whitlam government.1414 But this was not to last; soon, 
Whitwell (1986, p 229) stated, 'relations between the Fraser government and the Treasury 
were less than harmonious'. Fraser was frustrated at the tardiness with which Treasury 
responded to his requests for information.1415 He was also displeased with Treasury over 
alleged leaking of discussions about devaluation.1416  The department also annoyed him 
with an obdurate opposition to his support for immediate introduction of tax 
indexation.1417 These were factors behind Fraser's decision to set up a small 
                                                          
1407 Wanna (2002, p 100). 
1408 Snedden (1986, p 46:16) called him 'basically the receiver of instruction and briefs from the 
Treasury…a great repeater of words'. Clyde Cameron (1990, pp 115, 139) thought Lynch was 'like a 
clockwork toy, in that Treasury would wind him up and he would go on chattering away until the spring 
was unwound'. Wallace (1993, p 108) instead saw Treasury as Lynch’s ‘natural ally’ in fighting for tougher 
economic measures. 
1409 Buckley (1991, p 206). 
1410 Jolley (1978, p 218). 
1411 See Treasury (2001, p 88) for a short biographical essay. 
1412 Buckley (1984, p 39). 
1413 Yeend, cited in Schneider (1980, p 56). 
1414 Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, p 101). 
1415 Ayres (1987, p 311); Kelly (1978a, p 2); Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, pp 90 and 101); Weller (1989, 
pp 231-3). 
1416 Howard (2010, p 95) and Whitwell (1986, pp 229-230). David Kemp, then a senior adviser in Fraser’s 
office, claims when Fraser decided to devalue Treasury would not draft a speech for him; cited in Rhodes 
and Tiernan (2014, p 69). Fraser was also annoyed by Stone’s Friday night drinking sessions with 
journalists; Lewis (2014, p 76). 
1417 Whitwell (1986, p 229). 
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‘anti-Treasury’1418 within his own department and to split off the expenditure control 
aspects of Treasury (and over half its staff, including the senior deputy secretary) into a 
new Department of Finance in November 1976.1419 Another motivation for the split was 
a view that it would assist in the task of cutting government spending, and improving its 
efficiency, to have a department focused on it.1420 Lynch disapproved, reportedly called 
it 'a rat act'.1421 A common argument for splitting the jobs was a feeling that the job of 
treasurer was very onerous but Fraser did not use this argument as Lynch initially retained 
ministerial responsibility for both departments.1422 Many felt it would have made more 
sense for the department with expenditure control functions to have inherited the Treasury 
moniker (as this was essentially the role of Treasury at Federation) and a new title such 
                                                          
1418 Wentworth (1987, p 17:10). Ian Castles, a former Treasury economist, attracted economic talent to 
PM&C as he was seen as an attractive mentor and boss; Weller (2001, p 59), M Keating (2014, p 22). 
1419 Kelly (1985, p 62) called it 'a lesson in power politics' to Treasury's senior officers. O'Brien (1985, p 24) 
interprets the split as Fraser trying to reduce the power of Lynch and Stone. Interviewed in 1997 Fraser 
described it as ‘cutting them down to size’; cited in Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, p 114). Similar 
attempts to split monitoring of expenditure from treasury departments or establish rival sources of 
economic analysis have occurred in a number of European countries. UK Prime minister Harold Wilson 
established a department of economic affairs in 1964 with a long term focus on economic management, 
which was a rival to the chancellor, a move cynics interpreted as trying to divide the power of his two 
most dangerous rivals. The new department was to have a longer-term focus, but Treasury successfully 
saw it off and it was wound up in 1969. Wilson’s successor Jim Callaghan thought about splitting Treasury 
to ease the workload (or cynics suggested reduce the power) of chancellor Denis Healey but Healey 
successfully resisted. Healey’s chief secretary Joel Barnett (1982, p 113) argued ‘it seemed bad for a 
chancellor, in his overall control of the economy, to have removed from his direct control so important a 
part as the whole of public expenditure’. Some other European counties also have economics ministers in 
addition to finance ministers. There have generally been three reasons for their creation: as a counter to 
the finance minister, to reduce the load on the finance minister or to solve a problem of allocating 
portfolios in a coalition government; Larsson (1993, p 215). 
1420 Kelly (1978a, p 22). The idea of the split had first been proposed in a paper for the Coombs Royal 
Commission on Public Administration by Stuart Harris, Ian Castles and Bob Gregory; Task Force on 
Economic Policy (1975, paragraphs 11.38 and 11.51). The Commission had, however, rejected the 
suggestion arguing that ‘an attempt to divide responsibility for economic policy from that for the 
formulation of the budget would either fail (as it did in the United Kingdom) or greatly weaken the 
effectiveness of economic policy’; Royal Commission on Australian Government Administration (1976, 
p 304). Fraser and Lynch first discussed the idea soon after the 1975 election but took no decision then. 
Ian Castles advocated the split to Fraser, drawing on Canadian experience; Podger (2010). 
1421 Australian Financial Review, 6 July 1984, p 40; Buckley (1984, p 40). Former treasurer Billy Snedden 
(1986, p 47:9) described it as a 'piece of stupidity’. 
1422 Lynch described the treasurer being responsible for both departments as 'an essential part of the new 
arrangement'; The Australian, 24 November 1976, p 9. Wheeler referred to the common minister in a 
memo of 6 December 1976 implying it was a permanent arrangement; quoted in Weller (1977a, p 35) and 
Hancock (2015, p 206). Fraser may have felt it necessary to at least temporarily allow Lynch to head both 
departments to avoid any impression that the move was an implicit criticism of Lynch and to prevent him 
strongly opposing the split. It also avoided the need for a reshuffle prior to the 1977 election. Fraser 
announced an assistant minister would be appointed but intended to appoint a separate finance minister 
after the following election; Wanna (2002, p 109), Wanna, Kelly and Forster (2000, pp 104, 119) and 
Weller (1977a, p 37). 
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as Department of Economic Affairs introduced for the department responsible for policy 
advice, but Wheeler was not willing to give up the venerable Treasury name.1423 
Lynch hired John Hewson from the Reserve Bank as an advisor as ‘Lynch had an acute 
need for advice that was a counter-balance to the Treasury line, with much of which he 
disagreed’.1424 Stone (2007, pp 14-15) regarded Fraser's views, which often conflicted 
with those of Lynch and Treasury, as just wrong. 
Lynch’s successor John Howard was reportedly suspicious of Treasury when first 
appointed.1425 Kelly (1989b, p 8) believed he ‘always maintained a sense of distance 
between himself and the department’. But this did not stop him respecting the expertise 
of Treasury, which he regarded as ‘the best concentration of brains in the federal 
bureaucracy’.1426 Howard was Wheeler's seventh treasurer as secretary and he had dealt 
with two more as a senior Treasury officer. John Stone was the dominant personality in 
Treasury, initially as deputy secretary and from 1979 as secretary, to the extent that the 
era was referred to by some as the ‘Stone age’.1427 Over time Howard's relations with 
Stone, and Treasury more generally, deteriorated, as Treasury material appeared in the 
media and Treasury's advice was not heeded in the preparation of the 1982-83 budget.1428 
Howard publicly rebuked Stone for comments on a resources rent tax.1429 Treasury has 
always wanted to be the primary (or even sole) source of economic advice to treasurers. 
John Stone was particularly critical of the role of ministerial advisers such as John 
                                                          
1423 Contemporary Treasury office Ron Gilbert in Treasury (2001, pp 77-78. 
1424 Abjorensen (1993, p 70). 
1425 Wallace (1993, p 117). 
1426 Howard (2010, p 102). He refers to John Stone as ‘the brightest public servant with whom I ever dealt’. 
Treasury reportedly regarded Howard as smart 'but unable to promote a broad economic philosophy and 
sell it to cabinet'; cited in McGregor (1982, p 16). On becoming prime minister, he said his experience as 
treasurer led him to believe ‘if you only listen to Treasury and official advice on the state of the economy 
you don’t always get the full picture’; Savva (1996, p 3). 
1427 Fraser and Simons (2010, p 526), Kelly (1978b), Whitwell (1986, p 4). Shann (1987, p 26) argued that 
‘internal debates were dominated by John Stone’s powerful personality’. 
1428 Whitwell (1986, pp 237-8). Kelly (1985, p 444) says that by the time of the 1983 election ’Treasury was 
utterly relieved to be rid of Howard’. When later prime minister Howard observed that the public service 
was then working more co-operatively with the government than it had when he was treasurer; Howard 
cited by Podger (2005, p 10) and Howard (1998, p 4). Gittins (2015, p 128) comments ‘perhaps because 
Treasury secretary John Stone was so bombastic – you could be honest and do it his way or utterly 
unprincipled and do it some other way – Howard had a pretty adversarial relationship with his 
department’. Bongiorno (2015, p 15) observed that Stone’s relations with Fraser and Howard had become 
so toxic that the future Nationals senator voted Labor in 1983. 
1429 McGregor (1982, p 16) refers to a newspaper headline 'Howard carpets treasury boss'. 
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Hewson1430 and the way Howard would be stymied by Fraser in cabinet.1431 The Reserve 
Bank increased its influence due to its 'proven pragmatic policy judgement'1432 and an 
Economic Panel of independent economists was established.1433  
Russell’s (2003, p 8) assessment was that Stone 'saw himself as an important player on 
the national stage but had none of [his predecessor] Fred Wheeler's reassuring style with 
ministers'. While 'critics say he is too reluctant to reject the advice of his bureaucrats'1434, 
Howard says he did not just follow Treasury's advice; 'a lot of decisions I made as a 
mixture of economic and political considerations'.1435 Stone believes Howard’s 
‘performance as treasurer had…suffered from his distrust’ of Treasury.1436 
A change of government brought the dynamic Paul Keating to the job of treasurer. For 
Keating, ‘Treasury was magic’1437 and unlike many of his predecessors he would often 
make the short walk from Parliament House to the Treasury building and worked in the 
building during the preparation of major statements. ‘Keating’s personal style was 
conducive to building a close, personalised style with his bureaucrats.’1438 He said ‘the 
Treasury is a department of principle. I have fought for them.’1439 Soon after becoming 
treasurer Keating replaced Willis’ key advisor, John Langmore, who was critical of 
Treasury, with staff such as Tony Cole seconded from Treasury itself.1440 Soon after 
                                                          
1430 Howard (2010, p 104). Stone resented Hewson sitting in on his meetings with Howard and giving 
Howard his opinion without Stone being able to respond; Barnett and Goward (1997, p 137). He termed 
advisors such as Hewson ‘meritricious players who flit across the private ministerial advisory stage’; 
Michelle Grattan, The Age, 25 November 1982, p 3; Guttmann (2005, pp 160-1). At this time Howard and 
Hewson, with similar backgrounds were also good friends; Errington and van Onselen (2007, p 74); 
Howard quoted in Masters (1990b, p 10). 
1431 Gittins (2015, p 128). 
1432 John Hewson, Business Review Weekly, 2 April 1983, p 19. Howard being based in Sydney where the 
Reserve Bank has its head office may have also been a factor. 
1433 As at April 1981 it comprised Messrs Drane, Gates, Hogan, Jolley, Norman, Sharp and Snape. Jolley 
who had been Lynch’s personal economic adviser, worked for the Victorian Chamber of Manufacturers 
and the others were academics. 
1434 Samuel (1978, pp 48-50). Fraser claimed that Howard followed the Treasury line more closely than 
had Lynch; Boxall and Gillespie (2013, p 111). 
1435 Cited in McGregor (1992, p 16). 
1436 Stone (2013, p 46). 
1437 Kelly (1994, p 69). Watson (2002, p 568) observed ‘he loved budgets’.  
1438 Gruen and Grattan (1993, p 52). Keating would often talk directly to Stone’s deputies; Goldfinch (1999, 
p 17). 
1439 Hansard, 23 October 1986, p 2653. He once described Treasury officers as ‘hard-working, committed, 
earnest Australians working in the public sector for some decent altruistic outcomes’; Carew (1990, p 60).  
1440 Keating dismissed Langmore as a ‘colossal fool’ and ‘a true believer of the mixed-up orthodoxy of the 
50s and 60s’; Spencer and Chubb (1993). Langmore’s critique of Treasury is in Langmore (1988). He was 
elected to parliament in 1984 and was a backbencher in the Hawke and Keating governments. 
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Keating ceased being treasurer he said ‘I have had the highest regard for Treasury and it 
was a privilege to have it serve me’.1441   
The attraction was mutual. Treasury liked having a treasurer who won debates on 
economic reform in cabinet.1442 As former Treasury deputy secretary David Morgan 
observed, ‘Treasury got more of its agenda up in the decade of the Hawke-Keating 
Government than for the rest of the post-war period combined’.1443 Former secretary 
Bernie Fraser (1991, p 261) recalled the second half of the 1980s as ‘a rare period of 
sustained rational decision making under a treasurer committed to delivering real reforms 
rather than mouthing good intentions…a period when the Treasury was much more 
persuasive with ultimate decision makers than it had been for some time’. In preparing 
for the tax summit, for example, Kelly (1989b, p 8) reported Treasury ‘responded beyond 
the call of duty for a minister who fought with a passion it had never seen before for the 
policies in which it had long believed’. Interviews with experts suggested that Treasury 
was seen as by far the most influential institution in contributing ideas to economic policy 
in the 1980s.1444 The pace of financial deregulation picked up; Table 9.4. 
There was consideration of reuniting Treasury and Finance but Weller, Scott and Stevens 
(2011, p 111) believed by then Treasury could see merit in having two powerful economic 
ministers in the cabinet so the idea lapsed. It has not been revived since and the two 
departments and ministers have generally worked harmoniously. Often the finance 
minister has been a senator (Walsh, Minchin, Wong, Cormann), allowing the treasurer 
and finance minister to represent each other in the other house. When the treasurer is 
overseas the finance minister is often the acting treasurer. Nearly all the secretaries of the 
finance department have previously worked in Treasury.  
 
 
                                                          
1441 Keating (1991b, p 11). He said Treasury was ’served I think by great people’; Gruen and Grattan (1993, 
p 55). He paid similar compliments at the Tax Summit; Kelly (1994, p 172). 
1442 Edwards (1996, p 233), Gruen and Grattan (1993, p 52). Mills (1993, p 205) calls Keating ‘the strongest 
advocate Treasury has ever had, both in cabinet and in the broader community’. Gittins (2015, p 128) 
writes ‘Treasury loved Keating and gave him great loyalty because he could win debates in cabinet’. 
Stutchbury (1990, p 58) commented that Treasury ‘was keen to support a treasurer with political clout in 
cabinet’. 
1443 Spencer and Chubb (1993), Toohey (1994, p 152). 
1444 It was followed by the OECD, Reserve Bank and ACTU; Goldfinch (1999, p 5). 
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Table 9.4: Chronology of Financial Deregulation in Australia 
Feb 1972 Maximum interest rates on overdrafts and housing loans over $50,000 
removed. (This was raised to $100,000 in February 1976.) 
Sept 1973 Interest rate ceiling on certificates of deposit removed. 
Dec 1979 Tender system for Treasury notes introduced. 
Dec 1980 Interest rate ceiling lifted for bank deposits. 
June 1982 System of credit directives (quantitative lending guidelines) abolished. 
Aug 1982 Tender system for Treasury bonds introduced. 
Dec 1983 Australian dollar floated. 
Apr 1984 Stock exchange deregulated. 
Aug 1984 Trading banks allowed to pay interest on cheque accounts.  
Feb 1985 Government announced entry of 16 foreign banks. 
Apr 1985 Interest rate ceilings (other than for home loans < $100,000) abolished. 
Apr 1986 Interest rate ceiling abolished for new home loans. 
Aug 1988 Statutory reserve deposits requirement abolished. 
Aug 1988 Removal of distinction between trading and savings banks. 
Aug 1996 Authorised short-term money market dealers abolished as part of move to 
real time gross settlement for high-value payments. 
Sources: derived from Carew (1998, pp 9-36), Grenville (1991) and Battellino and 
McMillan (1989, pp 23-29).  
 
Keating had four Treasury secretaries during his term as treasurer.1445 To the surprise of 
many, Keating initially retained John Stone as Treasury secretary1446 until Stone resigned 
                                                          
1445 This contrasts with the general pattern of secretaries lasting longer than treasurers. 
1446 According to Stone (2012, p 21 and 2013, p 45), Keating was initially planning to replace Stone with 
Chris Higgins, but Higgins advised Keating to retain Stone. Stone’s account is challenged in Bramston 
(2016, p 193). According to Gruen and Grattan (1993, p 53), ‘Stone, initially, was privately full of praise for 
his new master. Inevitably, however, it was a relationship that could not last’, given Stone’s strong views 
(such as his opposition to floating the dollar) and insistence that the department present a single position 
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in August 1984. Stone was succeeded by Bernie Fraser1447, who referred to ‘a period of 
genuine cooperation between Treasury and the government of the day’ which contributed 
to a number of reforms which ‘penetrated social as well as economic blackspots’.1448 
Keating and Fraser were close and Keating’s ‘regard for Fraser was immense’.1449 But 
his appointment was supported by both Howard and Stone.1450 After Keating appointed 
Fraser the Reserve Bank governor in 1989, he promoted Chris Higgins to Treasury 
secretary, ‘a man of great talent…[whose] overriding passion…was public policy’.1451 
After Higgins’ untimely death in December 1990, Tony Cole1452 was shifted from the 
Productivity Commission to head Treasury.1453 Under Fraser, Higgins and Cole, 
Treasury’s views became less monolithic and would present ‘an acceptable second best’ 
if the government resisted Treasury’s initial preference.1454  
The Keating tenure saw Treasury become, in Wanna’s (2002) phrase, a ‘handmaiden to 
the market’. Paul Kelly regards this as the end of the ‘Australian settlement’. During this 
era, the treasurer’s job came to encompass microeconomic reform as well as 
macroeconomic management. As a former UK chancellor put it, borrowing Isaiah 
Berlin’s terminology ‘macro-economic policy is the province of the hedgehog and 
micro-economic policy that of the fox…macro-economic policy is one big thing, whereas 
                                                          
on every issue. Keating’s office believed Stone should be removed but Keating resisted, arguing that ‘a 
demonstrable bloodletting on the first and best known person abroad in Australian finance was not 
smart’; interview with Paul Kelly (2001, p 97). As Boston and Uhr (1996, p 49) observed ‘the incoming 
Labor government cleverly resisted any temptations to purge the bureaucracy’. Day (2015, p 227) believes 
Keating wanted to reassure international financial markets that the incoming government would be more 
stable than the previous Labor government. As Keating said in his interview with O’Brien (2013), ‘the last 
thing we needed to look like was the Beverly Hillbillies arriving again’. 
1447 See Treasury (2001, p 90) for a short biographical essay and Kelly (1994, pp 274-5) and McGregor 
(1991) for profiles.  
1448 Fraser quoted in Treasury (2001, p 90). 
1449 Keating was the only outside invitee to Fraser’s wedding according to Ian Macfarlane; Kelly (2009, 
pp 109-110). 
1450 Kelly (1989a, p 21). Hawke and other ministers preferred Higgins but Keating chose Fraser; Kelly 
(1989b, p 8). Before making his choice, Keating asked both to write an essay on their policy views and the 
role of the secretary; Edwards (1996, p 257). Fraser said of Keating in an interview ‘I have a pleasant 
feeling being around him. There’s something that clicks’; McGregor (1991, p 39). Hawke and cabinet’s 
preference had been Chris Higgins; Kelly (1989b, p 8 and 1994, p 274). Kelly (1989a, p 26) says Fraser has 
been ‘more successful than any predecessor for several decades’ in achieving Treasury’s policy agenda. 
1451 Keating (1991a, p 6). Higgins is profiled in Edwards (1996, pp 364-8), Fraser (1991), M Keating (2007), 
Kelly (1989b, p 8) and Treasury (2001, p 100).  
1452 Treasury (2001, p 104) provides a short biographical essay. 
1453 Keating mused about appointing his senior adviser Dr Don Russell, a former treasury officer, to head 
Treasury; ‘an idea that filled the senior echelons of the department with horror’; Tingle (1994, p 310). 
Russell declined the offer, preferring to stay in the Treasurer’s office; Bramston (2016, p 368) and Wallace 
(1992, p 5). He did eventually become a departmental secretary, but of the industry department in 2011. 
1454 Gruen and Grattan (1993, p 53) and Fraser interviewed in Kelly (1989). 
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micro-economic policy consists of a myriad of for the most part relatively small things, 
which cumulatively become very important indeed’.1455  
With deregulation, treasurers are increasingly being judged minute-by-minute by 
markets. Globalisation reduces the scope for them to affect Australian economic 
conditions.1456 Wages are no longer centrally set, there are few tariffs left to cut, the 
currency has been floated and is determined by global dynamics, interest rates are set by 
the Reserve Bank and the market, and decisions about investment in Australia are 
increasingly made in head offices overseas.  
The Economic Planning Advisory Committee was established in 1983 but while it did 
some useful research it had little influence on policy.1457 After the 1987 election, the 
Industries Assistance Commission was moved from the Industry portfolio to the Treasury 
portfolio, seen as a victory for Treasury and a broadening of the treasurer’s role from 
macroeconomic policy to also encompassing microeconomic reform.1458 Over Stone’s 
objections, Keating replaced the National Income Forecasting Committee with the Joint 
Economic Forecasting Group with a wider membership including Barry Hughes from 
Keating’s office. Keating successfully fought in cabinet against regularly presenting 
detailed Treasury forecasts to cabinet, arguing that if they got out pessimistic forecasts 
would be self-fulfilling.1459  
Colebatch (2015, p 11) thought ‘one of Keating’s greatest weaknesses was his habit of 
relying on officials to guide him’. Cabinet colleague John Button (1988, p 324) recalled 
Keating once telling him ‘Treasury writes the book and I speak it’. But while initially he 
relied on Treasury for guidance as ‘that was where the intellectual strength was’1460, over 
time ‘the balance changed’ and he began to guide them.1461 When he decided to float the 
                                                          
1455 Nigel Lawson (2004, p 123), UK chancellor of the exchequer 1983-1989. 
1456 As Tingle (2012a, p 9) puts it, 'our post-deregulation politics has been dominated by politicians 
reluctant to admit that one implication of opening up the economy is that they don't have quite as much 
control as they once did’. 
1457 Goldfinch (2000, p 143). In 1996 EPAC was merged with the Industry Commission and the Bureau of 
Industry Economics to form the Productivity Commission, but the EPAC role of bringing together business, 
the unions and government to work on economic issues was lost. 
1458 Weller (1989, p 208). Capling and Galligan (1992, p 152) claim industry minister Button did not oppose 
the move. 
1459 Gareth Evans’ diary entry, 17 April 1985, in Evans (2014, p 97). 
1460 Cited by Hamilton (2006, p 10). 
1461 Treasury officials cited in Campbell and Halligan (1992, p 25). His chief economic adviser, Tony Cole, 
remarked that Keating initially ‘was quite nervous about whether he had a really good understanding of 
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dollar, and his rejection of Stone's advice appeared correct, it built up Keating's 
confidence.1462 Keating became, and was perceived to be, the driving force of economic 
policy.1463 
When Keating resigned as treasurer, Hawke appointed John Kerin. He was popular with 
the department1464, notwithstanding earlier joking that his definition of waste was an 
‘empty seat on a bus full of Treasury economists going over a cliff’.1465 Kerin 
commissioned Treasury to develop a model that could quantify the price, revenue and 
distributional impacts of changes in indirect taxes. Ken Henry was in charge of the task, 
which Treasury undertook professionally if somewhat reluctantly knowing it would be 
used to criticise rather than develop indirect tax reform.1466   
Once Keating became prime minister he appointed John Dawkins as his treasurer. When 
appointed, Dawkins told its senior officers he was impressed with them, but Gruen and 
Grattan (1993, p 56) reported that ‘Treasury detected an initial note of suspicion’ and the 
relationship was not as ‘chummy’ as it had been with Keating. Dawkins wanted Treasury 
to be more of a ‘generator of ideas’, particularly on industry policy.1467 He thought it 
needed to catch up with ‘post rationalist reality’.1468 Dawkins replaced Cole as secretary 
with Ted Evans, in what the treasurer described as a reflection of his ‘longstanding belief 
in regular rotations of senior bureaucrats’ but others suggested was related to indiscreet 
                                                          
economics’ but ‘his natural feel for what was wrong with the economy was remarkably good’; St Anne 
(2012, p 53). 
1462 Ross Garnaut, quoted in D'Alpuget (2010, p 63); Megalogenis (2012, p 159). 
1463 In a series of interviews asking who contributed ideas to economic policymaking, Keating received the 
most nominations (by 22 interviewees), followed by Hawke’s economics adviser Professor Ross Garnaut 
(14), ACTU secretary Bill Kelty (12) and Hawke (9). The most influential institutions on economic policy 
were seen as Treasury, the ACTU, Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet and the Reserve Bank in that 
order and the most influential individuals Keating, Hawke, Kelty and Bernie Fraser; Goldfinch (2000, pp 45, 
124 and 127). A Treasury insider said ‘we have a strong treasurer who’s the de facto prime 
minister…everyone in the Treasury likes the treasurer’ while another remarked that Keating’s ability to 
get his way in cabinet put Treasury in a ‘very powerful position’; Campbell and Halligan (1992, p 24). 
Former minister Jim McClelland (1989, p131) argues that ‘the innovative and…unorthodox policies 
espoused by Keating and sold by him with great skill and ruthlessness to his colleagues and to the public 
originated, not in Keating’s clever brain, but in the highly competent and informed think-tank that is the 
Treasury’. 
1464 Grattan (1991, p 11) and Gruen and Grattan (1993, p 55) claim Treasury regarded him as the best 
replacement for Keating available. 
1465 Grattan (1991, p 11) and Tingle (1991, p 4). 
1466 Tingle (2012b, p 47). 
1467 Interview in Australian Financial Review, 27 April 1993. 
1468 Sydney Morning Herald, 25 February 1993. 
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public remarks by Cole.1469 Keating and his department devised the One Nation stimulus 
package, about which Dawkins reflected that ‘neither I nor the Treasury was genuinely 
consulted’.1470 
With the defeat of the Keating Government, Peter Costello took over for what proved to 
be the longest tenure of any treasurer. Costello early on said of Treasury ‘its power and 
influence is overstated and its culpability is overstated’.1471 In February 2001 Costello 
appointed Ken Henry1472 secretary of Treasury, having been impressed by Henry’s work 
in designing the tax package and being unconcerned with Henry having spent five years 
in Keating’s office. Treasury gradually increased its influence, picking up responsibility 
for business law and consumer affairs and the Government Actuary. 
Costello claimed ‘I had big fights with Howard, all the time. Big fights.’1473 One 
manifestation was Costello telling Treasury not to comply with requests to send 
information to the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
In the latter part of Costello’s tenure ‘Treasury’s role as a chief source of strategic and 
economic policy advice was considerably diminished’ and Ken Henry complained the 
department was left out of major policy debates such as the $10 billion water package.1474   
Treasury and the global financial crisis 
The defeat of the Howard Government brought Wayne Swan to the treasurer’s role. Swan 
regarded Treasury as ‘the engine room of the federal bureaucracy’1475 and he made a good 
start in his relations with Treasury, attending the department’s Christmas drinks in 2007 
and chatting with junior staff, a practice of some previous treasurers but something 
Costello did not do. Swan had very good relations with treasury secretary Ken Henry 
                                                          
1469 Canberra Times, 30 March 1993, p 2. Dawkins reportedly viewed Cole as too ideological and was 
annoyed by Cole suggesting during an election campaign that government finances were unsustainable; 
Wanna (2002, p 117). 
1470 Kelly (2009, p 54), Bramston (2016, p 446). 
1471 Eccleston (1996). 
1472 Treasury (2001, p 116) provides a short biographical sketch. 
1473 Costello was speaking in 2008; Hartcher (2009, p 104). 
1474 Wanna (2011, p 354). 
1475 Taylor and Uren (2010, p 24). As shadow treasurer Swan referred to 'Treasury – a department I have 
a great deal of respect for’ which 'for the last quarter century…has brilliantly and constructively 
contributed to the debate about economic reform in Australia'; Swan (2007b, p 5 and 2007a). As shadow 
treasurer he had called Treasury the ‘talent bank of the federal government’ and criticised the Howard 
Government for having disengaged from it; Dusevic (2007, p 81). 
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during the GFC and took his advice to ‘go early, go hard and go households’ with an 
economic stimulus package that was ‘timely, targeted and temporary’ and mostly 
spending rather than tax cuts. Treasury attracted some controversy for its public defence 
of the stimulus packages but believed it was right to defend them publicly both to protect 
its own reputation and to shore up business confidence.1476  
Rudd and Swan appointed Henry to chair an inquiry into the taxation system.1477 When 
Henry retired, Martin Parkinson returned to Treasury as the new secretary after a period 
as secretary of the climate change department. 
In Swan’s first term as treasurer, opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull was able to put 
Rudd and Swan under pressure as he had a mole inside Treasury reporting to him on 
government plans before they were announced. This came to a head when he called for 
Swan to resign on the grounds that a leaked Treasury email purported to show he and 
Rudd had made misleading statements about preferable treatment for a Brisbane car 
dealer under a government finance scheme. But when the email was found to be a forgery, 
it was instead then Turnbull who was under pressure. After the Liberals’ mole, Godwin 
Grech, was outed during this incident the leaks from Treasury dried up.1478 
Joe Hockey became treasurer after the defeat of the Rudd government. Relations with 
Treasury got off to a poor start when incoming prime minister Tony Abbott sacked 
Parkinson without telling Hockey, let alone consulting him about it.1479 Parkinson’s 
replacement John Fraser had worked in Treasury many years before but had spent the 
intervening years working for an international bank. Hockey had some differences with 
the secretary, once dismissing claims of a housing bubble as ‘lazy analysis’ despite Fraser 
saying that Sydney’s housing market was ‘unequivocally’ in a bubble.1480 
Hockey took much of the blame for the unpopular 2014 budget and was replaced by Scott 
Morrison when Abbott was replaced by Malcolm Turnbull in 2015. Under Turnbull’s 
                                                          
1476 Wanna (2011, p 354). 
1477 Henry was likely disappointed at the delay in releasing the eponymous tax review and that so few of 
the recommendations were enacted. 
1478 Personal recollection, Cassidy (2010, pp 12-19), Stuart (2010, pp 124-127), Taylor and Uren (2010, 
pp 171-176). 
1479 Hockey only found out when Parkinson told him and Hockey would have preferred to keep Parkinson; 
King (2014, pp 284-5). 
1480 Australian Financial Review, 5 June 2015, p 5; Canberra Times, 17 September 2015; Senate Economics 
Committee Estimates Hansard, 1 June 2015, p 35. 
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leadership a number of reforms ruled out on political grounds by Abbott were temporarily 
put back on the table but not for long.  
Conclusions 
Treasury (2001, p 112) itself has summed up its history as ‘Treasury shifted its focus from 
accounting to economics’ and is now ‘directed to three policy outcomes: a sound 
macroeconomic environment, well-functioning markets and effective government 
spending and taxation arrangements’. 
Another important change is to the contestability of information. While in the mid-20th 
century only the Treasury had the information and skills required to forecast the 
Australian economy, this ability is now also claimed by the Reserve Bank, numbers of 
private banks, think tanks and gun-for-hire modellers at the beck of any interest group. 
Ministerial offices now often provide alternative advice to treasurers with the advantage 
of propinquity against Treasury’s much larger staff numbers.  
Treasury has evolved as a policy-making department – broadening its role and outlook 
but constantly focused on the economic consequences. Treasurers brought different skills, 
backgrounds and political acumen to the role of the government’s chief economic 
spokesperson. In general their relationship with their department played a large role in 
their perceived effectiveness and historic assessments of their performance. 
A lesson from this chapter is that the relationship with Treasury is probably second only 
to that with the prime minister for a treasurer. It is notable that periods when relations 
with Treasury broke down (such as under Cairns, and the latter stages of the tenures of 
Lynch, Howard and Costello) were soon followed by the treasurer losing their post. By 
contrast periods of good relations (such as Fadden and Holt with Wilson, Chifley with 
McFarlane, Keating with Fraser and Higgins and Swan with Henry) tend to be times when 
treasurers are able to achieve their goals, be they smooth management of the economy or 
dynamic reforms. The following chapter puts the historical discussion from this chapter 
of how the roles of Treasury and treasurers have varied over time into a more theoretical 
framework. 
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Chapter Ten: Analysing the job of Australian 
treasurer 
Introduction 
This chapter adapts the political science literature reviewed in Chapter 2 on the indicators 
of a successful treasurer and what qualities or circumstances may lead to that success to 
the case of the Australian treasurers in the light of the discussion in the intervening 
chapters. It starts by presenting various indicators of successful treasurers, examining the 
historical impact of treasurers and their stewardship of the economy, but noting how 
imperfect are these measures. The importance of timing is stressed, along with the manner 
in which treasurers are either overwhelmed by crises or seize opportunities they provide. 
The Australian treasurers are then classified according to the typologies identified in the 
literature review, adapting them where necessary to Australian circumstances. In 
particular, it adapts Skowronek’s model of ‘political time’ to analyse how the Australian 
treasurer’s role has evolved over time.  
What indicates a successful treasurer? 
Chapter 2 described the difficulties in assessing what makes a successful treasurer. In the 
absence of experts’ polls, the impact of leaders is often assessed by criteria such as 
reputational studies including internet searches, the length of entries in encyclopedia or 
scholarly dictionaries of biography, and the extent of media commentary and biographical 
interest.1481 These are, of course, necessarily imperfect measures as they will be affected 
by many factors other than the subject’s role as treasurer. 
Using these criteria for treasurers requires distinguishing those who were also prime 
minister (ranked in Table 10.1) from those who only served as treasurer (ranked in Table 
10.2) as prime ministers tend to attract much more attention. Tables 10.1 and 10.2 
compare the numbers of internet searches made in Australia1482 over the decade 2007 to 
                                                          
1481 Ludwig (2002, p 275), Riall (2010, p 384). 
1482 This is done to reduce the extent to which the results are contaminated by searches for homonyms of 
Australian treasurers, such as UK prison reformer John Howard, the English actors Chris Bowen and Paul 
Keating, and the Irish writer Peter Costello. There is still a problem of searches for the recent federal 
politician John Forrest being attributed to those of the treasurer of a century ago of the same name.   
 286 
 
2016 and it is immediately apparent that (with the anomaly of Holt) the internet searches 
are dominated by the more recent treasurers.  
Table 10.1: Ranking of treasurers who were also prime minister  
Google 
searches 
(average = 
100) 
Australian 
Dictionary of 
Biography (‘000 
words) 
Books on 
subject listed in 
National Library 
of Australia 
catalogue* 
 
Columns in 
Oxford 
Companion 
to 
Australian 
Politics 
Lines in 
Dictionary of 
World 
Biography 
Holt (225) Chifley (6.9) Menzies (23) Menzies (4) Chifley (43) 
Howard (221) Bruce (6.3) Whitlam (20) Chifley (4) Whitlam (41) 
Whitlam (199) Menzies (6.1) Hawke (16) Whitlam (2) Hawke (31) 
Menzies (183) Watson (4.5) Keating (11) Howard (2) Bruce (26) 
Keating (155) Holt (4.5) Fisher (5) Hawke (2) Howard (26) 
Hawke (110) Fisher (4.4) Lyons (5) Keating (2) Fisher (24) 
Chifley (101) Lyons (4.0) Chifley (4) Lyons (1) Menzies (22) 
Fisher (47) Page (4.0) Bruce (4) Fisher (1) Lyons (21) 
Others (<30) Scullin (3.3) Howard (4) Bruce (1) Keating (15) 
 Cook (3.0) Holt (3) Scullin (1) Holt (15) 
 Others (<3) Others (<3) others (<1) Others (<15) 
Sources: derived from Google trends, various volumes of Australian Dictionary of Biography, Galligan and Roberts (2007), Jones 
(2016) and National Library of Australia website, May 2017.   * Excluding foreign language books and those written by the treasurer 
himself. For Holt and Whitlam it excludes books just about their disappearance and dismissal. 
Table 10.2: Ranking of treasurers who were not prime minister  
Google 
searches 
ADB           
(‘000 words) 
Books in 
National Library  
Columns in 
OCAP 
Lines in DWB 
Hockey (255) Forrest (5.8) Forrest (4) Forrest (1) Theodore (22) 
Swan (142) Theodore (4.0) Cairns (3) Cairns (1) Casey (22) 
Costello (114) Casey (3.7) Theodore (2) all others (0) Cairns (14) 
Morrison (114) Watt (3.1) Hayden (2)  Forrest (11) 
Bowen (85) Turner (2.2) Costello (2)  Hayden (9) 
Forrest (65) Lyne (2.1) all others (0 or 1)  Costello (8) 
Hayden (12) Spender (1.9)   all others (0) 
Others (<10) Snedden (1.5)    
 others (<1.5)    
Sources: as for Table 10.1. 
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John Howard was one of the most searched for names but these searches were presumably 
mostly concerned with his role as current or recent prime minister. Next was Gough 
Whitlam for whom searches surged after his death. Similarly, among those treasurers not 
prime minister the most common searches were for the recent treasurers Peter Costello, 
Wayne Swan, Joe Hockey and Scott Morrison. The strength of this ‘presentism’ suggests 
these rankings are of little use in comparing the performance of recent treasurers with the 
earlier treasurers.  
By contrast comparisons of books about or entries on former treasurers are biased towards 
earlier treasurers. The Australian Dictionary of Biography does not include entries on 
people until after they have died. The longer ago a treasurer held office, the more time 
there has been for books to be written about them. 
Taking into account the various measures in Tables 10.1 and 10.2, the most prominent 
treasurers are those such as Menzies, Chifley, Whitlam, Hawke and Howard who were 
also prime minister (and in two cases only treasurers for a day or a fortnight). Among the 
other treasurers, Forrest attracts attention more for his exploits as an explorer and 
long-serving premier of WA than for being treasurer; Casey and Hayden were 
foreign/external affairs ministers and governors-general longer than they were treasurer; 
and Cairns and Theodore may both been written about more for personal scandals than 
for their economic records. 
Treasurers and the importance of timing 
The importance of timing was noted in Chapter 2 where it was observed that it helps to 
come into the job in a new government.1483 Hockey had the advantage of coming into 
office when the budget had been ravaged by the need to address the global economic 
crisis but was unable to match his rhetoric about restoring the budget to balance by either 
benefiting from a more benign global environment or selling harsh fiscal medicine. 
Entering office during a recession also allows credit to be claimed when the economy 
recovers, even when as with Lyons in the early 1930s and Keating in 1984 it partly 
reflected the breaking of a drought.  
                                                          
1483 As Dell (1996, p 109) puts it in the UK, ‘it does a new chancellor no harm to be seen rectifying the 
omissions of his predecessor’. Ruth Richardson (1995, p 76), a New Zealand finance minister, remarked ‘a 
crisis inherited from your predecessor can give you a flying start in terms of impetus and goodwill’. 
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The least favourable circumstances under which to become treasurer are when the global 
conditions deteriorate soon after. Labor treasurers have been particularly unfortunate in 
this respect, with Theodore, Crean and Swan all facing global recessions or depressions 
and Fisher and Chifley world wars. (Fadden faced a year of World War II in his first stint 
and the terms of trade swings resulting from the Korean War early in his second but 
thereafter had generally benign international conditions.) 
It was also observed that it is difficult to follow a treasurer of the same party. Keating 
maintained his interest in economics as prime minister, driving the One Nation package 
to the frustration of his treasurer Dawkins.1484 This problem was also faced to varying 
degrees by Page, Casey, Spender, Holt, McMahon, Hayden and Willis while Poynton, 
Kerin and Bowen were only spared it by their short terms. Such treasurers need to justify 
reforms in terms of a response to changed conditions. Cairns had this opportunity when 
he succeeded Crean at the time of the mid-1970s recession, but was not up to it. Hayden 
took the opportunity to make some changes but was out of office before he had time to 
make a real mark.  
On the other hand, as also noted in Chapter 2, it can be an advantage in coming into the 
office after the prime minister has sacked your predecessor as a prime minister’s 
judgement will be questioned if they sack a second treasurer. This certainly strengthened 
Bill Hayden’s position as Gough Whitlam had removed his two predecessors. It probably 
also strengthened the position of John Dawkins and is likely to make it easier for Scott 
Morrison to retain the post. 
Assessing the managerial record of treasurers 
Part of being a great treasurer is good stewardship.  As noted in Chapter 2, assessing the 
record of treasurers as economic managers is fraught with difficulty. Firstly, there is the 
question of the extent to which economic decisions are truly made by the treasurer himself 
rather than the prime minister, cabinet or central bank. Secondly, the global economic 
circumstances matter greatly. A treasurer such as McMahon could point to good 
economic outcomes but global economic conditions were unusually smooth for him. By 
contrast Theodore/Scullin faced the great depression and Swan the global financial crisis. 
                                                          
1484 As Keating, himself remarked, ‘it is very difficult being treasurer to a prime minister who had been 
Labor’s longest-serving treasurer and an active one’; O’Brien (2015, p 653). 
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Thirdly, there are questions about whether a treasurer’s performance on say 
unemployment should be measured as the average rate over their tenure (which makes it 
hard for a treasurer such as Lyons who inherited very high unemployment to look good) 
or the change over their tenure (which makes it hard for a treasurer such as Holt who 
inherited very low unemployment and inflation rates to look outstanding).  
With these caveats in mind, tables 10.3 and 10.4 provide some summary information on 
economic records. Theodore, treasurer during the global great depression, unsurprisingly 
had the worst economic legacy. Matters gradually improved under the Lyons 
governments but unemployment stayed high until the War. Focusing on unemployment, 
the legacies of Chifley (especially considering he had to deal with the demobilisation of 
soldiers after World War II) and Fadden explain why they are held in high regard. Fadden 
handed over a very low inflation rate but this disguises that during his tenure inflation had 
briefly hit an all-time high. A benign global economy helped Holt leave a good record. 
The OPEC oil shocks and a wages surge led to a jump in inflation during the Whitlam 
government. While the unemployment rate at the time seemed high, it now looks quite 
moderate. Howard’s legacy of both high unemployment and high inflation and no 
progress in repaying public debt looks distinctly unimpressive. Keating ‘snapped the 
inflation stick’ (in his words) but the early 1990s recession wiped out the gains he had 
earlier made on unemployment. He would argue that the reforms he instituted contributed 
to the subsequent strong sustained economic growth which saw unemployment fall during 
Costello’s long tenure. Costello’s record is bolstered by the mining boom and measures 
of structural balances indicate that the underlying fiscal balance was nowhere as strong 
as the budget surplus in 2006-07 might suggest. Notwithstanding the ‘debt and deficit 
disaster’ rhetoric Hockey employed against Swan he left more debt himself. 
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Table 10.3: Economic legacy of treasurers  
 Final 
year 
Unemployment 
rate (end-year) 
Inflation 
(end-
year) 
Budget 
balance (% 
to GDP) 
Public debt 
(% to GDP) 
Earle Page 28/29 7 2 -1.3 44 
Ted Theodore 31/32 20 -5 -0.3 57 
Lyons/Casey 38/39 9 3 -0.3 38 
Ben Chifley 48/49 1 11 0.2 85 
Arthur Fadden 57/58 2 0 -1.0 32 
Harold Holt 65/66 2 4 -1.2 30 
Crean/Hayden 74/75 5 17 -3.5 21 
John Howard 82/83 10 11 -2.5 20 
Paul Keating 90/91 10 3 0.3 12 
Peter Costello 06/07 4 2 2.5 5 
Wayne Swan 12/13 6 2 -1.4 17 
Joe Hockey 14/15 6 2 -2.4 23 
Sources: RBA, Barnard (1987), Withers et al (1987), ABS, Budget papers (headline cash balance and CGS on issue). 
 
In terms of economic growth, the most dramatic period is again around the 1930s 
depression. Most recent treasurers have recorded average growth in per capita incomes 
of around 2 per cent per annum, similar to that recorded in the long boom of the latter 19th 
century. Holt gets the gold medal among post-war treasurers for the strongest average 
growth. But for a fair comparison it is necessary to put the Australian performance in an 
international context. The 1930s depression and the 2008 global financial crisis meant 
that Theodore and Swan faced very harsh conditions, which led their peers in other 
countries to record very poor outcomes. It also shows that while the Australian economy 
grew well in the 1950s and 1960s it lagged behind the growth of its international peers. 
Indeed in terms of comparative performance the post-war era’s best performer is Swan. 
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Table 10.4: Economic growth record of treasurers 
 (average annual percentage growth in real GDP)  
 Years Australia Median of 
peers1485 
difference 
Long boom 1879-1889 2.0 1.2 0.7 
1890s depression 1890-1900 -1.0 1.9 -2.9 
Early treasurers 1900-1922 1.1 1.1 0.0 
Earle Page 1923-1929 0.6 3.1 -2.5 
Ted Theodore 1930-1931 -9.0 -5.2 -3.9 
Lyons/Casey 1932-1938 4.4 1.8 2.6 
Ben Chifley 1942-1949 -0.5 1.5 -2.1 
Arthur Fadden 1950-1958 1.5 2.2 -0.7 
Harold Holt 1959-1965 2.9 3.4 -0.5 
Crean/Hayden 1973-1975 2.0 1.9 0.2 
John Howard 1978-1982 1.2 0.9 0.3 
Paul Keating 1983-1990 2.2 2.0 0.2 
Peter Costello 1996-2007 2.5 2.2 0.3 
Wayne Swan 2008-2012 2.6 0.5 2.1 
Joe Hockey 2013-2015 2.6 2.2 0.4 
Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook, April 2017; Maddison (2001). 
 
Treasurers and crises  
It was observed in Chapter 2 that great political leaders are often defined by their ability 
to deal with crises, raising the question of whether treasurers can best demonstrate their 
greatness by coping with economic crises such as global depressions. 
The first world war hindered the ability of the reformist-minded treasurers Fisher and 
Higgs to implement domestic reforms. Chifley as treasurer in the second world war was 
in some ways similarly constrained, but in others was able to turn the situation to his own 
use, introducing controls on the banking system and taxation reforms as wartime 
                                                          
1485 Peers are taken as Argentina, Canada, France, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, United Kingdom 
and United States. 
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measures, which could then be adapted in peace, but would have been much harder to 
introduce in peacetime. Scullin has a poor reputation as a prime minister as he was viewed 
as being swamped by the Great Depression of the 1930s, but Theodore's reputation as 
treasurer is better as with hindsight he was seen as fighting (albeit unsuccessfully) for 
measures that would have enabled the Australian economy to cope better with it. Keating 
framed the current account deficit in the balance of payments as threatening to reduce 
Australia to a ‘banana republic’, and argued this made reforms more urgent.1486 
Wayne Swan as treasurer may be the prime example among Australian treasurers of the 
axiom that people who are good at managing crises are better rewarded than those whose 
prescient management avoids them arising. He did not get much credit domestically for 
avoiding the recession which hit almost every comparable country during the global 
financial crisis (Table 10.4). History may treat him more kindly than contemporary 
commentators.1487  
Chapter 2 posited as the key tasks for a treasurer facing a recession; explaining how the 
economic problem reflects external influences, devising a policy response such as an 
economic stimulus package, explaining why this is necessary, explaining how the policy 
worked to limit the rise in unemployment and developing better policy responses for 
future recessions. Swan (with prime minister Rudd and treasury secretary Ken Henry) 
was effective in the second of these tasks during the global financial crisis but weaker on 
the communication aspects. During the Great Depression Theodore had the intellectual 
ability and confidence for the tasks but was not able to implement his preferred approach 
(for reasons discussed in Chapter 5). Crean and Cairns floundered in the mid-1970s. 
Keating was effective at both delivering reforms and justifying them. 
Typologies of treasurers  
A number of typologies of treasurers were presented in Chapter 2. The first was arguably 
the most-cited by journalists and politicians themselves; Tony Benn’s classification of 
straight men, fixers and maddies. Applying this to Australian treasurers; Fisher, Page, 
Theodore, Chifley, Cairns, Keating and Dawkins could be termed ‘maddies’, with their 
                                                          
1486 As Goldfinch and ‘t Hart (2003, p 238) observe ‘framing policy predicaments as crises provides 
potential momentum for policy reform’. 
1487 But set against this strong performance in his first term are the failures in his second term such as 
the mining tax and the repeated promises of a surplus. 
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desires to reshape the economic system, with most of the rest straight men. McMahon 
and Lynch (and maybe Morrison) could perhaps be classed as fixers.  
The second, also informal, classification was from Sol Encel who classifies leaders as 
larrikins and prima donnas. Applying this typology to Australian treasurers could see 
Fadden, Keating and Dawkins as larrikins, and Bruce, Casey, Menzies, Spender, Keating 
and Costello as prima donnas. It is a bit early to say but arguably Hockey could be placed 
among the prima donnas with his ‘in defence of’ series of speeches in 2009 and 2010 and 
Morrison as a larrikin based on his ‘whatever it takes’ performance in the immigration 
portfolio. 
It was argued in Chapter 2 that much of the academic literature on political leadership 
boils down to distinguishing two essential types; managers and reformers. This typology 
is applied to Australian treasurers in Table 10.5, with a third category added for the 
short-term treasurers who did not have time to demonstrate into which category they 
would fall.  
Within the reformers category, those in italics and brackets are the frustrated reformers 
who wished to do more but were held back. The classic example would be Theodore, who 
certainly had aspirations to be transformational but his short and interrupted tenure, the 
impact of the Depression and the blocking of some of his measures by the Senate 
prevented him achieving much.  
Howard claims to have wanted to do a lot more but been stymied by his prime minister 
Fraser while Costello makes the same claim about Howard as prime minister, but it should 
be noted both claims are contested.1488  
For our longest-serving treasurer the table distinguishes between early and late Costello, 
as he started out reformist but became increasingly managerial as he tired of the job and 
his focus shifted to his aspirations to become prime minister. 
 
 
 
                                                          
1488 On the former case, see Chapter 7. 
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Table 10.5: Basic classification of Australian treasurers 
Managers (aspiring) Reformers  Short-term 
Turner Fisher Watson 
Forrest (Higgs) Poynton 
Cook (Watt) Scullin 
Bruce Page Whitlam 
Lyons (Theodore) Hayden 
Menzies Casey Hawke 
Fadden Spender Kerin 
Holt Chifley Bowen 
McMahon Crean  
Bury Cairns  
Snedden (Howard)  
Lynch Keating  
Willis Dawkins  
late Costello early Costello  
 Swan  
 (Hockey)  
 (Morrison)  
 
This reformer/manager split is sometimes cross-classified by whether the leader attempts 
to implement their approach through imposition or by building consensus. This leads to 
what Richardson, Gustafson and Jordan (1982) and Errington (2008) refer to as four 
differing ‘policy styles’.1489 The Australian treasurers included in the first two columns 
of Table 10.5 are allocated to their respective classifications based on whether they sought 
to impose policy or build consensus in Table 10.6.1490 As with other examples of this style 
of classification, the conservator-manager category is the most common.  
 
 
                                                          
1489 They use different terms for the four styles, and other terms are used for Table 2.3, but the concepts 
are similar.  
1490 Some of the treasurers who probably aspired to be reformers but were prevented are excluded. 
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Table 10.6: Policy styles of Australian treasurers 
 Managers Reformers 
Impositional style Strong administrators 
Forrest, Bruce,                 
late Costello 
Transformational leaders 
Page, Theodore, Chifley, 
Keating, Dawkins, early 
Costello, Swan 
 
Consensus style Conservator-manager 
Turner, Cook, Lyons, 
Menzies, Fadden, Holt, 
McMahon, Bury, Snedden, 
Lynch, Willis 
Concertation fixers 
Fisher, Casey, Spender, 
Crean, Cairns, Howard,    
 
Another approach to cross-classifying leaders discussed in Chapter 2 is James Barber’s 
(1992) much-cited study of US presidents, which classifies them on two dimensions; their 
activity or passivity and whether they tended to have an ‘upbeat’ positive style or a more 
gloomy or reluctant negative attitude.   
The Australian treasurers included in the first two columns of Table 10.5 are allocated to 
their respective classifications in Table 10.7. Those allocated to the negative row were 
usually there as a reflection of the frustrations they experienced during their terms as 
treasurers. None had a negative sentiment at the time they were appointed treasurer.1491 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1491 With the possible exception of Cook who was impatient to get to London as high commissioner. 
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Table 10.7: Applying Barber’s framework to Australian treasurers 
 Managers (passive) Reformers (active) 
Positive Turner, Forrest, Bruce, Menzies, 
Fadden, Holt, McMahon, Bury, 
Snedden, Lynch, Willis, late Costello 
Fisher (to 1913), Page, 
Theodore, Casey, Spender, 
Chifley, Howard, Keating, 
Dawkins, early Costello, 
Swan 
 
Negative Cook, Lyons Fisher (1914-1915), Higgs, 
Watt, Crean, Cairns 
 
One approach to assessing a reforming treasurer is the ‘counterfactual’; asking the 
question of how different the country would have been if a particular treasurer had not 
held the post.1492 Keating stands out as the treasurer who took the economy in directions 
that alternative treasurers from his party (most likely Willis) would likely not have taken, 
or at least have taken much longer to do. Chifley was in the Labor mainstream but 
probably pushed some policies (notably bank nationalisation) harder than would have an 
alternative Labor treasurer (most likely Forde) of the period. If Whitlam had appointed 
Hayden as treasurer earlier he would have been a stronger treasurer than Crean and more 
disciplined than Cairns. On the non-Labor side, Page pursued some idiosyncratic interests 
which an alternative (perhaps Massy-Greene) would not have taken up. Spender was an 
earlier convert to Keynesianism than alternative treasurers from his side of politics 
(perhaps Hawker) and it would have been interesting to see where he would have taken 
economy policy were he to have had a longer tenure. 
Bramston (2011) identifies the following characteristics of successful leaders; 
• Bold ambitions 
• Courageously pursuing unpopular reforms 
• Persistently making the case for change 
                                                          
1492 Grint (2010, pp 3-4) says one definition of leadership is mobilising groups to do something they would 
otherwise not do. 
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• Determined 
• Deep convictions 
• Strategically recognising opportunities for reform 
• Taking the public with you. 
Keating probably best exemplifies these characteristics. He certainly pursued reforms 
with determination and was indefatigable in arguing for them with the press gallery. It is 
more arguable the extent to which he persuaded the public. Chifley shared many of the 
characteristics, although he egregiously failed to make the case for bank nationalisation 
to the public before announcing the policy. Howard demonstrated many of the 
characteristics while opposition leader and prime minister but was much more cautious 
as treasurer, in part because of his unusually low seniority in the cabinet at the time made 
him beholden to Fraser until the early 1980s. Theodore had many of the characteristics 
but his short interrupted and frustrated tenure limited his achievements. 
Also discussed in Chapter 2 is the typology of Harold Lasswell who classified political 
actors as agitators, administrators or theorists. Among Australian treasurers, Cairns 
probably best fits the agitator type, with Page, Theodore, Keating, Dawkins, Swan and 
Hockey having some of the characteristics in a muted form as they gave speeches pushing 
ideas. As noted above, many treasurers fall into the administrator or manager character. 
It is not obvious that any are purely theorists.1493 Theodore and, to a less extent, Fisher 
and Chifley read widely on economics without being formally educated on it and 
McMahon, Bury, Cairns, Hayden, Kerin, Dawkins, Willis, Swan, Bowen and Morrison 
studied economics at university.1494  
Predicting the performance of treasurers 
The strands of literature and typographies discussed in Chapter 2 were brought together 
by Skowronek to form a matrix which he applied to US presidents, classifying them as 
reconstructive, disjunctive, articulative and pre-emptive, an approach generalised by 
Laing and McCaffrie (2013) and ‘t Hart (2011b, 2014b). A similar analysis is applied to 
                                                          
1493 Barry Jones (2006, p 416), never a treasurer, places himself in the theorist category as a minister. 
Indeed, being a theorist may have disqualified him from consideration for a more senior ministerial post. 
1494 In Hayden’s case, he was an external student while an MHR. Cairns was more an economic historian 
than economist and while Swan started studying economics he switched to arts/law and concentrated on 
government.  
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Australian treasurers in Table 10.8, with some changes to the terminology. More 
treasurers fall into the maintaining and innovative cells than the others, suggesting that 
treasurers tend to suit their times. The innovative cell does include treasurers seen as 
among the best, such as Chifley and Keating, but also those such as Theodore who had 
good ideas but was unable to implement them and Cairns who critiqued the existing 
regime without being able to put anything in its place. The maintaining treasurers include 
many generally regarded as dull but competent. The complacent Panglossian treasurers, 
often following anachronistic policies that fail to respond to new challenges, tend to be 
among the less respected treasurers. 
Table 10.8: Typology of Australian treasurers relative to the economic conditions 
they inherited 
 Managers Reformers 
Benign economic 
conditions 
Maintaining 
Turner, Menzies, Fadden, 
Holt, McMahon, Bury,   
late Costello 
Visionary 
Fisher, Page, early 
Costello 
Challenging economic 
conditions 
Panglossian 
Cook, Lyons, Snedden, 
Lynch 
Innovative 
Theodore, Chifley, Cairns, 
Hayden, Keating, 
Dawkins, Swan, Hockey 
 
Successful reforming treasurers are those who in Skowronek's second typology, described 
in Chapter 2, are able to ‘reset political time’. By analogy with Skowronek’s model of US 
presidents presented in Table 2.4, a model of Australian treasurers is given in Table 
10.9.1495 The leadership types in the three rows of Tables 2.4 and 10.9 broadly correspond 
to the innovative, maintaining and Panglossian typology employed in Table 10.8.  
                                                          
1495 Walter (2010a, p 342) has also applied Skowronek's concept of 'political time' to Australian politics, 
noting ‘the sorts of leadership typically manifest at particular stages. Progressive reforms are always 
significant both in reacting to regime exhaustion and in initiating new directions (Deakin driven by his own 
financial failure in the 1890s, and driving 'new protection' in 1900-10; Coombs, Curtin and Chifley adamant 
that the miseries of the Depression would not be revisited and finding in Keynes the inspiration for 
post-war reconstruction; Hawke and Keating determined not to repeat Whitlam's mistakes and turning to 
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Table 10.9: Applying Skowronek’s ‘political time’ model to Australian treasurers 
 Accounting
Classical 
Premiers’ 
Plan 
(austerity) 
 
Keynesian 
(expansion) 
Monetarism Market New 
Keynesian 
 1900-1929 1930-1943 1944-1975 1976-1983 1984-2007 2008-2013 
Constructing Turner Lyons Chifley Lynch Keating Swan 
Managing most early 
treasurers 
 
 
Casey, 
Menzies 
Fadden, 
Holt 
 
Howard Costello Swan, 
Bowen 
Collapsing Scullin, 
Theodore
1496 
 Snedden, 
Crean 
Howard Swan  
 
The table distinguishes six eras, drawing on the economic history reflected in the narrative 
of Chapter 9 and the four pairs of parallel lives covered in Chapters 4 to 7. In the first era, 
discussed in Chapter 4, the treasurer presided over a small accounting department, 
reflecting the Gladstonian traditions and classical ‘laissez faire’ economics. The second 
era started when the Premiers’ Plan was adopted in response to the Depression. Despite 
the aspirations of the proto-Keynesian Theodore, the policies adopted by Lyons were 
largely conservative; see the discussion in Chapter 5. While Theodore had aspired to 
Keynesianism and Spender took the first steps, it was the White Paper on Full 
Employment that represented ‘the crowning glory of Keynesianism’1497 and ushered in 
the third, Keynesian era, described in Chapter 6, which continued after the war 
notwithstanding the return of conservative governments. The Keynesian era lasted until 
the OPEC oil shocks in the mid-1970s and the subsequent stagflation. The authorities 
then flirted with monetarism. This fourth era was short-lived. As discussed in Chapter 7, 
                                                          
market solutions rather than state provision as their alternative; finally, Rudd insisting that it is the task 
of social democracy to 'save capitalism from itself'.) Then there are the consolidators, often from 
Opposition parties but demonstrating the hold of the 'consensus' (Fisher and Hughes following Deakin; 
Menzies in the post-war period; early Howard following Hawke and Keating). Finally, there are those who 
must try to deal with regime exhaustion, or with the internal contradictions that bring a consensus down 
(Scullin and Lyons in the 1930s; Whitlam and Fraser as the long post-war boom ended; Howard in the last 
stages of his government). 
1496 Theodore was trapped in a collapsing system by his inability to pass legislation through the Senate or 
have the Commonwealth Bank cooperate with his policies. He was certainly not complacent about the 
challenges he faced and if he had his way would have started the Keynesian era much earlier. 
1497 Millmow (2015c, p 61). 
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the emphasis on monetary targeting was reduced until it was finally abandoned in 1985 
as the disconnect between monetary aggregates and GDP was exacerbated by the effects 
of financial deregulation and the growing availability of credit cards. The Keating 
treasurership was associated with the advent of the fifth ‘market era’ or ‘economic 
rationalism’, discussed in Chapter 7. The global financial crisis saw the start of a sixth 
‘new Keynesian’ era with a large economic stimulus package successfully warding off a 
severe recession. As shadow treasurer and during his first year as treasurer, Hockey 
opposed this approach but by his second budget was reintroducing stimulus for small 
business and appeared unperturbed by projections of larger budget deficits than those he 
inherited. Morrison has shifted the priority from reducing the deficit to providing tax cuts 
for business. 
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Chapter Eleven: Conclusions on what makes a 
successful treasurer 
The job of treasurer has changed greatly over time. There has been one important respect 
in which the job has been reduced from that faced by the earliest treasurers. The review 
of government spending is now the province of the finance minister. But in many respects 
the job is broader and more demanding and so the level and range of skills required to be 
judged a success in it has increased.  
Since the Keynesian revolution, the treasurer has been held responsible for the state of 
the economy. A century ago there were no published data on Australia’s GDP and 
treasurers then would not have been expected to be judged on its growth had there been 
such data. Recessions then were seen as like droughts, something out of the control of the 
treasurer and probably self-correcting, to be endured rather than cured. 
As well as the public’s expectation of vigorous economic growth and low unemployment, 
the treasurer is squeezed by public opinion which wants a contradictory mix of lower tax 
(at least on themselves), increased government spending (on individual areas such as 
health and education even if not in total spending) and a lower budget deficit (to the extent 
they have been convinced by treasurers like Costello that this is a sign that the budget is 
well-managed).  At the same time, elite opinion, and the opinion of many in the party 
room that may determine whether their future career is upward to the prime ministership 
or back to the backbench, as well as their own satisfaction, pushed treasurers to reform 
the system to make the economy healthier in the longer term. 
A treasurer may be regarded as ‘good’ if they can succeed in the first, managerial, role 
but to be regarded as ‘great’ a treasurer needs to achieve as a reformer as well. There are 
many qualities needed to achieve such greatness. Treasurers (like prime ministers) need 
a measure of luck and good fortune. But three key features stand out as crucial to making 
a treasurer’s reputation. 
Firstly, to be effective a treasurer needs immense political skills. These involve 
negotiation and communication skills to frame arguments about economic challenges in 
such a way that the current treasurer avoids blame and stakeholders and the community 
accept the need for the treasurer’s reforms even if they involve some short-term pain. The 
range of stakeholders with whom treasurers need to engage has expanded over time. It 
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includes business (especially important for treasurers from the Liberal Party and its 
predecessors), the trade unions (especially important for Labor treasurers), rural lobby 
groups (especially for the Country Party treasurers Page and Fadden) and community 
organisations. When, as has increasingly been the case in recent decades, the government 
does not control the Senate, the treasurer needs to be persuasive and accommodating to 
the minor party and independent senators. Increasingly important since financial 
deregulation has been keeping investors in financial markets, both domestic and foreign, 
on side. Bank economists provide a running commentary on each piece of economic data 
released. Maintaining the confidence of foreign bond holders, and the ratings agencies on 
which they place (or misplace) trust, requires treasurers to engage in roadshows in the 
world’s financial capitals (originally London and New York, but now also Tokyo, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Shanghai).  
Treasurers need to be good media performers and here too the demands are becoming 
ever greater with an expansion of media outlets, the advent of 24-hour news channels and 
the proliferation of social media. As opposition parties have become more sophisticated 
in media monitoring, the cost of a slip-up in a media appearance has become higher. 
Media performance encompasses how televised interviews or appearances on talkback 
radio are handled. Media management also involves advocacy with leader and opinion 
writers in private to shape their views. 
A particular challenge arises when an economy is entering a recession. The treasurer must 
then make a fine judgement about when, and how much, to change their rhetoric from 
'business as usual' to 'crisis management'.1498 Adopting the language of recession too early 
risks a self-fulfilling prophecy.1499 Leaving it too late risks perceptions of denial or being 
'out of touch'. The task is complicated by generally outdated and inconsistent economic 
data, and economic forecasts which tend to be least accurate around turning points.1500  
Treasurers also need to maintain the support of their party room. On various issues the 
Labor caucus caused problems for treasurers as diverse and distant in time as acting 
treasurer Lyons in the 1930s, Cairns in the 1970s and Dawkins in the 1990s. While Liberal 
                                                          
1498 't Hart and Tindall (2009, p 3). 
1499 John Major (1999, p 166) admits that as chancellor in 1990 he ‘suspected that recession might also be 
on the cards’ but ‘no advantage could accrue to anyone from a forecast that could only make it more 
likely’. 
1500 See, for example, Macfarlane and Hawkins (1983). An unnamed Treasury secretary once referred to 
a claim of precision for economic forecasts as ‘a lot of bulls—t’; Weller (1989, p 215).  
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treasurers have more autonomy in the short-term, if the party room comes to the view that 
the treasurer’s performance is a drag on public support for the government then the tenure 
of the treasurer may be brief, Hockey being a recent example.  
 They also need the support of the prime minister. They cannot do the job alone not steer 
government policy purely from the treasurer’s office. Treasurers tend to be most effective 
when they work in harmony with a supportive prime minister, a relationship recently 
dubbed a ‘political tandem’.1501 The combinations of Curtin/Chifley and Hawke/Keating, 
to a lesser extent Bruce/Page, and in their early days Howard/Costello and Rudd/Swan, 
have been particularly productive of economic reform. By contrast treasurers such as 
Watt, and to a disputed extent Howard, were held back by prime ministers who were 
unsupportive.1502  
The other crucial relationship, as highlighted by Chapter 9, is with the Treasury. 
Successful treasurers build an effective relationship with the department, harnessing it to 
both develop and accomplish the treasurer’s agenda. Effective treasurers find ways to 
build an effective 'tag team' with their departmental staff who have much technical 
expertise but often lack political acumen. Once (and aspiring future) treasurer Chris 
Bowen (2015, p xiii) has opined that ‘a good treasurer will neither be a captive of the 
Treasury nor ignore it’. As his predecessor, Frank Crean was fond of saying, Treasury 
officials should be ‘on tap, not on top’.1503 
The third key element in determining the success of a treasurer is a matter of timing. A 
treasurer arriving in office when exogenous factors such as the global economy and 
seasonal conditions are about to turn favourable is well placed to garner a good if 
undeserved reputation. A reforming treasurer is more likely to be successful if they take 
office at a time when the prevailing orthodoxy is under question. A purely managerial 
treasurer is more likely to be successful if they enter office at a time when economic 
conditions have been benign and so there is little appetite for change. 
Some potentially good treasurers have found it impossible to make effective headway 
because of the unfavourable economic circumstances they inherited when appointed to 
the job - Theodore is perhaps the most unfortunate featured in this study, although others 
                                                          
1501 Strangio, ‘t Hart and Walter (2015).   
1502 This is a lesson that Charlton (2015, p 68) highlights from Bowen (2015). 
1503 It was a line first coined in the UK by Professor Harold Laski; Crean (1993). 
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have been similarly unfortunate such as Fisher in his third term and Higgs (hindered by 
World War I), the three Whitlam government treasurers (who faced the OPEC oil shocks) 
and Swan (who faced the Global Financial Crisis – the first time since the Great 
Depression that global output contracted). Some treasurers facing unfavourable 
circumstances, however, turned adversity into opportunity and built their reputations on 
dealing with crises - Chifley and perhaps Keating. 
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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms 
ABS Australian Bureau of Statistics 
ACTU Australian Council of Trade Unions 
ALP Australian Labor Party 
ANU Australian National University 
ANZ Australia and New Zealand (bank) 
ANZSOG Australia and New Zealand School of Government 
AWU Australian Workers’ Union 
BCE Before Common Era   
BIS Bank for International Settlements 
CPI Consumer Price Index 
CSIRO Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
F&E Financial and Economic Committee 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFC Global Financial Crisis 
GNP Gross National Product 
GST Goods and Services Tax 
MHR Member of the House of Representatives 
MLA Member of the Legislative Assembly 
MLC Member of the Legislative Council 
MP Member of Parliament 
MS Manuscript held in the NLA 
NAA National Archives of Australia 
NLA National Library of Australia 
NSW New South Wales  
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries 
PM&C Prime Minister and Cabinet (department) 
R&D Research and Development 
RBA Reserve Bank of Australia 
SRD Statutory Reserve Deposit  
UAP United Australia Party 
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Dramatis personae 
* indicates an entry is available in the Australian Dictionary of Biography. 
Italics indicate cross-references. 
Tony Abbott (1957- ) has been an MHR since 1994 and was Australian prime minister 
(2013-2015). 
Peter Abeles (1924-1999) was a business leader best known as managing director of TNT 
transport and friend of Bob Hawke who served on the Reserve Bank board. 
Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967) was German chancellor (1949-1963) and negotiated Germany’s 
entry into NATO and the European common market. 
Saud Al Faisal (1940-2015) was a member of the Saudi royal family and Saudi Arabia’s foreign 
minister (1975-2015). 
*George Allen (1852-1940) was Treasury secretary (1901-1916). 
Ammonius of Athens (c100) was a Greek philosopher and teacher of Plutarch. 
Amyntianus was a biographer of Alexander the Great. 
*Frank Anstey (1865-1940) was a radical Labor politician, known for his books attacking the 
‘money power’, and a minister in the Scullin Government. 
Doug Anthony (1929-  ) was an MHR (1957-1984) and deputy prime minister (1971-1972 and 
1975-1983). 
Appianus of Alexandria (c100-c165) was a Greek historian who wrote a history of Rome. 
Humphrey Appleby was a fictional high ranking civil servant in the UK comedy series Yes, 
Minister, known for his devious manipulation of his minister and prolix language. 
*Hugh Armitage (1881-1963) was chief accountant (1916-1921), deputy governor (1927-1941) 
and governor (1941-1948) of the Commonwealth Bank of Australia. 
Wystan Hugh Auden (1907-1973) was an Anglo-American poet and friend of Keynes. 
Augustus (63 BCE–14), formerly known as Octavian, was the first Roman emperor.  
Newton Baker (1871-1937) was US secretary of war (1916-1921). 
*Edmund Barton (1849-1920) was MHR (1901-1903), Australia’s first prime minister 
(1901-1903) and a justice on the High Court (1903-1920). 
Kim Beazley Jnr (1948- ) was MHR (1980-2007), a senior minister in the Hawke-Keating 
Government and leader of the opposition (1996-2001 and 2005-2006). 
 307 
 
Kim Beazley Snr (1917-2007) was MHR (1945-1977) and education minister in the Whitlam 
Government. 
Tony Benn (1925-2014) was a British Labour MP (1950-1960, 1963-1983 and 1984-2001), writer 
and diarist. 
Isaiah Berlin (1909-1997) was a writer and professor of political theory (1957-1967) at Oxford 
University. 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen (1911-2005) was the longest-serving premier (1968-1987) of Queensland 
who launched a quixotic but doomed ‘Joh for prime minister’ campaign in 1985-1987. 
*John Bigge (1780-1943) was a British lawyer who conducted a royal commission into the 
effectiveness of transportation in Australia in 1819 and was critical of Governor Macquarie. 
Eugene Böhm-Bawerk (1851-1914) was professor of economics (1880-1889) at Innsbruck 
University and Austrian finance minister (1893, 1896-1897 and 1900-1904). 
*Henry Boote (1865-1949) was a Labor writer and founded with Andrew Fisher the Gympie 
Truth, which he edited. He later edited the Brisbane Worker and Australian Worker. 
James Boswell (1740-1795) was a Scottish writer and a friend and biographer of Samuel Johnson. 
Chris Bowen (1973-  ) was Australian treasurer in 2013 and author of a collective biography of 
twelve treasurers, and is currently Australia’s shadow treasurer. 
*Edward Braddon (1829-1904) was Tasmanian premier (1894-1899), responsible for the 
Australian constitution initially requiring ¾ of customs revenue being returned to the states. 
*James Brigden (1887-1950) was professor of economics at the University of Tasmania and 
public servant who contributed to a number of economic inquiries. 
*Stanley Melbourne Bruce (1883-1967) was MHR (1918-1929 and 1931-1933), Australian 
treasurer (1921-1923) and prime minister (1923-1929) and assistant treasurer (1932-1934). 
*Wallace Bruce (1878-1944) was a businessman and lord mayor of Adelaide (1925-1927) who 
chaired a committee on economic policy in 1932. 
Edmund Burke (1729-1797) was a British Whig MP who argued that MPs should be 
representatives not delegates. 
*Tom Burke (1910-1973) was a Labor MHR (1943-1955) who aspired to be treasurer. 
*Leslie Bury (1913-1986) was an economist who uniquely both worked in the Australian 
Treasury (1949-1951) and was Australian treasurer (1969-1971). 
John Button (1932-2008) was a senator (1974-1993) and industry minister in the Hawke-Keating 
Government. 
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Jim Cairns (1914-2003) was a Labor MHR (1955-1977) and Australian treasurer (1974-1975). 
*Arthur Calwell (1896-1973) was a Labor MHR (1940-1972), minister in the Curtin-Chifley 
Government and leader of the opposition (1960-1967). 
*Archie Cameron (1895-1956) was an MHR (1934-1956) serving as leader of the Country Party, 
and Speaker (1950-1956). 
*James Keith Campbell (1928-1983) was an accountant and chairman of home builders 
LJ Hooker, who chaired an inquiry into the Australian financial system, reporting in 1981. 
Bob Carr (1947-   ) was a journalist, diarist, NSW premier (1995-2005), Labor senator (2012-2013) 
and foreign minister (2012-2013). 
Jimmy Carter (1924-   ) was governor of Georgia (1971-1975), US president (1977-1981) and won 
the 2002 Nobel Peace Prize. 
*Richard Casey (1890-1976) was an MHR (1931-1940 and 1949-1960), Australian assistant 
treasurer (1933-1935), treasurer (1935-1939), life peer and governor-general (1965-1969). 
Gustav Cassel (1866-1944) was professor of economics at Stockholm University (1904-1936) and 
adviser to the League of Nations. 
Ian Castles (1935-2010) worked in Treasury and was Australian Statistician (1986-1994) and 
secretary of the Department of Finance (1979-1986). 
*James Catts (1877-1951) was an MHR (1906-1922) and a supporter of King O’Malley’s plans for 
a Commonwealth Bank. 
*Ben Chifley (1885-1951) was MHR (1928-1931 and 1940-1951), Australian treasurer 
(1941-1949) and prime minister (1945-1949). 
Jean Chrétien (1934- ) was Canadian finance minister (1977-1979) and prime minister 
(1993-2003). 
Marcus Tullius Cicero (106BCE-43BCE) was a famous Roman orator, senator and consul. 
*Manning Clark (1915-1991) was professor of Australian history (1949-1980) at the ANU and 
author of the controversial six-volume A History of Australia.   
Tony Cole (1947- ) was principal private secretary (1983-1985) to treasurer Keating and 
secretary (1991-1993) of the Australian Treasury. 
*James Collins (1869-1934) was deputy secretary (1901-1916) and secretary (1916-1926) of the 
Australian Treasury. 
*Rex Connor (1907-1977) was an MHR (1963-1977) and minister for minerals and energy 
(1972-1975) in the Whitlam Government. 
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*Joseph Cook (1860-1947) was Australian treasurer 1920-1921 and prime minister 1913-1914. 
Herbert ‘Nugget’ Coombs (1906-1997) was an economist, governor of the Commonwealth Bank 
(1949-1960) and the first governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (1960-1968). 
*Douglas Copland (1894-1971) was professor of economics at the University of Melbourne, 
vice-chancellor of the ANU and chaired the committee which formulated the Premiers’ Plan. 
Peter Costello (1957- ) was MHR (1990-2009) and the longest-serving Australian treasurer 
(1996-2007). 
Frank Costigan (1931-2009) presided over a royal commission into organised crime. 
Frank Crean (1916-2008) was MHR (1951-1977), a long-serving (initially unofficial) shadow 
treasurer and Australian treasurer (1972-1974). 
Simon Crean (1949-  ) was the son of Frank Crean, MHR (1990-2013), minister assisting the 
treasurer (1990-1991) and shadow treasurer (1998-2001 and 2003-2004). 
Anthony Crosland (1918-1977) was a lecturer in economics at Oxford University, British Labour 
MP (1945-1974), UK foreign secretary (1976-1977) and author of The Future of Socialism. 
*John Curtin (1885-1945) was MHR (1928-1931 and 1934-1945), leader of the opposition 
(1935-1941) and prime minister of Australia (1941-1945). 
Hugh Dalton (1887-1962) was a British Labour politician and economist, a friend of Keynes and 
UK chancellor of the exchequer (1945-1947). 
Fred Daly (1912-1995) was MHR (1943-1975) and a minister (1972-1975) in the Whitlam 
Government. 
John Dawkins (1947-  ) was a Labor MHR (1974-1975 and 1977-1994) and Australian treasurer 
(1991-1993). 
*Anderson (also known as Andrew) Dawson (1863-1910) was Queensland premier in 1899, 
leading the world’s first Labor government, senator (1901-1906) and a minister (1904). 
*Alfred Deakin (1856-1919) was a journalist and lawyer, MHR (1901-1913) and Australian prime 
minister (1903-1904, 1905-1908 and 1909-1910). 
*John Dedman (1896-1973) was a Labor MHR (1940-1949), minister in the Curtin-Chifley 
(1941-1949) Government and aspired to be treasurer. 
Demosthenes (384BCE-322BCE) was a great Athenian orator. 
*Warren Denning (1906-1975) was a journalist and historian.  
Dionysius (c430BCE-367BCE) was a poet and the ruler of Syracuse. 
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Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881) was a novelist, British Tory MP (1837-1876) and chancellor of the 
exchequer (1852-1853) and UK prime minister (1868 and 1874-1880). 
Titus Flavius Domitian (51-96) was a Roman emperor and consul. 
Alexander Downer (1951- ) was a Liberal MHR (1984-2008), leader of the opposition 
(1994-1995) and foreign minister (1996-2007) in the Howard Government. 
*Edward Dyason (1886-1949) was an economist and stockbroker who served on a number of 
government committees. 
George Edwards (1855-1911) was MHR (1901-1906 and 1910-1911). 
Harry Edwards (1927-2012) was a professor of economics (1962-1972) and MHR (1972-1993). 
*Ulrich Ellis (1904-1981) was a journalist and activist, who worked for Earle Page and Arthur 
Fadden and helped them write their memoirs. 
Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) was an American essayist and poet. 
Sol Encel (1925-2010) was professor of sociology (1966-199) at the University of New South 
Wales. 
Epaminondas (?-362BCE) was a victorious Theban general with a vision for a federated Greece. 
Ludwig Erhard (1897-1977) was an economist and German minister for economic affairs 
(1949-1963) and chancellor (1963-1966). 
Saul Eslake (1958-   ) was chief economist (1995-2009) with ANZ and since 2012 has been chief 
economist with Bank America-Merrill Lynch. 
Eumenes of Cardia (c361BCE-316BCE) was a secretary to Alexander the Great and satrap of 
Cappadocia.  
Gareth Evans (1944-  ) was a Labor senator (1978-1996) and MHR (1996-1999), a cabinet 
minister (1983-1996), shadow treasurer (1996-1998) and is now Chancellor of the ANU. 
Ted Evans (1941- ) was deputy secretary (1984-1989) and secretary (1993-2001) of the 
Australian Treasury. 
*Herbert ‘Doc’ Evatt (1894-1965) was a High Court judge, MHR (1940-1960), simultaneously 
attorney-general and external affairs minister (1941-1949) and opposition leader (1951-1960). 
Fabius Maximus Verrucosus (c275BCE-203BCE) was a Roman consul and dictator, famous for 
wars of attrition. 
*Arthur Fadden (1894-1973) was MHR (1936-1958), Australian treasurer (1940-1941 and 
1949-1958) and prime minister (1941). He brought down the ‘horror budget’ in 1951. 
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*William Farrer (1845-1906) was a wheat breeder who developed the Federation breed, which 
reduced losses from rust and parasites. 
*James Fenton (1864-1950) was an MHR (1910-1934) and acting prime minister (1930). 
*John Fihelly (1882-1945) was deputy premier and treasurer of Queensland. 
*Andrew Fisher (1862-1928) was a Labor MHR (1901-1915) and Australian treasurer and prime 
minister (1908-1909, 1910-1913 and 1914-1915). 
*Frank Forde (1890-1983) was a Labor MHR (1922-1946) and Australian prime minister briefly 
in 1945. 
*John Forrest (1847-1918) was a famous explorer, premier of Western Australia (1890-1901), 
MHR (1901-1918) and Australian treasurer (1905-1907, 1909-1910, 1913-1914, 1917-1918). 
Bernie Fraser (1941-   ) was deputy secretary (1984) and secretary (1984-1989) of the Australian 
Treasury and governor (1989-1996) of the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
John Fraser (1951-   ) was deputy secretary (1990-1993) of the Australian Treasury and has been 
secretary since January 2015. 
Malcolm Fraser (1930-2015) was MHR (1955-1983) and Australian prime minister (1975-1983). 
*Charles Frazer (1880-1913) was MHR (1903-1913), postmaster-general (1911-1913) and acting 
treasurer (1910, 1911). 
Milton Friedman (1912-2006), professor of economics (1946-1977) at Chicago University, visited 
Australia in 1975 promoting markets and monetarism and won the 1976 Nobel Prize. 
*John Garvan (1873-1927) was chair (1924-1925) of the Commonwealth Bank. 
*Henry George (1839-1897) was an American journalist and political economist who advocated 
a tax, possibly the only tax, on land values and visited Australia in 1890. 
George Gibbons (1887-1954) was a Labor MHR (1929-1931) and put the Gibbons-Theodore plan 
to caucus. 
*Lyndhurst Giblin (1872-1951) was an economist, Tasmanian MLA (1913-1916), served on 
numerous government committees and wrote a history of the Commonwealth Bank. 
*Robert Gibson (1863-1934) was chair (1918-1921) of the Federal Economies Commission and 
when chair (1926-1934) of the Commonwealth Bank in the Depression clashed with Theodore. 
Julia Gillard (1961- ) was a Labor MHR (1998-2013), Australia’s first female deputy prime 
minister (2007-2010) and first female prime minister (2010-2013). 
William Gladstone (1809-1898) was chancellor of the exchequer (1852-1855 and 1859-1866) 
and prime minister (1868-1874, 1880-1885, 1886 and 1892-1894) of the UK. 
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Johann Goethe (1749-1832) was a German poet, dramatist and politician. 
John Gorton (1911-2002) was a senator (1959-1968) and MHR (1968-1975) and Australian prime 
minister (1968-1971). 
Germaine Greer (1939-  ) is an Australian feminist writer and academic. 
Theodore Gregory (1890-1970) was professor of economics (1927-1937) at the University of 
London and a member of the Niemeyer mission to Australia in 1930. 
Andrei Gromyko (1909-1989) was a Russian politician and diplomat, serving as foreign minister 
of the Soviet Union (1957-1985) and president (1985-1988). 
*Littleton Groom (1867-1936) was an MHR (1901-1929 and 1931-1936), held a number of 
ministerial portfolios and was Speaker (1926-1929). 
*Harry Gullett (1878-1940) was a farmer, historian and MHR (1925-1940) who held a number of 
ministerial portfolios. 
Keir Hardie (1856-1915) was a British MP (1892-1893, 1900-1915) and first parliamentary leader 
(1900-1911) of the Labour Party, who was friends with Andrew Fisher in Scotland. 
Bob Hawke (1929- ) was president of the ACTU (1970-1980), a Labor MHR (1980-1992), 
treasurer for a day in 1991 and Australian prime minister (1983-1991). 
*Charles Hawker (1894-1938) was an MHR (1929-1938) who spoke often on economic matters 
and was minister for commerce and markets in 1932. 
Bill Hayden (1933-  ) was MHR (1961-1988), acting Australian treasurer (1973, 1974, 1975), 
Australian treasurer (1975), opposition leader (1977-1983) and governor-general (1989-1996). 
Frederich von Hayek (1899-1992) was an Austrian Nobel laureate in economics (1974) and 
advocate of the free market who was a major influence on Margaret Thatcher. 
Denis Healey (1917-2015) was a British MP (1952-1992), chancellor of the exchequer 
(1974-1979) and deputy Labour leader (1980-1983). 
Ted Heath (1916-2005) was a British MP (1950-2001) and UK prime minister (1970-1974). 
*James Heathershaw (1871-1934) was Australian Treasury secretary (1926-1932).  
Ken Henry (1957-   ) was secretary (2001-2011) of the Australian Treasury.   
Herodotus of Halicarnassus (c485BCE-c425BCE) was arguably the Western world’s first historian 
and wrote mainly about the Persian War. 
John Hewson (1946-   ) was an adviser to Australian treasurers Phillip Lynch and John Howard, 
Liberal MHR (1987-1995), shadow treasurer (1989-1990) and opposition leader (1990-1994). 
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*Chris Higgins (1943-1990) was deputy secretary (1984-1989) and secretary (1989-1990) of the 
Australian Treasury. 
*Henry Higgins (1851-1929) was a lawyer, MHR (1901-1906), attorney-general (1904), high 
court judge (1906-1929) and president of the Arbitration Court (1907-1920). 
*William Higgs (1862-1951) was a senator (1901-1906), MHR (1910-1922) and Australian 
treasurer (1915-1916). 
Fred Hilmer (1945-  ) is a businessman, vice-chancellor (2006-2015) of the University of New 
South Wales and chair (1992-1993) of the National Competition Policy Review Committee. 
John Hobson (1858-1940) was a journalist who promoted the theory of under-consumption, 
which led him to call for redistributive taxation, and a precursor of Keynes. 
Joe Hockey (1965-   ) was a Liberal MHR (1996-2015), minister for financial services (1998-2001), 
shadow treasurer (2009-2013) and Australian treasurer (2013-2015). 
*Jack Holloway (1875-1967) was a trade unionist and defeated sitting prime minister Bruce in 
1929, held a number of ministerial portfolios and served as acting prime minister in 1949. 
*William Holman (1871-1934) was NSW premier (1913-1920) and MHR (1931-1934). 
*Harold Holt (1908-1967) was MHR (1935-1967), Australian treasurer (1958-1966) and prime 
minister (1966-1967). 
Richard Holt is a British economist who has worked in the City of London and writes on British 
economic policy. 
John Howard (1939-  ) was a Liberal MHR (1974-2007), Australian treasurer (1977-1983), shadow 
treasurer (1983-1985) and prime minister (1996-2007). 
*Billy Hughes (1862-1952) was Australia’s longest-serving MHR (1901-1952), an Australian 
prime minister (1915-1923) and held a number of ministerial portfolios. 
*Robert Irvine (1861-1941) was a radical professor of economics (1912-1922) at the University 
of Sydney and adviser to Theodore. 
*William Irvine (1856-1922) was a vigneron and MHR (1906-1914)  
Roy Jenkins (1920-2003) was a UK MP (1948-1977 and 1982-1987), chancellor of the exchequer 
(1967-1970) and author of a collective biography of UK chancellors. 
Andrew Johnson (1808-1875) was governor of Tennessee (1853), US senator (1857-1862 and 
1875), vice-president (1864-1865) and president (1865-1869) after the assassination of Lincoln. 
Bob Johnston (1924-  ) was governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia (1982-1989). 
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Barry Jones (1932-  ) was a quiz champion, teacher, writer, Victorian MP, Labor MHR (1977-1998) 
and science minister (1983-1991). 
Richard Kahn (1905-1989) was professor of economics (1951-1972) at Cambridge University. A 
protégé of Keynes, he also worked closely with Joan Robinson and developed the multiplier. 
Paul Keating (1944-  ) was MHR (1969-1996), briefly minister for northern Australia (1975), 
shadow treasurer (1983), Australian treasurer (1983-1991) and prime minister (1991-1996). 
Bill Kelty (1948-  ) was ACTU secretary (1983-2000) and an architect of the Accord. 
John Kerin (1937-  ) was an MHR (1972-1975 and 1978-1993) and Australian treasurer (1991). 
John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) was a British economist best known for his General Theory, 
which led to the widespread adoption of countercyclical macro-economic policies.  
Harry Knight (1919-2015) was deputy governor (1968-1975) and governor (1975-1982) of the 
Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Nikolai Kondratiev (1892-1938) was a Russian economist who identified ‘long waves’ in 
economic data. 
*Jack Lang (1876-1975) was NSW premier (1925-1927 and 1930-1932) and advocate of the 
radical ‘Lang Plan’ during the Depression. He met regularly with the young Paul Keating. 
John Langmore (1939-  ) was adviser to Ralph Willis and a Labor MHR (1984-1996). 
Harold Lasswell (1902-1978) was an American political scientist and professor of law at Yale 
University. 
*John Latham (1877-1964) was MHR (1922-1934), leader of the opposition (1929-1931), 
attorney-general (1925-1929 and 1932-1934) and chief justice (1935-1952). 
Mark Latham (1961-  ) was a Labor MHR (1994-2005), shadow treasurer (2003) and leader of 
the opposition (2003-2005), columnist and author. 
Nigel Lawson (1932- ) was a British Conservative MP (1974-1992), financial secretary 
(1979-1981) and chancellor of the exchequer (1983-1989). 
*Nelson Lemmon (1908-1989) was a Labor MHR (1943-1949 and 1954-1955) and a protégé of 
Ben Chifley. 
David Lloyd George (1863-1945) was a British MP (1890-1945), chancellor of the exchequer 
(1908-1915), prime minister (1916-1922) and took an expansionary policy to the 1929 election.  
*Robert Lowe (1811-1892) was a lawyer and NSW MLC before returning to England, entering 
the Commons (1852-1880) and serving as chancellor of the exchequer (1869-1873). 
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*Phillip Lynch (1933-1984) was a Liberal MHR (1966-1982), minister assisting the treasurer 
(1969-1971), Australian treasurer (1975-1977) and Reserve Bank board member (1983-1984). 
*William Lyne (1844-1913) was premier of NSW, approached to be the first Australian prime 
minister (but could not gather enough support), MHR (1901-1913) and treasurer (1907-1908). 
*Enid Lyons (1897-1981) was the wife of Joseph Lyons and later first female MHR (1943-1951), 
first female minister (1949-1951) and a magazine columnist. 
*Joseph Lyons (1879-1939) was Tasmanian premier (1923-1928), MHR (1929-1939), Australian 
treasurer 1932-1935 and prime minister (1932-1939). 
Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) was a Florentine diplomat and author of The Prince, a cynical 
guide to statescraft largely based on his observations of Cesare Borgia. 
Ian Macfarlane (1946- ) was Reserve Bank of Australia deputy governor (1992-1996) and 
governor (1996-2006). 
William Mahony (1877-1962) was a Labor MHR (1915-1927) who controversially resigned 
allowing Ted Theodore to enter parliament.  
*William Maloney (1954-1940) was a doctor and Labor MHR (1904-1940) where he was a strong 
supporter of old age pensions and King O’Malley’s plans for a Commonwealth Bank. 
Paul Martin (1938- ) was Canadian finance minister (1993-2002) and prime minister 
(2003-2006). 
*Walter Massy-Greene (1874-1952) was an MHR (1910-1922) and senator (1923-1925 and 
1926-1938) and assistant treasury minister (1932-1933). 
Russell Matthews (1921-2000) was a professor of accounting (1964-1986) at the ANU and expert 
in fiscal federalism who served on the Commonwealth Grants Commission (1972-1990). 
William McAdoo (1863-1941) was US treasury secretary (1913-1918) who introduced the 
Federal Reserve system and US senator (1933-1939).  
*William McCormack (1879-1947) was Queensland premier (1925-1929) and a close associate 
of Ted Theodore. 
*John McEwen (1900-1980) was briefly prime minister in 1967-1968 and held a number of 
ministerial portfolios during a long period as MHR (1934-1971). 
*Stuart McFarlane (1885-1970) was Australian Treasury secretary (1938-1948). 
*Thomas McIlwraith (1835-1900) was Queensland premier (1879-1883, 1888 and 1893). 
*William McMahon (1908-1988) was a long-serving Liberal MHR (1949-1982), and served as 
treasurer (1966-1969) and prime minister (1971-1972) of Australia. 
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*John McPhee (1878-1952) was Tasmanian premier (1928-1934). 
Leslie Melville (1902-2002) was a professor of economics (1929-1930), the Commonwealth 
Bank’s first economist and served on the Reserve Bank board (1960-1963 and 1965-1975).  
*Robert Menzies (1894-1978) was Victoria’s deputy premier (1932-1934), MHR (1934-1966), 
Australian treasurer (1939-1940) and long-serving prime minister (1939-1941 and 1949-1966). 
*Denison Miller (1860-1923) was the first Commonwealth Bank governor (1912-1923). 
*Richard Mills (1886-1952) was professor of economics (1922-1945) at the University of Sydney 
and a member of the royal commission into the monetary and banking systems. 
James Monroe (1758-1831) was governor of Virginia (1799-1802 and 1809-1811), a diplomat, 
US secretary of state (1811-1817) and president (1817-1825). 
Scott Morrison (1968-  ) has been an MHR since 2007 and is the Australian treasurer (2015-   ). 
Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) campaigned for Indian independence and was India’s first prime 
minister (1947-1964). 
Brendan Nelson (1959-   ) was MHR (1996-2009), minister and opposition leader (2007-2008). 
Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) was a German philosopher and writer. 
Otto Niemeyer (1883-1971) was financial controller at the UK Treasury and adviser at the Bank 
of England who headed a controversial financial mission to Australia in 1930. 
Birgitte Nyborg is a fictional Danish prime minister in the TV series Borgen. 
*David O’Keefe (1864-1943) was a Labor senator (1901-1906 and 1910-1919), MHR (1922-1925) 
and Tasmanian MLA (1934-1943). 
*King O’Malley (c1858-1953) was an MHR (1901-1917), minister and long-term advocate for a 
national central bank. He became the last survivor from the first federal parliament. 
Alfred Ozanne (1877-1961) was MHR (1910-1913 and 1914-1917).  
*Earle Page (1880-1961) was a long-serving MHR (1919-1961), leader of the Country Party 
(1921-1939), Australian treasurer (1923-1929) and briefly prime minister (1939). 
Martin Parkinson was deputy secretary (2001-2007) and secretary (2011-2014) of the Treasury 
and is now secretary of the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
Andrew Peacock  (1939-   ) was MHR (1966-1994), minister assisting the treasurer (1971-1972), 
foreign minister (1975-1980), twice opposition leader, and shadow treasurer (1987-1989). 
*George Pearce (1870-1952) was a long-serving senator (1901-1938) who held a range of 
ministerial portfolios and was acting prime minister for seven months (1916). 
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Pericles (c495BCE-429BCE) was an Athenian democratic statesman, great orator and general. 
Phillip II (382BCE-336BCE) was King of Macedon and father of Alexander the Great. 
*Jock Phillips (1911-1986) was an economist with the royal commission on the monetary 
banking system, Reserve Bank deputy governor (1960-1968) and governor (1968-1975). 
John Phillips (c1930-2014) was deputy governor (1987-1992) of the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
Philopoemen (c253BCE-182BCE) was a Greek general. 
Ben Pimlott (1945-2004) was a British historian and biographer of Hugh Dalton. 
William Pitt (the Younger) (1759-1806) was a British MP 1781-1806, chancellor of the exchequer 
(1782-1783, 1783-1801 and 1804-1806) and effectively prime minister. 
Max Planck (1858-1947) was a German physicist and professor who developed the quantum 
theory and won the Nobel Prize in 1918. 
Plutarch of Chaeronea (c46-126) was a Greek author, most famous for his Parallel Lives of Greek 
and Roman statesmen and a source for Shakespeare’s Roman plays. 
Ian Potter (1902-1994) was an Australian businessman. 
Enoch Powell (1912- 1998) was professor of Greek at Sydney University (1937-1939), a UK MP 
(1950-1974 and 1974-1987) and financial secretary to the treasury (1957-1958). 
*Alexander Poynton (1853-1935) was an MHR (1901-1922) and briefly Australian treasurer 
(1916-1917). 
Christopher Pyne (1967-  ) is an MHR (1993-  ) and is the Australian minister for defence industry. 
*Richard Randall (1906-1982) was deputy secretary (1957-1966) and secretary (1966-1971) of 
the Australian Treasury.  
*George Reid (1845-1918) was NSW premier (1894-1899), MHR (1901-1909), leader of the 
opposition (1905-1908) and Australian prime minister (1904-1905). 
Peter Reith (1950-   ) was MHR (1982-1983 and 1984-2001), shadow treasurer (1990-1993) and 
cabinet minister (1996-2001). 
*Staniforth Ricketson (1891-1967) was a stockbroker and journalist who helped persuade his 
friend Joseph Lyons to defect from Labor to the conservative parties. 
Graeme Richardson (1949- ) was a Labor senator (1983-1994), power broker and cabinet 
minister (1988-1992 and 1993-1994). 
Joan Robinson (1903-1983) was a professor of economics (1965-1971) at Cambridge University, 
an early supporter of Keynes and developed the concept of imperfect competition. 
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*William Sydney Robinson (1876-1963) was a businessman and financial journalist. 
John Rose (1935- ) was economic adviser (1977-1983) to Malcolm Fraser and director 
(1984-2000) of the Melbourne Business School. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) was a French writer and philosopher famous for his concept 
of the ‘social contract’. 
Kevin Rudd (1957-  ) was MHR (1998-2013) and Australian prime minister (2007-2010 and 2013). 
Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) was an English philosopher and mathematician who won the 1950 
Nobel Prize for Literature. 
Don Russell was principal adviser to treasurer Paul Keating (1985-1991), Australian ambassador 
to the US (1993-1995) and secretary of the industry department (2011-2013). 
*Thomas J Ryan (1876-1921) was a lawyer, Queensland premier (1915-1919) and MHR 
(1919-1921), his early death preventing him becoming Labor leader as was generally expected.  
Paul Samuelson (1915-2009) was professor of economics at MIT who worked in diverse fields of 
economics, wrote a textbook Economics (still in print) and later won the 1970 Nobel Prize. 
*Edward Shann (1884-1935) was professor of history and economics at the University of 
Western Australia, wrote an economic history and served on many government committees.  
Boris Schedvin (c1936-   ) was professor of economic history (1979-1991) at the University of 
Melbourne and author of a study of the Great Depression. 
Cornelius Scipio Africanus (185BCE-129BCE) was a Roman consul and general and a patron of 
poets and philosophers. 
*Harry Sheehan (1883-1941) was secretary of the Australian Treasury (1932-1938) and 
Commonwealth Bank governor (1938-1941). 
Mary Shelley (1797-1855) was the author of Frankenstein, daughter of feminist writer Mary 
Wollstonecraft and second wife of poet Percy Shelley. 
Adam Smith (1723-1790) was a Scottish economist, author of The Wealth of Nations, and 
professor of logic (1751) and moral philosophy (1752-1764) at Glasgow University. 
*Billy Snedden (1926-1987) was a Liberal MHR (1955-1983), Australian treasurer (1971-1972), 
leader of the opposition (1972-1975) and Speaker (1976-1983). 
*William Guthrie Spence (1846-1926) was a trade unionist and writer and MHR (1901-1919). 
*Percy Spender (1897-1945) was MHR (1937-1951), Australian assistant treasurer (1939) and 
treasurer (1940), ambassador and president (1964-1967) of the International Court of Justice. 
John Spender (1935-  ) was the son of Percy Spender and MHR (1980-1990). 
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*Bertram Stevens (1889-1973) was NSW premier (1932-1939) and aspired to become treasurer. 
John Stone (1929- ) was deputy secretary (1971-1979) and secretary (1979-1984) of the 
Australian Treasury and a National Party senator (1987-1990).    
Lytton Strachey (1880-1932), an iconoclastic British biographer, wrote Eminent Victorians. 
Gunnar Sträng (1906-1992) was Sweden’s finance minister (1955-1976). 
Wayne Swan (1954-  ) was shadow treasurer (2004-2007) and Australian treasurer (2007-2013). 
Tacitus (c56-c118) was a Roman historian and praetor. 
*Edward (‘Red Ted’) Theodore (1884-1950) was Queensland premier (1919-1925), Labor MHR 
(1927-1931) and Australian treasurer (1929-1930 and 1931-1932). 
Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) was the French author of Democracy in America. 
Malcolm Turnbull has been a Liberal MHR since 2004, was shadow treasurer (2007-2008), 
opposition leader (2008-2009) and is now the Australian prime minister (2015-   ). 
*George Turner (1851-1916) was Victorian premier (1894-1899 and 1900-1901), MHR 
(1901-1906) and Australia’s first treasurer (1901-1904 and 1904-1905). 
Giorgio Vasari (1511-1574) wrote a collective biography of Italian painters.  
Eddie Visbord (1928-  ) was head of economics (1975-1979) and deputy secretary (1979-1986) 
in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
William Wallace (c1274-1305) was a Scottish nationalist leader who defeated the English army 
at Stirling Bridge before being defeated by Edward I at Falkirk.  
Robert Walpole (1676-1745) was UK chancellor of the exchequer (1715-1717 and 1721-1742) 
and effectively prime minister. 
*Eddie Ward (1899-1963) was a radical Labor MHR (1931 and 1932-1963) and minister in the 
Curtin-Chifley Government. 
*Chris Watson (1867-1941) was an MHR (1901-1910) and treasurer and prime minister in 1904. 
*George Watt (1890-1974) was Australian Treasury deputy secretary (1947-1948) and secretary 
(1948-1951). 
*William Watt (1871-1946) was Victorian premier (1912-1913 and 1913-1914), MHR 
(1914-1929) and Australian treasurer (1918-1920) and acting prime minister (1918-1919). 
William Wentworth IV (1907-2003) was an economist and Liberal MHR (1949-1977).  
Fred Wheeler (1913-1994) was secretary (1971-1979) of the Australian Treasury. 
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Gough Whitlam (1916-2014) was Labor MHR (1952-1978), opposition leader (1967-1972 and 
1976-1977), prime minister of Australia (1972-1975) and briefly treasurer (1972).  
Walt Whitman (1819-1892) was an American poet.  
*Charles Wickens (1872-1939) was Commonwealth Statistician (1922-1932) and served on a 
number of government committees and as a key economic adviser. 
Ralph Willis (1938-   ) was MHR (1972-1998) and Australian treasurer (1991 and 1993-1996). 
Roland Wilson (1904-1996) had two PhDs in economics and was the Commonwealth Statistician 
and the longest-serving secretary (1951-1966) of the Australian Treasury.       
Mary Wollstonecraft  (1759-1797) was an English writer, feminist and mother of Mary Shelley. 
Virginia Woolf (1882-1941) was an English writer and feminist. 
*John Wren (1871-1953) was a controversial businessman, claimed to have had dubious 
financial dealings with some politicians. 
 
Major sources: Australian Dictionary of Biography, Parliamentary Handbook (44th edition), 
Hornblower and Spawforth (1999), Jones (2016) and Treasury (2001). 
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